1. The primary obligation of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces is to protect the country and its citizens from challenges to their security. In the final analysis, a nation not worth defending is a nation not worth preserving.
2. The Government has just completed a comprehensive review of defence policy. In so doing, it fulfilled its commitment to wide-ranging consultations by involving Parliament and listening to the views of ordinary citizens, defence experts, disarmament advocates and non-governmental organizations.
3. The Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy played an integral role in shaping Canada's new defence policy. Virtually all its recommendations are reflected in the White Paper.
4. The consensus achieved on the way ahead for an effective, realistic and affordable policy calls for multi-purpose, combat-capable armed forces able to meet the challenges to Canada's security both at home and abroad.
CHAPTER I: INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
5. The Cold War is over. Yet Canada faces an unpredictable and fragmented world, one in which conflict, repression and upheaval exist alongside peace, democracy and relative prosperity.
6. As a nation that throughout its history has done much within the context of international alliances to defend freedom and democracy, Canada continues to have a vital interest in doing its part to ensure global security, especially since Canada's economic future depends on its ability to trade freely with other nations.
RECENT PROGRESS
7. The breakup of the Soviet Union significantly reduced the threat of annihilation that faced Canada and its allies for more than 40 years, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and German unification marked an end to the division of Europe into hostile blocs.
8. Significant progress has been achieved in the elimination, reduction and control of various weapons.
9. Progress has also been made in resolving several protracted regional conflicts.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
10. The world's population is growing rapidly, putting pressure on global political, financial and natural resources, as well as on the environment. In addition, the past decade has seen exponential growth in the number of refugees and of people displaced within their own countries. The breakdown of authority in certain states is yet another source of instability.
11. Increasingly, armed forces are being called upon to ensure safe environments for the protection of refugees, the delivery of food and medical supplies, and the provision of essential services in countries where civil society has collapsed. And yet, the international community cannot intervene every time these pressures reach the breaking point.
12. Among the most difficult and immediate challenges to international security are civil wars fuelled by ethnic, religious and political extremism. The absence today of adversarial relations among the world's great powers suggests that, in the future, regional conflicts are more likely to be contained. That being said, Canada cannot escape the consequences of these conflicts, whether in the form of refugee flows, obstacles to trade, or damage to important principles.
13. The spread of advanced weapon technologies has emerged as another security challenge of the 1990s. The transfer of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery capabilities to so-called "rogue" regimes is of particular concern.
14. Diminishing resources make it more difficult for advanced industrial states to cope with global security challenges.
15. The world is neither more peaceful nor more stable than in the past. Canada's defence policy must reflect the world as it is rather than the world as we would like it to be.
CHAPTER II: DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS
16. Defence policy must respond to challenges at home -- in particular to current fiscal circumstances.
17. At the present time, our prosperity -- and with it our quality of life -- is threatened by the steady growth of public sector debt. This situation limits governmental freedom of action in responding to the needs of Canadians.
18. The Special Joint Committee called for a period of relatively stable funding for defence, but at lower levels than those set out in the 1994 budget.
19. Although National Defence and the Canadian Forces have already made a large contribution to efforts to reduce the deficit, the Government believes that additional cuts are both necessary and possible.
20. As a result of this, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces will do less in some areas. The Department and the Forces will also reshape the defence program and operate more efficiently to deliver the elements of the policy outlined in the White Paper.
CHAPTER III: COMBAT-CAPABLE FORCES
21. At present, there is no immediate direct military threat to Canada, and today's conflicts are far from Canada's shores. However, Canada cannot dispense with the maritime, land and air combat capabilities of modern armed forces.
22. We must maintain a prudent level of military force to:
- deal with challenges to our sovereignty in peacetime;
- generate larger forces if needed; and
- participate effectively in multilateral peace and stability operations and, if and when required, in the defence of North America and our allies in Europe, and in response to aggression elsewhere.
23. We must take account of the changing face of peacekeeping. The nature of these operations has changed considerably and now poses far more risks to our personnel.
24. This combination of military requirements has led the Government to conclude that the retention of multi-purpose combat-capable forces is in the national interest. These forces provide the Government with a broad range of military options at a cost consistent with our other policy and fiscal priorities.
25. Canada needs armed forces that are able to operate with the modern forces maintained by our allies and like-minded nations against a capable opponent -- that is, they must able to fight "alongside the best, against the best".
26. The challenge will be to design a defence program that delivers capable armed forces within the limits of our resources. By making difficult choices and trade-offs, we will be able to preserve the core capabilities and flexibility of a multi-purpose force. This force will enable Canada to attend to its security needs, now and in the future.
