



Chapter 5:

Hemispheric Relations





Security and Defence Organizations and Initiatives



Note: On July 3, 2009, Resolution 1962 expelling Cuba from the OAS was abolished (Cuba ratified it would not return to the OAS).

Source: Compilation based of information provided by the mentioned organizations in their web sites.

Analysis

Notes on the Hemispheric Context

Hal Klepak

Professor Emeritus of the Royal Military College of Canada.

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter allows for regional organizations with aims consistent with those of the Charter to act in support of UN security objectives.

These dispositions are the basis for regional and sub-regional security arrangements in the Americas founded in the years after World War II. Two accords were agreed:

- The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty, 1947)
- The Charter of the Organization of American States (1948).

They provide, with the Inter-American Defence Board, already in existence since 1942 when wartime defence cooperation was well developed, a collective security system which, under United States leadership, was later further buttressed by a series of bilateral Mutual Assistance Pacts over the years of and after the Korean War of 1950-53.

These arrangements were vastly reinforced by the expansion and deepening of institutionalized cooperation resulting from US and much Latin American reaction to the Cuban Revolution of 1959. Military cooperation came to know levels never before experienced and direct action in line with US objectives regionally became the rule even to the point of the overthrow of elected governments felt to be “soft on communism”.

With the end of the cold war, the reasons for a collective security system at the hemispheric level became steadily less clear and with the exception of the months following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, Latin American support for it continued to erode. This was exacerbated by the widespread disappointment in much of Latin America over the US interpretation of the Rio Treaty in 1982 when Argentina occupied militarily the Malvinas and was defeated in the subsequent war with the United Kingdom.

Despite US attempts to breathe new life into the system through the Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas and the resultant ‘Williamsburg Spirit’ from its first meeting in 1995, the drift towards regional answers to largely regional defence and security needs became a reality. The end of the 1994 Miami Consensus on hemispheric integration by 2005 meant that soon Latin American countries were moving on with constructing their own more local arrangements although they were willing to accept small anti-narcotics and anti-terrorism efforts at the OAS. This trend was

exacerbated by the ideological divisions increasingly present as the reformist ALBA nations began to coalesce but was already visible before that body came into being.

The present patchwork of organizations is a result of these changes in the hemispheric and regional contexts. In North America, now including Mexico, the Security and Prosperity Partnership and the Mérida Initiative look no farther south. And in Central America and the Caribbean, the *Conferencia de Fuerzas Armadas Centroamericanas* underscores the special cooperative accords among the countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. In addition, the Central America Regional Security Initiative expands in at least some elements CFAC to include Belize, Costa Rica and Panama.

The Caribbean reflects a more complex picture. The small Eastern Caribbean States maintain since 1996 a Regional Security System which benefits from UK, US and Canadian assistance. In addition, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative links 15 States of the larger zone, including three continental States, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, with the US in a larger regional grouping.

In South America, the 12 UNASUR nations have adopted a number of defence and security initiatives and in 2010 founded the *Consejo de Defensa Suramericano* to begin to bring together their approaches to defence. They have moved to establish a series of shared ways of addressing issues and build confidence. In addition there are many bilateral, trilateral and sub-regional arrangements involving other groupings such as Mercosur, the Andean region accords, and Amazon initiatives.

Finally, the reformist governments in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela, have coalesced around a regional organization based on ideology, and added another form of grouping, ALBA, to the geographical and geopolitical ones already in place.

This plethora of organizations and accords grouping the nations of the Hemisphere is in addition to the overarching architecture of the OAS and its Inter-American Security ‘system.’ Some newer regional arrangements acknowledge themselves as part of the larger hemispheric system while others do not. Lacking any longer an obvious external threat that might unite the nations of the Americas, the more regional approach now clearly dominates.



Inter-American Defence System

There is no formal defence “system” in the American hemisphere, but rather different instruments related to this subject. Organizations –such as the OAS-, treaties –such as the TIAR-, a diverse array of forums, and academic institutions such as the Inter-American Defence College.

MAPS Assistance Programs (1953-1956, under the legal umbrella of TIAR)

Inter-American Naval Conferences (1959, forum)

Conference of American Armies (1960, forum)

System of Cooperation among the American Air Forces (1961, forum)

Inter- American Defence College (1962)

Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas (1995, forum)

Inter-American Defence Board (IADB) - 1942

Created as a coordinating body during World War II, it has remained over time. Objective: identify solutions to common challenges of defence and security which may arise in the American continent. Role of advisor in peace times.

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) – 1947

It establishes that an attack on an American State will be considered an attack to all, and it also establishes the duty to assist. It was an instrument of the Cold War and it serves as a legal structure providing a framework for bilateral agreements between the United States and the countries of the region.

Organization of American States (OAS) – 1948

Objective: achieve peace and justice in all its Member States. It replaced the Panamerican Union.
 -Committee of Hemispheric Security (1995).
 - Secretariat for Multidimensional Security (2005).
 -IADB becomes an OAS entity(2006).

	Hemispheric Institutions	Sub-regional Response
1947-1948 Beginning of the Cold War	Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. IADB (role of advisor in peace times). Charter of the OAS (collective security). School of the Americas (1946-1999). Inter-American Air Forces Academy (1947). Agreements for United States military missions in other countries.	Diplomatic solidarity with the United States.
1950-1953 Korean War	MAPS with 17 Latin American countries (the United States provides training, equipment, and weapons in return for support to policies; permanent military missions in each country).	Cooperation with the United States in the system building (except Mexico). Participation of Colombia in the War.
1959-1968 Effects of the Cuban Revolution	Inter-American Naval Conferences (CNI). Conference of American Armies (CAA). System of Cooperation Among the American Air Forces (SI-COFAA). Inter-American Defence College (IADC). Annual joint exercises.	Wave of military coups in Latin America (1964-1973). Tlatelolco Treaty (1967) and Prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America.
1975-1986 Democratization	OAS reform.	Weapons control projects. Attempts at conflict resolution.
1989-1991 End of Cold War; Post Cold War.	Creation of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission –CICAD- (1986). Special Security Committee of the OAS (1991).	Disagreements on how to address the drug issue. Regional Security System (RSS) amended in 1996 (Caribbean).
1994 Summit of the Americas	Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas –CMDA- (1995). Creation of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (1999). Inter-American Defence College reform (1995-6). WHINSEC replaces the School of the Americas (2001). Permanent Security Committee of the OAS (2005).	Consensus on hemispheric integration. Conflict resolution. Confidence measures. Peru denounces the TIAR (1990). Withdrawal of condemnation in 1991. Conference of Central American Armed Forces (1997).
2001 September 11 Attack	Brazil invokes the TIAR. Creation of the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security (2005). Meeting of Ministers of Public Security –MISPA I- (2007).	Initial exceptional solidarity with the United States. Mexico denounces TIAR (2002).
2005 End of Miami Consensus		Foundation of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America –ALBA- (2004). Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (2005). Merida Initiative (2008). Union of South American Nations–UNASUR- (2008). South American Defence Council (2008). Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (2010). ALBA Defence School (2012). Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela announced their denouncement of the TIAR (2012). Venezuela denounces the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (CADH) in September 2012 (1).

