Monday
17 April 2000
0830-1130 (LS)
Ethnic differences, even substantial differences, do not set a society inexorably on a path toward war. Tensions along ethnic, racial, or historical fault lines can lead to civil violence, but to explain the Yugoslav crisis as a result of ethnic hatred is to turn the story upside down and begin at its end.
Susan L. Woodward
Balkan Tragedy, p. 18
Purpose
The purpose of this case study is to analyze the recent war in Kosovo from the perspectives of both sides and to evaluate its implications for future military theory, US military strategy, and the joint operational art.
Learning Objectives
1. Understand the international environment, diplomatic actions and interagency activities which led up to Operation Allied Force.
2. Comprehend the character and conduct of the recent war in Kosovo from the perspectives of the various nations and organizations involved in the conflict.
3. Evaluate the strategy used in Operation Allied Force and whether it sets useful precedents for the use of force in future conflicts.
4. Evaluate the effectiveness of Operation Allied Force as a combined, joint operation.
5. Analyze Operation Allied Force as a harbinger of future war.
Discussion
This topic begins a part of the course in which we will put our learning so far to use. First, we will analyze Operation Allied Force as a case study in the current and future art of warfare. Then, we will conduct a multiple crises exercise in which you will have the opportunity to craft military strategy for dealing with the full range of 21st Century threats.
Our goal in this case study is an analysis of strategic decision-making and the application of armed force in conjunction with various instruments of statecraft during the 1998-1999 Kosovo crisis. Operation Allied Force took place from 24 March to 3 June 1999. The readings provide background material on the complicated mix of factors that influenced strategy, planning and, ultimately, the use of military force. While most currently available readings cover the entire war, we want to focus our attention each day on a slightly different aspect of the war. For today's session, we will consider the role of force as part of an integrated strategy to resolve the crisis in Kosovo prior to actual fighting by NATO forces. Our second lesson will concentrate on the "character and conduct" of the campaign itself, including the military occupation of Kosovo by NATO forces. In the third lesson, we will examine what, if anything, about this war is an indicator of the future of armed conflict as we will experience it.
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203 are included in the readings to provide the sequence of international actions and responses through 1998 and 1999 in the run up to the conflict. These should be reviewed with the NATO Defence council statement of 11 June 1998 and the North Atlantic Council Communiqué of 08 December 1998 to gain a comprehensive picture of events leading to Operation Allied Force. Substantial effort was put into diplomacy and statecraft, to no avail.
PDD 56 served as a template for our national approach to Balkan problems in 1998 and 1999. The PDD is focused on " complex contingency operations" - peace operations - such as the peace accord implementation operation conducted by NATO in Bosnia and the humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq, Operation Provide Comfort. Kosovo was the ideal venue for the execution of PDD 56. The PDD calls for creation of a political-military implementation plan that includes a comprehensive situation assessment, mission statement, agency objectives, and desired end state. The PDD assumes the U.S. will conduct future operations in coalition with other like-minded nations wherever possible.
A series of articles from the Serbian press relates the view from the 'other side' as we moved toward conflict. As Sun Tzu pointed out, to be successful in war one must know the enemy as well as oneself.
Strategic planning was often challenged by the realities of Balkan politics. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had to be persuaded to support the Rambouillet agreement. Evidently, our assumptions and expectations about Serbia's response to the agreement were off the mark. Assumptions that are a fundamental aspect of any military strategy must be continually reassessed during a crisis. The integration of diplomacy, force and other instruments of statecraft were required to coerce Milosevic and halt the ethnic cleansing. His motivations vis-à-vis Kosovo are explained by Silber and Little in a supplemental reading should review be required.
Two timelines of events are provided as the eighth required reading.
Issues for Consideration
1. Western leaders have been quoted widely stating that diplomacy backed up by military force' is key to solving international disputes. Knowing of the potential for conflict in Kosovo years in advance, were governments unwilling or unable to formulate policy and then back it up with military force to avoid the clash of arms? Why or why not?
2. Military strategy includes the threat of force to achieve political aims. With this in mind, evaluate NATO's military strategy prior to the beginning of hostilities. What accounts for your evaluation? What was the range of military strategic options open to NATO?
3. PDD 56 was used extensively in preparation for the conflict in Kosovo. It includes the requirement for a transition/exit strategy. Was this requirement addressed? If so, how?
4. How might the nation's various 'tools of statecraft' have been better applied? Was use of the 'military tool' in some form inevitable?
Required Readings
1. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, "Executive Summary," pp. vii-xvii. (Student Issue)
2. NATO Handbook (1998), Chapter 3 " The Transformation of the Alliance," pp. 69-72 and 75-78. (Student Issue)
3. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1160 (March 31,1998), 1199 (September 23, 1998), and 1203 (October 24,1998). (Reprint)
4. NATO Defence Council statement of 11 June and NAC Communiqué of 08 December 1998. (Reprint)
5. Series of three FBIS articles reported from Serbia, December 1998 to January, 1999:
"Assembly Passes Declaration Condemning US 'Interference," Belgrade Radio, December 03, 1998. (Reprint)
"Serbian Government Statement on Kosovo Situation," Tanjug: State Owned News Agency, January 15, 1998. (Reprint)
"Markovic Opens Assembly Debate on Kosovo," Belgrade Radio, February 04, 1998. (Reprint)
6. Floyd Spence, "Limits To Our Leadership", The Washington Post, April 22, 1999. (Reprint)
7. Eliot A. Cohen, "What's Wrong With the American Way of War", The Wall Street Journal, March 30, 1999. (Reprint)
8. "Kosovo, an account of the crisis, NATO's Objectives, Chronology of Events and Actions," UK Ministry of Defence, June1999. (Reprint)
Recommended Readings
1. PDD/NSC 56 White Paper: Managing Complex Contingency Operations, May 1997.
2. Laura Silber and Alan Little, Yugoslavia, Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), Chapter 2.
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