CHAPTER IV: PROTECTION OF CANADA
27. Taken together, the size of our country and our small population pose unique challenges for defence planners.
28. While some might argue that the dramatic changes abroad have eroded the traditional role that the Canadian Forces play in the defence of Canada, it would be a mistake to dismantle their capacity to defend our country. Canada should never find itself in a position where the defence of its national territory has become the responsibility of others.
29. The Forces must be capable of mounting effective responses to emerging situations at home. Specifically, the Canadian Forces will:
* demonstrate, on a regular basis, the capability to monitor and control activity within Canada's territory, airspace, and maritime areas of jurisdiction;
* assist, on a routine basis, other government departments in achieving various other national goals in such areas as fisheries protection, drug interdiction, and environmental protection;
* be prepared to contribute humanitarian assistance and disaster relief within 24 hours, and to sustain this effort for as long as necessary;
* maintain a national search and rescue capability;
* maintain a capability to assist in mounting, at all times, an immediate and effective response to terrorist incidents; and,
* respond to requests for Aid of the Civil Power and sustain this response for as long as necessary.
CHAPTER V: CANADA-UNITED STATES DEFENCE COOPERATION
30. The United States is Canada's most important ally and the two countries maintain a relationship that is as close, complex, and extensive as any in the world.
31. As strategic arms reduction treaties between the United States and Russia are implemented over the next decade, stability will be enhanced. Nevertheless, potential challenges to continental defence remain: Russia retains strategic nuclear forces able to reach North America and a number of states have acquired, or are seeking to acquire, weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
32. Canada-US defence cooperation continues to provide highly valued stability in a volatile and turbulent world. Though Canada-US defence cooperation continues to serve this country's fundamental interests extremely well, certain arrangements require updating:
- Canada will contribute to aerospace surveillance, missile warning, and air defence capabilities at a significantly reduced level.
- In the negotiations on the renewal of the NORAD agreement, Canada will seek to preserve its benefits and examine closely those areas which may need to change in accord with evolving challenges to continental security.
- Canada supports ongoing discussions on the possible expansion beyond North America of NORAD's missile warning function, and is interested in gaining a better understanding of missile defence through research and in consultation with like-minded nations.
- The possibility of developing a space-based surveillance system for North America in the next century will be explored, subject to a variety of military, financial and technological considerations.
33. Canada will continue to rely on the stability and flexibility of its relationship with the United States to help meet defence requirements in North America and beyond. To that end, the Department and the Forces will:
- maintain the ability to operate effectively at sea, on land, and in the air with the military forces of the United States in defending the northern half of the Western hemisphere. This includes plans for the provision of forces already tasked for other missions to the defence of the continent, consisting of:
* a joint task force headquarters;
* a maritime task group on each coast;
* a brigade group with associated support elements;
* two squadrons of fighter aircraft; and
* a squadron of transport aircraft.
- begin formal negotiations with the United States on the renewal of the NORAD agreement that expires in 1996, ensuring that its provisions reflect North American aerospace defence priorities;
- as part of a renewed NORAD agreement, cooperate in:
* the surveillance and control of North American airspace;
* the collection, processing and dissemination of missile warning information within North America; and
* the examination of ballistic missile defence options focused on research and building on Canada's existing capabilities in communications and surveillance; and
- maintain Canada's participation in the Canada-US Test and Evaluation Program, the Defence Production and Development Sharing Arrangements, and other existing bilateral arrangements.
CHAPTER VI: CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
34. The complex problems that confront the international community today defy easy solutions. Nevertheless, Canada will remain a strong advocate of multilateral security institutions. We will continue to play an active role in the UN, in NATO and in the CSCE, and we will develop our defence relationships with other countries, especially in the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America.
A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE ON MULTILATERAL OPERATIONS
35. In recent years, multilateral operations have expanded to encompass the complete range of military activity -- from preventive deployments to enforcement actions.
36. The design of all missions should reflect certain key principles and essential operational considerations:
- There be a clear and enforceable mandate.
- There be an identifiable and commonly accepted reporting authority.
- The national composition of the force be appropriate to the mission, and there be an effective process of consultation among missions partners.
- In missions that involve both military and civilian resources, there be a recognized focus of authority, a clear and efficient division of responsibilities, and agreed operating procedures.
- With the exception of enforcement actions and operations to defend NATO member states, in missions that involve Canadian personnel, Canada's participation be accepted by all parties to the conflict.
- The size, training and equipment of the force be appropriate to the purpose at hand, and remain so over the life of the mission.
