Tuesday
7 March 2000
0830-1030 (L)
No major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of political factors.... Only if statesmen look to certain military moves and actions to produce effects that are foreign to their nature do political decisions influence operations for the worse. In the same way as a man who has not fully mastered a foreign language sometimes fails to express himself correctly, so statesmen often issue orders that defeat the purpose they are meant to serve. Time and again this has happened, which demonstrates that a certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of general policy.
Carl von Clausewitz
The government, which formulates war policy and has to adapt it to conditions which often change as a war progresses, can rightly intervene in the strategy of a campaign by modifying its object.... While it should not interfere with the commander in the handling of his tools, it should indicate clearly the nature of his task.
Sir Basil Liddell Hart
To bring a war or one of its campaigns to a successful close requires a thorough grasp of national policy. On that level strategy and policy coalesce: the commander is simultaneously a statesman.
Carl von Clausewitz
There are some officers who say: "We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms." It is vital that these simple-minded officers be made to realize the relationship that exists between policy and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.
Mao Tse-tung
Purpose
The purpose of this lesson is analyze the relationships between US national security strategy, military power, and military strategy at the national and theater levels and comprehend the key factors that shape and constrain US military strategy.
Learning Objectives
1. Comprehend the relationship of national security strategy to national and theater military strategy.
2. Evaluate the different roles of the unified commanders, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense in creating and carrying out national and theater military strategies.
3. Comprehend the factors that shape and constrain the unified commanders, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense in the design and execution of military strategy.
4. Comprehend how the Secretary of Defense balances these factors to craft unified strategic direction to the Armed Forces.
Discussion
As you learned from Course 5602, Fundamentals of Military Thought and Strategy, military strategy begins with the political objectives it is intended to achieve. Our recent history has clearly sensitized not only national security professionals, but also the media, Congress, and the general public to the risks associated with the use of force. As a result, the right questions about such issues as vital interests, clear objectives, and popular support have become a routine part of the national discourse. While this does not assure that the right answers will be forthcoming, it highlights the primacy of the policy/strategy link and underscores the need to ensure that military power is not expected to "produce effects that are alien to its nature."
The stakes involved in committing the nation's armed forces dictate that special care be taken to make the interaction between policy and military strategy-and between politicians and military commanders-as harmonious as possible. As a future player in this arena, you need to grasp the dynamics involved, understand the "how" and "why" of the civil-military interface, and be able to capitalize on the synergies that accrue when policy guidance and strategy complement and reinforce-rather than hinder-each other.
Understanding the correlation between political and military objectives-grasping the true character and importance of the civil-military interface-are critical first steps. You've done that in Courses 5601 through 5604. However, as we move from theory to practice-from concepts to implementation-the complexity increases exponentially. This is so because the relationships are both multi-dimensional and dynamic; because the environment is inherently uncertain; because "friction" dominates both planning and execution; and because the participants are often guided by different-if not conflicting-considerations.
This means that strategy is not a linear, top-down flow of guidance from the policy maker to the military planner. This places a premium on both the quality and integrity of military advice, and requires a thorough understanding of military imperatives by civilian leaders. Adding to the challenge is that rarely, if ever, can military power alone attain enduring political objectives. These realities call for a careful orchestration of all the instruments of statecraft to assure a mutually reinforcing, synergistic effect or, at the very least, to preclude force and diplomacy from operating at crossed purposes.
In the American system, the person who serves at the nexus of national military strategy, national security strategy, policy and politics is the civilian Secretary of Defense. As part of the National Command Authority, the SecDef must receive and act upon the military advice of the JCS and unified commanders, reconciling it with all of the factors just discussed. It is therefore appropriate that we begin our study of military strategy with the perspective of the SecDef and what he (or she) expects of the senior military strategists who serve him.
Issues for Consideration
1. Is there a meaningful distinction between a nation's ability to fight and its ability to wage war? Can a state really be "good at fighting, but not so good at waging war," as Colin Gray suggests? What are the implications of your assessment for our current strategic posture?
2. Colin Gray lays out six inter-connected reasons to explain why "superior strategic performance" is difficult to achieve and sustain. Do you agree with his analysis? How persuasive is his conclusion that "strategic performance can only rest on tactical performance"?
3. It has been more than three years since former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry articulated the "prevent-deter-defeat" strategy in his article. Is this an appropriate strategy for using American power? What are some of its military implications? Are we pursuing it properly? Is it working?
4. Archer - Following the logic of the prevent-deter-defeat strategy, what sorts of international actions might cause the US to begin shifting from prevention to deterrence? What are the military implications of such events? What is the role of non-military instruments of power?
Required Readings
1. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States. Chapter I, "American Military Power." (Student Issue)
2. Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Praegar, 1996), Chapter 1, "On Strategic Performance," pp. 3-14; and Chapter 10, "Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs,"pp. 235-246. (Reprint)
3. Charles R. Larson, "Personal Reflections on the Use of Military Force and its Relevance to National Security Strategy," Naval War College Review, vol XLVII, no 2, (Spring, 1995), pp. 84-90. (Reprint)
4. Stephen M. Walt, "Musclebound: The Limits of US Power," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol LV, no 2 (March/April, 1999), pp. 44-48. (Reprint)
5. Perry, William J., "Defense in an Age of Hope," Foreign Affairs, vol LXXV, no 6, (November/December, 1996), pp. 64-79. (Reprint)
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