13 Jan 00
1330-1530
"An Army should have but one chief; a greater number is detrimental"
Niccolo Machiavelli: Discorsi, XV, 1531
"The teams and staffs through which the modern commander absorbs information and exercises his authority must be a beautifully interlocked, smooth-working mechanism. Ideally, the whole should be practically a single mind."
General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Overview:
Combatant command is defined in Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces as: "A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." The number of unified combatant commands is not fixed by law or regulation and may vary from time to time. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.
Unified Command over US operational forces originated during World War II. The experience of global warfare in World War II, brought home the importance of unity of military effort achieved through the unified command of US forces. On 14 December 1946 President Truman signed the "Outline Command Plan", which was in effect the first Unified Command Plan. It called for establishment of "an interim measure for the immediate postwar period," of seven unified commands: Far East Command, Pacific Command, Alaskan Command, Northeast Command, Atlantic Fleet, Caribbean Command, and European Command. The National Security Act of 1947 was the first definitive legislation "to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces." The act assigned responsibility to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to "establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the best interest of national security." Over the next 50 years, the Unified Command Plan adapted to changing strategic requirements within a global framework necessitated by the Cold War and US containment strategy.
The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 changed the role of the combatant commanders significantly. Frustrated by perceived inefficiencies of inter-Service rivalry and overly complicated command lines evident in the Vietnam War, the Iranian hostage rescue attempt, and the bombing of Marine barracks in Beirut, political and military leaders sought reform. Specifically, the Act placed the Commanders-in-Chief (or "CINCs") of the various commands directly in the chain of command beneath the Secretary of Defense and the President. It also gave them legal command authority over all forces assigned, and gave them a powerful voice through the Chairman, JCS, and the Joint Staff in strategic decisions, including programming and budgets.
Today there are nine Combatant Commands, five geographic ( US European Command, US Pacific Command, US Atlantic Command, US Southern Command, US Central Command) and four functional (US Space Command, US Special Operations Command, US Transportation Command, and US Strategic Command). The CINCs are responsible to the National Command Authorities for the planning and performance of specific assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands. In response to the post-Cold War national strategy emphasizing "engagement," they are further responsible for theater engagement strategies in peacetime, requiring extremely close collaboration with US Ambassadors to nations within their respective areas of responsibility.
Such planning is merely one way in which the role of the CINCs and the structure of the Unified Command Plan changes in response to changed strategic circumstances and direction. The evolution of the UCP, involving as it does the very public allocation and positioning of US Armed Forces, is itself a tremendously important strategic document with potentially profound diplomatic and political implications. This means that the perspectives of all nine combatant commanders are very important considerations in the Chairman's formulation of "military advice" at the national level. Understanding the combatant commands of the United States is therefore very important to understanding how US national strategy is created and carried out.
Objectives:
- Comprehend the historical, legal, and doctrinal foundations for the US system of unified commands.
- Comprehend the Unified Command Plan as a dimension of national military and security strategy.
- Comprehend the organizational framework and unique command authority of Combatant Commanders.
- Comprehend the role played by the CINCs in the formulation and execution of US national security strategy
- Comprehend major issues facing Combatant Commanders today.
Issues for consideration:
- Is a global Unified Command Plan necessary in the aftermath of the Cold War, or does it imply "strategic overstretch," that is, an impossibly broad span of control and spreading thin of US forces?
- What changes, if any, are needed to adapt the Unified Command Plan to the post cold war era? Does the current plan adequately address emerging issues such as homeland defense and information warfare? /li>
- Should military, diplomatic or political considerations prevail in deciding whether and how to change the UCP? What might be the diplomatic, strategic or political consequences of various possible changes?
- What are a CINC's sources of power and influence? Are the roles of CINCs, Service Chiefs and US Ambassadors all compatible? Should power and authority be allocated differently among them?
Required readings:
* Chapter 6, Title 10, United States Code (Armed Forces) (Student issue)
* Chapter 2, The Joint Officer's Guide 1997 (AFSC Pub 1) (http://www.afsc.edu/pub1/afsc0000.htm)
Supplemental readings:
* Unified Combatant Commands (http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/almanac/organization/)
* JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 24 February 1995, Chapter II, Sec D & E; Chapter III; and Chapter IV, Sec A & B. (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/capstone.htm)
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