INSTITUTION BUILDING IN MERCOSUL'S DEFENCE- AND SECURITY SECTOR (I). BRAZIL'S DEFENCE COOPERATION: BETWEEN DOMINANT ARMED SERVICES AND MARKED BILATERALISM

Daniel Flemes
Octubre 2004


Índice:

1. Introduction
2. The Special Relationship between Argentina and Brazil
3. The Brazilian-Argentine consultation and coordination mechanism for international security- and defence issues (MMC)
3.1. The operating level: Mecanismo Permanente de Análisis Estratégico (MAE)
3.2.Critical appreciation of MCC and MAE
4.The bilateral working groups for defence policy (GTBD)
4.1. Grupo de Trabalho Bilateral de Defesa between Brazil and Argentina
4.2. Grupo de Trabalho Bilateral de Defesa between Brazil and Chile
5. The military cooperation: Conferences, common manoeuvres, training cooperation,personnel exchange and technological collaboration
5.1. Confidence building measures of the Brazilian army
5.2. Confidence building measures of the Brazilian air force
5.3. Confidence building measures of the Brazilian navy
5.4. Confidence building measures of the Brazilian armed forces joint staff
6. The UN-peace mission in Haiti: Heading towards a multilateral security- and defence policy led by Brazil?
7. Conclusion: The starting institutionalisation of the Argentine-Brazilian axis
8.Bibliography
9.List of interview partners
10. Appendix


Abstracts

The defence cooperation between Brazil and her neighbours can be divided into two areas that are equally important for the establishment of a regional security community. Firstly the bilateral defence political cooperation, the development of which can be proven by the Brazilian-Argentine coordination mechanism for questions of security and defence as well as the bilateral working groups for defence policy. And secondly military collaboration mainly supervised by the three branches of service including conferences, common manoeuvres, training cooperation, personnel exchange as well as technical cooperation. Despite the marked autonomy of the armed services (especially in Brazil and Chile) the two areas do not develop independently from each other, but the defence political measures are reflected in the practical cooperation level. In doing so Argentina and Brazil may be regarded as the centre of gravitation concerning the subregional defence cooperation. Therefore they can be identified as the potential core countries of a security community that is about to develop in the South of Latin America. It is true that the UN-peace mission in Haiti supervised by Brazil offers the opportunity to break away from the bilateral corset and to develop multilateral instruments of the defence collaboration. But plannings - such as the deployment of a common permanent task force - are regularly petering out on the rhetoric level so far.

La cooperación en asuntos de defensa entre Brasil y sus países vecinos se puede dividir en dos áreas de igual importancia para la creación de una comunidad regional de seguridad. Un ámbito es la cooperación bilateral de políticas de defensa, cuyo desarrollo puede comprenderse a través del mecanismo argentino-brasileño de coordinación de asuntos de seguridad y de defensa y por los grupos de trabajo bilaterales de políticas de defensa. El segundo ámbito, cuya responsabilidad recae principalmente en las fuerzas armadas, abarca la cooperación militar que implica conferencias, maniobras comunes, cooperación en la formación, intercambio de personal y cooperación técnica. A pesar de la marcada autonomía de las fuerzas armadas (especialmente en Brasil y en Chile), ambas áreas no se desarrollan independientemente una de la otra, si no que las medidas de política de defensa se reflejan también en el nivel de cooperación práctica. Argentina y Brasil podrían identificarse así como el centro de gravedad de la cooperación subregional de defensa, como potenciales estados núcleos de una comunidad de seguridad en surgimiento al sur de América Latina. La misión de paz de las Naciones Unidas liderada por Brasil en Haití ofrece una oportunidad de escaparse del corset bilateral y desarrollar así instrumentos multilaterales para la cooperación de defensa. Pero hasta ahora los planes para la formación de una tropa permanente común de intervención quedaron en el plano retórico.

Die Verteidigungskooperation zwischen Brasilien und seinen Nachbarstaaten lässt sich in zwei Bereiche einteilen, die für die Bildung einer regionalen Sicherheitsgemeinschaft gleichermaben von Bedeutung sind. Erstens, die bilaterale verteidigungspolitische Zusammenarbeit, deren Entwicklung sich anhand des brasilianisch-argentinischen Koordinierungsmechanismus für Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsfragen sowie anhand der bilateralen Arbeitsgruppen für Verteidigungspolitik, nachvollziehen lässt. Und zweitens, die überwiegend von den Teilstreitkräften verantwortete militärische Zusammenarbeit, die Konferenzen, gemeinsame Manöver, Ausbildungskooperation, Personalaustausch sowie technische Zusammenarbeit umfasst. Trotz der ausgeprägten Autonomie der Teilstreitkräfte (insbesondere in Brasilien und Chile), entwickeln sich beide Bereiche nicht unabhängig voneinander, sondern die verteidigungspolitischen Maßgaben finden auf der praktischen Kooperationsebene durchaus ihren Niederschlag. Argentinien und Brasilien können dabei als Gravitationszentrum der subregionalen Verteidigungszusammenarbeit und somit als potentielle Kernstaaten einer im Entstehen begriffenen Sicherheitsgemeinschaft im südlichen Lateinamerika identifiziert werden. Die brasilianisch geführte UN-Friedensmission in Haiti bietet zwar eine Gelegenheit, aus dem bilateralen Korsett auszubrechen und multilaterale Instrumente der Verteidigungszusammenarbeit zu entwickeln. Doch bisher versanden Planungen, etwa eine gemeinsame ständige Eingreiftruppe aufzustellen, regelmäßig auf der rhetorischen Ebene.


1. Introduction

The countries of the Mercosul show different degrees of political stability and varying institutional deficiencies. Only over the past years the national security policies (1) have developed into public policies controlled by democratically legitimated actors. The states in the South of Latin America do not have a tradition of public debates on security political issues, since the armed forces have exclusively dominated this field of politics in the past. In spite of a visible rapprochement between Brazil and her neighbouring countries Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, which will be shown in this article, no security political regime or another subregional defence- or security system has derived from the cooperation process so far. Neither have the actors involved decided that the objective of the ongoing process should be the formalization or institutionalization of the security- and defence political collaboration. On the contrary this is about a widely open process, the result of which can hardly be forecasted by politicians and scientists. Therefore the first step has got to be the tracing of the actual development of the subregional cooperation over the past years in order to determine their degree of formalization and effect with respect to specific measures and cooperation forums. Only on this empirical foundation a hypothesis on the development of a pluralistic security community with the core countries Brazil, Argentina and Chile can be verified or disproved.

During the 1980s the military cooperation in the continental context between Brazil and her neighbouring countries was still predominantly organized under the aegis of the Interamerican Defence Board (Junta Interamericana de Defensa - JID) based in Washington. Since the 1960s the US-American ministry of defence has invited the commanders-in-chief of the American armed services to regular meetings (such as the Conferencia de Ejércitos Americanos - CEA) in order to discuss the regional security situation and coordinate the activities of the military intelligence services (Radseck 1998: 8). The first supranational manoeuvres of the region also took place in the context of the interamerican meetings of the three branches of service: Naval exercises have been carried out twice per year in the South Atlantic, in which Uruguay and the USA participated besides the ABC-countries. Until the end of the 1980s only the navy managed to realize a subregional military cooperation excluding the USA and that applied to the technical sector only. So the Control Area Marítima Atlántico Sur (COAMAS) between the Mercosul-countries agreed on the restricted exchange of information between the naval units and the coordination of patrol travels in the South Atlantic.

Since 1993, representatives of the armed forces joint staffs of all Southern Latin American armed services have been taking part in annual symposiums on strategic studies. The subject of the military cooperation on the subregional level represents the common theme running through these conferences through the 1990s. Only at the tenth Simposio de Estudios Estratégicos de los Estados Mayores Conjuntos y de la Defensa in 1997 in Montevideo, for instance, more than one half of the contributions dealt with the theme "The Mercosul and the subregional security - Effects on the role of the armed forces". Accordingly Radseck (1998: 913) observes an increase in the actors involved in the military cooperation from the 1990s, which meant a qualitative leap of the defence political collaboration in this case: Besides the armed services the armed forces joint staffs and especially the civilianly run ministries of defence (in Brazil a ministry of that kind was only established in 1999) are called for action. The following paragraphs will analyse in what way this tendency can be proven by the latest history.

The military cooperation across the national border during the 1990s, which went far beyond the common degree of confidence building measures between the armed forces, is an indication for the development of a security community in the South of Latin America. The cooperation, for example, included the exchange of officers between the national military institutions and mutual technological support as well as common military exercises, which were carried out on bilateral and subregional level.

However a starting institutionalisation of the military- and defence political cooperation can only be observed on a bilateral level. Since 2000 Brazil has been holding bilateral working groups for defence policy (Grupo de Trabalho Bilateral de Defesa - GTBD) with several countries of the subregion. Since 1995 the half-yearly sitting Comité Permanente de Seguridad (COMPERSEG) has been ensuring a continuous security political dialogue between Argentina and Chile, in which representatives of the armed forces joint staffs and civil actors from the foreign ministries and the ministries of defence cooperate. This committee had paved the way for the standardized methodology for the equalization of the defence households of the two countries supervised by the CEPAL. Since 1997 the Mecanismo de Consulta y Coordinación entre Brasil y Argentina en materia de Defensa y Seguridad Internacional (MCC) also sits in conference. The MCC is an Argentine-Brazilian security political coordination forum similar to the COMPERSEG where the participating foreign ministers and ministers of defence emphasize the necessity of the foundation of a security alliance in the context of the Mercosul including Chile.

The different kinds of international cooperation between civilian and military actors imply that Argentina, Brazil and Chile do not longer perceive each other as a threat, but strive for a common protection against external dangers. These countries do not consider military violence as a means of solving conflicts any more: "On the military as well as the diplomatic level all actors involved are aware that dispute with the neighbouring countries can impossibly be settled by military force […] military actors only talk of cooperation, not of integration on the defence sector" (Rial 1994: 38). The more the observed cooperation processes turn out to be resistant to regression, the more indication there is for the assumption that a regional security community is about to develop in the South of Latin America with the core countries Argentina, Brazil and Chile.

In the next paragraph the importance of the special relationship between Argentina and Brazil (Chapter 2) will be focused. To testify the state of the bilateral defence collaboration in the next step Brazil's most significant defence political cooperation forums are introduced: MCC (Chapter 3) and GTBD (Chapter 4). The degree of institutionalization of these bilateral institutions is of vital importance for the definition of a security community. In the following the results of the work of these forums so far will be shown. Afterwards a second area of defence cooperation that is equally important for the establishment of a regional security community will be analyzed: The military collaboration mainly supervised by the three branches of service including conferences, common manoeuvres, training cooperation, personnel exchange as well as technical cooperation (Chapter 5). This working paper argues that despite of the marked autonomy of the armed services - especially in Brazil and Chile - the two areas do not develop independently from each other, but the defence political measures are reflected in the practical cooperation level. In doing so Argentina and Brazil may be regarded as the centre of gravitation concerning the subregional defence cooperation.

Therefore they can be identified as the potential core countries of a security community that is about to develop in the South of Latin America. It is true that the UN-peace mission in Haiti supervised by Brazil (Chapter 6) offers the opportunity to break away from the bilateral corset and to develop multilateral instruments of the defence collaboration.


2. The Special Relationship between Argentina and Brazil

The bilateral defence political collaboration with the Mercosul-neighbour Argentina is of particular significance as the following bilateral Argentine-Brazilian agreements and declarations signed during the 1980s and 1990s will show: After Argentina had been granted the status of a special partner of the NATO at the instigation of the USA in 1997, the defence political cooperation between Brazil and Argentina worsened at first. Just like the negative reaction on the part of Chile concerning Argentina's turning to the USA the Brazilian actors did not hide their political disappointment about the procedure of the Menem-administration in this question either. Consequently the just taken up Itaipava-process, from which the security political consultation and coordination mechanism (MCC) with the working group Mecanismo de Análisis Estratégico developed, stagnated. The first conference of the MAE did not take place until Menem's successor Fernando de la Rua had entered into office in 2000. During the election campaign he had already announced his intention to intensify the security- and defence political cooperation with Brazil, if he was elected. The alliance between the Unión Civica Radical (UCR) and the Frente por un País Solídario (Frepaso) led by de la Rua emphatically criticized Argentina's alienation from Brazil, which the Peronist party answered for (see La Nación, 17 December 1999). The integration into the NATO implied actually a rapprochement with Washington.

