Monday
27 March 2000
0830-1130 (S)
... the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt, sustained combat incident to operations on land.
10 USC 3062
...the Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes in general, naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea.
10 USC 5062
...the Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.
10 USC 5963
... the Air Force includes aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. It is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war...
10 USC 8062
The Coast Guard ... shall be a military service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times. The Coast Guard shall be a service in the Department of Transportation except when operating as a service in the Navy. ... The Coast Guard shall enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable Federal laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ... and shall maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war.
14 USC 1-2
Purpose
The purpose of this lesson is to comprehend the strategic role of US conventional forces and to analyze future challenges confronting these forces.
Learning Objectives
1. Develop an understanding of the general size, roles, missions, capabilities and limitations of Active and Reserve component US conventional forces.
2. Evaluate US conventional forces in terms of the current and future security environment.
3. Evaluate the deterrent capacity of US conventional forces.
Discussion
In the next section of the course, we will begin an examination of the components of US military power from a functional, rather than a Service, perspective. You should be relatively familiar with the Services from Course 5612, PREP-Ts and other exposure. Our aim here is to evaluate the military strategic means available to the US strategist in terms of the missions and threats just discussed. This examination should cause you to weigh the relative utility of each of these means, to imagine new ways in which they might be put to use in a synchronized manner and also to imagine other means that perhaps should be developed that are better than these.
The preponderance of US military power is concentrated in conventional forces: the divisions, battle groups and wings of the four services, and the active duty and reserve service people who man them. (For our purposes, we are including US special operations forces as "conventional," even though they are often referred to as "unconventional" forces) Conventional forces are a strategic asset. At the most basic level, they are the fighting organizations with which wars are won. Because of the flexibility implied by the term conventional they can perform other tasks as well, from disaster relief to peacekeeping to maritime interdiction to controlling civil disturbances. Their existence can have a significant deterrent value, especially when they are strategically positioned in or near scenes of probable crisis and when they are perceived as superior, ready and deployable.
On the other hand, conventional forces are expensive, especially when kept at high states of readiness, requiring continual maintenance and training. The expense of these forces often seems excessive in times of peace. Conventional forces are hard to change. First, they are large, intricate and elaborate organizations. Second, radical changes in conventional forces must entail at least temporarily lowered readiness and hence strategic risk. Third, they attract constituencies, both among the military people who comprise them and among the civilian communities where they are stationed.
In accordance with Title X, US Code, conventional forces are organized, trained and equipped by each of the services to perform the missions outlined above. Each of the services has over time developed its own perspective on how to employ these forces. These perspectives are captured in the respective service doctrines. Yet the combatant commanders employ the conventional forces in a joint and interagency environment. As the capabilities of conventional forces continue to grow in terms of their ability to influence an ever-expanding battle space, friction between service doctrines also grows. How these doctrinal differences are resolved is important to the effectiveness of the joint force in executing the national military strategy.
A fundamental question for American national security strategists is what kind and how many conventional forces are needed. All of the strategic and military trends evident today have implications for conventional forces. Whether or not it is possible to design and field forces that yield the "full spectrum dominance" central to Joint Vision 2010 is an open question. Can any force structure actually dominate all conceivable forms of military conflict from disaster relief through thermo-nuclear war? Should the US create special units for peacekeeping? What are the effects of precision technologies and weapons of mass destruction on the large, platform-laden organizations that currently make up our forces? What portion of our force can be placed in reserve, at acceptable strategic risk? Do our forces have the right mix of capabilities, and if so, why do we hear so much about "high demand/low density" (HD/LD) items? Are Army divisions inherently too heavy for rapid deployment and agile operations? Are aircraft carriers obsolete? These and a host of other questions surround the conventional forces that we will examine today.
Issues for Consideration
1. Are the conventional forces of the US military adequately structured for the missions inherent to the National Military Strategy?
2. What capabilities inherent in our conventional forces are no longer relevant to today's strategic environment? What capabilities must be added?
3. What redundancies in capabilities exist between the conventional forces of the Services? How should these redundancies be resolved?
4. What are the majors areas of doctrinal friction in the joint employment of conventional forces? How should this friction be resolved? What impact does this have on roles, missions and resources provided for conventional forces?
5. Scenario - CINCENT believes the enhanced capabilities of his 2006 force offer him opportunities for operations that were not possible previously. His emerging concept for dealing with the Iraqi attack, if it takes place, is to go to offensive ground operations within three days.
He's considering beginning with strikes with cruise missiles, CONUS-based bombers and information operations while the rapid deployment of forces is taking place. He will bring in two brigades to link up with Army equipment stored in the theater and begin offensive operations with them. Within ten days of beginning deployment, he plans to introduce an additional division by marrying troops with US Army equipment afloat. He will land a MEF within the same timeframe. At the end of ten days, he will be employing approximately three divisions (in addition to some Kuwaiti brigades) to take on seven or more Iraqi divisions.
Everything the CINC is considering is consistent with Joint Vision 2010 and the US Army's vision of employing forces in the future. The concepts have not been tested. Although the initial success in the Korean conflict does point to the leverage that comes with the JV210 concepts and forces, it's hard to know about this theater. There would clearly be risks for the National Command Authority to consider. Should the JCS support the CINCs' plans or should they insist upon a more measured "pound, build and attack" approach similar to the last Gulf War?
Required Readings
1. Joint Pub 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities. Chapter II, "Service Capabilities and Organization", pp. II-1 thru II-16; Chapter V, "CD-ROM Overview" (Student Issue)
2. Binnendijk, Hans and Richard Kugler (eds), "Conventional Operations and Warfare: A New Era Ahead?" Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World. Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1999, pp. 261-276. (Student Issue)
3. US Special Operations Command Pub 1, Special Operations in Peace and War, "Introduction," pp. iii-v; Chapter 1, "What Are Special Operations," pp. 1-1 - 1-6. (Reprint)
4. Barnett, D. Sean and James S. Thomason, "Flexible Presence in the 21st Century" Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 98-99), pp. 7-14. (Reprint)
5. Hooker, Richard D. Jr., "Joint Campaigning in 2010" Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 98-99), pp. 40-47. (Student Issue)
6. Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 (RCE-05), Volume 1: Study Report, pp. 1-22.
Recommended Readings
1. "Military Readiness: Good News, Bad News and Questions for the Future," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 24 September 1998.
2. DoD Pub 1215.15-H, "The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, " October, 1998. Read Chapters 1,2,3,4 and 11; review Chapter 6 and Appendix A.
3. Moore, Scott W., "Today its Gold, Not Purple" Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 98-99), pp. 100-106.
4. Macgregor, Douglas A., "Command and Control for Joint Strategic Actions," Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 98-99), pp. 25-33.
5. Utley, Douglas E., "The Area of Operations-Fighting One Campaign" Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 98-99), pp. 34-39.
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