(1) Until the denouncement enters into force, in a years time, Venezuela, as an OAS Member State, will continue to be subject to the authority of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (CIDH) and the duties imposed by the Charter of OAS, subscribed by that country in 1948. Consequently, any case of human rights violations occurring up to the date of entry into force of the claim, could be heard by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, pursuant to section 78 of CADH.

Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas (CDMA)

The CDMA is a unique meeting of regional Ministers of Defence. It brings together 34 countries of the Hemisphere to meet every two years. It is a forum, the objective of which is to advance towards reciprocal knowledge, analysis, debate and exchange of views and experiences on defence and security, as well as any other interaction mechanism to allow its fulfilment. It has an ad-hoc structure, as it has no formal permanent secretariat. The countries offer themselves as hosts.


Its decisions are not binding.

Williamsburg Principles

- Mutual security rests on the preservation of democracy.
- Military and security forces play a critical role in supporting and defending the legitimate interests of sovereign democratic States.
- Subordination of the Armed Forces to the democratically controlled authority.
- Transparency in defence matters.
- Dispute resolution through negotiated settlements.
- Greater defence cooperation in support of security needs.

Inclusion of civil society in the Conference process:

- I Williamsburg, 1995
- II Bariloche, 1996
- III Cartagena, 1998
- IV Manaus, 2000
- V Santiago, 2002
- VI Quito, 2004
- VII Managua, 2006
- VIII Banff, 2008
- IX Santa Cruz, 2010



Agenda- 10th CDMA

- Uruguay is the host country of the X CDMA in October 2012.
- Natural Disasters, Biodiversity and Environmental Protection.
 - Peacekeeping missions.
 - Security and defence and validity of the Inter-American Defence System.

The preparatory meeting of the IX Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas, held in the city of Santa Cruz, established the invitation to **Cuba**, as special guest.

Topics contained in Final Declarations


	Bariloche	Cartagena	Manaus	Santiago	Quito	Managua	Banff	Santa Cruz
Condemning outlawed armed groups/terrorism.		↓	•	•	•	•	•	•
Civil society contribution.							↓	•
Inter-American Convention: transparency in conventional weapons.		↓	•	•	•	•	•	•
Cooperation on natural disasters.		↓	•	•	•	•	•	•
Defence: responsibility of all the society.			↓	•	•	•	•	•
Humanitarian demining.			↓	•	•	•	•	•
HHRR/IHL education.		↓	•	•	•	•	•	•
Military education/training.							↓	•
Promotion of meetings and exchanges.		↓	•	•	•	•	•	•
Civilian training/inclusion.			↓	•	•	•	•	•
Multiculturalism.								↓
Multidimensionality/new threats according to domestic laws.			↓	•	•	•	•	•
Non-proliferation.			↓	•	•	•	•	•
Peace operations.	↓	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Gender perspective.				↓	•	•	•	•
Institutional modernization processes.					↓	•	•	•
Small arms and light weapons proliferation.		↓	•	•	•	•	•	•
Promotion of confidence-building measures.	↓	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Protection of the cultural heritage.					↓	•	•	•
Subregional realities/flexible architecture.			↓	•	•	•	•	•
Democracy-security-economy relation.				↓	•	•	•	•
Budgetary transparency.			↓	•	•	•	•	•

Source: Compilation based on the Conferences' Final Declarations and the web site of the Uruguayan Ministry of Defence. The main subjects addressed in each declaration have been considered.



Organization of American States (OAS)

Structure



The principal theme of the 41st session of the OAS General Assembly was "Citizen Security in the Americas". It was held on 5 - 7 June 2011 in San Salvador, El Salvador.

The Declaration of San Salvador on Citizen Security in the Americas has its origin there. The Committee on Hemispheric Security made a Working Plan to follow this issue and develop a Plan of Action.

Committee on Hemispheric Security

It is in charge of studying and making recommendations on hemispheric security, particularly on those entrusted to it by the Permanent Council or the General Assembly. In recent years, the following actions have been carried out, according to the issues addressed:

Hemispheric Security

Declaration on Security in the Americas (2003)

- Meeting of Ministers on Public Security of the Americas, MISPA III, (Trinidad and Tobago - 2011/11/17). Issues dealt with: police management. Recommendations focused on co-operation, professionalization, modernization.
- Development of a resolution project "Promotion of Hemispheric security: A Multi-dimensional Approach", approved in the 42nd session of the General Assembly, (Bolivia, 2012).
- Follow up of the Special Conference on Security (Washington D.C. - 2012/04/18).

Confidence and Security Building

Declaration of Santiago (1995)

- Fourth Meeting of the Forum on Confidence and Security promotion Measures (Lima, Perú – 15th – 16th November 2010).
- Development of a resolution project: "Promotion of Confidence and Security in the Americas", later approved by the General Assembly (2011).

Non- proliferation of nuclear weapons

- Meeting on "Inter-American Support to the Nuclear Ban Treaty" and "Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education" (2010).
- Meeting on the consolidation of the regime established in the Tlatelolco Treaty, with the participation of the United Nations and other international organizations with competence in these matters (2011).

Illicit Trafficking in Firearms

Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other related Materials (2011)

- Seminar on "Illicit Trafficking in firearms" (2012).

Conventional Arms

Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions.

- First Conference of the States Parties to the CITAAC (2009).

Anti-Personnel Mines

- Central America has become a Free Area for Anti-Personnel Mines (2010).
- Development of a resolution project "Latin-America as a Free Area for Anti-Personnel Mines", later approved by the General Assembly (2011).

Criminal Gangs

- Second Special Meeting on Criminal Gangs towards a Regional Strategy to promote Inter-American Cooperation (2010).
- Development of a Working Plan towards a regional strategy to promote Inter-American cooperation for dealing with criminal gangs (2010).

Natural Disasters Reduction

- I Meeting of High-Level National Authorities on Natural Disaster Reduction and Risk Management (2008).

Anti-Trafficking in Persons

- Development of a Working Plan against the Trafficking in Persons in the Hemisphere (2010-2012).

Transnational Organized Crime

- Development of a resolution project for the execution of a Hemispheric Action Plan against transnational organized crime and the strengthening of hemispheric cooperation (approved in 2010).
- Third meeting of the OAS Technical Group on transnational organised crime (Trinidad and Tobago - November 2011).
- High-Level Hemispheric Meeting on Transnational Organized Crime (2012).



Source: Compilation based on the Presidential Report on the activities of the Committee of Hemispheric Security 2010-2011, 2011-2012; Declarations and Resolutions approved in the 41st and 42nd Regular Meetings of the OAS General Assembly and website of the Committee of Hemispheric Security.

Inter-American Defence Board (IADB)

Created in 1942, it is an international forum made up of civilian and military representatives appointed by the Member States, who provide technical and educational advice on military and defence matters in the hemisphere. Its structure consists of a Council of Delegates (President, Vice-president, delegations of Member States); a Secretariat and the Inter-American Defence College (IADC).

One of the activities the Committee on Hemispheric Security (CHS) entrusted to the IADB is the submission of an annual report on the Promotion of Confidence and Security Measures (MFCS) of the OAS member countries.

In 2012, the IADB developed three studies based on its role of advisor:

- On the participation of the Armed Forces in support of public security activities, requested by the OAS General Secretariat.
- On the Inter-American Defence System, requested by the Permanent Mission of Canada to the OAS.
- On the history of the IADB, requested by the Permanent Mission of Argentina to the OAS.

