



Mikkel Ostergaard / Panos Pictures

Human trafficking

The trafficking of human beings has burgeoned into a multi-billion-dollar industry that is so widespread and damaging to its victims that it has become a cause of human insecurity.

Associated with the worldwide liberalisation of transport, markets and labour, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and a doubling in world migration over the past 40 years, human trafficking has become a major source of revenue for organised crime.

According to the US State Department, 'Human trafficking is the third largest criminal enterprise worldwide, generating an estimated \$9.5 billion in annual revenue.'⁵⁷

The State Department's estimate is just for the revenue generated by trafficking itself. The illicit profits for the traffickers generated by the victims *after* they arrive in the country of destination are many times higher. A recent report by the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimated these to be some US\$32 billion a year.⁵⁸

The US State Department claims that 'at least' 600,000 to 800,000 individuals are trafficked across national frontiers each year. Of these, it is believed that approximately 80% are women and girls and up to 50% are

minors.⁵⁹ If those who are trafficked *within* borders are included, the total number of victims could be as high as 4 million.

But the illegal nature of the trade, the low priority given to data collection and research, and the frequent reluctance of victims to report crimes, or to testify for fear of reprisals, combine to make gauging the numbers trafficked each year extremely difficult.

According to an analyst from the UN's Global Programme against Trafficking in Human Beings, 'Even though some high-quality research exists most of the data are based on "guesstimates", which, in many cases, are used for advocacy or fund-raising purposes'.⁶⁰

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Recent research by the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) Counter-Trafficking Service shows that between 2001 and 2003 the number of victims of international trafficking referred to the IOM decreased in Kosovo

by 67%, in Macedonia by 46% and in Moldova by 35%. In Albania the decline was 90% between 2000 and 2003. Numbers of victims receiving 'assistance' from the IOM in Bosnia and Herzegovina declined by 75% between 2001 and 2003.⁶¹

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What is human trafficking?

These findings do not necessarily mean that trafficking has declined—there are other possible explanations. But at the very least these data raise questions about the claim that the trade in human beings is steadily increasing.

In November 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted a new protocol that defines trafficking (including trafficking within countries) as:

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.⁶²

Cross-border trafficking should not be confused with people-smuggling. Traffickers seek to exploit their victims for long-term profit. People-smuggling ends once human cargoes are delivered across borders.⁶³

However, as the ILO has noted, in practice 'it is often difficult to distinguish ... between workers who have entered forced labour as a result of trafficking and those who have been smuggled.'⁶⁴

Trafficking takes place in three stages: recruitment, transportation and exploitation.

Recruitment

Cross-border traffickers frequently use false promises of well-paid overseas employment to recruit their victims. Positions are advertised in legitimate employment agencies, in mainstream magazines, in newspapers or on the Internet.

Women are the major victims of trafficking, and most are trafficked into some form of prostitution. Some are aware that they will be employed as sex workers, but few understand the degree to which they may be indebted, intimidated, exploited and controlled.⁶⁵

These findings raise questions about the conventional wisdom that trafficking is steadily increasing.

An IOM study reported that among trafficked females who had been interviewed by researchers, 10% had been kidnapped.⁶⁶ Another study estimated that 35% of minors trafficked from Albania were abductees.⁶⁷ Abductors are often acquaintances, relatives or friends of the family. In some cases, children are simply sold by their parents or guardians.⁶⁸

Transportation

The second stage in cross-border trafficking is transportation to the target country—which is usually, but not always, the promised destination. Here, traffickers often use people-smuggling networks, relying on corrupt police and bribed border guards and customs officials to help move their human cargoes expeditiously across frontiers.

But increasingly, trafficked persons travel openly, on legal or forged travel documents, which are often obtained with help from their traffickers.⁶⁹

Exploitation

The final stage in the trafficking chain is 'employment' in a wide variety of businesses that seek cheap, compliant

workers, and whose operators ask few questions about the origin of their employees.

A study by the United Nation's Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) found that 85% of women, 70% of children and 16% of trafficked men are used for sexual exploitation.⁷⁰ The ILO, on the other hand, estimates that only 43% of victims are trafficked into commercial sexual exploitation.⁷¹ The fact that two separate UN organisations come out with such different figures serves again to remind how uncertain all estimates in this area are.

Male victims tend to be exploited as forced labour, drug vendors and beggars—even as combatants in armed conflicts.

Controlling victims

To realise their profits, traffickers must ensure that their 'investments' are safeguarded, making the control of victims a top priority.