- There be a defined concept of operations, an effective command and control structure, and clear rules of engagement.
37. Canada will maintain its specialization in multilateral operations. Certain international scenarios will result in a prompt Canadian response, such as the need to come to the defence of a NATO state. In other circumstances, Canada will be more selective and commit forces if suitable personnel are available in sufficient numbers, if they can be appropriately armed and properly trained to carry out the task, and if they can make a significant contribution to the success of the mission.
38. Consistent with this perspective, Canada will commit maritime, land, and air forces (as well as support elements) to the full range of multilateral operations, including:
- preventive deployment of forces;
- peacekeeping and observer missions;
- enforcing the will of the international community and defending our NATO allies;
- post-conflict peacebuilding (including humanitarian assistance); and
- measures to enhance stability and build confidence.
39. Combat training remains the best foundation for the participation of the Canadian Forces in multilateral missions.
40. Canada will support and contribute to the enhancement of peacekeeping training at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre at Cornwallis, Nova Scotia.
ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMITMENTS
Strengthening the UN
41. Canada is in favour of a vigorous and effective United Nations and we will enhance our ability to contribute to UN operations.
42. The Canadian Forces will remain prepared to deploy on UN operations contingency forces of up to a maritime task group, a brigade group plus an infantry battalion group, a wing of fighter aircraft, and a squadron of tactical transport aircraft. Were these forces to be deployed simultaneously, this could conceivably involve as many as 10,000 personnel.
43. Within this upper limit, Canada will increase its commitment of stand-by forces to the UN to two ships, one battle group, one infantry battalion group, one squadron of fighter aircraft, a flight of tactical transport aircraft, a communications element, and a headquarters element. If deployed simultaneously, this would represent a commitment of 4,000 personnel.
44. The Forces will also remain prepared to deploy, for limited periods, medical personnel, signal units, and engineers in humanitarian relief roles.
NATO: Participation and Reform
45. Canada will remain a full member of NATO and will work toward striking an appropriate balance between the Alliance's traditional mission and its newer roles.
46. Canada gives its full support to NATO expansion, but continues to believe that this question must be addressed very carefully. We will participate in multilateral and bilateral programs that aim to gradually integrate all of our North Atlantic Cooperation Council partners into an effective security order for the Northern Hemisphere.
47. Canada will also remain a strong supporter of reform within NATO and believes that NATO's reservoir of military competence and capabilities should make a greater contribution to UN operations.
48. Canada will insist that the Alliance become a more efficient organization. NATO's large and costly bureaucracy needs to be reduced, and the military budget should be spent on activities that are relevant to current needs.
49. In the event of a crisis or war in Europe, the contingency forces that Canada will maintain for all multilateral operations would immediately be made available to NATO.
Objectives
50. The Government is renewing Canada's traditional commitment to participate in the military dimension of international security affairs. By choosing to maintain a multi-purpose, combat-capable force, Canada will retain the capability to make a significant and responsible contribution to international peace and stability, whether within a UN framework, through NATO, or in coalitions of like-minded countries. The Canadian Forces will:
- maintain the capability to assist the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in the protection and evacuation of Canadians from areas threatened by imminent conflict;
- participate in multilateral operations anywhere in the world under UN auspices, or in the defence of a NATO member state, and, to that end:
- be able to deploy, or redeploy from other multilateral operations, a joint task force headquarters and, as single units or in combination, one or more of the following elements:
* a naval task group, comprised of up to four combatants (destroyers, frigates or submarines) and a support ship, with appropriate maritime air support,
* three separate battle groups or a brigade group (comprised of three infantry battalions, an armoured regiment and an artillery regiment, with appropriate combat support and combat service support),
* a wing of fighter aircraft, with appropriate support, and
* one squadron of tactical transport aircraft;
* provide, within three weeks, single elements or the vanguard component of this force and be able to sustain them indefinitely in a low-threat environment and, within three months, the remaining elements of the full contingency force;
* earmark an infantry battalion group as either a stand-by force for the UN, or to serve with NATO's Immediate Reaction Force; and,
* have plans ready to institute other measures to increase the capabilities of the Canadian Forces to sustain existing commitments or to respond to a major crisis;
- maintain the following specific peacetime commitments to NATO:
* one ship to serve with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic,
* aircrews and other personnel to serve in the NATO Airborne Early Warning system,
* approximately 200 personnel to serve in various NATO headquarters, and
* the opportunity for Allied forces to conduct training in Canada, on a cost-recovery basis;
- make three notable changes to its NATO peacetime commitments. Specifically, Canada will:
* terminate its commitment to maintain a battalion group for the defence of Northern Norway and propose to contribute an equivalent unit to a NATO force designed to deploy rapidly anywhere within Alliance territory, including Norway;
* assign, on an occasional basis, one ship to NATO's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean; and
* scale back its contribution to the NATO Infrastructure Program so as to be able to expand our bilateral contact programs with Central and Eastern Europe under the Military Training Assistance Program.