Member Countries:

Antigua and Barbuda	Chile*	Haiti	Peru*
Argentina	Colombia*	Honduras*	Suriname*
Barbados*	Dominican Republic*	Jamaica	Trinidad and Tobago*
Belize*	El Salvador*	Mexico*	Uruguay*
Bolivia*	Ecuador	Nicaragua*	United States*
Brazil*	Guatemala*	Panama*	Venezuela
Canada*	Guyana*	Paraguay*	

* Countries with delegates in the Council (data as of 31 August 2012). Most of the delegates exercise functions at the Permanent Mission of their country to the OAS or as Attaché to the United States).

The Secretariat has 26 advisors from Brazil (13), Chile (2), Colombia (3), the United States (2), Mexico (3), Peru (1) and the Dominican Republic (2).

Inter-American Defence College

Created in 1962, the Inter-American Defence College has the aim of training members of hemispheric countries in defence and security matters.

It has a 2-year curriculum for the Advanced Course on Hemispheric Defence and Security.

The number of students in each class of the Inter-American Defence College is approximately 60. Each member state of the Organization of American States is entitled to send three (3) students, which are funded by the country sending them.

It has received a total of **2,497** students since its creation.

Its activities and seminars deal with the following themes:

- The role of the military in hemispheric security.
- Human rights and international law.
- Border security.
- Peacekeeping operations.
- Disasters and complex emergencies.

Source: Compilation based on information from the Inter-American Defence Board; webpage of the Inter-American Defence College; Resolution of the Organization of American States General Assembly (OAS- 1 -XXXII/06), 2006, and Inventory of Measures for Confidence Promotion and Security Strengthening of the IADB (March 2012).

Inter-American Naval Conferences (CNI)

They started in 1959 and are held every two years. Their purpose is to study common naval concerns and promote permanent professional contacts.

Member countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. The Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network and the IADB have observer status.

The 25th Conference was held in May 2012 and was located, for the first time, in Mexico (current location of the CNI).

The main theme addressed was Inter-American maritime security, focusing on providing humanitarian assistance in emergency or disaster areas, to countries affected by a natural disaster. The participants were the navies of: Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay; as well as the Chief of Staff of Argentina, Honduras, Panama and Venezuela; the United States, the Director General of the Secretariat of the Inter-American Defence Board, the Secretary of the Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network and the deputy chief of the United States Naval Operations.

Conference of the Leaders of the Marine Corps of the Americas

The Fifth Conference was held in 2011 in Peru, and it aimed at increasing the commitment of leaders of Marine Corps or naval forces of the Western Hemisphere. Fourteen countries participated (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Dominican Republic, United States and Uruguay).

They started in 1999, and are held every two years.


Source: Compilation on the basis of information from the web pages of the Mexican Navy Secretariat (SEMAR), and of the organization of the 24th Inter-American Naval Conference and the Peruvian Navy.



Conference of American Armies (CAA)

Created in 1960, it is made up of 20 member armies (Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela). Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica and Suriname took part as observers, as well as the CFAC and IADB.

Its purpose is to act as a debate forum for the exchange of experiences among the continent's armies.



Cycles, theme and activities

XXVII – 2006-07 XXVIII – 2008-09 XXIX – 2010-11 XXX – 2012-13

The CAA and its contribution to Peacekeeping Operations (developed under the United Nations mandate) and assistance operations in cases of disasters through the creation and implementation of mechanisms and procedures to improve the collective capacity of their members and their interoperability.

2 YEAR CYCLE

Preparatory conferences

- Ad-hoc and specialised conferences**
- Peacekeeping operations.
 - Environment.
 - Science and technology.
 - Education and training.
 - Military-civic relations.
 - Assistance operations in the case of disasters.
 - Peacekeeping operations procedures, education and training.
 - Legal affairs.
 - Emerging threats and risk situations.
 - Ad hoc meetings on procedures, legal affairs and science and technology in peacekeeping operations.

Commanders' conferences

It provides reports and proposals to the Commanders' conference

Exercises

Within the framework of the CAA, countries make joint exercises for peacekeeping operations, radio-communications, military-civic relations, cabinet of activities, communications and disasters, among others.

For the first time in the history of the cycles, an extraordinary Commanders' Conference will be held on emerging risk situations, in response to proposals by Ecuador. It will be held in December 2012 in Mexico.

During the 28th Conference (2009), the CAA procedural guidelines for assistance in case of disasters were approved.

In 2011, and within the framework of the conversations held within the CAA, the Huemul Exercise was carried out. 600 military personnel from the Armies of Brazil, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, United States and Uruguay took part. It was the first exercise which simulated a crisis situation to put the rules, manuals and existing procedures into practice.

In 2012 the CAA Communications Exercise was held with the aim of developing the necessary capacities to keep the CAA radio network operational. 14 armies took part: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, United States and Uruguay. They exchanged information on the situation of their countries affected by the hypothetical Guadalupe hurricane.

In addition, the "cabinet" exercise of Peacekeeping operations was performed in Guatemala to apply the knowledge of planning and execution of pre-deployment, deployment and withdrawal stages in PKO, which are covered in the basic tactical procedures included in the manuals and guidelines of CAA.

The CAA has approved the Peacekeeping Operations Manual including, among other issues, the various levels and phases of training, responsibilities and gender issues.

Source: Compilation based on information provided in the web page of the Conference of American Armies, el XXX Cycle of the SEPCEA, Newsletter Nº 2 of 30th cycle of SEPCEA and webpage of the Chilean Army and The Ministry of Defence.

System of Cooperation among the American Air Forces (SICOFAA)


Created in 1961, the SICOFAA is a system which seeks cooperation among the region's Air Forces. It promotes training, knowledge and experience exchanges to strengthen the capabilities of the Air Forces -and their equivalents- in order to provide support to its members' requirements. According to its 2012-2027 Strategic Plan, its strategic areas are humanitarian aid and institutional strengthening.

Members: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama (National Aero Naval Service), Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. **Observers:** Belize, Costa Rica (Air Surveillance Service), Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica and Mexico.

The SICOFAA Combined Air Operations Manual for Humanitarian Aid during Disasters was approved in 2011. It is aimed at carrying out combined air operations for humanitarian aid during disasters within the framework of cooperation strengthening and mutual understanding.

Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA)

The Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA) was founded on March 15, 1943. It is located in Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, United States. Its stated mission is to train and educate the military forces to build and generate abilities for the support of world stability and security, while generating academic and cultural relations. It offers training courses for Officers (ISOS) and professional training courses for Non-Commissioned Officers (INCOA).



Meetings were held in 2011 and 2012 by the the different committees of the system: Personnel, Information, Operations, Logistics, Science and Technology.

2012-2017 Master Plan – SICOFAA

Its general purpose is to position SICOFAA as an agile and effective response mechanism on humanitarian aid during disasters, through the following specific goals:

- Strengthening mechanisms for support and integration among Air Forces and their equivalents in the region.
- Optimizing the response capability of the Air Forces and their equivalents in response to disasters emerging in the region, which may require SICOFAA to intervene.
- Optimizing technical capabilities inherent to the planning and development of combined air operations.
- Promoting the establishment of a common doctrine of aerospace safety.

