Thursday
21 October 1999
0800-1000 (IS)
In case opportunity for destruction of major portion of the enemy fleet is offered or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task.
Chester W. Nimitz
Introduction:
World War II began and ended in Asia. While United States participation dates from December 1941, the conflict in the Pacific long preceded that date. Japanese official histories date the start of war as September 1931 and the conquest of Manchuria. Most western historians, more conservatively, date the start from July 1937 and the Japanese invasion of China, more than two years before the outbreak of war in Europe. The war in Asia ended three months after Germany's surrender.
The war in the Far East had multiple dimensions. Japan, having failed to defeat the most populous nation on earth in 1941, chose to attack two of the three greatest empires in the world in order to secure the resources of her Far Eastern colonies. By the end, Japan had managed to align herself against China, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The war was not limited to the Pacific, but waged also in Manchuria, China, and Southeast Asia (theaters seldom treated in any depth in American histories). After six months of spectacular victories beginning in December 1941, the remainder of the war saw the stubborn retreat of Japanese forces throughout the Pacific and Southeast Asia and increasing military pressure on the Japanese homeland. Meanwhile, in fighting the war in China, the United States found itself linked to the regime of Chiang Kai-shek and affected by the weaknesses of that regime, both during and after the war. In the end, Japan faced forces advancing from several directions, with planning underway for the invasion of the home islands; the complete destruction of her overseas trade through naval blockade; the progressive destruction of her major cities though strategic bombardment; and, finally, the detonation of two atomic bombs. History provides many examples that unanticipated and unintended consequences follow the recourse to arms. The war that Japan unleashed, whether in 1931, 1937, or 1941, provides perhaps one of the most obvious, and relevant, examples of how war, once underway, imposes its own logic.
The readings examine the planning and implementation of strategies for the Pacific campaigns during World War II and again provide rich material for examining the relation of military strategy to national policy. Consider carefully the effectiveness of the strategic military concepts of operations employed by both sides in the Pacific. As in the European campaigns, there is and continues to be much controversy over how military strategy for the Pacific evolved and was executed. More than any other theater in World War II, the Pacific offered the opportunity for joint operations, but opportunity was not always exploited.
Objective:
- Analyze and critique the application of military power in the Pacific during World War II in light of the theories studied thus far in the course.
Issues for Consideration:
- Did the naval aspects of the war in the Pacific follow more closely the concepts of Mahan or Corbett? Which technologies had the most pronounced effect on the conduct of naval operations? Did any of these technologies invalidate the concepts of Mahan or Corbett?
- Critique the decision of the United States to rely on two (or more) commanders in the Pacific rather than appoint a single theater commander. Was the decision based more on differing viewpoints on how to conduct the war or upon the personalities involved? Do you think that the decision was beneficial or detrimental to American strategic success? Why?
- Compare the strategic bombing campaign against Japan with the one against Germany. Did the theories themselves differ or was there a differing prosecution of the same theory? Did the use of the atomic bomb represent a change in the theory or practice of strategic bombing? Why or why not?
- How would you categorize U.S. military strategy in the Pacific in terms of the strategic concepts employed: sequential or simultaneous; direct or indirect; symmetrical or asymmetrical? What were the alternatives?
Required Readings:
* Larry Addington, "The Second World War, 1939-1945," The Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 240-265. (Student Issue)
* D. Clayton James, "American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War." Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 703-732. (Student Issue)
* Russell F. Weigley, "The Strategic Tradition of A.T. Mahan: The Strategists of the Pacific War," The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977), pp. 269-311. (Student Issue)
Supplemental Readings:
* John Ferris and Michael I. Handel, "Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty, and the Art of Command in Military Operations," Intelligence and National Security, Number 1, January 1995, pp. 1-58.
* H. P. Willmott, The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1989).
* Dan Van der Vat, The Pacific Campaign: World War II, The U.S. -Japanese Naval War 1941-1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982).
* Edward S. Miller, War Plan ORANGE: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991).
* Nitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, Midway (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1955).
* Ronald Spector, Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan (New York: Random House, 1985).
* John Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987).
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