- expand bilateral and multilateral contacts and exchanges, in response to changing geographic priorities, with selected partners in Central and Eastern Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, Latin America and Africa, with a particular emphasis on peacekeeping, confidence-building measures, and civil-military relations; and,
- support the verification of existing arms control agreements and participate in the development of future accords.
CHAPTER VII: IMPLEMENTING DEFENCE POLICY
51. The new defence policy heralds a fundamental transformation of the way in which the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence will conduct their operations and do business in the coming years.
52. Most areas of defence will be cut. The relative weight of the naval, land and air establishments will be altered to allow for the transfer of more resources to where they are most needed -- mainly to operational land forces. Everything is being made leaner. Everything is undergoing the closest scrutiny.
53. These measures will ensure that the Canadian Forces remain well commanded, properly trained, and adequately equipped for the missions the Government asks them to carry out.
MANAGEMENT, COMMAND AND CONTROL
54. While the structural foundations of the Department and the Canadian Forces are basically sound and capable of meeting the challenge, they can be further streamlined. We will, by 1999, reduce headquarters staffs by at least one-third.
55. In the Government's view, the civilian-military integration of National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) continues to prove its worth. There is no compelling reason to reverse it.
56. A new command and control structure will be put into place by mid-1997. The command of military operations will continue to be exercised by the Chief of the Defence Staff and one layer of headquarters will be eliminated.
CAPITAL PROGRAM, PROCUREMENT AND INDUSTRIAL IMPACT
57. National Defence is radically restructuring plans to purchase capital equipment. Planned acquisitions will be cut by at least 15 billion dollars over the next 15 years.
58. New equipment will be acquired only for purposes considered essential to maintaining core capabilities of the Canadian Forces, and will be suited to the widest range of defence roles. Emphasis will be on extending the life of equipment. Wherever possible, the Forces will operate fewer types of equipment than is now the case, and purchase equipment that is easier to maintain.
59. DND will adopt better business practices. This means, inter alia:
- greater reliance on a "just-in-time" delivery system to reduce inventory costs;
- procurement of off-the-shelf commercial technology whenever possible;
- an enhanced partnership with the private sector;
- the transfer or contracting out of support functions and activities to Canadian industry; and
- a streamlined, more efficient materiel support process.
60. Multi-purpose, combat-capable forces require the support of a technologically sophisticated industrial base. National Defence will work with Industry Canada, as well as Public Works and Government Services Canada, towards harmonizing industrial and defence policies to maintain essential defence industrial capability.
INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUPPORT
61. Further reductions of defence infrastructure and support are both possible and necessary. Action is underway to extend the rationalization process beyond the measures mandated in the 1994 federal budget.
DEFENCE STUDIES
62. The modest program of assistance to Canadian universities and other institutions involved in defence studies will be maintained, and a chair of defence management studies will be established.
PERSONNEL ISSUES
63. Personnel cuts will continue.
64. The Government will amend the National Defence Act as appropriate to meet modern military requirements. In particular, this will involve amendments to the military justice system as it relates to both courts martial and summary trials.
65. The Government will place more emphasis on renewable, short-term periods of service for members of the Canadian Forces. The actual period of service for engagements will depend upon the skills and training required to do the job.
66. Reservists participating in and returning from operational assignments will benefit from the same post-operational care now available to the Regular Force.
67. Military career paths will be restructured to reduce the number of postings and assignments. This will:
- result in fewer relocations;
- ease the burden on military personnel and their families; and
- result in savings for the government.
68. The Forces will reduce military staff in certain occupations and trades as functions are contracted out or reassigned to civilian employees. The ratio of general officers and senior civilian officials to overall strength, as well as the ratio of officers to non-commissioned members in the Regular Forces and the Reserves, will be significantly decreased.
69. The percentage of women in the Canadian Forces is among the highest of any military force in the world. Nevertheless, the commitment to making military careers more attractive to women will be reinforced.
70. The need for "universality of service" in the military remains paramount. At the same time, the Department and the Forces will ensure that equitable employment opportunities continue to exist for all Canadians, regardless of gender, race, sexual orientation, or culture. Likewise, the workplace policy of "zero harassment" will be strictly enforced.