As early as in February 2000 the new permanent secretary for military affairs in the Argentine ministry of defence, Angel Tello, assured Brazilian diplomats in Buenos Aires that the defence political cooperation with Brazil was one of the first priorities of the new Argentine government. Above all the Itaipava-process was meant to be taken up again, on the foundation of which both countries were to develop a "common strategy" (quote Tello) to face "the common threats and risks effectively" (Paulo Joppert, interview on 13 May 2004). Brasília answered to the Argentine efforts of rapprochement with an invitation to the new Argentine minister of defence Ricardo López Murphy. Only a few months earlier the Brazilian government had ignored the inquiry of López Murphy's predecessor, Jorge Domínguez. Domínguez had also intended a meeting with the Brazilian minister of defence Èlcio Àlvarez.

López Murphy's visit to Brasília in spring 2000 represents the first official meeting of the ministers of defence concerning the Argentine-Brazilian relationships. On this occasion López Murphy emphasized that the trustful security relations were of particular importance regarding commercial political differences in the Mercosul. Furthermore the defence political communication between the two countries implied a stabilizing element, which presented the whole subregion positively against the background of a predictable change of the global structures of security. Consequently an attractive investment climate were created (ibid.). As a result of the achieved agreements the bilateral security- and defence relationships were intensified again. On the foundations of the meetings of the ministers of defence an agenda of subjects was laid down that was to be discussed by the inclusion of the foreign- and the economics ministries of both countries in April 2000 in Buenos Aires.

By the declaration of Buenos Aires (see Declaración de Buenos Aires, 28 April 2000) at the latest - the first foreign politically important document of the de la Rua-administration - promising dynamics returned to the bilateral security relationships between Argentina and Brazil. On one hand both countries' foreign ministers, ministers of defence and ministers for economic affairs decided on the intensification of the broader safety political dialogue put on, which was to manifest itself in the second term of 2000 by the constituent assembly of the MAE in Argentina. On the other hand the actors involved agreed on the installation of a bilateral working group for defence policy (GTBD) for the dealing with specific defence political questions, which was also intended to meet for the first time in the same year. Moreover the document expresses the foreign ministers' and the ministers' of defence willingness for a future joint analysis of regional and global problems that are of a politico-strategic nature. As precise aims the following points are mentioned: The support of the Ottawa-process (warding off anti-person mines), the creation of more transparency at the trade with conventional weapons, the cooperation at UN-peace missions as well as the technological-scientific collaboration in the defence sector.

Apart from the increasingly constructive cooperation between the governments the participation by the parliaments in the bilateral cooperation in the sector of security and defence can be observed over the past years. Particularly since the Argentine as well as the Brazilian representatives of the people are often accused of lacking interest and missing competence in this field of defence politics (see Flemes 2004a, Rizzo de Oliveira 2002, Saint-Pierre 2003), the commitment of the committees for foreign affairs and defence of the Argentine and Brazilian chambers of representatives regarding the bilateral security cooperation has to be rated high. At the end of August 2002 the chairman of the Brazilian committee for foreign affairs and defence (CREDN), Aldo Rebelo, as well as the chairmen of the two Argentine committees for foreign affairs (CRREE), Jorge Alberto Escobar, and for defence (CDN), Jorge Antonio Villaverde, signed a common memorandum in Buenos Aires. This document intends to "support the communication about common objectives in the foreign- and defence policy and ways for their realization as well as integration of the two countries into these fields of politics". For the realization of these targets the parliamentarians decided on regular meetings, courses and conferences, in which academic and political actors were to participate. On the one hand this should positively effect the parliamentary debate in both countries. On the other hand these events are intended to represent a forum for the integration of the Argentine and Brazilian public into the discussion of foreign- and defence political issues (Maria José da Conceição Maninha, interview on 20 May 2004).

The foundations for the "strategic alliance" proclaimed after the Argentine change of government by the presidents da Silva (in office since January 2003) and Kirchner (in office since May 2003) had already been laid down in various ways. This bilateral alliance, which both governments agreed on by a common declaration on the occasion of their first meeting in June 2003 in Brasília, goes far beyond security- and defence political considerations (see da Silva/ Kirchner 2003). The presidents rather stress the importance of the Mercosul and the ultimate objective of the South American integration as their foreign political priority. In this context a development model is planned to be established, which equally guarantees economic growth and social justice. According to the two presidents the "productive cooperation" between the core countries of the Mercosul requires a security- and defence political component that ensures peace and stability as the development basis for the whole subregion. Therefore the presidents da Silva and Kirchner decided on the continuation of the meetings of the security political consultation and coordination mechanisms (MCC) and its executive body MAE. The second conference of the MCC was planned for November 2003 in Calafate; one month earlier, in October 2003, the MAE was meant to sit in conference in Buenos Aires for the third time.

Beyond the security political cooperation in a narrower sense the strategic partnership between Argentina and Brazil implies the coordination of the national sectors of energy, which is guaranteed by a bilateral commission for energy (Comisión Mixta Bilateral Permanente en Materia Energética). Those government offices responsible for questions of infrastructure were ordered to realize projects that encourage the physical integration of the two countries (and also generate employment). The presidents da Silva and Kirchner instructed the foreign ministries with the coordination of measures for the facilitation of the border traffic between the two countries. Problems that occurred at this first stage of the integration of the border regions mainly concern the sectors of education, labour and health respectively the according departments of the two countries. Apart from that bilateral commissions work at the intensification of the technological (Comisión Mixta de Cooperación Técnica) and cultural (Comisión Mixta de Cultura) cooperation between the Mercosulpartners.

Argentina and Brazil can be seen as the subregion's "strategic centre of gravitation" (Saint-Pierre 2003: 6): On a consolidated confidence basis the two countries define common values and interests, which they pursue and protect together by means of diplomatic and political instruments available. In doing so synergy effects need to be utilized to overcome existing weaknesses of the single states. The advantages and promising future prospects of the hard core (núcleo duro) of the subregional cooperation, which the bilateral defence political collaboration of the two countries forms, are stressed by Saint-Pierre (ibid.: 7) with the aid of partly contradictory arguments. The strategic alliance, for instance, implied a defensive density (densidade defensiva), the potential of deterrence of which the other subregional countries could not answer to. At the same time the strategic center of gravitation built by Argentina and Brazil was meant to work as a magnet of cooperation, though, which would lead to the integration of the neighbouring countries into the defence political collaboration medium-term. Indication for Brazil's and Argentina's intentions for a process of that kind, which would result in a hegemonial peace (see Aron 1986), cannot be proven by the current security- and defence policies of the two countries. It is true that especially Brazil plays a leading part in the process of cooperation that can be observed at present. But concerning the support of the security- and defence political collaboration with the neighbouring countries the government actors rely less on means of power and deterrence in order to establish a cooperative peace in the subregion. They rather bet on the use of those instruments based on the principle of equality, which are analysed in the following paragraphs. However an opinion is agreed with, in which the bilateral corset of the subregional cooperation in the defence sector has got a stabilizing quality in the first place and restricts the possibilities of the defence political collaboration beyond the Argentine-Brazilian axis merely in the second place. But the following paragraphs will also work out the inherent weaknesses of the precise kinds and cooperation forums.


3. The Brazilian-Argentine consultation and coordination mechanism for international security- and defence issues (MMC)(2)

In April 1997 Buenos Aires and Brasília agreed to a future security political collaboration by a common memorandum (Memorandum de Entendimiento sobre Consulta y Coordinación). The Brazilian-Argentine consultation and coordination mechanism for international security- and defence issues (Mecanismo de Consulta y Coordinación entre Brasil y Argentina en materia de Defensa y Seguridad Internacional - MCC) was established in August 1997 with the protocol from Itaipava (Acta de Itaipava). On the occasion of the signing of the bilateral agreement the future members of the MCC met for the first time: Apart from the foreign ministers of both countries the Argentine minister of defence and the Argentine of the armed forces joint staff and general staffs of the army and the navy took part in the appointment of the security political consulation body. For lack of a civilinaly run ministry of defence the naval minister- admiral Rodrigues Pereira- represented Brazil, who was again was accompained by the heads of the general staffs of the army, the air force and the navy.

The representatives of government agreed on annual meetings, wich were to take place alternately in Argentina and Brazil. It was decided on thebuilding o fan executive secretary´s office, the Mecanismo Permanente de Análisis Estratégico (MAE). On the one hand the MAE is supposed to realice the decisions of ministres´ conferences and to prepare each following meeting of the consulation and coordination mechanism on the otrher hand. In content the MCC délas with all issues on defence policy and the internacional security. However the protocol from Itaipava Explicity ascribes disarmament, nondistribution of mass extermination weapons and peace operation of the United Nations to the comittee.

As early as in 1995, two years befote the fondation of the MCC, Argentina had launched the permanent, bilateral security comité COMPERSEG ( Comité Permanente de Seguridad) together with her Western neighbour Chile. This body of experts, wich Lodz the same status as the permanent secretary, already indicates an advanced degree of formalization ( see Runza 2004) and can be regarded as a precursos institution of the Brazilian- Argentine MCC. In contrast to Argentina and Chile, though, Argentina and Brazil had never been enemies in the course of their common history, but their realtionship was traditionally marked by strong rivalry. Due to this constellation and hence a greater mutual trust between Argentina an Brazil the MCC Developer in a far less formal way than the Argentine- Chilean COMPERSEG. But also the initially mentioned hostility to institutionalisation and formalization deeply anchored in Brazils´s political culture, wich contrast the " prussian virtues" of Chilean, might have contributed to this deficient development.

Tus the MCC has so far mainly acted for the unspecific communication of security political data Duch as the Exchange respectively the re-certification of security politically coordination mechanism in therefore of little strategic importante. Nevertheless it is about the central forum for the security politcal dialogue between the two largest South American countires.

Although the Brazilian government had decide don annual meetings with the Argentines i the protocol form Itaipaiva in 1997, the comité has so far only got together twice. In comparison: The Argentine- Chilean COMPERSEG has had 13 meetings between 1996 and 2003 aftel all. As for the two conferences common secretary´s office that délas with security- and politicalissues of Argentina and Brazil.

Another difference between the two bilateral security political cooperation forums COMPERSEG and MCC possesses no academia Component. It is trae that the few nacional expertson defence- and security policy are consulted sporadically. But these importat sources of information are not formally integrated in the operating process of the comité as in case the COMPERSEG with the FLACSO- Chile and SER en el 2000. Rather tose information are chiefly based on personal contacts between the political decision makers and single academics.

The representatives of government agreed on annual meetings, which were to take place alternately in Argentina and Brazil. It was decided on the building of an executive secretary's office, the Mecanismo Permanente de Análisis Estratégico (MAE). On the one hand the MAE is supposed to realize the decisions of the ministers' conferences and to prepare each following meeting of the consultation and coordination mechanism on the other hand. In content the MCC deals with all issues on defence policy and the international security. However the protocol from Itaipava explicitly ascribes disarmament, nondistribution of mass extermination weapons and peace operations of the United Nations to the committee.

As early as in 1995, two years before the foundation of the MCC, Argentina had launched the permanent, bilateral security committee COMPERSEG (Comité Permanente de Seguridad) together with her Western neighbour Chile. This body of experts, which holds the same status as the permanent secretary, already indicates an advanced degree of formalization (see Runza 2004) and can be regarded as a precursor institution of the Brazilian-Argentine MCC. In contrast to Argentina and Chile, though, Argentina and Brazil had never been enemies in the course of their common history, but their relationship was traditionally marked by strong rivalry. Due to this constellation and hence a greater mutual trust between Argentina and Brazil the MCC developed in a far less formal way than the Argentine-Chilean COMPERSEG. But also the initially mentioned hostility to institutionalisation and formalization deeply anchored in Brazil's political culture, which contrasts the "prussian virtues" of the Chileans, might have contributed to this deficient development.

