Thursday
14 October 1999
0900-1100 (IS)
Dislocation is the aim of strategy; its sequel may be either the enemy's dissolution or his easier disruption in battle.
B. H. Liddell Hart
Introduction:
The inability of military forces to achieve decisive tactical success on land during World War I, particularly on the Western Front, prevented the attainment of strategic military objectives, which, in turn, prevented the attainment of national objectives. The dilemma that stemmed from trying to defeat the enemy by pitting mass against mass was created, according to British military theorist and Western Front veteran Liddell Hart, by Clausewitzian logic. Liddell Hart argued that "by making battle appear the only 'real warlike activity,' his [Clausewitz's] gospel deprived strategy of its laurels, reduced the art of war to the mechanics of mass-slaughter, and incited generals to seek battle at the first opportunity, instead of creating an advantageous opportunity." Liddell Hart went on to say of Clausewitz, "He narrowed the purpose of strategy when, ignoring his own qualifications, he defined it as 'the employment of battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the war.'""
Liddell Hart was horrified by the destruction of the First World War, and sought an alternative to conflict in the "physical sphere" with its inherent loss of life and property, potential for unintended consequences, and failure. He found his answer in the ancient Chinese theorist, Sun Tzu, who had declared:
The concept expressed by cheng, 'normal' (or 'direct') and ch'i 'extraordinary' (or 'indirect') is of basic importance. The normal (cheng) force fixes or distracts the enemy; the extraordinary (ch'i) forces act when and where their blows are not anticipated.
Sun Tzu offered an indirect approach that pursued victory in the "moral sphere" of war through dislocation of the enemy without having to destroy the mass of the enemy's forces. Liddell Hart studied twenty-five centuries of warfare and concluded that in 30 major conflicts, involving 280 campaigns, only six times "did a decisive result follow a plan of direct strategic approach to the main army of the enemy." Furthermore, he argued that in almost all those cases of successful employment of the indirect approach the victor had gained a psychological advantage over the enemy before any physical clash took place. "Thus," he declared, "the indirect approach is by far the most hopeful and economic form of strategy."
The first reading, from Sun Tzu's The Art of War, introduces you to the earliest known effort to develop and put in writing a comprehensive military theory. Written most probably between 400-320 BC by one or more Chinese strategists, The Art of War is a series of pithy maxims once described as "the concentrated essence of wisdom on the conduct of war." The second reading, from Liddell Hart's Strategy, presents the most coherent discussion of his "indirect approach," in which you will recognize many of Sun Tzu's ideas. Although Liddell Hart did not write Strategy until after World War II, he had developed the conceptions that lay at the heart of the "indirect approach" during the interwar years. For those interested in how the ideas integral to Sun Tzu and the "indirect approach" dovetailed with some of the more prominent strategic and doctrinal thinking during the interwar period, the reading by Brian Bond and Martin Alexander provides insight. This was a period of great transition, and many military men and other strategists were looking for approaches that would preclude a repetition of the kind of war that had bled Europe so pitilessly from 1914-1918.
Objectives:
- Comprehend the principal ideas from Sun Tzu's The Art of War and their impact on military thinking and operations today.
- Analyze the validity of Liddell Hart's theory of the indirect approach.
Issues for Consideration:
- Do you find any of Sun Tzu's ideas relevant today? Which ones do you believe are most applicable?
- What are the major points of agreement/disagreement between Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart?
- How valid is the concept for the indirect approach? Support or refute the argument that battles, campaigns, and even wars can be won in the moral sphere before the clash of arms occurs.
- How could you employ air, land, and sea power in an indirect approach? Can you think of any historical examples when one or more of those military capabilities were employed indirectly?
- Liddell Hart declared that "to concentrate all is an unrealizable ideal, . . . the larger the force that is effectively used for distraction of the enemy, the greater is the chance of the concentration succeeding in its aim," and that "true concentration is the fruit of calculated dispersion." Explain the meaning of these two statements. Give examples of the practical application of this concept.
- How well did the military leaders and analysts of the inter-war period understand the importance or role of weapons introduced during World War I? How successful were they in developing doctrine that reflected the capabilities of the technologies of the day?
Required Readings:
* Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 63-110. (Student Issue)
* B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. ed. (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), pp. 319-360. (Student Issue)
* Brian Bond and Martin Alexander, "Liddell Hart and De Gaulle: The Doctrines of Limited Liability and Mobile Defense," Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 598-623. (Student Issue)
Supplemental Reading:
* B. H. Liddell Hart, Paris, or the Future of War (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1925; reprint ed., New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1972).
* B. H. Liddell Hart, The Ghost of Napoleon (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1980).
* John J. Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
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