Debt bondage is one of the commonest methods. Victims are often grossly overcharged for transportation, and when the costs of accommodation, food and clothing are added to this debt and exorbitant interest rates are charged, escape from indebtedness can become virtually impossible.

Wartorn countries may be used as transit routes. Mass displacement and loss of livelihoods create a huge potential supply of victims.

Violent coercion—rape, beatings and threats to family and loved ones—is also often used to intimidate the victims. One study of trafficked women assisted by the IOM found that some 55% had been beaten and sexually abused.⁷²

To discourage escape, traffickers may withhold their victims' identification and travel documents, reducing the prospect of successful escape and return home. Victims without legal residency rights in their destina-

tion country are reluctant to appeal to the authorities for help, in case doing so puts them at risk of prosecution, deportation, or both.

Human trafficking and conflict

Armed conflicts create new opportunities for traffickers. Wartorn countries may be used as transit routes, while mass displacement and loss of livelihoods create a huge potential supply of victims.⁷³ Women and girls are frequently trafficked within and across borders to provide sexual services to combatants and to work as cooks, cleaners and porters. The longer a war persists, the more extensive the displacement, and the more prolonged and widespread the suffering and poverty, the greater the opportunities for traffickers.

A 2002 report from the US State Department described abuse by government-backed militias in the long-running civil war in impoverished southern Sudan. This included 'capture through abduction (generally accompanied by violence); the forced transfer of victims to another community; subjection to forced labor for no pay [and] denial of victims' freedom of movement and choice'.⁷⁴

The aftermath of war also provides opportunities for traffickers. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone and other societies struggling with post-war reconstruction, peacekeepers and humanitarian and aid workers generate a strong demand for sex workers, one that traffickers have been quick to meet. Involvement of UN peacekeepers in trafficking has become a major source of concern for the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Human trafficking and poverty

The victims of trafficking mostly originate in countries plagued by weak or corrupt governments, economic decline, poverty, social upheaval, organised crime and violent conflict. In failing states and some former communist countries, weak law enforcement has permitted the organised crime networks involved in trafficking to flourish largely unchallenged.

Poverty appears to be the single most significant driver of human trafficking. In a 2001 report on nine coun-



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Kosovo: women forced into prostitutions have often been trafficked from the former Soviet Union.

tries in West and Central Africa, the ILO's International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour found that 'countries that have widespread poverty, low education levels and high fertility rates tend to be those from which children are trafficked.'⁷⁵

In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, high unemployment, low wages and the disappearance of social safety nets following the collapse of communism have made the blandishments of traffickers more attractive to potential victims, while governments have done little to try to control the trade. Trafficking of women and girls is also driven in part by sexual and ethnic discrimination.

Responsibility for trafficking does not rest solely with the traffickers. Without the strong demand for trafficked labour from brothel owners, sweatshop operators and others, there would be no trade in human beings. And without demand from consumers for cheap sex and the goods made by ultra-cheap labour, there would be no brothels or sweatshops.

Responsibility is also shared by governments in recipient countries, which have done little to combat the trade.

Combating trafficking

Over the last few years, in part as a result of increased media attention, there have been signs that the problem is being taken more seriously. In Europe, for example, there has been a concerted effort to create and harmonise legislation aimed at bringing down the criminal organisations that run the big trafficking networks.

Recognition of the need to combat trafficking is growing in the rest of the world as well. By August 2005, 117 countries had signed, and 87 countries had become parties to, the new UN trafficking protocol, which entered into force in December 2003.⁷⁶

This new protocol makes a strong call for the protection of victims. But Europol, in its 2003 report, *Crime Assessment: Trafficking of Human Beings into the European Union*, notes that, notwithstanding this commitment, it is still the victims of trafficking that too often bear the brunt of legal censure, while their exploiters walk free. 'Women soliciting in public are criminalised, initially for offences related to the selling of sexual services and subsequently for offences arising from their illegal entry to and residence in the country and lack of valid documentation.'⁷⁷

The case for a more victim-sensitive approach to combating trafficking is pragmatic as well as moral. Prosecuting traffickers—and dismantling the networks that support them—is far more likely to succeed with the cooperation of victims. No one is better positioned than the victims to identify—and testify against—the exploiters.



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Creating a human security index?

It is not possible at present—and may not even be desirable—to produce a reliable human security index. But it is possible to determine which countries are most threatened by political violence, human rights abuse and instability.