Thus the MCC has so far mainly acted for the unspecific communication of security political data such as the exchange respectively the re-certification of security politically relevant information between Argentina and Brazil. This bilateral consultation and coordination mechanism is therefore of little strategic importance. Nevertheless it is about the central forum for the security political dialogue between the two largest South American countries.

Although the Brazilian government had decided on annual meetings with the Argentines in the protocol from Itaipava in 1997, the committee has so far only got together twice. In comparison: The Argentine-Chilean COMPERSEG has had 13 meetings between 1996 and 2003 after all. As for the two conferences of the MCC there are neither minutes available for the public nor is there a permanent common secretary's office that deals with security- and defence political issues of Argentina and Brazil.

Another difference between the two bilateral security political cooperation forums COMPERSEG and MCC is the fact that the MCC possesses no academic component. It is true that the few national experts on defence- and security policy are consulted sporadically. But these important sources of information are not formally integrated in the operating process of the committee as in the case of the COMPERSEG with the FLASCO-Chile and SER en el 2000. Rather those information are chiefly based on personal contacts between the political decision makers and single academics.


3.1. The operating level: Mecanismo Permanente de Análisis Estratégico (MAE)

The Mecanismo Permanente de Análisis Estratégico (MAE) commissioned with the practical implementation of all decided measures is run by the vice-foreign ministers as well as the Argentine permanent secretary for military affairs (vice-minister of defence). Since 1999 the head of the secretary's office for politics, strategy and international affairs (an admiral of the navy) in the Brazilian ministry of defence has been in charge. After all the MAE can prove four conferences in the last seven years, in which the international security agenda was the main subject of the bilateral dialogue. The coordination of the endeavours of both countries within the OAS was given special attention. However the actors generally restricted to inform their counterparts about the positions of their governments concerning questions of regional and global security. Thus describing the profile of the forum's duties with strategic coordination would be exaggerated. Due to a lack of precise demands by the MCC this body of experts, which is also organised like an executive secretary's office, is rather used for exchange of information only.

The first meeting of the MAE took place on 6 October 2000 in Buenos Aires. At this point the Brazilian civilianly run ministry of defence had already been founded, but had not yet been completely installed. Consequently Brasília was only represented by the Itamaraty, whereas Argentina has from the beginning been represented in the MAE by her foreign- as well as her ministry of defence. The agenda of the first conference was limited to an analysis of the regional and international security situation, in which both sides expressed their perspectives and interests. For the first time Brazil and Argentina discussed the possibilities for a future technological-scientific collaboration on the sector of defence on this occasion.

The second meeting of the MAE took place two years later on 14 October 2002 in Brasília. The representatives of both countries articulated already precise questions concerning the security- and defence-cooperation:

The third meeting of the MAE took place on 30 and 31 October 2003 in Buenos Aires. After the representatives of the foreign ministries and ministries of defence had again articulated their view on the regional and international security situation and consulted each other concerning the future regional and hemispheric security-conferences, the following points were discussed in more detail: The fourth meeting of the MAE took again place on 4 and 5 March 2004 in Buenos Aires. During this conference the same topics were dealt with as already five months earlier. The steps so far carried out in the defence collaboration were specified:
Furthermore the Argentine and Brazilian actors struck the balance of the results of the extraordinary all-American security conference, which the OAS held in Mexico from 26 till 28 October 2003. Apart from that the two governments discussed their perspectives and interests at the VI. Conference of the Ministers of Defence of the Americas planned for November 2004 in Quito.


3.2. Critical appreciation of MCC and MAE

From the beginning the absence of a civilian ministry of defence in Brazil has contributed to an asymmetry within the bilateral relationships, which is rather unusual for the actors involved. The ministry founded in 1999 has only got involved in the work of the bilateral groups more intensely over the last two years, especially in the operating level (MAE). With the starting consolidation of the structures of the still quite young ministry and the inherent capability to coordinate a greater regularity of the MAE-meetings can be noticed as well as a more explicit subject agenda since 2002. However up until now the Argentine actors show greater initiative. They can refer to experiences already made at the bilateral defence cooperation with Chile (COMPERSEG) and are obviously more interested in the bilateral cooperation forum. Three of the so far four meetings of the were organized by the Argentine government and took place in Buenos Aires.

By this two aspects are addressed, which might complicate a further development and intensification of the MCC: Asymmetries and diverging interests between the two countries and internal factors, such as different patterns of civil-military relationships, which the late foundation of the Brazilian ministry of defence already points at. Another problem implies the lack of transparency of the investigated defence political committees. This problem could be solved by coupling to the academic community, which is equipped with a greater public reach.

Divergent security political interests do not only result from the different military, political and economic potential of the two South American countries, but especially from the different claims and aspirations. While the Argentines are increasingly keen on the subregional cooperation and mainly critical to a "special partnership" with the USA, as it had still been intended by Carlos Menem, the regional power Brazil is trying to diversify her international relationships. Brazil's turning to other regional powers (Russia, India, China, South Africa), which also implies other security political components, is critically observed by the Argentine conservative side (see La Nación, 18 March 2004). Argentina reproaches Brasília for ultimately pursuing global objectives and using the Mercosul merely as a medium to position herself as a global placer. These voices are confirmed by Brazil's sole claim for a permanent seat in the security council of the United Nations, should it be reformed.

However the moderate Brazilian engagement respectively the sluggish consolidation of the bilateral committees in the defence sector cannot only be explained by diverging roles within the international system. Comparative analyses come to the result that the civil supremacy in the Argentine case has developed the most since the country's economic decline under the military government, the lost Falkland Island-conflict and the following discreditation of the Argentine armed forces (see Diamint 1999, Diamond/ Plattner 1998, Hunter 1998 and Pion-Berlin 2001). Nevertheless the Argentine armed forces do also have influence on the military- and defence policy. Therefore the Argentine ministry of defence has hardly influence on structural changes within the military institutions. This is due to quickly fluctuating staff combined with a chaos concerning competences. In the international collaboration the Argentine armed services pursue the interests of their institutions to an accordingly great extent, since the ministry of defence expresses hardly any political targets that could focus the objectives of the armed services within the bi- or multilateral military cooperation. As far as that goes the Argentine ministry of defence is able to make the army, air force and navy proposals at the most, but not to exercise the command authority. Apart from the civil control deficit the Argentine ministry of defence is certified considerable functional deficits at the implementation of defence political defaults that would have to precede the goal-directed intensification of the defence political cooperation (Radseck 2004: 129).

The previous chapter has already detected functional deficits of a similar kind in the Brazilian ministry of defence at the definition and implementation of the security- and defence policies as well as a weak civil control over the armed forces. Up until today the defence policy has to be regarded as a military enclave in the Brazilian case. Although the Brazilian political elites clearly state their willingness to intensify bilateral cooperation mechanisms with Argentina, such as the MCC and MAE, these efforts regularly peter out on the declarative level. One reason for that is the fact that numerous decisive positions in the Brazilian ministry of defence are held by conservative generals who fear a loss of their influence on the security- and defence policy, should future decisions on the bilateral or subregional level be made by political actors.

As long as information and channels of communication of the international military collaboration are almost exclusively controlled and kept secret by the military in the Brazilian ministry of defence, the generals continue to be in charge of the control monopoly within the international defence political collaboration. The breaking up of this monopoly of the generals and the integration of civil actors (parliament, media, sciences) in the decision making processes is only possible, if the culture of secrecy is clearly restricted in the Brazilian sector of security and defence.

The positive developments for the bilateral cooperation between Argentina and Brazil, which derive from the agenda of the MAE, can be divided into military- and defence political aspects. It is true that a "strategic alliance" between Argentina and Brazil in the defence political sense - as the two present presidents keep postulating - is out of the question, since the voting on the national defence doctrines and security strategies has so far not been integrated in the agenda of the bilateral committees. But the MAE was used to come to an agreement on issues concerning the regional and global security as well as to possibly find a common position opposite a third country on the hemispheric or international platforms.

At the military and technological cooperation the Mecanismo de Consulta y Coordinación and the Mecanismo Permanente de Análisis Estratégico in particular have led to a clear increase of almost all bilateral activities on the military-technically sector. The following paragraphs will analyse to what extent confidence building measures, such as common manoeuvres, personnel exchange and military-technically cooperation at the maintenance and production of weapon systems, for instance, have further developed qualitatively. But before this Brazil's bilateral working groups for defence policy will be documented. These bilateral institutions can be understood as a bridgehead between the defence political and the military-technical cooperation.


4. The bilateral working groups for defence policy (GTBD)

Since its foundation the civilianly run ministry of defence has initiated bilateral working groups for defence policy (Grupos de Trabalho Bilateral de Defesa - GTBD) with most South American countries. Those working groups that function as an intergovernmental discussion forum for defence political issues exist between Brazil and all the countries of the extended Mercosul - only Paraguay is excluded so far. Moreover Brazil has also been keeping up bilateral working groups for defence policy with Peru and Venezuela since 2001.


4.1. Grupo de Trabalho Bilateral de Defesa between Brazil and Argentina

The GTBD between the Brazilian and Argentine ministry of defence was founded in July 2000 in Brasília. On this occasion the two ministers of defence decided annual meetings - alternately in Argentina and Brazil -, which should contribute to a more efficient international cooperation on the defence sector. So far three meetings of the Argentine-Brazilian working group have taken place. The respective home government has delivered meeting-records.(3)

The first conference of the Argentine-Brazilian cooperation forum for questions of defence took place on 26 October 2001 in Brasília. Both delegations were headed by the ministers of defence (Geraldo Quintão, Brazil and José Horacio Jaunarena, Argentina). Apart from five militaries with the minister's consultant Machado e Costa there was only one diplomat in the Brazilian delegation. The delegation of the Argentine minister of defence Jaunarena reflected a more balanced image with four civilians and five members of the military. The officers involved were employed at various departments of the administrations - mainly in the ministries of defence - and did therefore not take part in the bilateral working groups as representatives of the armed forces.

Four weeks after 11 September 2001 the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington inevitably dominated the agenda of the first meeting of the Argentine-Brazilian GTBD. The Brazilian minister of defence Quintão emphasized the necessity of a common analysis of the incidents in the USA, from which possible consequences for the strategic situation in South America and an adjustment to the defence planning of the South American countries might be derived. The Argentine minister of defence Jaunarena agreed with Quintão and stressed that the process of integration in the South of Latin America was to be intensified. At the same time security- and defence political aspects had to play a more important part in the future than so far in order to preserve the interests of the Argentine and Brazilian populations.

After the head of the department for strategic intelligence - housed at the secretary's office for politics, strategy and international affairs of the Brazilian ministry of defence - general da Silva Fernandes had carried out a strategic evaluation of the regional and international security situation, the working group dealt with the following three subject areas:
4.2. Grupo de Trabalho Bilateral de Defesa between Brazil and Chile

The bilateral working group for defence policy between Brazil and Chile has already had the first meeting in December 2000 in Santiago de Chile. Both countries' ministers of defence - Geraldo Quintão, Brazil and Mario Fernández, Chile - made the coordination of both countries' defence political positions the main objective of the bilateral cooperation forum, which is meant to be realized by annual meetings (4). While the Chilean delegation consisted of five civilians and nine members of the military, there was again only one civilian representative amongst the Brazilian delegation of eight persons in total.

Annual meetings of Brazil's and Chile's armed forces joint staffs were planned for the future. In addition to that the Brazilian delegation suggested the establishment of sub- working groups, which should deal with issues of bilateral interest: Military cooperation, planning and organization, strategic intelligence as well as science, technology and arms industry. The results of the sub-working groups are to be presented at the annual meetings of the GTBD.

The bilateral working group discussed the following subjects based on lectures of the Chilean delegation: The bilateral working group discussed the following subjects based on lectures by the Brazilian delegation: Moreover the Brazilian ministry of defence invited the Chilean delegation to send an officer to the Escola Superior de Guerra in Rio de Janeiro, where he should participate in a training program on strategic studies. In addition to that the Chilean side distributed a list with specific fields within the armed forces as well as the defence industry, in which the Chilean ministry of defence is interest in an exchange of staff and an intensified cooperation.