CIVILIAN WORKFORCE
71. Our civilian employees will continue to play critical roles, although their overall numbers will be reduced to approximately 20,000 by 1999.
TOTAL FORCE
72. The Government remains convinced that the Total Force approach is the right one for Canada, but changes are needed to reflect Canada's requirement for ready forces.
73. The new strategic environment has prompted the Government to reconsider the traditional approach to mobilization planning. These plans will be revised to reflect post-Cold War requirements.
74. By 1999, the Regular Force and the Primary Reserve will be reduced to approximately 60,000 and 23,000, respectively.
75. The Government agrees with the Special Joint Committee that the land force must be expanded. Approximately 3,000 soldiers will be added to the army's field force. Additional resources will be provided through reductions in headquarters, restructuring of the three environments and a reduction in the size of the Reserves.
76. The Reserves are a national institution and provide a vital link between the Canadian Forces and local communities. Their main role will continue to be the augmentation, sustainment and support of deployed forces.
77. While the number of reservists will be reduced, their quality and overall ability to provide the Total Force with trained personnel for unit augmentation will be significantly improved.
78. A thorough examination of all elements of the Primary and Supplementary Reserves will be conducted. A greater proportion of the Reserves' resources must go towards improving their operational capability and availability. The new strategic and fiscal environment requires streamlining of reserve organizations and rank structures.
79. The Government will also enhance the Canadian Rangers' capability to conduct Arctic and coastal land patrols, and will modestly increase the level of support to Cadet organizations.
OPERATIONAL MARITIME FORCES
80. Multi-purpose maritime combat capabilities are maintained to carry out a wide range of domestic and international operations. The Canadian Forces have substantially reduced anti-submarine warfare activities connected with the protection of shipping and countering missile-carrying submarines in the North Atlantic, while increasing their participation in UN and multilateral operations.
81. To carry out these tasks adequately, Canada's navy will require:
- new, affordable shipborne helicopters as a replacement for the Sea King;
- the retention of the support ship HMCS Provider, previously slated to be paid off in 1996; and
- 12 Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels.
82. In keeping with the Special Joint Committee's recommendation, the Government intends to explore the option of acquiring four recently constructed Upholder-class submarines.
OPERATIONAL LAND FORCES
83. The importance of the Canadian Forces' mission to support an allied land campaign in Central Europe has diminished, allowing the withdrawal of our forces from Europe. Multi-purpose combat capabilities are now maintained to carry out a wide range of domestic and international operations.
84. To carry out these tasks adequately, Canada's land forces will require:
- new armoured personnel carriers;
- modernization of other suitably armoured personnel carriers in the current fleet; and
- the eventual replacement of the fleet of Cougar armoured training vehicles.
OPERATIONAL AIR FORCES
85. The focus of air planning and operations has shifted from missions driven primarily by the former Soviet threat to a more balanced set of national and international priorities. Multi-purpose combat capabilities are now maintained to execute a wide variety of domestic and international operations, as well as to provide support to maritime and land operations.
86. To carry out these tasks adequately, Canada's air forces will require:
- a replacement for the Labrador search and rescue helicopters; and
- acquisition of a small number of precision-guided munitions for the CF-18.
87. Expenditures on fighter forces and support will be reduced by at least 25% through retirement of the CF-5 fleet, cuts in the cost of fighter-related overhead, reductions in the annual authorized flying rate and by cutting the number of operational aircraft from 72 to between 48 and 60. These changes will delay the need to buy a replacement aircraft well into the next century.
88. In the absence of valid offers to buy the VIP A-310 Airbus, and in recognition of the future demand for strategic airlift support, it will, as recommended by the Special Joint Committee, be reconfigured for a strategic transport and air cargo role.
CONCLUSION
89. The Government believes the defence policy enunciated in the White Paper reflects a Canadian consensus.
90. The White Paper affirms the need to maintain multi-purpose, combat-capable sea, land and air forces that will protect Canadians and project their interests and values abroad. It also concludes that their traditional roles should evolve in a way that is consistent with today's strategic and fiscal realities.
91. The new policy recognizes that the defence budget will be under continuing pressure as the Government strives to bring the deficit under control. More reductions can and will be accommodated, including further reductions in personnel, infrastructure and the capital program.
92. The White Paper provides Canada's men and women in uniform and their civilian colleagues the direction they require to carry out their duties on behalf of the nation, whether the world of the future is a peaceful and stable one, or is plagued by increasing violence within and among states.
93. Whatever the future brings, the new defence policy will enable Canada to respond and adjust as necessary to deal with the range of challenges to our security that could arise, now and into the next century.
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