Every year the much-cited *Human Development Report* produced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) ranks countries around the world according to their citizens' quality of life. It draws on data about life expectancy, educational achievement and income to create a single composite measure that it calls the Human Development Index (HDI).

UNDP's annual ranking exercise generates intense interest, a great deal of media coverage—and considerable controversy. In 2004 Norway, Sweden and Australia ranked on top of the index, while Sierra Leone, Niger and Burkina Faso took the bottom places.

Composite indices like the HDI can serve a number of purposes. They can:

- Encapsulate in a single measure a range of complex data.
- Facilitate comparisons between countries over time.
- Stimulate public discussion.

- Be used to bring pressure to bear on governments.⁷⁸

In recent years there has been considerable debate about creating a human security index, and two such indices have already been developed. Both focus primarily on development issues; neither includes any measure of violence; neither is regularly updated.⁷⁹

There are a number of possible measures of human insecurity that might be combined to make a composite index, including battle-related death rates, 'indirect' death rates, and homicide and rape rates.

In recent years there has been considerable debate about creating a human security index.

Is it possible to combine indicators of this kind into a single composite human security index?

The short answer is that it is certainly not currently possible, and that it is probably not desirable.

There are a number of practical challenges. The most serious is that the existing datasets used to measure human insecurity are not comprehensive enough—

and many are not updated annually. Data on homicide and rape are missing for most of the least secure countries in the world and there are no global data on indirect deaths—those deaths caused by disease and the lack of food, clean water and health care that result from war.

Moreover, even if it were possible to create a single composite human security index, it is not clear that doing so would be desirable. While composite indices have distinct advantages, simplicity also has a downside. Composite indices can conceal more information than they convey. Presenting the data from individual human security datasets separately, rather than aggregating them into a single index, conveys more information—and conveys it more clearly.

Aggregating very different measures—death rates and rankings of human rights violations, for example—also raises difficult questions about how to weight the different measures when combining them.

And while providing useful insights into the least secure countries, such measures are not very useful for determining the most secure countries, the majority of which are found in the developed world.

Here the difficulty is that there is not much insecurity to measure. By definition, highly secure countries rarely experience warfare, so very few suffer battle-related deaths. And human rights measures for some of the most secure countries are also missing from the Political Terror Scale dataset. The World Bank instability indicator does include the more secure industrialised countries, but it is too narrow to serve as a useful measure on its own. Differentiating among countries that are not afflicted by war, are highly stable politically and have very low levels of political repression is extraordinarily difficult.

Nevertheless these two datasets, along with the Uppsala/Human Security Centre dataset, measure important dimensions of human insecurity. The statistics they

provide form the basis of Figure 2.11, and give three parallel measures of the world's least secure countries:

- *The Uppsala/Human Security Centre dataset.* The figures shown are the 'best estimates' of death rates from political violence in 2003. They include both battle-related deaths and deaths from one-sided violence.
- *The Political Terror Scale* from the University of North Carolina, Asheville, which measures core human rights abuse. Countries are scored on a scale from 5 (worst) to 1 (best), based on human rights violations in 2003.⁸⁰
- The World Bank's composite *Political Instability and Absence of Violence Index*,⁸¹ a measure that gauges the probability that a government 'will be destabilised or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.'⁸² Countries are ranked on a scale from 0 (worst) to 100 (best).

Are these the world's least secure countries?

Figure 2.11 reveals a remarkable overlap between these three measures of human insecurity. Countries plagued by high levels of political violence and human rights abuse tend also to be politically unstable, and vice versa.

But the absence of any measure of criminal violence is a major concern. A number of countries that experience neither wars nor political instability nevertheless have very high levels of criminal violence.

The Ipsos-Reid survey finding that many people fear criminal violence more than they fear political violence (see Part I) gives further weight to the argument that criminal violence data should be included in any composite index of human security.

An even bigger omission is the absence of any data on indirect deaths. As we show in Part IV of this report, war-related disease and malnutrition kill far more people than combat does.

Figure 2.11 The world's least secure countries?