The Brazilian delegation offered the Chilean minister her support at the organization of the V. conference of the ministers of defence of the Americas, which took place in 2002 in Santiago de Chile. In the end the Chilean delegation reported on experiences made at peacemissions supervised by the United Nations and on the Centro Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz de Chile (CECOPAC), a training centre built in Santiago de Chile. There the members of the UN-peace-missions are trained and prepared for their international operations.

The Brazilian-Chilean GTBD held the second conference in November 2001 in Brasília. With a view of the attacks of the terror network Al Quaida from 11 September 2001 in the USA the representatives of both sides agreed that the South American countries should react "with one voice" (minister Geraldo Quintão) to the strategic change caused by the threat of terrorism. The Chilean actors added the common aim had to be the consolidation of a regional identity. A foundation for the development of a common strategic perspective could be regularly happening seminars on issues of security and strategy, where high-ranking representatives of government would take part as well as academic experts. After a common strategic evaluation of the situation and an analysis of the problem common regional approaches of a solution could result from the seminars, the Chilean permanent secretary of the navy Ángel Flisfish explained.
Moreover the Chilean delegation showed its interest in extending the bilateral cooperation with Brazil into further subject areas that are only indirectly concerned with the defence policy. The exploration of the Antarctic, the industrial development and space travel were given as examples.

After a strategic evaluation of the regional and international security situation by the head of the department for strategic intelligence in the Brazilian ministry of defence, general da Silva Fernandes, the following points of the agenda were in the centre of the second conference of the Brazilian-Chilean GTBD:
5. The military cooperation: Conferences, common manoeuvres, training cooperation, personnel exchange and technological collaboration

Defence- and security political questions on the political level between Brazil and her neighbouring countries - especially Argentina - are collected by the consultation and coordination mechanism (MCC) as well as the strategic analysis mechanism (MAE) and dealt with by bilateral working groups (GTBDs). Additionally there are bilateral meetings of the armed forces joint staff and the three branches of service, including confidence building measures in the form of personnel exchange and common manoeuvres that the armed services carry out independently.

The existing system allows each of the three branches of service to establish their own channels of communication with their counterparts in other countries and to use these relatively independently from the political instructions by the Brazilian foreign ministry or the ministry of defence. The Brazilian navy, for example, may decide freely about the intensification of the relations with the Argentine fleet or a rapprochement with the Portuguese navy instead. Equally autonomous are the commanders of the two cooperating navies concerning the definition of the priorities and cooperation measures intended without necessarily considering the political government orders (Eugenio Diniz, interview on 25 June 2004).

In the run-up to the bilateral meetings of the armed forces joint staffs of the subregion the Brazilian armed forces joint staff very rarely informs the Brazilian embassy on the scene of action, although military attachés are sent to the embassies for this purpose amongst others. Just as rarely are the results of the bilateral dialogues reported to the Brazilian foreign ministry or the consultation and coordination mechanism for international security- and defence questions (Paulo Joppert, interview on 13 May 2004). The self-dynamics of the military dialogue became evident when the Argentine-Brazilian general staff meetings were continued during the adjournment of the Itaipava-process. The armed forces joint staffs of Argentina and Brazil sat in conference in Buenos Aires in 1998 and in Manaus in 1999. In other words: While the most significant bilateral forum for defence issues was suspended due to political reasons, the armed forces joint staffs discussed their common agenda. The relative autonomy the Brazilian armed forces enjoy at the military cooperation is particularly owed to the fact that until 1999 there has been no political government office dealing with the coordination of politico-militarily measures of the armed services and the armed forces joint staff. However the consolidation of the civilianly run ministry of defence might undermine the tradition of direct negotiations between the Brazilian armed forces and their partner institutions medium-term. The following analysis of the confidence building measures of the Brazilian military is intended to give information on how big the gap between the defence political defaults and the concrete military cooperation has been since the establishment of the Brazilian ministry of defence in 1999.


5.1. Confidence building measures of the Brazilian army

The Brazilian army cooperates particularly closely with her Argentine counterpart. Two-annually both countries' army general staffs sit in bilateral conferences (Conferência Bilateral de Estado-Maior - CBEM), where the actors talk about their experiences - especially in military training and planning. Over the last few years the army general staffs have dealt with the subjects intelligence and logistics amongst others as well as single operations and manoeuvres. At the last CBEM in April 2002 in Buenos Aires the two general staffs of the army made the following agreements and recommendations: Five agreements and one recommendation on personnel questions, one agreement in the sector of military intelligences, three agreements on concrete military operations as well as three agreements and four recommendations in the sector of logistics and armaments (Oliveira Seixas 2003: 9). Moreover regular bilateral conferences with the army general staffs of Chile, Uruguay, Ecuador, Guayana and Venezuela are held.

Another bilateral cooperation forum is to be seen in the regional meetings for military exchange (Reunião Regional de Intercãmbio Militar - RRIM). There the Brazilian army cooperates with the armies of the adjacent states. In Brazil the army general staff coordinates this form of the bilateral collaboration, which is carried out by the army commands of the area (Comandos Militares de Àrea). The predominant aim of the cooperation mechanism is the military protection of the border regions in a joint effort with the army units of the neighbouring countries. For this purpose experiences and information are exchanged on the one hand. The army general staffs try to adjust their proceeding to each other in order to complement one another reasonably in the border regions on the other hand (Alberto Hallwass, interview on 14 May 2004).

The RRIM with Argentina take place annually. In doing so the bilateral meetings are alternately held in Argentine and Brazilian cities located at the border. The third regional meeting for military exchange between the Argentine and the Brazilian army took place from 7 October until 9 October 2002 in the Brazilian Santiago (Rio Grande do Sul).

In the sector of training and personnel a few measures have to be pointed out, which represent the intensive cooperation of the Argentine and Brazilian army. At the army academies of both countries, for example, the native language of the neighbouring state is taught. At the Argentine Escuela Superior de Guerra as well as the Brazilian Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército liaison officers of the respective twin institution are involved in the conceiving of the officers' courses (ibid.). The participation in courses and training programs at the military academies of the neighbouring country have become part of the daily life of the Argentine-Brazilian cooperation on the army level by now. Furthermore soldiers between the Argentine and the Brazilian army units stationed at the common border are exchanged regularly. Table 1 (see appendix) shows an overall view of the cooperation measures carried out by the Brazilian army and those of the subregion in the sector of training and personnel exchange between 1999 and 2003. First of all it is striking that the international cooperation in this sector takes almost entirely place bilaterally. At the same time in 1999 the Brazilian army has supported one hundred percent of the bilateral exchange programs for courses at army academies with the Argentine army. In the following year only 13 of 40 common courses and exchange programs were carried out with Argentina. It is conspicuous, though, that the courses at the Brazilian military intelligence (Centro de Inteligência do Exército - CIE) are left to participants from Argentina, Chile and Paraguay. Another diversification of the bilateral cooperation partners of the Brazilian army can be observed in 2001. It is true that the armies of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay perform still most of the cooperation measures (26 of 59 in total). But also the Amazon neighbours - Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Guyana and Suriname - can prove 23 bilateral cooperative operations with the Brazilian army in total. It is striking again that the courses on military intelligence in Brazil are - with very few exceptions - left to army soldiers from Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. The confidence building measures in the sector of training and personnel exchange between 2002 and 2003 deliver a clear picture. During these two years seven courses each (i.e. for mountain infantry, operations in rain forest areas, military intelligence) were carried out, in which Argentine and Brazilian members of the army took part in the respective neighbouring country.

Also considering the common army manoeuvres between 1999 and 2003 (see table 2) it is striking that Argentina was involved in all exercises with Brazilian participation carried out in the subregional context. In contrast to the confidence building measures in the sector training and personnel exchange often more than two countries are involved in the army exercises. Those armies taking part in multilateral manoeuvres in the subregional context come exclusively from the Mercosul-countries.

Table 2: Common exercises of the Brazilian army in the subregional context between 1999 and 2003

YearPlaceParticipating CountriesExercise Description
1999ArgentinaArgentina, Brazil and Uruguay1. TRANSAMERICA III: Staff exercise of the armies
1999Brazil (Rio Grande do Sul)Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay 2. CRUZ DEL SUR 1999
2000Brazil (Rosario do Sul)Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay3. CRUZ DEL SUR 2000
2000Argentina (Posadas)Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia (as observer) 4. IGUAZÚ: Search, evacuation, rescue and transport of missing persons
2000Brazil (Goias)Brazil and Argentina (as observer) 5. OPERACIÒN SACI I: Conventional army exercise
2000Argentina (Córdoba)Argentina and Brazil6. CABAÑAS 2000: Simulation of a peace misión
2001Brazil (Parque Nacional Iguaçú)Argentina and Brazil7. IGUAZÙ II: Planning of common measures for mutual support in natural disasters
2001ArgentinaArgentina and Brazil (Observer: Paraguay and Uruguay) 8. LAZO FUERTE 2001: Planning of a conventional operation
2001BrazilBrazil and Argentina9. OPERACIÒN SACI II: Manoeuvre of the operative military planning
2001ArgentinaBrazil and Argentina10. CABAÑAS 2001: Simulation of a peace mission
2001Brazil Argentina, Brazil11. CRUZ DEL SUR 2001
2002Argentina (Paraná) Argentina and Brazil (Observer: Paraguay and Uruguay) 12. LAZO FUERTE 2002: Organization of a common military operation of a convencional kind
2003Brazil (Santa Maria)Argentina and Brazil13. LAZO FUERTE 2003: Common staff exercise of the Argentine and Brazilian army
2003BrazilBrazil and Argentina14. OPERACIÒN SACI III: Manoeuvre of the operative military planning

Own representation resulting from a comparison of the following sources: Centro de Estudios Nueva Mayoria 2004, Comisión de Seguridad Hemisférica de la Organización de los Estados Américanos 2002, Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas Argentinas 2004, Junta Interaméricana de Defensa 2001 as well as research interviews by the author with members of the armed forces, ministerial officials and academic experts on defence in November/ December 2003 and in May/ June 2004 in Brazil (see list of interview partners).

On the operative level common auxiliary employments after natural disasters are planned, for instance. Concerning the common involvement in UN-peace operations there are already structures for a bilateral army general staff, which would carry out the planning of a UN-mission if necessary (Oliveira Seixas 2003: 10). Argentine army soldiers have joined the Brazilian contingent of the East Timor-mission of the United Nations; Brazilian militaries have integrated into the Argentine group in Cyprus. The staff manoeuvres of the two armies are performed to the extent of a brigade.


5.2. Confidence building measures of the Brazilian air force

Also the military cooperation of the Brazilian air force in the sector of training and personnel exchange takes almost entirely place in a bilateral context. Similarly to the army's cooperation measures in this sector the collaboration with the Argentine Mercosul-partner was focused on first of all. According to table 3 (see appendix) eight out of nine common training courses were held at the training centres of the Argentine or Brazilian air force in 1999. Only Peru was included into an officer training course. During the two following years the Brazilian air force intensified its training cooperation with the Chilean and Uruguayan air forces to return to the exclusively Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in 2002 and 2003 again. During the whole investigation period of five years common training courses of the air force general staffs were left to the Argentine-Brazilian tandem.

Between 1999 and 2003 the Brazilian air force carried out far less common exercises with the friendly air forces of the subregion. One crucial reason for this might be the unequally higher expenditures an air force exercise imply compared to army manoeuvres. Apart from that it has to be taken into account that the Brazilian air force came even without common manoeuvres with other countries only on 120.000 out of 200.000 advised flying hours due to a budgetary shortfall in 1999, for example (see Estado de São Paulo, 30 May 2000). 440 out of 775 air crafts of the Brazilian air force were on the ground in May 2000 due to repair- and maintenance work (de Oliveira 2003: 6). As table 4 clearly shows between 1999 and 2000 there were no common exercises carried out.


Table 4: Common exercises of the Brazilian air force in the subregional context between 1999 and 2003

Year Place Participating Countries Exercise Description
2001Argentina (Misiones) and South BrazilArgentina and Brazil1. Tanba I: Common exercise for the coordination of intercepting- and monitoring activities in case of the crossing of both air spaces by hostile air crafts
2001Argentine-Brazilian border Argentina and Brazil2. PRATA I: Manoeuvre for the localization and identification of illegally entered air crafts into the air space.