The Master Plan is part of a Strategic Plan (Planestra 2012-2027) which establishes the strategic areas and purposes, including the projects to be implemented.

Strategic Areas	Objectives	Projects to be implemented
SICOFAA's institutional strengthening	Enhance the System's operational capacity to provide humanitarian aid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operational readiness • Aerospace Security • Cooperation II (virtual) and III (real) exercises. • Promoting a culture of aerospace security.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training - Inter-institutional coordination - Optimization of SICOFAA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fostering regional knowledge and experientia exchange. • Increasing the levels of exchange with regional organization. • Updating SICOFAA organizational structure. • Improving SICOFAA telecommunications and IT system.

Source: Compilation based on information provided by the website of the SICOFAA Permanent Secretariat, the Combined Air Operations Manual for Humanitarian Aid during Disasters (2011), the 2012-2027 Planestra Strategic Plan and the 2012-2017 SICOFAA Master Plan.



Analysis:

Hemispheric Forums and Mechanisms: Difficulties in reaching Agreement

Francisco Rojas Aravena

Member of RESDAL Board

Secretary General of Flacso from 2004 to 2012

The international context has changed and so has the hemispheric scenario. The global and regional strategic framework is no longer the same. New powers have emerged –such as the BRICSA. Brazil is now a regional and global power. Developed countries are stagnant and crisis-ridden. Latin America, and South America in particular, continue to grow and provide new opportunities for development and poverty reduction. Poverty rates fell from 48.4% in 1990 to 30.4% in 2011. However, inequality persists and has increased in the northern countries of the hemisphere. New integration processes are moving forward, as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), a prestigious entity that stands as a legitimate voice in the global arena.

Latin America and the Caribbean constitute an interstate peace zone and a region free of nuclear weapons. Electoral democracy has consolidated in the region, and the strengthening of democratic governance is pursued. One of the major weaknesses, though, is the lack of full territorial control. This opens the door to organised crime, turning it into one of the world's most violent regions with staggeringly high manslaughter rates.

Summit of the Americas. The hemisphere calls for a change in the perspective and view that the Americans and Latin Americans have on their position within the international system, the kind of historical development and the relations maintained, as well as their new opportunities for the future. The Summit of the Americas stems as the multilateral forum where these discussions can take place and embodies the major platform for dialogue across the hemisphere.

It is the only forum where the Heads of State and government of the hemisphere can share common and professional views on global, cross-border and hemispheric issues, reach agreements, create opportunities and coordinate shared actions and endeavours. It also offers an opportunity to identify differences regarding the items on the agenda and action plans. This flexible and ad hoc scenario also allows for introducing emerging issues.

The VI Summit held in Cartagena, Colombia (April 14 -15, 2012) set the stage to start a dialogue process on one of the most substantial and decisive issues of the hemisphere: the legalisation of drugs and the critical views on the “war against drugs”. Special attention was also given to the adverse effects of the exclusionary and discriminatory policies against Cuba, and the failure to tackle issues such as Malvinas, which largely attracted the attention of the Heads of State. The most prominent feature of the Summit Diplomacy is the Presidents’ direct and honest dialogue. That is the key to the process.

Just as in the V Summit of Trinidad and Tobago, no consensus was reached in order to arrive at a declaration. Nevertheless, a mandate was approved for the OAS to start a process to find alternative strategies in the fight against drugs. Thus, the countries acknowledged that 30 years of “war against drugs” have rendered no results. On the contrary, it has escalated violence and militarisation in Latin America. Former Presidents Ernesto Zedillo from Mexico, Cesar Gaviria from Colombia and Fernando H. Cardoso from Brazil underscored the failure of this policy, the lack of results and how far away the region is from eradicating drugs. They called on the need to make a critical analysis of the issue.

Some of the current topics that characterise the debate on drug-trafficking include the following aspects: 1) drug use has spread worldwide; 2) partial victories strengthen the “balloon effect” and crop proliferation; 3) increased number of trafficking routes; 4) scattered and fragmented cartels; 5) de-institutionalising effect and a failure of reforms to establish state policies; 6) failed demand reduction policies; 7) little success in regional and international agreements; 8) increased support to alternative legalisation policies.¹

The “forward defence” concept moves the US national security fight inside Latin American and Carib-

¹ Bruce Bagley, *Drug Trafficking and organized crime in the Americas: major trends in the Twenty-first Century* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2012).

bean nations, overlapping its own goals with those of these countries, where consumption is low. Borders are “re-defined” and resemblance is found between insurgency and drug-trafficking. Such equivalence is not only untrue but also simplistic and undermines the complexity of the concept.² A direct consequence is the overlapping of roles, thus leading to the de-professionalisation of police and armed forces.³

Cuba’s exclusion from hemispheric debates was another salient feature of the Summit. As a result, the presidents of Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela refused to attend. Also, the ALBA countries pointed out that unless Cuba was invited to the next Summit, the members of the group would not participate either.

The anachronistic traces of the Cold War still present in the hemisphere were evidenced in the absence and departure of some heads of state before the meeting’s closing, which was clearly depicted on the “family photo”.

OAS debates. Upon Bolivia’s request, the main topic of the OAS General Assembly gathered in June, in Cochabamba, was food sovereignty and its relationship with the fight against poverty. Directly linked to this is the search for mechanisms that may help avoid food price speculation in the “futures market” on the part of financial brokers, as was reported by President Leonel Fernández.

The most transcendental decision was to approve the *Social Charter of the Americas: Renewal of the hemispheric commitment to fight extreme poverty in the region*. The issue of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) gained special significance due to the presence of President Rafael Correa, who stated that although the United States is not part of the American Convention in the matter, it makes use of the IACHR to attack the policies of countries, particularly in relation to sensitive issues, such as mass communication media issues and that it seeks to impose “precautionary measures” which are not in line with the IACHR’s competence. Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela have criticised the IACHR, accusing it of acting beyond its scope. Due to discrepancies with IACHR resolutions, Brazil withdrew its ambassador to the OAS. The OAS Secretary General sympathised with Brazil and asked that the resolution be reviewed. Likewise, Venezuela announced its withdrawal from the IACHR. At the General Assembly, Secretary Insulza proposed the creation of a Reflection Group to

turn the IACHR and the Court into independent and strong bodies.

The Committee on Hemispheric Security filed a single, comprehensive resolution before the General Assembly. This 64-paragraph document addressed issues such as the Declaration of San Salvador on Citizen Security in the Americas, the Follow-up of the Special Conference on Security, the Special Security Concerns of the Small Island States of the Caribbean, among other issues.

Hemispheric defence matters. The Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas is a multilateral forum for the discussion of defence matters. It gathers the ministers of defence of the Hemisphere and is part of the Summit Diplomacy process; it takes non-binding decisions and it is an ad hoc forum that holds sessions every two years.

The X Conference, to be held in Uruguay in October 2012, is intended to address 3 main topics: a) natural disasters, environmental protection and biodiversity; b) Peace missions; c) Security and defence and the Inter-American Defence System. In relation to the latter, discussions address the role of the Inter-American Defence Board, which is subject to a process of debate and reform including a change to its name (whether it is maintained or changed into Organization of Defence and Cooperation of the American States –ODCAS).