Fatalities from political violence		Core human rights abuses			Political instability/violence		
	Rate per 100,000 (2003)		Amnesty International (2003)	State Dept. (2003)	Average ranking (2003)		World Bank (2002)
Liberia	59.4	Colombia	5	5	5	DRC	0.0
Iraq	35.1	DRC	5	5	5	Liberia	0.5
Burundi	16.2	Iraq	5	5	5	Afghanistan	1.1
Sudan	8.5	Sudan	5	5	5	Burundi	1.6
Uganda	6.5	Algeria	5	4	4.5	Côte d'Ivoire	2.2
Israel/Palestinian Terr.	5.8	Indonesia	5	4	4.5	Sudan	2.7
Nepal	4.4	Israel	5	4	4.5	Somalia	3.2
DRC	4.2	Liberia	5	4	4.5	Colombia	3.8
Somalia	3.9	Afghanistan	4	4	4	Palestinian Terr.	4.3
Colombia	1.6	Angola	4	4	4	Iraq	4.9
Philippines	1.4	Brazil	4	4	4	CAR	5.4
Eritrea	1.3	Myanmar (Burma)	4	4	4	Georgia	5.9
Afghanistan	1.1	Burundi	4	4	4	Nepal	6.5
Côte d'Ivoire	0.7	Cameroon	4	4	4	Congo-Brazzaville	7.0
Algeria	0.7	CAR	4	4	4	Algeria	7.6
Senegal	0.4	China	4	4	4	Zimbabwe	7.6
Russia	0.4	Congo-Brazzaville	4	4	4	Nigeria	8.6
Ethiopia	0.3	Côte d'Ivoire	4	4	4	Angola	9.2
Indonesia	0.2	Ethiopia	4	4	4	Chad	9.2
Ecuador	0.2	India	4	4	4	Uganda	10.3
India	0.2	Nepal	4	4	4	Israel	10.8
Saudi Arabia	0.2	North Korea	4	4	4	Indonesia	11.4
Turkey	0.2	Pakistan	4	4	4	Rwanda	11.9
Nigeria	0.2	Palestinian Terr.	4	4	4	Guinea	12.4
Morocco	0.2	Philippines	4	4	4	Pakistan	13.0
Pakistan	0.1	Russia	4	4	4	Yemen	13.0
Sri Lanka	0.1	Somalia	4	4	4	Sierra Leone	14.1
Thailand	0.1	Uganda	4	4	4	Haiti	14.6
Myanmar (Burma)	0.1	Zimbabwe	4	4	4	Myanmar (Burma)	15.1

Source: Human Security Centre, 2005

Three different measures of human insecurity give three separate 'least secure' rankings. There is a high degree of overlap between the rankings.⁸³

PART II

ENDNOTES

1. UNESCO Bangkok, 'Trafficking Statistics Project', UNESCO Bangkok website, www.unescobkk.org/index.php?id=1022 (accessed 1 August 2005).
2. 'UNICEF Official Cites "Largest Slave Trade In History"', *UN Wire* 20 February 2003, http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20030220/32139_story.asp (accessed 1 August 2005).
3. In 2002 the US and its allies were fighting al-Qaeda, which is not a state.
4. For Uppsala's analysis of the 2002 and 2003 political violence data, see the *Human Security Report* website at www.humansecurityreport.info.
5. For more detailed information on definitions, see the *Human Security Report* website at www.humansecurityreport.info. See also the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's database at www.pcr.uu.se/database/.
6. These data are current as of September 2005 but may be subject to slight revision as new information becomes available. Note that coding decisions mean that there are sometimes slight differences in the information contained in Figures 2.1–2.5. For example, Uppsala argues that since the ultimate goal of al-Qaeda is the overthrow of the US, the conflict should be coded as a conflict over control of the government of the US. The conflict is consequently counted in the Americas conflict total in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. In Figure 2.3, which lists the numbers of cases of armed conflict and one-sided violence by location, the USA vs. al-Qaeda conflict is counted in Afghanistan's conflict total because that is where the fighting occurred. In Figures 2.4 and 2.5, battle-related deaths and deaths from one-sided violence are counted in the country where they occur.
7. Due to coding rules, the total number of conflicts in each region in Figure 2.3 may not exactly match the total number of conflicts in each region in Figure 2.1. The interstate conflict between India and Pakistan in 2002 and 2003 is counted once in the Asia total in Figure 2.1. However, it is counted twice in Figure 2.3 (which lists the number of cases of armed conflict and one-sided violence by country): once in India's total and once in Pakistan's total (fighting occurred in both countries). Similarly, the US vs. al-Qaeda conflict is included in Afghanistan's total (and Asia's) in Figure 2.3, whereas in Figure 2.1 it is included in the Americas regional total.
8. Ted Robert Gurr, 'Containing Internal War in the Twenty-First Century', in Fen Osler Hampson and David M. Malone, eds., *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002). The author notes that the sample was not comprehensive since it only examined intercommunal conflicts among groups that were also involved with conflicts with a government.
9. Professor Marshall was previously at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland.
10. Monty G. Marshall, 'Global Conflict Trends', Figure 3, Center of Systemic Peace website, 1 February 2005, <http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/conflict.htm> (accessed 19 June 2005). For a comparison with trend data on the number of states with armed conflicts that is derived from Uppsala's state-based data, see Monty G. Marshall, 'Measuring the Societal Impact of War', in Fen Osler Hampson and David M. Malone, eds., *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System*.
11. Although this information is not published in this report, it is available on the *Human Security Report* website at www.humansecurityreport.info.
12. Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2005*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2005).
13. For information on the Correlates of War dataset, see www.correlatesofwar.org/. For information on the International Institute of Strategic Studies' Armed Conflict Database, see http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_WorldMap.asp.
14. For information on the Factiva database operated by Dow Jones and Reuters, see www.factiva.com. The database draws on some 9000 media sources around the world, including local, national and international newspapers, leading business magazines, trade publications and newswires. Uppsala also draws on other sources of data, including primary source material.

