United States. National War College, Course 5 - Part VI: Fighting and Winning - Topic 25: Kosovo Case Study. Lessons and Future Operations

Title: United States. National War College, Course 5 - Part VI: Fighting and Winning - Topic 25: Kosovo Case Study. Lessons and Future Operations

TOPIC 25: KOSOVO CASE STUDY - LESSONS AND FUTURE OPERATIONS

Wednesday
19 April 2000
0830-1130 (S)

All war aims at the surrender of the mind-the conversion of the will to resist into a willingness to accept defeat.
Major General William J. Donovan

Purpose

The purpose of this case study is to analyze the recent war in Kosovo from the perspectives of both sides and to evaluate its implications for future military theory, US military strategy, and the joint operational art.

Learning Objectives

1. Comprehend the character of a war in which the side conducting offensive operations has no combat casualties.

2. Understand the warfighting lessons of Operation Allied Force as a combined, joint operation.

3. Analyze Operation Allied Force as a possible harbinger of future war at the military strategic and joint operational levels.

Discussion

With Operation Allied Force, the NATO alliance successfully completed a relatively precise air campaign, had no combat casualties, flew 78 days and over 38,000 sorties while maintaining Alliance solidarity. By any measure, this is an astonishing accomplishment. What are the lessons of this unusual clash of arms?

The real findings from Kosovo may well be what the war tells us about our force planning and what decision-makers and strategists conclude about the nation's current benchmark of being able to conduct two simultaneous major theater wars. Are our forces properly structured to meet future requirements we will likely face? Are we truly dominant across the 'spectrum of conflict' or is this wishful thinking?

Kosovo has also broken new ground for NATO. NATO's exploration of its changing role is of primary concern for members of the alliance, for nations wishing to join, and for those countries outside the alliance concerned with NATO's new strategic direction. Much greater emphasis will be placed on NATO' s capability to conduct non-Article V operations. Operation Allied Force clearly marked the disparities in relative military capabilities of alliance members. Defense spending by our allies and their approach to the Defense Capabilities Initiative will forecast future Alliance strength and capability.

As can be read in the article from Belgrade and the post war statement of Slobodan Milosevic, the fighting may be over but the conflict will continue. The Serbs look backward and live their history every day. Operation Allied Force is now part of their history just like the ethnic strife of this bloodiest of centuries and legends of defeat by the Ottoman Turks over six hundred years ago. The challenge in the Balkans is to develop a future which does not mirror the travails of the past.

Issues for Consideration

1. What is victory in a conflict like Operation Allied Force? A war of 78 days duration with no combat casualties to offensive forces is an amazing accomplishment, but how important is it to the overall achievement of success?

2. Commitment of air power for Allied Force approached that postulated for a major theater war. What are the implications of this reality for current force planning? We produced a well coordinated combined air operation, but this was by no means execution of joint and combined operations across the 'spectrum of conflict.' Should service force planners be focusing more now on light, more mobile (PDD 56) forces?

3. Is Operation Allied Force predictive of future NATO operations? Why or why not? Will operations that don't meet the political benchmark of alliance consensus still be conducted by coalitions of the willing within the alliance? What are the differences between 'alliance' and 'coalition' warfare?

4. Is there an exit strategy for our nation's involvement in the Balkans, or will our 100,000 troop commitment to Europe simply be garrisoned in the Balkans vice Germany? Are their missions there appropriate for forward deployed combat forces? Why or why not?

Required Readings

1. NATO Handbook (1998), Chapter 5, "The Alliance's Operational Role In Peacekeeping" pp. 113-129. (Student Issue)

2. Secretary William S. Cohen and Gen. Henry H. Shelton's joint statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, "Department of Defense Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review," October 14, 1999. (to be replaced when Joint Lessons Learned are presented to Congress) (Reprint)

3. Slobodon Milosevic, "Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's Address to the Nation", June 10, 1999. (Reprint)

4. William Drozdiak, "Politics Hampered Warfare," The Washington Post, July 20, 1999. (Reprint)

5. Andrew F. Krepinevich, "The Lessons of Kosovo," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments - Backgrounder, October 13, 1999. (Reprint)

6. Michael Mandelbaum, "A Perfect Failure," Foreign Affairs, vol 78, no 5, (September/October, 1999), pp. 2-8.

Recommended Readings

1. Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Unlearning the Lessons of Kosovo," Foreign Policy,
Washington, Fall 1999.

2. Fareed Zakaria, "Keeping Kosovo," National Review, New York, 27 September 1999.

3. Ralph Peters, "Can NATO Finish the Job In Kosovo?," Wall Street Journal, New York, 29 March 1999.