Own representation resulting from a comparison of the following sources: Centro de Estudios Nueva Mayoria 2004, Comisión de Seguridad Hemisférica de la Organización de los Estados Américanos 2002, Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas Argentinas 2004, Junta Interaméricana de Defensa 2001 as well as research interviews by the author with members of the armed forces, ministerial officials and academic experts on defence in November/ December 2003 and in May/ June 2004 in Brazil (see list of interview partners).

The only two air force manoeuvres in the subregional context in the year 2001 - Tanba I and PRATA I - were carried out together with the Argentine air force.
In contrast to the exercise Tanba the operation PRATA was not exclusively coordinated by Brazilian air force bases. This time the Argentine planes were based in Buenos Aires and the Brazilian jets at the air force base in Santa Maria in Rio Grande do Sul. The mission implied the location of non-identified air crafts and their pursuit. If the interceptors did not manage to force these planes to land on their own territory, the Argentine respectively the Brazilian air force was informed about their illegal entering into the air space of the neighbouring country beforehand. After completion of the manoeuvre the commanders-in-chief of the Argentine and Brazilian air force signed a common declaration on 22 June 2001, by which the trained scenarios were taken up to the expirations of routine by both countries' air force pilots.


5.3. Confidence building measures of the Brazilian navy

In comparison with the other two armed services the Brazilian navy may look back on a far longer tradition of confidence building measures. Over the last decades the Brazilian navy has continuously been approaching its sister institution in the neighbouring countries. Concerning the bi- and multilateral cooperation several mechanisms were used: Common exercises, personnel exchange, common training programs as well as various information- and coordination forums. The Brazilian fleet regards the protection of the territorial waters and the safety of the sea routes as the main duty. Particularly the natural resources in the South Atlantic (80 percent of the mostly undeveloped national oil supplies are within the exclusive economic zone in front of the Brazilian Atlantic coast) are to be protected militarily. In view of the tremendous size of the South Atlantic region the necessity of the cooperation with the other South Atlantic neighbours goes without saying. In doing so the common control of the resources-rich sea area out of the exclusive economic zone is necessary and requires regional partners to prevent the exploitation of the natural wealth by external actors. In this respect the Argentine and the Brazilian navies keep up a particularly intensive cooperation.

The close collaboration between the Argentine and Brazilian naval forces is also reflected in the sector training and personnel exchange on the side of the armed services. Table 5 (see appendix) shows that the Argentine navy has been involved in all confidence building measures in 1999. As for the year 2000 a diversification of the partner institutions that the Brazilian navy cooperated with can be seen noticed. Personnel exchange programs were initiated in cooperation with the Peruvian and Chilean armada especially. But also during this year one half of all confidence building measures in the sector training and personnel exchange have been carried out with the Argentine navy. In the following years the Argentine and Brazilian armadas find back to their exclusive relationship. With the exceptions of one officer cadet from Venezuela, who visits the Brazilian naval academy, and an exchange of Brazilian and Peruvian naval officers the Brazilian navy carries out all 15 confidence building measures with its Argentine counterpart.

Since 1978 the Brazilian navy has been performing common manoeuvres with the Argentine naval forces. Besides the upper water sea-fleet the common exercises also integrate submarines and naval pilots. In addition to that the naval infantrymen of both countries have been carrying out common landing manoeuvres with amphibian tanks over the last few years. In the course of the years the bilateral operations have reached a high operative and technological level up to interoperationality (del Pozzi 2003: 3). The list of the naval manoeuvres carried out in the subregional context in the latest history (see table 6) again proves the central role of the Argentine-Brazilian connection within the military cooperation between the countries of Southern Latin America. Apart from a few exceptions, which all concentrate on 2000 - as already noticed in the context of the confidence building measures of army and air force - the navy of Argentina has been involved in all common exercises of the last five years.


Table 6: Common exercises of the Brazilian navy in the subregional context between 1999 and 2003

Year PlaceParticipating CountriesExercise Description
1999 Brazil (between Rio de Janeiro and Salvador da Bahia)Argentina and Brazil1. FRATERNO XIX: Manoeuvre of the upper water sea-fleets with 2.012 participating soldiers, 12 destroyers and 6 helicopters
1999 South Atlantic (between Rio de Janeiro and Puerto Belgrano)Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay2. POST-FRATERNO: Practising the mutual logistical support with 1.587 soldiers, 7 destroyers, 5 helicopters and one tanker
1999South AtlanticSouth American Countries3. TRANSOCEANIC: Staff exercise for the coordination of the means of communication
1999Argentina (Buenos Aires) Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay4. COAMAS 1999: Staff exercise for the coordination of the communication channels
2000Brazilian territorial watersArgentina and Brazil5. REVISTA NAVAL: Manoeuvre on the occasion of the festivities ,500 years Brazil"
2000Argentina (Puerto Belgrano, Mar del Plata)Argentina and Brazil6. FRATERNO XX: Common sea-exercise to raise the degree of interoperationality
2000Uruguay (Montevideo)Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay7. COAMAS: Staff exercise for the control of the ocean shipping traffic on the Atlantic
2000in the territorial waters of the participating countriesBrazil, Argentina, Paraguay8. PLATINA
2000in the territorial waters of the participating countriesBrazil, Argentina and Uruguay9. DIPLOMEX
2000ParaguayBrazil and Paraguay10. SANDOPE: hydrographical measurements of the Rio Paraguay together with the Paraguayan navy
2000Carribean SeaBrazil, Suriname and Venezuela11. CARIBE
2000Brazilian territorial watersBrazil, Colombia and Peru12. BRACOLPER
2000Brazilian territorial waters Brazil, Ecuador and Peru13. BRAPEQUA
2000PacificBrazil and Peru14. BRAPER
2000Brazilian territorial watersBrazil and Colombia15. BRACOl
2001Brazilian territorial watersArgentina and Brazil16. FRATERNO XXI
2002Argentina (Bahía Blanca) Argentina and Brazil17. ARAEX VI: Landing manoeuvres, inclusion of an aircraft carrier, three aircrafts, several frigates, one destroyers and one tanker
2002Brazilian territorial watersArgentina and Brazil18. TEMPEREX: Combat aircrafts start and land on the Brazilian aircraft carrier São Paulo
2002Brazilian territorial watersArgentina and Brazil19. FRATERNO XXII

Own representation resulting from a comparison of the following sources: Centro de Estudios Nueva Mayoria 2004, Comisión de Seguridad Hemisférica de la Organización de los Estados Américanos 2002, Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas Argentinas 2004, Junta Interaméricana de Defensa 2001 as well as research interviews by the author with members of the armed forces, ministerial officials and academic experts on defence in November/ December 2003 and in May/ June 2004 in Brazil (see list of interview partners).

Especially the agreement on the common control of the South Atlantic CAMAS (Control Area Marítima Atlántico Sur), which has been anchored in the Mercosul by now and which also includes Paraguay, has led to the intensification of the mutual knowledge of the navies' command structures. In the following the most important common activities of the Argentine and Brazilian naval forces will be outlined.

Common exercise Fraterno

The first operation Fraterno was carried out as early as in 1978 and has therefore got a pioneering character within the Argentine-Brazilian military cooperation. Since then the common manoeuvre has annually been taking place alternately in the Argentine and Brazilian territorial waters. This way the fleets have got the opportunity of getting used to the geographical circumstances - especially the coasts - of their neighbours. In these exercises the weapons systems of the navies are employed closely-to-reality, although the common aim is the coordination of the weapons systems and their technological further development. At the same time the degree of interoperationality is being increased steadily. By growing interoperationality military manoeuvres with an even higher degree of operative complexity can be realized every year.

At a meeting of the general staffs of the Argentine and Brazilian navy in 1996 the admirals decided to include landing manoeuvres with amphibious vehicles in the Fraternoexercise for the first time in the following year. During the first years the landing exercises had only been carried out on the planning level in order to settle questions on the national legal systems concerning actions of foreign troops on the own territory. But since 1998 the Brazilan naval infantrymen have been practising the storming of the Argentine mainland and vice versa. In 1999 the general staffs of the Argentine and Brazilian naval forces decided to increase the number of the naval infantrymen participating in the landing manoeuvres to company strength.

Common exercise ARAEX

The ARAEX-exercises consist mainly of landing manoeuvres of Argentine naval pilots on Brazilian aircraft carriers. Until 1997 the jets of the Argentine fleet have rehearsed takeoffs and landings on the aircraft carrier Minas Gerais, which was designed milarly to the former Argentine aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo. Between 1998 and 2001 the common manoeuvres could not take place because the Minas Gerais rode at anchor for a general inspection. Since 2003 the ARAEX-exercises have been performed on the new Brazilian aircraft carrier São Paulo.

After only in 1994 an Argentine jet of the model Super Etendard has had an accident at the landing on the Minas Gerais, catapult takeoffs and over hook secured landings of the Argentine combat aircrafts on the Brazilian aircraft carrier have become a routine by now. They also include the so called touch and go-manoeuvres where the Argentine aircrafts touch the ground of the aircraft carrier only briefly in order to continue their flight again. This close kind of militarily technological cooperation (military integration in an operatively restricted frame) between the armed forces of two countries is only possible, if there is a stable confidence basis between the countries respectively their military institutions.

Common exercise ATLASUR

The ATLASUR-manoeuvre owes its existence to an Argentine initiative, which aimed at the approximation to her Eastern neighbour at the Atlantic, South Africa. Accordingly the first ATLASUR-exercise was carried out in 1993 in a bilateral context between Argentina and South Africa in the Argentine territorial waters. Initially the Argentine and South African navy had decided to carry out the exercise every two years alternately in the Argentine and the South African part of the South Atlantic. Since 1999, though, the Brazilian and Uruguayan naval forces have also been taking part and give a multilateral quality to it.

The common exercise ATLASUR is meant to lead to a better coordination of the activities in the South Atlantic between the naval institutions of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Even more so it strives for a better organization between the three neighbours and their South African counterpart. On a long-term basis the degree of the interoperationality between the navies involved is intended to be increased, so that a multilateral control of the South Atlantic sea area is made possible. All participating countries complete a considerable part of their foreign trade over the South Atlantic navigation.

Common exercise ACRUX

ACRUX is about a multinational manoeuvre, in the context of which different scenarios of the inland navigation in the widely branched out river system Paraguay-Paraná are exercised. The Argentine, the Uruguayan, the Brazilian, the Paraguayan and the Bolivian navy participate in this exercise. They all emphasize that they do not exercise police measures, which aim at the organized drug crime or the international terrorism, for instance. The admirals of the countries involved consider the common exercise ACRUX rather as a confidence building measure between the South American armed forces and as a contribution to the subregional cooperation in the defence sector (del Pozzi 2003: 13).


5.4. Confidence building measures of the Brazilian armed forces joint staff

Even the Brazilian armed forces joint staff works qualitatively and quantitatively the closest with the Argentine armed forces joint staff. This fact becomes very obvious by looking at the confidence building measures in the sector of training and personnel exchange between 1999 and 2003 listed in table 7 (see appendix). After the Brazilian armed forces joint staff had exclusively carried out confidence building measures with the Argentine neighbour in 1999 and 2000, a broader dispersion of cooperation partners can be observed in 2001 - a development parallel to that of the confidence building measures of the armed services. In 2001 common officer training courses with the armed forces joint staffs of a whole number of Latin American countries were held: Argentina, Paraguay, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, Suriname, Guatemala and Mexico. In the following years of 2002 and 2003 the representatives of the armed forces joint staffs of Brazil concentrated on their Argentine partner again and realized 100 percent of the cooperation measures in the sector of training and personnel exchange in this bilateral context. The integration of Brazilian officers and corporals into the Argentine contingent of the UN-mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP) coordinated by the armed forces joint staffs deserves special attention in this context. Since 2002 Argentine officers and corporals have been integrated into the Brazilian contingent of the UN-peace troop in East Timor (UNMISET) in response.