15. For an account of the methodology used in these studies, see the American Association for the Advancement of Science website at <http://shr.aaas.org/hrdag/>.
16. Note that some commissions are truth commissions while others are truth *and* reconciliation commissions.
17. Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2005*.
18. The treatment of Uppsala's data by the *Small Arms Survey* (SAS) is problematic for a number of reasons. Before 2002 Uppsala did not collect death toll data on non-state conflicts or on one-sided violence, so large numbers of deaths from political violence were not being counted. But deaths in these categories *were* being measured in the epidemiological surveys and the in-depth historical investigations referenced in the SAS. By the time of the Iraq war, Uppsala *was* collecting data on death tolls from non-state conflicts and one-sided violence, but here the SAS's comparison is problematic for a different reason. The SAS's analysis compares Uppsala's 'best estimate' of reported and codable battle-related deaths in Iraq in 2003 with those of a much-cited epidemiological survey published in the British medical journal the *Lancet* (L. Roberts, R. Lafta, R. Garfield et al., 'Mortality Before and After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: Cluster Sample Survey', *Lancet* 364 (20 October 2004): 1857–1864). Uppsala's estimate of deaths is 8494, while the *Lancet* estimate for the year is 22,980—a figure more than twice as large. The *Lancet* survey estimate is for all deaths from political violence from the date the war started to the end of 2003. But Uppsala's dataset compilers were unable to code any of the killings during the post-war insurgency, primarily because the perpetrators could not be identified, so the only battle-related deaths Uppsala codes for 2003 are for the short period in March and April when the conventional war was being waged. In the Iraq case, when 'like' really is being compared with 'like'—when war-related deaths from violence are compared over the same period of time—there is no appreciable difference between Uppsala's death count and that of the *Lancet* survey. This single example doesn't refute the claim that in general the Uppsala's data collection approach under-counts battle-related deaths—as noted previously the very nature of Uppsala's methodology makes this inevitable. The SAS's evaluation of the Uppsala data suggests that more case studies—and more detailed analysis—are necessary to get a better estimate of the degree to which under-counting is taking place in the report-based methodologies.
19. Note that the Middle East figures should be considerably higher, since Uppsala was unable to code the fatalities in Iraq during the post-war insurgency.
20. The Uppsala/Human Security Centre dataset records 'best', 'low' and 'high' estimates for each category of political violence each year. The 'best estimate' is the figure that Uppsala regards as being most credible, based on the most authoritative available information. In Figures 2.4 and 2.5 only the 'best estimates' are published, but the 'high' and 'low' figures are available on the *Human Security Report* website at www.humansecurityreport.info.
21. Note that the numbers recorded in this figure and the following figure do not represent the total number of deaths from political violence but rather the number of *reported* and *codable* deaths. These totals are almost certainly lower than the true death toll.
22. Note that the death toll for Iraq is only for the period of the conventional war (20 March 2003 to 9 April 2003), not the subsequent insurgency.
23. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1998: Consumption for Human Development* (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 1998).
24. Graça Machel, *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children* (New York: United Nations and United Nations Children's Fund, 1996), <http://www.unicef.org/graca/graright.htm> (accessed 10 August 2005).
25. European Union Institute for Security Studies, *A Secure Europe in a Better World* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2003), <http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf> (accessed 10 August 2005).
26. Christa Ahlström and Kjell-Åke Nordquist, *Casualties of Conflict—Report for the World Campaign for the Protection of Victims of War* (Uppsala: Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1991).
27. Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures*, 14th ed. (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1991).