Upon the request of Canada, it is conducting a study on “The future of the mission and roles of instruments and components of the Inter-American defence system”, which will enable to highlight the many instruments, components and entities that presently address defence issues, though no formal “Inter-American system” actually exists.

Regarding the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR in Spanish), Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela announced -within the framework of the OAS 42nd General Assembly- that they would issue a formal claim over the Treaty based on section 25 therein. They stated that the Treaty has lost legitimacy and effectiveness. Mexico withdrew from it in 2001.

In conclusion, while hemispheric asymmetries are unavoidable, cross-border issues call for the cooperation of all. In view of scourges such as drug-trafficking, climate change, financial crisis and transnational organised crime, no sub-region or State by itself can successfully resolve them. Only through cooperation and joint actions will successful results be achieved. Hemispheric forums and spaces must be improved and create the necessary cooperation to ensure success in the hemisphere in the light of the new risks and threats ahead.

² Constantino Urcuyo, *La ampliación de una guerra fallida*. (Unpublished original, 2010).

³ Francisco Rojas Aravena, “El riesgo de la superposición entre las políticas de defensa y seguridad” in *Revista Nueva Sociedad* (Caracas: 2008), N° 213.



Central American Armed Forces Conference (CFAC)

The CFAC was created in 1997 as a forum to promote permanent and systematic efforts for cooperation, coordination and mutual support among the Central American armed forces.


Members: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Dominican Republic.

Observers: Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Germany, Russia, Spain, Taiwan, United Kingdom and United States.

CFAC is an observer member of the Conference of the American Armies.

In February 2012, Honduras took over as President of the Higher Council.

Functional organization:



CFAC coordination authorities have met over the last years and have reached agreements and made advances on the following issues:

Fight against common threats (organized crime, drug-trafficking and criminal gangs)

CFAC's Plan of Integrated Cooperation to Prevent and Counteract Terrorism, Organized Crime and Related Activities includes: periodical reports on threats and operations to counteract such threats; ongoing information exchange; exchange of experiences; (virtual and practical) training exercises; coordinated actions on land, at sea or in the air; particular operation plans in each country; meetings of border unit commanders; manuals for interoperability of land, air and sea forces. Among other fields, penitentiary security is also discussed.

Humanitarian aid and natural disasters

Since it was created in 1999, the Humanitarian and Rescue Unit (UHR-CFAC) has rendered assistance during extreme natural disasters (hurricanes, tropical storms and depressions, floods and droughts) affecting the region.

Peacekeeping operations

Cooperation in this field gave rise to the creation of the Peacekeeping Operations Unit (UOMP – CFAC) in 2004, which in 2012 analyzed the creation of the CFAC Battalion. Staff training is provided at CREOMPAZ in Guatemala.

Other fields

Annual program on military confidence-building measures.
Exchange program for officers in the educational area.
Industrial and logistics commercial mechanisms.
Cooperation on health-care service exchange among the Armed Forces.

Regional coordination

The Central American Security Commission works at the level of the Central American Integration System (SICA) and is composed of a Sub-Committee of Defence, made up of representatives of the Ministries of Defence of SICA member countries. Although CFAC is not part of SICA, both institutions maintain permanent communication.

CFAC representatives take part in high-level meetings, such as the Central American Security Conference (CENTSEC) sponsored by the United States Southern Command. CFAC also collaborates with other regional institutions, such as the Coordination Centre for the Prevention of Natural Disasters in Central America (CEPRENAC) and the Central American Commission of Maritime Transport (COCATRAM).

In July 2012, it agreed on the creation of a military training base for human rescue with the support of the United States. The base will be located in Honduras.

CFAC takes part in simulation exercises and drills of the Humanitarian Allied Forces (FAHUM), as well as in activities on information exchange and multinational coordination organized by the US Southern Command. As way of example, a seminar-workshop for the mitigation of epidemics took place in March 2012.


Sources: Acuerdo de Creación de la CFAC (1997); Reglamento de la CFAC (2008); websites of the National Ministry of Defence of El Salvador and Guatemala, the Army of Nicaragua, Secretariat of National Defence of Honduras; SICA; COPECO - Honduras and COCATRAM.

Central American Integration System (SICA)

Within the framework of the 11th Meeting of Central American Presidents (Tegucigalpa, Honduras on 13 December 1991), the Tegucigalpa Protocol was signed, giving rise to the Central American Integration System (SICA) and replacing the old Central American States Organization (ODECA). SICA is the political institution that deals with economic, political and social integration matters. Four years later (15 December, 1995), the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America was signed as a supplementary instrument of the Tegucigalpa Protocol, and became a regional legal instrument on security. The Treaty resulted in the Democratic Safety model and introduced the Central American Security Commission as a subsidiary authority subordinated to the Meeting of Presidents and the Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers in order to coordinate, assess, follow up and formulate proposals on regional security.

Member states: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. Dominican Republic is an associated State.

Components of the Central American Security Strategy 2007-2011




Sources: *Index of Public and Citizen Security in Latin America (RESDAL, 2011)*.

25 years after signing the Esquipulas II Agreement...

The 1987 Esquipulas Agreements marked one of the most important milestones in the peace process in Central America and contributed the cessation of armed conflicts in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua. These agreements established a range of measures to promote national reconciliation, an end of hostilities, democratization, free elections, the elimination of all assistance to irregular military forces, negotiations on arms control, and assistance to refugees.

Although the key role in the process of peace-building and transition to democracy in Central America has been played by the relevant actors of each country, a series of initiatives have been launched by the international community from the 1980s onwards in order to attain peace and negotiate a political settlement.



Sources: Compilation based on the *Declaración de Esquipulas I* (1986), *Acuerdo de Esquipulas II* (1987) and the web site of the United Nations and the Organization of American States.



UNASUR's South American Defence Council

Creation: December 2008. A Forum for Cooperation, Consultation and Coordination. It is attended by the Ministers of Defence of UNASUR member countries and senior representatives of Foreign Affairs Ministries.

Objectives:


- Consolidate South America as a "peace zone"
- Build a South-American identity in the area of defence, based on subregional and national characteristics while contributing to the strengthening of Latin America and Caribbean unity.
- Generate consensus to reinforce regional cooperation in the area of defence.

When the CDS was created, the political will to peacefully settle disputes and promote hemispheric and sub-regional peace and security prevailed. Under these principles, a positive consensus was achieved excluded three aspects:

- a) The CDS is not conceived as a collective security organization.
- b) The new body does not deal with security issues.
- c) The CDS does not identify common adversaries.




Evolution of a Regional Security Mechanism



Structure and Organization

The term of the pro-tempore President of the South American Defence Council coincides with that of the UNASUR President (in the 2010-2011 period, the Council Secretariat was taken over by Peru in replacement of Suriname).

2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013
Chile	Ecuador	Peru	Paraguay	Peru



Main activities under the 2011–2012 Action Plan

Centre for Strategic Defence Studies (CEED)

The CEED was inaugurated in May 2011 at the 6th CDS Ministers' Meeting. Its budget was approved and an internal by-law was also adopted. The CEED was responsible for preparing the First South American Registry of Defence Spending and also keeps the database of security- and confidence-building measures.

Out of the 27 activities proposed in the 2012 Action Plan:

- 48% falls under the defence policies' category.
- 18.5% falls under military cooperation, humanitarian action and peace-keeping operations.
- 18.5% accounts for defence industry and technology.
- And 15% accounts for training.



