Tuesday
28 September 1999
0900-1000 (L)
There are in Europe many good generals, but they see too many things at once. I see only one thing, namely the enemy's main body.
I try to crush it, confident that secondary matters will then settle themselves.
Napoleon Bonaparte
Introduction:
When the Revolution swept over France in 1789, it ushered in profound social and political changes. Almost overnight, the state ceased to be the private domain of the monarch and became, instead, the public property of its citizenry. Suddenly, France's citizens discovered they had a powerful vested interest in the welfare of the state, and they quickly proved themselves willing to make enormous exertions to advance what they perceived to be their national interests.
Not surprisingly, the great social and political upheaval that convulsed France brought equally profound changes in the character and conduct of European warfare. In fact, the changes in the structure of both society and government were so fundamental that they served as the basis for a "revolution in military affairs." The small professional army that had been the private instrument of the French king quickly disintegrated. Then, threatened by the reactionary monarchies of Europe and imbued with the spirit of fervent nationalism, France's citizenry banded together to form a mass people's army to defend their newly-won freedoms. This new army combined several innovations begun during the late eighteenth century--the division system, skirmishers, improved artillery, and attacks in column--with unprecedented numbers and martial spirit to wage war on a truly revolutionary scale and level of intensity.
When this revolution in military affairs was paired with the military genius of Napoleon Bonaparte, the result was staggering. For nineteen years, Napoleon's armies dominated various coalitions of the other major European powers. In the end, they defeated him only through exhaustion of France's resources and by turning many of his own military methods, including some degree of the social and political changes that powered them, against him. In the process, the Europeans changed the face of warfare.
This lesson examines how and why French Revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare changed the character and conduct of war. The reading reviews eighteenth century warfare, examines the military innovations already underway at the start of the French Revolution, and traces the course of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. The lecture will examine in even greater detail the changes in warfare wrought by the French Revolution and Napoleon. The essential point to understand from this lesson is that the social upheaval of the French Revolution combined with Napoleon's genius to produce a watershed in the evolution of warfare-a watershed that would, in turn, produce a torrent of military thought.
Objective:
- Comprehend the fundamental changes in the character and conduct of war prompted by the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.
Issues for Consideration:
- What changes in the character or conduct of warfare emerged during the French Revolution? How were those changes rooted in the social and political upheaval caused by the French Revolution?
- What were the essential characteristics of Napoleon's military method?
- Was Napoleon a great strategist? Operational artist? Tactician? Leader? Manager? What were his greatest strengths and weaknesses? Was he successful because of, or in spite of, the changes in warfare brought by the French Revolution?
Required Readings:
* Larry Addington, "From Dynastic to National Warfare, 1775-1815," The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 19-42. (Student Issue)
Supplemental Readings:
* Peter Paret, "Napoleon and the Revolution in War," Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 123-142.
* Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1994), pp. 105-147.
* Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980).
* David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York, NY: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1966).
* Hans Delbruck, The Dawn of Modern Warfare, Vol. 4 of History of the Art of Warfare, trans. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1990).
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