Friday
1 October 1999
0930-1130 (IS)
War is . . . a paradoxical trinity--composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.
The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.
Carl von Clausewitz
Introduction:
Carl von Clausewitz was a Prussian contemporary of Jomini's, but his major theoretical work, On War, was initially far less widely read and referenced than The Art of War. While Jomini remained an active military advisor and theorist until his death in 1869, promoting and defending his military theory, Clausewitz died two years before the publication of On War. Clausewitz's wife published the rough, unfinished manuscript at the urging of friends as a testimony to her husband's memory. Consequently, for many years, familiarity with Clausewitz's work remained confined to a narrow circle of students, largely within Prussia. Moreover, Jomini's work was far more attractive to most military officers and theorists. What Jomini offered was a straightforward, systematic, and seemingly scientific handbook for organizing, planning, and conducting war. What Clausewitz seemed to offer, on the other hand, was a complex, philosophical tome on the essence of war and the difficulty of conducting it well-unless possessed of the natural military genius to see through the uncertainties and ambiguities that permeated conflict. Jomini clearly seemed the more practical and useful to soldiers in the field.
Nonetheless, Clausewitz's work was an enormous advance in the evolution of military thought. The very aspect of On War that made it less attractive to military officers and theorists also made it supremely important. Clausewitz was not content with providing a simple handbook or checklist of steps to follow to wage war more successfully. First of all, he did not believe that could be done because war was far too complex and unpredictable. More importantly, he wanted to probe the fundamental nature of war and its place in the full spectrum of human activity. He hoped to guide his readers to a better understanding of war's complexity rather than provide prescriptions, so they would be better prepared to formulate solutions to the unique problems each would face in waging their own wars.
Clausewitz's famous quotation regarding the "trinity of war," cited above, specifies the elements that comprise war's nature. More than any other statement, it encapsulates his final refinement of his theory of war. Some would even go so far as to argue that it represents a distinct and second theory of war. He did not fully perfect this notion until late in his life, in 1827, and, as he himself acknowledged in two notes you will read, he had only begun to incorporate it in On War before his untimely death. His initial conception of a theory of war, an abstract vision that formed the basis for most of On War, was formulated as early as 1804 and is stated most concisely at the outset of Chapter Eleven, Book Four.
The very concept of war will permit us to make the following unequivocal statements:
1) Destruction of the enemy forces is the overriding principle of war. . . .
2) Such destruction of forces can usually be accomplished only by fighting.
3) Only major engagements involving all forces lead to major success.
4) The greatest successes are obtained where all engagements coalesce into one great battle.
Eventually, Clausewitz realized his early abstract conception of war did not fully mesh with reality. War was more than just fighting, and it did not always entail the complete destruction of the enemy. Glimmers of this more sophisticated conception of war begin to emerge in Book Six, and its influence can be seen in Books Seven and Eight as well. Unfortunately, before he died, Clausewitz believed only Chapter One, Book One, was in final, refined form. Thus, as you read Clausewitz, recognize that everything after the first chapter is in draft form and has not been revised in accordance with his refined theory of war. That is the cause of much of the confusion about Clausewitz and of many of the book's apparent contradictions.
To simplify your study of Clausewitz, and to attempt to clarify the evolution of his thought, we've arranged the reading for this lesson and the next in what seems to be the chronological order in which Clausewitz wrote. The assignment begins with Clausewitz's discussion of what a theory of war should include, then goes on to his discussion of the engagement (his initial conception) and the relative strength of attack and defense in the engagement. The next segment of the reading is his note of 10 July 1827, in which he, for the first time, acknowledges that his theory of war is wrong because it does not conform to reality. The assignment then returns to Book Six, where the more mature theory begins to emerge and traces its development through Book Eight and finally to Chapter One, Book One, the last segment of the book he completed and the one segment he revised to his satisfaction. This chapter, not surprisingly, is the clearest statement of his theory, the conceptual foundation upon which the entire revised work was to be based.
Time devoted to study Clausewitz's theory, to comprehend it, dissect it, analyze it, and critique it, is time well spent. His comprehensive understanding of war in all of its aspects, as well as his influence on the great strategic thinkers and practitioners since Napoleon, make careful study of On War professionally essential. Moreover, the line of argument in many portions of On War is so rich, so nuanced, and so subtle that no two people come away from reading Clausewitz with the same exact understanding of his meaning. The significance of his work is likely to change over time for the individual reader as well, based on changes in perspective, background, and experience when the book is read. Repeated readings and reflection will reward you with entirely new interpretations and insights into his mind and the nature of war. The most serious students of Clausewitz find that the more they read, the more they learn.
If you are reading Clausewitz for the first time, three techniques may help you along. First, begin by reading the appropriate sections from Bernard Brodie's "A Guide to the Reading of On War" beginning at page 641, as well as Peter Paret's introductory essay (pp. 3-25) which provides the context for Clausewitz's ideas. Second, read all the subheadings, which outline the logic of Clausewitz's thoughts, before reading the main body of the text. Third, after reading the text, read the introductory essay by Brodie (pp. 45-58) and see if you agree that Clausewitiz's notions remain valuable on the eve of the twenty-first century.
Objective:
- Analyze Clausewitz's theory of war and its applicability to the employment of military force today.
Issues for Consideration:
- Did Clausewitz represent the continuation of an ongoing trend of development in military thought or a sudden and radical departure from any lines of thought already underway?
- Clausewitz argues that "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means." German World War I Field Marshal Erich Ludendorff, on the other hand, declared that "warfare is the highest expression of the national will to live, and politics must, therefore, be subservient to the conduct of war." And American military historian Russell Weigley maintains that "war once begun has always tended to generate a politics of its own: to create its own momentum, to render obsolete the political purposes for which it was undertaken, and to erect its own political imperatives." Which of these views reflects your own notion of the relationship between war and policy?
- What did Clausewitz mean when he wrote (p. 89), "As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity. . ."? What implications do the dominant tendencies and their concerns have for the development of national and military strategies and the objectives of those strategies?
- Clausewitz wrote that "War is. . .an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." In what alternative ways can military power be employed to influence another nation's will? If Clausewitz is correct, what is the implication of his statement for the selection of war-termination objectives?
- What impact, if any, does a nation's form of government have on the Clausewitzian trinity?
- Clausewitz draws a clear distinction between two kinds of war. What is the actual difference between the two? Is the distinction compelling? Why does he argue (bottom of p. 88) that "the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." What are the possible implications of not following Clausewitz's admonition?
Required Readings:
* Carl von Clausewitz, On War. ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 127-147, 226-229, 357-359, 69-70, 488-489, 577-627, and 75-89. (Student Issue)
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