Number of activities proposed per area

	2011	2012
Defence policies	5	13
Military cooperation, humanitarian actions and peacekeeping operations	6	5
Defence industry and technology	4	5
Training	3	4

Agreements and Events (2012)

- Workshop on "Elaboration of risk map for natural disasters and anticipated mitigations". The proposal of the "Protocol on Cooperation Mechanisms among the South-American Ministries of Defence in the event of major natural or man-made disasters" was approved.
- Meeting on mechanisms to provide transparency to the military inventory of the South American region. It was agreed that the South American Military Inventory Form would be adopted.
- Meeting of UNASUR Ministers of Defence, Interior, Justice and Foreign Affairs, aimed at analyzing the threats poses to peace and stability in the region.
- Working Group to assess the possibility to establish regional policies and mechanisms to confront cyber-security or IT threats in the defence field.
- Actions of Antarctic cooperation (e.g. the 35th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting).
- Conference on Strategic Thinking (topics: sovereignty, new regionalism and defence, defence spending, mutual confidence and cooperation, strategic relations and defence in the regional context).
- Creation of a virtual classroom system for meetings, seminars and real-time information exchange.
- Working Group Meeting to regulate the Statute of the South American Defence Council.
- First Working Group's technical meeting to submit a feasibility report with a view to regional design, development and production of a South American basic training aircraft.

Sources: Compilation based on information provided by the website of the South American Defence Council, Management Report of the CDS pro-tempore Presidency (2010-2011) and the Minutes of the 6th executive Meeting of the South American Defence Council (Asuncion, 4th June 2012).



US Southern Command

SOUTHCOM, headquartered in Miami, Florida, is one of the ten Unified Combatant Commands (UCC) of the Department of Defence. It is charged with the task of providing planning, operations and cooperation in security for 31 countries in the Americas, except for Mexico (which is part of the Northern Command⁽¹⁾), and the 12 islands which constitute States or territories under European sovereignty (the territories forming part of the US administration are also excluded). It also has jurisdiction in part of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (the waters adjacent to Central American and Caribbean countries, between 30° and 92° West meridians) and the Gulf of Mexico. The US Southern Command extends its scope of action to the Panama Canal.

Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATFS)

The working group has the mission to detect, follow-up and support interdiction to disarticulate illicit trafficking, including drug trafficking in the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico and the Eastern Pacific. It is located in Key West and has representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Mexico, Peru, Spain, The Netherlands, and United Kingdom.

Its key strategic purposes include the following:

- Supporting allied countries and other agencies, in order to counteract illicit trafficking.
- Strengthening security capabilities through bonds established with allied countries.
- Positioning the United States as a leader and an allied actor through information exchange, support to regional initiatives and inter-agency cooperation, as well as private sector and NGO cooperation.
- Building a long-lasting relationship to enhance security, stability, governance and prosperity.


In line with this, annual exercises are conducted, rotation is carried out and advisory assistance is provided.

SOUTHCOM Security Assistance Offices in the Americas⁽²⁾

Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.


(1) It comprises the continental territory of the United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding waters up to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, the Florida Strait and parts of the Caribbean to include Bahamas, Puerto Rico and US Virgin Islands.

(2) Each office is composed of at least one serving military person established in the US embassy. Its missions include providing financial and technical assistance, transfer of resources, and training and services to host countries, as well as promoting military-military contacts.



U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO)
 It is responsible for US forces and military means operating in Latin America and the Caribbean. It manages all naval units under the responsibility of the Southern Command.

Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)



Fourth Fleet
 Assigned to COMUSNAVSO. It operates jointly with other Southern Command components. One of the operations conducted is the Continuing Promise Mission. This is an annual humanitarian and civil assistance operation developed in the Caribbean, Central and South America under the naval component charge of Southern Command and the US Naval Forces Southern Command. This mission is conducted in cooperation with partners from other agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations and other international partners.

Deployment of the Continuing Promise Mission

Ships	Date of development	Route
USNS Comfort	June – October 2007	Belize, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago.
USS Boxer and USS Kearsarge	April - November 2008	Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago.
USNS Comfort	April - July 2009	Antigua and Barbuda, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama.
USS Iwo Jima	July –November 2010	Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Suriname.
USNS Comfort	2011	Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Peru.

Más allá del horizonte (Beyond the Horizon)

It conducts humanitarian assistance exercises. Troops specialized in engineering, construction and healthcare provide services and information to the communities. The exercise was performed in the following countries:
 2009: Colombia, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
 2010: Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama and Nicaragua
 2011: Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Nicaragua
 *Other exercises are provided in the Caribbean dossier.

Operation Martillo

It is aimed at interdicting illicit maritime trafficking in the Central American region. The US Southern Command participates through JITFS. In 2012, the following countries took part: Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, also in partnership with Canada, France, Great Britain, Spain and The Netherlands.

Source: US Southern Command Public Affairs Office. Command Strategy 2020, United States Southern Command Report *U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Inter-agency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation*, United States Government Accountability Office (july 2010), Website of the United States Army South and Federal Health Care Center (Defence Department).

Initiatives of the U.S. Department of State

The US Department of State develops several initiatives which, in cooperation with other government agencies, are aimed at providing assistance in the fight against drug-trafficking and organized crime. These comprise military assistance funding.

Merida
 It was created in 2007. At its outset, this initiative was divided into Merida-Mexico, Merida-Central America (currently CARSi) and Merida-Caribbean (currently CBSI)*.
Objectives: Fight against organized crime and related violence, based on principles of shared responsibility, confidence-building and respect of sovereign independence.
Activities: Training and equipment for institutional strengthening that may lead to building a framework of border and citizen security as well as the administration of justice.

Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSi)
 CARSi has taken this name since 2009. It seeks to counteract the effects of arms smuggling and **drug-trafficking, criminal gangs and organized crime in Latin America.**
Countries: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.
 It supports programmes related to the strengthening of security agencies and justice institutional capacities, contributing to a greater State presence in vulnerable communities.

Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI)
 CSDI bears this name as from 2009, once the “Colombia Plan” was terminated.
Objectives: Supporting the National Consolidation Plan of the Colombian government through regional development programmes which contribute to establishing and sustaining the State’s presence in areas where groups related to organized crime are present.

*For further information on CBSI (Caribbean Basin Security Initiative), see the anglophone Caribbean dossier.

Sources: Website of the U.S. Department of State and Report: *U.S. Agencies Have Allotted Billions in Andean Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Reporting of Results. Appendix IV: Western Hemisphere Initiatives to Combat Narcotics Trafficking and Related Crimes* United States Government Accountability Office (July 2012).



Bilateral agreements signed on defence matters (2010-2012)

Central America and Mexico

- Mexico– Dominican Republic: Agreement on Exchange of Information and Experiences to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (2011).
- Dominican Republic – Haiti: Agreement for Strengthening Border Security (2012).

Andean Region

- Bolivia – Colombia: Agreement for the Creation of Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers Mechanism (2011). Cooperation Agreement on Security, Defence and Fight against Drug-trafficking (2012).
- Bolivia – Peru: Supplementary Extension Protocol to ILO Conventions (2010).
- Chile – Colombia: Memorandum on Defence Cooperation (2011).
- Colombia – Venezuela: Cooperation Agreement to Combat Drug-trafficking (2011).
- Peru – Venezuela: Memorandum for Establishing and Developing Cooperation on Security and Defence (2012).