By looking at other kinds of cooperation the Brazilian armed forces joint staff keeps up (see table 8) the bilateral meetings of the armed forces joint staff is given particular importance to. In doing so the bilateral conferences of the armed forces joint staff with Argentina between 1999 and 2003 take partly place twice a year. According to the available data those bilateral meetings are also held with the armed forces joint staffs of Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. It is fair to assume, though, that over the past years general staff meetings have also taken place or will take place in the future with those neighbouring countries, that bilateral working groups for defence policy (GTBD) have been formed with (such as Uruguay and Venezuela). After all these GTBDs often imply the starting point for the general staff meetings. Table 8 lists the rest of the cooperation measures between the armed forces joint staff of Brazil and its counterparts in the subregion between 1999 and 2003. All bilateral confidence building measures were carried out with the Argentine armed forces joint staff.


Table 8: Cooperation forums and -forms of the Brazilian armed forces joint staff in the subregional context between 1999 and 2003

YearPlaceParticipating CountriesMeasure Description
1999no dataArgentina and BrazilPlanning of the mutual support in an emergency
2000no dataAll Latin American Countries excluding Guyana and SurinameSymposium on strategic studies of the armed forces joint staffs (Simposio de Estudios Estratégicos de los Estados Mayores Conjuntos y de la Defensa)
2001ArgentinaArgentina and Brazil Integration of a Brazilian training officer into the exercise unit for peace missions in Central Argentina
2001BrazilArgentina and BrazilConference on logistics- and medical measures
2001ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilOfficer training course for national defence
2001BrazilArgentina and BrazilConference on strategic intelligence
2001no dataAll Latin American countries excluding Guyana and SurinameSymposium on strategic studies of the armed forces joint staffs (Simposio de Estudios Estratégicos de los Estados Mayores Conjuntos y de la Defensa)
2002 BrazilArgentina and BrazilConference on strategic intelligence
2003Argentina (Buenos Aires)Argentina and BrazilConference on strategic intelligence

Own representation resulting from a comparison of the following sources: Centro de Estudios Nueva Mayoria 2004, Comisión de Seguridad Hemisférica de la Organización de los Estados Américanos 2002, Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas Argentinas 2004, Junta Interaméricana de Defensa 2001 as well as research interviews by the author with members of the armed forces, ministerial officials and academic experts on defence in November/ December 2003 and in May/ June 2004 in Brazil (see list of interview partners).

The initially mentioned symposiums on strategic studies, in which representatives of the armed forces joint staff of all Latin American countries participate (with the exception of Guyana and Suriname), form a multilateral element within the military cooperation marked by bilateral structures. At these conventions also conceptual and theoretical questions of the subregional defence cooperation are discussed in addition to the practical confidence building measures. A subject of increasing importance at the strategy symposiums of the Latin American armed forces joint staffs is the cooperation of the Latin American armed forces in the context of peace missions of the United Nations.


6. The UN-peace mission in Haiti: Heading towards a multilateral security- and defence policy led by Brazil?

The UN-mission in Haiti already mentioned in the previous chapter in the paragraph on Brazil's security political re-orientation at the beginning of the 21st century might also have implications for the future defence political cooperation between the South American countries. On the basis of the UN-resolution from 1542 the stabilization mission MINUSTAH has been installed in Haiti in June 2004. The Brazilian army general Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira is in command of the peace operation. The multilateral peacekeeping force headed by Brazil is intended to consist of 6.700 soldiers from 13 countries on the whole, although only 2.259 of them have arrived in Haiti so far (being located: August 2004). Brazil deploys the biggest troop with 1.200 men, who are meant to protect the inhabitants' security in Port au Prince. The so far second strongest contingent provides Chile with 600 soldiers who are responsible for the safety in the Northern part of the country around Haiti's second largest city Cap-Haitien. Argentina has promised to provide a battalion of 600 soldiers for the control of the former stronghold of rebels Gonaives. Uruguay's battalion (also 600 soldiers) will patrol in the Southern part of Haiti. Paraguayan, Bolivian and Peruvian units complete the South American contingent, parts of which have already arrived in Haiti. Apart from Canada, France and the USA - all of them had supported the previous interim mission (MIF) - Benin, Nepal and Croatia sent smaller units and single specialists to Haiti.

Besides the military operation MINUSTAH falls also back on civil support, which mainly implies police officers. The Portuguese Adilio Ruivo Custodio is in command of the international police troop that is planned to include 1.622 policemen in total. But only 224 of them have been sent to Haiti by their respective country so far. The special representative of the secretary-general of the United Nations supervises the UN-mission in Haiti. The former Chilean foreign minister Juan Gabriel Valdés was entrusted with this task. The stabilization of the security situation in the Caribbean state is the ultimate aim of the MINUSTAH in order to guarantee the realization of the presidential races planned for the end of 2005. In addition to the maintenance of law and democratic order the disarmament of the round about 25.000 rebels is the most difficult problem the blue berets are confronted with. In spring 2004 these rebels marched towards Port au Prince and finally forced the deposition of the authoritarian president Aristide who is said to have entered into office by electoral fraud.

Moreover the military units of the "pleasant leading power" (see Correio Braziliense, 7 June 2004) contribute to the medical supply for the population and the reconstruction of the infrastructure of Latin America's poorest country. President da Silva promised to support the investments of Brazilian enterprises in Haiti. In an interview published in Folha de São Paulo (see 9 July 2004) the Haitian interim Prime Minister Gerard Latortue raised hopes that "a visit of the football stars of the Brazilian national league might contribute more to the disarmament of the rebels than the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations". According to the idea of those responsible the football fans were to receive their ticket after handing over a weapon. As expected the Brazilians won six to zero against the Haitian range on 18 August in Port au Prince in the presence of the Brazilian president da Silva (see Jornal do Brasil, 19 August 2004). Nothing was said about the handing over of weapons, though. Already one week after the departure of the president and the national league, the Brazilian commander of the UN-operation, general Ribeiro, admitted that the disarmament of the Haitians can only take place slowly, after small weapons have been circulating relatively freely for 40 years. First of all the security situation and the living conditions ought to be improved so that the people handed over their weapons they merely needed for self-defence, the general said (see O Globo, 23 August 2004).

Even if the disarmament of the civilians will only be little successful in the short-term, MINUSTAH is of great importance for the defence political cooperation in South America. Above all it has to be noticed that for the first time peacekeeping forces that consist almost exclusively of South American units carry out a peace mission of the United Nations headed by Brazil. The practical military cooperation between the South American governments has got the potential of introducing a turn to multilateralism within the subregional defence cooperation, which has so far mainly relied on bilateral structures. Even president da Silva and his minister of defence Viegas have stressed this progress at a visit to the troops prior to the football match on 18 August 2004 in Port au Prince (see Estado de São Paulo, 19 August 2004).

The Argentine president Nestor Kirchner went one step further. He understands the participation of Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the Haiti-mission as a permanent multilateral task force about to develop. The military units of the ABC-countries should first of all be available for UN-mandated peace missions and medium-term build "the embryo of a common regional defence system" (see Estado de São Paulo, 18 May 2004). The Argentine minister of defence Pampuro added that this was not yet about a military arm of the Mercosul, but the development headed towards defence political integration. At an informal meeting in Buenos Aires in May 2004 the ministers of defence of Argentina, Brazil and Chile had analysed the conditions for the establishment of a permanent common troop contingent (ibid.). At a public function of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Brasília in June 2004 the Chilean female minister of defence Michelle Bachelet held the view that the cooperation structures between Argentina, Brazil and Chile should be designed in a flexible and multidimensional way for the time being. In fact Bachelet's intended "flexible security architecture" implies that each of the three countries decides unilaterally, whether to cooperate in the bilateral, subregional or hemispheric context or to pursue several of these options of the security- and defence political cooperation simultaneously. In doing so external actors would have the opportunity - by bilateral agreements with single South American countries - to cause discords between them and to disturb the subregional cooperation process severely. This danger was very apparent at Argentina's appointment as the special partner of the NATO in 1997.

A critical view shows differences between the attitudes of the Southern states of Latin America concerning the future structure of the security- and defence political cooperation. Since the voting out of Carlos Menem especially Argentina has been in favour of the development of a subregional security system beyond diplomatic declarations of intent. At the same time Chile represents an intercessor who first of all - due to her classic sovereignty understanding - intends to build a solid frame work of bilateral security cooperation. Uruguay retreats from Brazil consciously at the peace mission in Haiti. The Uruguayan minister of defence Fau got a separate participation (força independente) of the Uruguayan contingent in the MINUSTAH accepted by the UNO (see Correio Braziliense, 14 May 2004). Headed by the big neighbour the small Mercosul-member is obviously worried about its national profile. At the same time Brazil's efforts are restrained, since the Amazon region of Brasília, which is considered to be strategically vulnerable, is the first priority and a subregional security community with the Cono-Sur-countries would only imply a marginal increase of security in this respect.

So during a public hearing in the Brazilian congress in May 2004 the Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim emphasized Brazil's security political responsibility for the whole region that also included the Caribbean state of Haiti. Already due to her geographic size and political importance Brazil had to do her leading part in international safety crises justice, too. If Brazil did not do so, others would be prepared to fill the leading part in Latin America, Amorim commented. Saying this Amorim bluntly alluded to the still existing US-American claim to leadership in Latin America. In this sense the Brazilian ambassador at the United Nations, Ronaldo Sardenberg, expressed himself also at the second congress for international law at the Centro de Direito Internacional in Belo Horizonte. In his opinion the delegation of the Brazilian blue berets represents a crucial step for the consolidation of Brazil as "reference for international safety questions in Latin America" (see Infomar 2004). By Brazil's increased participation in peace missions of the United Nations the Itamaraty also obtains a promising position in the competition for potential new permanent seats in the UN-security council. Ambassador Sardenberg does not make a secret of the Brazilian hopes connected with the report of the UN-secretary-general Kofi Annan on a security council reform, which is still for 2004 expected. Moreover MINUSTAH reflected Latin America's capability to solve her problems independently, Sardenberg explained during a function of the Instituto de Estudos Avançados of the university in São Paulo (see Estado de São Paulo, 18 August 2004).

Accordingly the da Silva administration sends troops to Haiti not only to support the subregional cooperation, but also to support its claim to Latin American leadership. On the occasion of the already mentioned visit to the troops in May 2004 the minister of defence Viegas pointed out that it was true that Brazil aimed at giving a stronger military support to the international security questions ("maior protagonismo militar no mundo"). But this also depended on the financial endowment of the defence department. However Brazil only considers UN-mandated military operations and mainly those in Latin America and the Portuguese speaking states of Africa (see Estado de São Paulo, 19 August 2004). On the one hand the peace operation in Haiti shows Brasília's capability to make an important contribution to the international safety under difficult circumstances. On the other hand the Brazilian government inspires confidence in the dominant actors of the international system (Zaverucha 2004: 2). The Haiti-mission is in the United States' as well as in France's interest. Arousing the favour of these two permanent members of the UN-security council - whose recommendation concerning a permanent seat in the UN-committee should not to be underrated - by one and the same foreign political decision only is presently not an easy task and implies a rare opportunity.

In Brazil the discussion on the expenditures of the UN-mission and the comparison of the situation in Haiti with the public security in Rio de Janeiro ("We have got our own Haiti!") dominated the internal debate on this operation. The da Silva administration was even polemically reproached for letting the USA degrade them to henchmen. In contrast to that the importance of the MINUSTAH for the regional security cooperation remained underexposed. At the same time the representatives of the people got upset about the fact that logistic preparations for the UN-mission had already been made before the voting in the house of representatives (see Correio Braziliense, 14 May 2004). After the members of congress had rejected the bill of the troop delegation in a first meeting, the chamber of representatives confirmed the Brazilian commitment to Haiti with 266 to 118 votes in a special conference on 12 May 2004. One week later 38 out of 48 senators in the senate voted for the deployment of troops in the Caribbean state (see Estado de São Paulo, 13 May 2004 and 19 May 2004). Those representatives that had spoken against the military employment mentioned the high costs with respect to the small cash balance as the main argument. So the representative Fernando Gabeira from Rio de Janeiro (independent) precalculated expenditures of 300 billion reais, which in his view were better used for the favelas in Rio de Janeiro (see Correio Braziliense, 14 May 2004). According to official data the costs for the Brazilian contingent - consisting of 970 army soldiers and 230 naval infantrymen - will have summed up to 150 billion reais by the end of 2004. The Unites Nations will pay about one half of the exspenditure back to the Brazilian treasury. Nevertheless the Brazilian minister of defence has already expressed his willingness to leave the troops in Haiti beyond the UN-mandate (see Reuters 27 May 2004). In view of the public discussion on the necessity of a Brazilian participation in the MINUSTAH the minister of defence Viegas argued that the Haiti-mission could also be seen as a military training for potential army intervention for the criminality fight in the future, for example in Rio de Janeiro.