28. See endnote 22.
29. Uppsala has collected data on one-sided violence back to the mid-1990s, which will be used to graph trends in the 2006 *Human Security Report*. Subject to funding, the same backdating exercise will be undertaken for non-state conflicts.
30. See the background document commissioned by the Human Security Centre, Linda Cornett and Mark Gibney, 'Tracking Terror: The Political Terror Scale 1980–2001', at the *Human Security Report* website, www.humansecurityreport.info.
31. The Political Terror Scale counts human rights abuses by any group—government or non-government. Most abuse, however, is by governments.
32. The definitions of regions correspond approximately with the categories used by the US Department of State. The exact definitions are spelled out in Linda Cornett and Mark Gibney, 'Tracking Terror: The Political Terror Scale 1980–2001'. See the *Human Security Report* website, www.humansecurityreport.info.
33. For a discussion of this issue, see James Ron, Howard Ramos and Kathleen Rodgers, 'Transnational Information Politics: Amnesty International's Country Reporting, 1986–2000', Department of Sociology, McGill University, 11 August 2004, <http://www.gwu.edu/~psc/news/ISQ%20submission2.pdf> (accessed 1 August 2005).
34. Ibid.
35. Linda Cornett and Mark Gibney, 'Tracking Terror: The Political Terror Scale 1980–2001'.
36. John Mueller, *The Remnants of War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Paul Collier, 'Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44 (2000): 839–853.
37. Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler, 'Murder by Numbers: Socio-Economic Determinants of Homicide and Civil War', Centre for the Study of African Economies Working Paper Series, no. 2004–10, <http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2004-10text.pdf> (accessed 10 August 2005). The authors found no evidence that the causal relationship went the other way: that high rates of homicide increased the risk of civil war.
38. In July 2004, for example, the *9/11 Commission Report* argued for 'integrated all-source analysis' of international terrorism. National Commission Report, 22 July 2004, <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf> (accessed 20 June 2005).
39. World Health Organization, *The World Health Report: 2004: Changing History* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2004), www.who.int/whr/2004/en/ (accessed 20 June 2005).
40. See Interpol data in the background document commissioned by the Human Security Centre, Graeme Newman, 'Human Security: A World View of Homicide and Rape', at the *Human Security Report* website www.humansecurityreport.info.
41. Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler, 'Murder by Numbers: Socio-Economic Determinants of Homicide and Civil War'.
42. There are several methodological difficulties in compiling and presenting this data over time. During the past 40 years there has been a dramatic increase in the number of countries in the international system, and many borders have changed. Not all countries keep accurate records. Some of the countries that do keep records compile and report them annually; others do so less frequently.
43. UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, *Global Report on Crime and Justice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
44. Graeme Newman, 'Human Security: A World View of Homicide and Rape'.
45. Cited in Bree Cook, Fiona David and Anna Grant, *Sexual Violence in Australia*, Research and Public Policy Series no. 36 (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2001), <http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/rpp/36/> (accessed 24 June 2005).
46. UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, *Global Report on Crime and Justice*.
47. Bree Cook, Fiona David and Anna Grant, *Sexual Violence in Australia*.
48. Louise Rimmer, 'Cool Hand Luke', *The Scotsman*, 16 August 2003, <http://news.scotsman.com/index.cfm?id=887492003> (accessed 7 June 2004).

49. Josinaldo Aleixo de Souza, *Socibilidades emergentes—Implicações da dominação de matadores na periferie e traficantes nas favelas* (PhD diss., Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 25 September 2001).
50. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Year Book, 2004: *Armament Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
51. DATASUS, 'Sistema de informações sobre mortalidade', Ministério de Saúde, Secretaria da Saúde do Governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, <http://tabnet.datasus.gov.br/cgi/defptohtm.exe?sim/cnv/obtrj.def> (accessed 7 June 2004).
52. Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 'Minors Killed Since 9 December 1987', http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Minors_Killed.asp (accessed 7 June 2003; site discontinued).
53. DATASUS, 'Sistema de informações sobre mortalidade'.
54. Rachel Brett and Margaret McCallin, *Children: The Invisible Soldiers*, 2nd ed. (Stockholm: Rädda Barnen, 1998).
55. Secretaria de Segurança Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (SSP-RJ), SSP-RJ website, <http://www.ssp.rj.gov.br/> (accessed 10 August 2005).
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