- Argentina – Venezuela: Defence Cooperation Agreement (2012).
- Brazil – Colombia: Agreement to regulate the operation of the Binational Border Commission (Combifron) (2012).
- Brazil – Ecuador: Defence Cooperation Agreement (2011).
- Brazil – El Salvador: Amendment to the Supplementary Agreement on technical, scientific and technological cooperation to carry out “Technicians training for the implementation and development of civil protection” project (2011).
- Brazil – Peru: Memorandum of Understanding on the Aerospace Field (2012), Memorandum of Understanding on Naval Engineering (2012).
- Brazil – Venezuela: Memorandum of Understanding for establishing a border regime (2011).
- Bolivia – Brazil: Memorandum for conducting joint military exercises and operations at borders (2011).
- Bolivia – Uruguay: Defence Cooperation Agreement (2011).
- Bolivia – Paraguay: Additional Protocol to the Treaty on Peace, Friendship and Borders (2011).
- Chile – Paraguay: Memorandum on Defence Cooperation (2011).
- Chile – Ecuador: Inter-agency Cooperation Agreement on citizen security and prevention of natural disasters (2011). Addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding for the MINUSTAH Joint Engineers’ Company (2012).
- Colombia – Honduras: Cooperation Agreement to Combat Drug-Trafficking in the Caribbean Sea (2011).
- Paraguay – Uruguay: Cooperation Agreement within the Framework of Defence (2011).
- Ecuador – Haiti: Cooperation Agreement for Haiti Reconstruction (2012).
- Ecuador – Dominican Republic: Cooperation Agreement for Haiti Reconstruction (2010).
- Ecuador – Uruguay: Defence Cooperation Agreement (2010 y 2012).
- Ecuador – Venezuela: Agreement on Technical-Military Cooperation (2011).
- Paraguay – Peru: Defence Cooperation Agreement (2011).
- Peru – Uruguay: Defence Cooperation Agreement (2011).
- Venezuela – Cuba: Agreement for Ship Construction for the Bolivarian Navy in Puerto Callao (2012).



Southern Cone:

- Argentina – Chile: Inter-ministerial Memorandum on “Cruz del Sur” Combined Peacekeeping Force (2010), Memorandum on the Contributions to the United Nations Reserve Forces Agreements System (2011) and Memorandum on Emergency Medical Evacuation in Humanitarian Demining Tasks (2012).
- Argentina – Uruguay: Mutual Cooperation Agreement on Aerospace Control and Surveillance (2012).



Agreements signed with the rest of the Americas

- Brazil – United States: Agreement on Cooperation in the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (2011).
- Chile – Canada: Memorandum on Defence Cooperation (2012).
- Colombia – Canada: Agreement on Integrated Security (2012) / Colombia – United States: Agreement for the transfer for five UH-60 helicopters (2010).
- El Salvador – United States: Extension of the Agreements on Military Personnel Protection in the Country (2011) and Ida Tropical Storm Reconstruction Project (2011).
- Guatemala – United States: Memorandum on the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (2011).
- Mexico – United States: Agreement on Emergency Management Cooperation in Cases of Natural Disasters and Accidents (2011), Extension of the Agreements on Military Personnel Protection in the Country (2011), Cooperation Agreement in Cases of Natural Disasters and Accidents (2011).
- Peru - United States: Memorandum for Strengthening Political-Military Relations (2012).

Europe

- Argentina – France: Agreement on Cooperation with the Argentine Joint Peacekeeping Training Centre (2011).
- Brazil – Spain: Defence Cooperation Agreement (2010) / Brazil – The Netherlands: Defence Cooperation Agreement (2011).
- Chile – Turkey: Memorandum on Defence Industry Cooperation (2012).
- Ecuador – Belarus: Cooperation Agreement with the Ministry of Military Industries (State Military-Industrial Committee) (2012) / Ecuador – Italy: Defence Cooperation Agreement (2011 y 2012).
- Paraguay - Spain: Protocol of Cooperation (2011).
- Peru – Belarus: Agreement on Technical-Military Cooperation (2011) / Peru – Great Britain: Memorandum on Defence Industry Cooperation and its corresponding Annex on Material Protection and Classified Information (2011) / Peru – The Netherlands: Memorandum on Defence Cooperation (2011) / Peru – Ukraine: Agreement on Technical and Military Cooperation (2011).
- Uruguay – Spain: Protocol of Cooperation with the Ministries of Defence (2011) / Uruguay – Italy: Cooperation Agreement on Security and Defence Systems Acquisition (2011) / Uruguay – Portugal: Defence Cooperation Agreement (2011).



With Asia

- Argentina – Israel: Memorandum on Industrial and Technological Cooperation (2010) / Argentina – China: Defence Cooperation Agreement (2012).
- Bolivia – China: Agreement on Cooperation which includes logistical equipment and military fellowships and officers’ exchange (2011), Master Agreement on Economic Cooperation for the acquisition of six H425 multi-purpose helicopters aimed at providing logistical assistance in natural disasters (2011), and Agreement on Military Cooperation for the donation of military materials (2012).
- Chile – China: Cooperation Agreement on Security and Defence (2011) / Chile – Russia: Agreement on Mutual Protection of Secret Information in the Field of Military-Technical Cooperation (2010).
- Colombia – China: Agreements on Assistance and Military Cooperation (2011 y 2012).
- Nicaragua – Taiwan: Memorandum on Cooperation and Military Exchange (2011) / Nicaragua – Russia: Agreement for Developing the Disaster Mitigation and Prevention System (2011).
- Peru–China: Inter-institutional Cooperation Agreement on Military Training (2011).
- Venezuela – Russia: Technical- Military Cooperation Agreement (2012).



With Africa

- Argentina – South Africa: Memorandum on Defence Cooperation (2010).
- Brazil – Angola: Defence Cooperation Agreement (2010) / Brazil – Nigeria: Defence Cooperation Agreement (2010) / Brasil – São Tomé and Príncipe: Defence Cooperation Agreement (2010).

Sources: *Memoria del Ministerio de Defensa de Colombia* (2011 and 2012) y *del Ejército de Nicaragua* (2011). *Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia*. Websites of the Ministries of Defence of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela; Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Spain, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela. Websites of the Air Force of Colombia, the Army of Nicaragua, the Presidencies of Mexico and Uruguay.

Analysis:

Defence and Security in the Western Hemisphere

David Mares

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The defence and security situation in the Western Hemisphere is outwardly promising. Relations between Colombia and Venezuela are the best they have been in a decade, Argentina has responded with diplomacy to the UK's military deterrent around the Malvinas/Falklands Islands, UNASUR has a draft methodology for comparing defence budgets, regular meetings of Defence Ministers at the hemispheric and sub-hemispheric level are the norm, a new regional organization that articulates a vision of Latin American solidarity has been created (CELAC), and a number of boundary disputes between Latin American countries have been submitted to the International Court of Justice for resolution.