Referring to Jorge Zaverucha's opinion (see 2004) at least the assignment practice of the command posts for the UN-operation reflects the "fragility of the Brazilian democracy". After all the army commander-in-chief, general Francisco Roberto de Albuquerque, ordered the commanders of the MINUSTAH (general Ribeiro Pereira) and of the Brazilian troops (general Américo Salvador de Oliveira) without consulting the minister of defence beforehand. As for the confirmation general Albuquerque did not participate in the festivities on the fifth anniversary of the installation of the civilianly run ministry of defence. In view of this Zaverucha asks (ibid.: 3) provocatively: Although the Brazilian contingent in Haiti consists mainly of army units, the armed forces joined staff (Estado Maior de Defesa - EMD) plans and coordinates the MINUSTAH. It is true that the army general staff is responsible for the operative supervision, just like at the previous participations in UN-missions. But the stronger role of the EMD might lead to a restriction of the traditionally marked autonomy of the army. It remains in question, though, whether an actual progress in the Brazilian civil-military relations in the sense of more effective civil control of the armed forces can develop from this.


7. Conclusion: The starting institutionalisation of the Argentine-Brazilian axis

The tendency of an increase of actors involved in military cooperation, which was already noticeable in the 1990s, can also be observed in the latest history. Apart from the ministries of defence especially the armed forces joint staffs show an increasingly frequent participation in the international military cooperation. In addition to the coordination of UN-peace missions regular bilateral general staff meetings and strategy symposiums deliver proofs for this development. Furthermore Brazil's armed forces joined staff was involved in the MAE as well as in the bilateral working groups for defence policy. These committees may be regarded to be the link between the military and defence political cooperation.

The assumption of an uncoupling of the military from the political cooperation process cannot be proven to be right, though, since the confidence building measures of the Brazilian armed forces clearly reflect the close defence political cooperation between Argentina and Brazil. Also the short-term crisis of the bilateral defence cooperation - produced by Argentina' approximation to the USA at the end of the 1990s - was only later reflected in a diversification of the cooperation partners of the Brazilian armed forces in 2000 and 2001. It is true that the causal connection between the two developments cannot be proven without a doubt. But no other qualifiers can be identified that could explain the striking differences of the preferred cooperation partners of the Brazilian armed services - especially in the sector of training and personnel exchange.

Even the assumption that defence political direction decisions find an echo on the level of the military collaboration can be proven to be right. This is not least due to the exclusive character of the confidence building measures of the Argentine and Brazilian armed forces they have achieved after the defence political re-rapprochement between their governments. The starting point for this new quality of the bilateral cooperation in the security- and defence sector implied the minister declaration from Buenos Aires in April 2000. Above all this declaration saw to the revival respectively the building of the defence political cooperation committees MAE and GTBD. After the first meetings of the MAE in October of the same year and meetings of the GTBD in October 2001 also the Brazilian armed forces returned to their familiar Argentine cooperation partners. Again the confidence building measures in the sector of training and personnel exchange reflect this development most clearly, since these are almost completely of a bilateral nature.

The common exercises that are more often carried out in a multilateral context and require a thorough planning- and preparation period are marked by more continuity altogether. A decline in the common manoeuvres with Argentina resp. the multiplication of the cooperation partners after their defence political disagreements can only be observed at the Brazilian navy. In doing so the air force was not able to carry out common exercises due to financial restrictions in 2002 and 2003. The high costs of the air force exercises might also be the reason for why the Brazilian army and navy were much more willing to cooperate with their subregional sister institutions on three resp. four common exercises per year (1999-2003) than the air force. The quantitative comparison of the armed services' confidence building measures in the sector of training and personnel exchange is little meaningful, since it is overlaid by the asymmetrical strength of the personnel. So during the investigation period the Brazilian army has carried out round about three times more common courses or the like by its 115 measures in total than the navy and the air force. After all the army deploys two thirds of the manpower of the Brazilian armed forces and has therefore got broader possibilities in this field.

Finally it has to be mentioned that the military cooperation between Brazil and her subregional partners - apart from the UN-peace mission in Haiti - do not show joint armed service exercises or operations. This deficiency in the collaboration between these countries heading towards a regional security community results mainly from the far dating back tradition of the well developed autonomy of the armed services in Brazil and other South American countries. This independence goes to a point where the three branches of service create doctrines and strategies of their own in their military academies that may quite possibly differ from one another. Only over the past years the Brazilian armed services have started to organize common internal manoeuvres in the Amazon area. In doing so they are confronted with considerable structural and logistical problems such as the means of communication, for instance (Coronel José Alberto da Costa Abreu, interview on 18 May 2004). Lack of multilateralism and the dominant role of the armed services are the most crucial obstacles that have to be overcome within the military cooperation, if the armed forces of the subregion are to collaborate effectively. The one problem implies the other, since the leading actors of the armed services are particularly afraid of a restriction of their politico-military power, should the number of the hierarchically higher or equally ranked decision makers increase.

The political dimension of Brazil's international cooperation in the defence sector is chiefly limited to the bilateral collaboration with the Argentine Mercosul-partner. However this has mainly been formalized over the past years. With regard to the cooperation forums MCC/ MAE and GTBD a starting institutionalisation of the bilateral defence cooperation can even be noticed. This does even more apply to the Argentine-Chilean collaboration in the context of the COMPERSEG, though. Nevertheless the working committees MAE and GTBD are still particularly tainted with structural deficits, which belong again to the problem area of the civil-military relationships in great parts. Even after the foundation of the civilianly run ministry of defence the militaries are still dominating the bilateral working groups as well as the strategic analysis mechanism. This condition giving rise to criticism leads also back to Brazil's lack of civil defence experts. Another deficit, especially of the MAE, has to be seen in its intransparency. The meeting records are mainly rated confidential and in contrast to the Argentine-Chilean counterpart COMPERSEG no academic defence experts take part in the conferences of the MAE.

Another problem of the defence political cooperation between Argentina and Brazil imply the different ideas on the respective role of the two countries in the international system. Buenos Aires showed more commitment within the MAE to the defence political collaboration with Brasília than vice versa and can already prove a consolidated cooperation committee with the Argentine-Chilean COMPERSEG. Compared with the statements of the Brazilian da Silva administration even the statements of the Argentine minister of defence and president Nestor Kirchner show throughout continuing efforts of cooperation up to the defence political integration - in the form of the establishment of permanent common troop contingents, for instance. As far as that goes the so called strategic alliance between Argentina and Brazil suffers now and then from Brazil's endeavours to distinguish herself as a security political global player by means of a foreign political strategy of diversification. At the same time closer relationships with other emergent nations and regional powers out of the subregion are particularly entered into.

Generally it can only be talked about a "strategic alliance" in the security- and defence political sense, if its members operate on the basis of a common security strategy. But Argentina and Brazil - within the MAE - as well as the other countries of the subregion are far away from the development of common doctrines and strategies. In view of the quantity and quality of the military and defence political cooperation between Argentina and Brazil these two biggest countries of the subregion form undoubtedly the stabilizing centre of a security community in the South of Latin America that is about to develop. Two developments are to be expected: Firstly the model function inherent of the bilateral relations between the two countries - as well as between Argentina and Chile - may lead to an intensified bilateral cooperation between the other subregional states for the time being. Secondly the ABC-countries work as a magnet for a multilateral security- and defence cooperation in the future.

In this second sense Brazil's first civilian minister of defence Geraldo Quintão has already expressed himself in August 2002 on the occasion of a lecture at the diplomat school of the Itamaraty, the Instituto Rio Branco (quoted in Almino 2002: 44):
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Saint-Pierre, Héctor Luis (2003): Brasil e Argentina: Rumo à cooperação estratégica, in: Octubre Sudamericano, Buenos Aires, año II, N° 3

Soares, Luiz Filipe de Macedo (2003): O Brasil no cenário regional de defesa e segurança, Ciclo de Debates do Ministério da Defesa, Centro General Ernani Ayrosa, Itaipaya, Rio de Janeiro, in: www.defesa.gov.br/enternet/sitios/internet/ciclodedebates/luizfilipemacedo.htm, 15.1.2004

Zaverucha, Jorge (2004): O Brasil no Haiti e o Haiti no Brasil, in: Newsletter RESDAL, año III, N° 15, p.2 in: www.resdal.org.ar


9. List of interview partners

Cypriano, Eduardo Arnaud, Colonel, Secretariat for logistics and mobilization (SELOM), Ministry of defence, 17 May 2004

Bezerra Júnior, Manuel Nelson, Naval Captain, Secretariat for politics, strategy and international affairs (SPEAI), Ministry of defence, 12 May 2004

Cardoso, Alberto, General, Secretariat for science and technology of the Brazilian army, 29 December 2003 Cavalcanti, Antonio, Colonel, Department for international affairs, Ministry of defence, 17 May 2004

da Conceição Maninha, Maria José, Chairwoman of the foreign- and defence committee of the Brazilian chamber of representatives, 20 May 2004

da Costa Abreu, José Alberto, Colonel, Director of the cabinet of the armed forces joint staff (EMD) 18 May 2004

da Silva Abreu Capitão, Fernando Mose, Naval Captain, Secretariat for politics, strategy and international affairs (SPEAI), Ministry of defence, 14 November 2004

de Carvalho, Paulo, Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), 5 May 2004

de Mello Portella, Paulo Ruy, Colonel, Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), 19 December 2004

de Morais Barbosa Rego Correia, Murillo, Vice-Admiral, Director of the department for politics and strategy at the secretariat for politics, strategy and international affairs (SPEAI), Ministry of defence, 12 May 2004

de Oliveira, Edimar Pereira, Center for strategic studies, Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), 15 December 2003

Diniz, Eugenio, Universidade Cândido Mendes, Naval academy, 25 June 2004

Duarte, Carlos, Department United Nations, Ministry of foreign affairs, 17 May 2004

Martins Filho, João Roberto, Universidade Federal de São Carlos, 24 May 2004

Fuccille, Alexandre, Secretariat for politics, strategy and international affairs (SPEAI), Ministry of defence, 12 May 2004

Hallwass, Alberto, Colonel, Army general staff , Subdivision for international affairs, 14 May 2004

Joppert, Paulo, Minister, Director of the department South America, Ministry of foreign affairs, 13 May 2004

Leal Villoso, Carlos Augusto, Brigadier, Director of the department for international affairs (DAI), Ministry of defence, 17 May 2004

Liedtke, Joachim, Naval Captain, Defence attaché at the German embassy in Brasília, 9 December 2003

Lopes Soares, Celso, Naval Captain, Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), 1 December 2003

Matsuda, Haruki, Lieutenant, Centre for strategic studies of the army general staff school (CEE/ECEME), 14 December 2004

Pinheiro, Glenio, General, Director of the training department of the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), 17 December 2004

Proença Júnior, Domicio, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 22 December 2003

Ramalho da Rocha, Antonio Jorge, Secretariat for education and cooperation (SECO), Ministry of defence, 12 May 2004

Saint-Pierre, Hector Luis, Director of the centre for Latin American studies at the Universidade Estadual de São Paulo (UNESP), 28 May 2004

Tabajara de Oliveira, Nelson, Department for the OEA, Ministry of foreign affairs, 27 May 2004


Soares Alves, Samuel, Universidade Estadual de São Paulo (UNESP), 28 May 2004

Vieira Leite, Somilon, Naval Captain, Secretariat for logistics and mobilization (SELOM), Ministry of defence, 17 May 2004

Westermeyer Benz, Alfred, Naval Captain, Chilean defence attaché in Brasília,12 December 2003