Yet this activity belies underlying issues that escape the attention of the regional security architecture, flare up periodically and whose continuation limits the ability of the hemisphere and its subregions to reach the status of a real peace and security area. And, despite the rhetoric of cooperation the options most used for defusing militarized conflict when it arises actually contributes to the perception that militarizing a dispute provides domestic and foreign policy advantages. A "moral-hazard" phenomenon develops because weak countries believe that they can be provocative militarily and have the regional community intervene not only to ensure that the weak country is not forced to capitulate to superior force, but also to pressure the more powerful state to make concessions as a means of ensuring peace.¹

The Issues

The official security focus at the hemispheric level is on protecting democracy; from Colombia northward and to the Caribbean crime and its cross-border flows (products, money, weapons, people) are especially of concern; and in most of South America the defence of national sovereignty stands out. Even if Latin America rejects the 'war on drugs' and chooses a different tactic to deal with drug consumption (including making so-called hard substances into prescription drugs), the interstate flows of these substances will still be problematic unless they completely open these markets. The new issues of natural resources, environmental damage and indigenous cultural survival are also gaining traction across the region.

There are also non-acknowledged security issues. Na-

tional boundaries remain contentious issues between countries, and military signaling and coercion occurs between Latin American countries. For example, Venezuela claims two-thirds of Guyana (and the Venezuelan military blew up gold mining dredges in an area recognized by the international community as Guyanese in 2007); Bolivia still demands a sovereign outlet to the sea through Chile; and Argentina claims the potentially hydrocarbon-rich Malvinas/Falklands Islands under British control. Ideological competition in the region abated with the end of the Cold War, but the failure of the Washington Consensus and the rise of populist governments in a number of countries means ideological competition exists once again. Cross-border ideological conflict can be especially severe, since it strikes at the legitimacy of a political system, and thus sovereignty – that is, a government's mandate to make decisions in the name of its citizens.

The Timidity of Leadership

Both the US and Brazil prefer to work with institutions in hopes of lowering leadership costs. The United States used to play the major role in Latin America's security architecture, often in very destabilizing ways, but global overextension has sapped its strength in the hemisphere. The US retains influence, nevertheless. The US successfully defended the new Honduran government of Porfirio Lobo after the civil-military coup in 2009. US support of Colombia after the 2008 military incursion into Ecuador facilitated Colombia's perception that it had acted legitimately in defence of its national interests. In the unlikely event of a major war in Latin America, however, especially if it involved an extra-hemispheric actor in some way, the US would find the resources to determine the outcome, at least in the short term.

Brazil has emerged as a potential regional stabilizer, using its 'soft power' based on a longstanding professional diplomatic corps at the Foreign Ministry (aka Itamaraty), insightful Presidential intervention at key moments (for example, amid the tension created by Bolivia's nationalization of Petrobras assets), public and private investment and aid for the region, and a new willingness to develop solidarity with Latin America. Brazil articulates a regional vision of cooperation, with economic integration, political alliance and shared values (social justice, democracy and human rights) forming the basis for peaceful relations. Brazil's view of conflict management is ultimately to build

¹ David R. Mares, *Latin America and the Illusion of Peace* (London: IISS and Routledge, 2012).



confidence in order to avoid tensions and it believes that this is best accomplished through institutions that emphasize national sovereignty. Of course, this also fits Brazilian domestic interests, as it has rejected the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights' intervention in the controversy over building dams in the Amazon and the 2008 National Strategy of Defence rejects the legitimacy of Brazilian citizens working with foreign NGOs in challenging government decisions for the Amazon region.

The Inadequacy of Institutional Responses

There is a proliferation of institutions in the hemisphere, with multiple ones claiming jurisdiction on the defence of democracy. While UNASUR helped broker better relations between Colombia and Venezuela, it did little to resolve the underlying sources of tensions between the two states – the use of Venezuelan territory by the Colombian guerrillas for money, guns, and rest. Since the guerrillas have not laid down their arms but rather changed their tactics to get around the government's successes in attacking the leadership, the basis for a future deterioration in bilateral relations remains. It is also true that bilateral agreements regarding responsibilities for securing common borders include information sharing by Brazil with its neighbors but not joint patrols, especially in the most contentious border region along Colombia's borders with Venezuela and Ecuador. Bolivia reinforces its borders with aid from Venezuela, but does not do it in a cooperative manner with either Paraguay or Chile. And Bolivia refused to work with Chile in downplaying the cross border crossing of armed Bolivian patrols, instead decorating the soldiers and accusing Chile of 'abusing' them.

The response of UNASUR/Mercosur to the Paraguay situation suggests a greater intervention in domestic politics in support of democratic consolidation. Previously, only efforts by the armed forces or police to force a president out of office fell into this sanctioned category (Venezuela 2002, Honduras 2009, Ecuador 2010). But the July 2012 suspension of Paraguay from the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) and UNASUR because, while the legislature followed the letter of the law in impeaching President Fernando Lugo, they violated due process along the way, is a potential watershed in the defence of democracy in the region.

The quick and unilateral manner in which Paraguay was suspended raises the question of whether the institutions themselves violated due process in responding to the Paraguayan situation. Mercosur and UNASUR do not define the standards for democracy nor the process by which an accused can defend themselves against the charges. Are violent protests in the streets illegitimate tools for removing Presidents and thus grounds for suspension of the country, at least until new and peaceful elections can be held? Can a legislature which loses its

supermajority in an election delegate decree powers to a President for a period of time as a means of limiting the opposition's ability to block future legislation requiring a supermajority (as happened in Venezuela in 2010)? What about a Constituent Assembly process that proceeds even as pro-government demonstrators keep opposition delegates from entering the building to vote (e.g., Bolivia in 2007)? Who will evaluate elections that are widely accused of irregularities (e.g., Nicaraguan municipal elections of 2008) to decide whether the government has violated the community's democracy clause?

Latin American actions on Cuba also represent a contradiction and a challenge for Latin America's focus on democracy. The historical peculiarity of the Cuban Revolution and the US embargo makes many Latin American states perceive that the path to democratization in Cuba lies in incorporating it into the regional community. The Rio Group admitted Cuba in 2008, a path for its reincorporation into the OAS was created in 2009, it is a member of the newly created CELAC, and Latin American leaders insisted at the 2012 Summit of the Americas that an invitation to Cuba for the next Summit meeting is a prerequisite. But if Cuba makes no significant progress towards at the very least some form of electoral democracy and a formally free press, Cuba's participation could undermine the link between national sovereignty and democracy that underpins Latin America's contemporary security architecture.

Conclusion

The regional security environment has little transparency, limited common understanding of threats and competing strategic views, and is one in which the use of low levels of military force in inter-state bargaining is considered acceptable. The only principle for the management of disputes is essentially to agree to a dialogue after militarization. The slowness of Latin American nations to demand that parties engaged in conflict return to a status quo ante situation means that a government engaged in provocative behavior can expect to make at least short term gains before having to respond to regional pressures for an end to the militarization, though not for a resolution of the dispute itself.

The region needs, therefore, to develop a regional norm against the first use of military force in relations among members of the community. Without this blanket prescription, political allies of an initiator would rationalize the circumstances in which the recourse to force by their ally was pre-emptive or preventive of the rival's 'certain' use of force. Latin America already has norms precluding use of force to conquer territory and against the overthrow of democracy. A norm against the use of force to affect inter-state relations would resolve the moral-hazard issue.