10. Appendix

Table 1: Common training programs and personnel exchange of the Brazilian army and the subregional armies between 1999 and 2003
Table 3: Common training programs and personnel exchange of the Brazilian air force and the subregional air forces between 1999 and 2003
Table 5: Common training programs and personnel exchange of the Brazilian navy and the subregional naval forces between 1999 und 2003
Table 7: Common training programs and personnel exchange of the armed forces joint staff from Brazil and those of the subregion between 1999 and 2003

Table 1: Common training programs and personnel exchange of the Brazilian army and the subregional armies between 1999 and 2003

YearPlace Participating CountriesMeasure Description
1999ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilPostgraduate course for intelligence matters at the training centre of the Argentine military intelligence
1999BrazilArgentina and BrazilCourse for operations in rain forest areas, one Argentine corporal is involved in the instruction of the course
1999Argentina and BrazilArgentina and BrazilExchange program of the military academies for the training of sergeants
1999ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilInvitation of Brazilian cadets to the Colegio Militar de la Nación
2000ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilGeneral staff course for Brazilian officers in Argentina
2000BrazilArgentina and BrazilFoundation course intelligence at the Brazilian military intelligence (Centro de Inteligência do Exército - CIE)
2000BrazilArgentina and BrazilCourse for operations in rain forest areas in the Brazilian Amazon
2000BrazilArgentina and BrazilVisit of Brazilian army soldiers at the Argentine engineer academy of the army
2000ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilOfficer Training Course of Brazilian officer cadets at the Argentine army academy
2000ArgentinaArgentina and Brazil Postgraduate course of the Argentine military intelligence
2000BrazilArgentina and BrazilCEAEPE-course for politics and strategy
2000BrazilArgentina and BrazilLiaison officer course at the Brazilian army academy
2000BrazilArgentina and BrazilPostgraduate course of the Brazilian military intelligence (Centro de Inteligência do Exército - CIE)
2000BrazilArgentina and BrazilCourse for operations in rain forest areas in the Brazilian Amazon
2000Brazil and ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilOfficer Training Course
2000ArgentinaBrazil and ArgentinaTwo officers and five Brazilian sergeants participate in courses for the armoured tracked vehicle XK 105 A 25 of the Argentine army
2000Brazil and ColombiaBrazil and ColombiaExchange of cadets
2000Brazil and ParaguayBrazil and ParaguayExchange of cadets
2000Brazil and EcuadorBrazil and EcuadorExchange of cadets
2000Brazil and PeruBrazil and PeruExchange of cadets
2000Brazil and ChileBrazil and ChileExchange of cadets
2000Brazil and BoliviaBrazil and BoliviaExchange of cadets
2000Brazil and VenezuelaBrazil and VenezuelaExchange of cadets
2000Brazil and UruguayBrazil and UruguayExchange of cadets
2000Brazil and ArgentinaBrazil and ArgentinaExchange of cadets
2000ChileAll Latin American countriesFifth meeting of the military academies in Chile
2000BrazilBrazil, Bolivia and SurinameStaff course
2000ParaguayBrazil and ParaguayParatroops course
2000SurinameBrazil and SurinameCourse for systems and processes in the field of data analysis
2000BrazilBrazil, Ecuador and ParaguayCourse on social communication
2000BrazilBrazil, Argentina and EcuadorCourse for military psychology
2000BrazilBrazil and EcuadorOfficer Training Course for artillery
2000UruguayBrazil, Ecuador and UruguayLiaison officer course
2000ChileBrazil, Bolivia, Chile and SurinameOfficer Training Course for defence issues
2000BrazilBrazil and SurinameCourse for air space surveillance
2000BrazilBrazil and ParaguayCourse on mapping (2000 - 2002)
2000BrazilBrazil and PeruCourse on electronics, arms mechanics, car mechanics and chemistry (2000 - 2002)
2000VenezuelaBrazil and VenezuelaPostgraduate training course in mapping
2000BrazilBrazil, Argentina, Chile and ParaguayFoundation course in intelligence
2000UruguayBrazil, EL Salvador and UruguayCourse on techniques of instruction
2000BrazilBrazil and PeruCourse for command- and special forces
2000VenezuelaBrazil and VenezuelaTechnical course on material analysis
2000PeruBrazil and PeruOfficer Training Course
2000BrazilBrazil and EcuadorIntelligence course
2001Brazil and ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilExchange of cadets
2001BrazilArgentina and BrazilOfficer training Liaison officer course
2001BrazilArgentina and BrazilOfficer Training Course
2001ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilOfficer Training Course
2001BrazilArgentina and BrazilCourse for operations in rain forest areas
2001BrazilArgentina and BrazilPostgraduate intelligence course in Brazil
2001BrazilArgentina and Brazil Exchange between the military academy for engineering in Brazil and the technical school for officers in Argentina
2001BrazilBrazil and UruguayMilitary exchange of engineers
2001UruguayBrazil and UruguayMilitary exchange of engineers
2001ColombiaBrazil and ColombiaExchange of cadets
2001BrazilBrazil and ColombiaExchange of cadets
2001BrazilBrazil and ParaguayExchange of cadets
2001BrazilBrazil and EcuadorExchange of cadets
2001BrazilBrazil and PeruExchange of cadets
2001BrazilBrazil and ChileExchange of cadets
2001BoliviaBrazil and BoliviaExchange of cadets
2001VenezuelaBrazil and VenezuelaExchange of cadets
2001UruguayBrazil and UruguayExchange of cadets
2001ArgentinaBrazil and ArgentinaExchange of cadets
2001EcuadorBrazil and EcuadorCourse on international law and armed conflicts
2001BrazilBrazil and ArgentinaCourse on operations in wooded areas - category B
2001BrazilBrazil and EcuadorCourse on operations in wooded areas - category C
2001BrazilBrazil and ColumbiaSurvival training in the rain forest
2001BrazilBrazil and UruguayParatroops course
2001BrazilBrazil and ParaguayOfficer Training Course
2001BrazilBrazil and VenezuelaOfficer Training Course
2001BrazilBrazil and VenezuelaCourse of the artillery for shore protection and air defence
2001BrazilBrazil and GuyanaCourse on operations in rain forest areas - category B
2001BrazilBrazil and GuyanaCourse on operations in rain forest areas - category C
2001BrazilBrazil and Venez uelaCourse on operations in rain forest areas - category B
2001BrazilBrazil and ParaguayOfficer Training Course for social communication
2001BrazilBrazil and EcuadorOfficer Training Course for psychological methods at the military
2001BrazilBrazil and VenezuelaOfficer Training Course of the infantry
2001BrazilBrazil and ChileOfficer Training Course for defence issues
2001BrazilBrazil and VenezuelaOfficer Training Course for defence issues
2001BrazilBrazil and ParaguayLiaison officer course
2001BrazilBrazil and VenezuelaPostgraduate course in mapping
2001BrazilBrazil and VenezuelaPostgraduate course in computer science
2001BrazilBrazil and UruguayFoundation course for intelligence
2001BrazilBrazil and ParaguayFoundation course for intelligence
2001BrazilBrazil and MexicoIntermediate course for intelligence
2001BrazilBrazil and ParaguayIntermediate course for intelligence
2001BrazilBrazil and VenezuelaIntermediate course for intelligence
2001BrazilBrazil and ParaguayPostgraduate course for intelligence
2001BrazilBrazil and VenezuelaPostgraduate course for intelligence
2001BrazilBrazil and ArgentinaPostgraduate course for intelligence
2001BrazilBrazil and VenezuelaCourse for the instructors of the audiovisual communication technique
2001UruguayBrazil and UruguayOfficer Training Course
2001VenezuelaBrazil and VenezuelaOfficer Training Course for logistics
2001EcuadorBrazil and Ecuador Foundation course for intelligence
2001UruguayBrazil and UruguayFoundation course for intelligence
2001ChileBrazil and ChileFoundation course for intelligence
2001PeruBrazil and PeruFoundation course for psychological warfare
2001PeruBrazil and PeruAdvanced course for psychological warfare
2001ColombiaBrazil and ColombiaCourse for interrogation techniques
2001BoliviaBrazil and BoliviaCourse for digital mapping and information systems
2001BrazilBrazil and SurinameFurther training course for officers of the infantry
2001BrazilBrazil and SurinameFoundation course for intelligence
2002Argentina and BrazilArgentina and BrazilExchange of cadets
2002BrazilArgentina and BrazilCEAEPE course for politics and strategy
2002ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilOfficer Training Course
2002BrazilArgentina and BrazilCourse for operations in rain forest areas
2002BrazilArgentina and BrazilPostgraduate course for intelligence
2002ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilPostgraduate course for intelligence
2002BrazilArgentina and BrazilFoundation course for intelligence
2003Argentina and BrazilArgentina and BrazilExchange of cadets
2003ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilMountain infantry course, also course for instructors and assistants of mountain infantrymen
2003BrazilArgentina and BrazilOfficer Training Course
2003ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilOfficer Training Course
2003BrazilArgentina and BrazilPostgraduate course for intelligence
2003BrazilArgentina and BrazilFoundation course for intelligence
2003BrazilArgentina and BrazilCourse for operations in rain forest areas

Own representation resulting from a comparison of the following sources: Centro de Estudios Nueva Mayoria 2004, Comisión de Seguridad Hemisférica de la Organización de los Estados Américanos 2002, Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas Argentinas 2004, Junta Interaméricana de Defensa 2001 as well as research interviews by the author with members of the armed forces, ministerial officials and academic experts on defence in November/ December 2003 and in May/ June 2004 in Brazil (see list of interview partners).


Table 3: Common training programs and personnel exchange of the Brazilian air force and the subregional air forces between 1999 and 2003

YearPlaceParticipating CountriesMeasure Description
1999Argentina, Brazil and PeruArgentina, Brazil and PeruOfficer Training Course at the military schools of the air force; Brazil and Argentina exchange officers
1999ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilCourse for intelligence operations in the air space, under Brazilian direction
1999Brazil (São Paulo)Argentina and BrazilFoundation course for supply measures, Argentine direction
1999BrazilArgentina and BrazilCourse on radar employment in the air space
1999Argentina and BrazilArgentina and BrazilExchange of instructors for the model of aircraft T-27- Tucano
1999BrazilArgentina and BrazilFlight simulation of the T-27
1999Argentina (Brigada Aérea El Palomar)Argentina and BrazilExchange of pilots for the model of aircraft C-130
1999Brazil Argentina and BrazilExchange of search parties and rescue squads
1999ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilTraining program for pilots, nine Brazilian pilots participate
2000ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilCourse for politics and strategy in aerospace
2000ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilExchange of instructors for the model of aircraft T-27-Tucano
2000BrazilArgentina and BrazilFlight simulation of the T-27
2000BrazilArgentina and BrazilGeneral staff course
2000BrazilBrazil and ArgentinaMeeting of the heads of the air force intelligences at the headquarters of the Secretaria de Inteligência (Secint)
2000Brazil and ChileBrazil and ChileExchange for the flight simulation of the models of aircraft Mirage and F-5
2000Brazil and ChileBrazil and ChileExchange of pilots for C130 planes
2000Brazil, Peru, Uruguay and VenezuelaBrazil, Peru, Uruguay and VenezuelaExchange of instructors and technicians in the field of telecommunication and computer science
2000Brazil and ChileBrazil and ChileExchange of pilots for fighter planes
2000Brazil and ChileBrazil and ChileExchange of instructors for the model of aircraft T-27
2000 Brazil and Uruguay Exchange of cadets
2000AntarcticBrazil and ChileSurvival training in the Antarctic and flight employments with C-130 planes in the Antarctic
2001ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilCourse on the model of aircraft DOUGLAS A4-AR
2001 BrazilArgentina and BrazilCourse for maintenance inspectors - CIMAN
2001BrazilBrazil and ArgentinaMeeting of the heads of the air force intelligences
2001Brazil and ChileBrazil and ChileExchange for the flight simulation of the models of aircraft Mirage and F-5
2001Brazil and PeruBrazil and PeruExchange of pilots for the model of aircraft T-27
2001Brazil and UruguayBrazil and UruguayExchange of cadets
2001Brazil and UruguayBrazil and UruguayExchange of pilots for fighter- and reconnaissance planes
2001UruguayBrazil and UruguayMeeting of the heads of the air force general staffs from Brazil and Uruguay
2001Brazil, Peru, Uruguay and VenezuelaBrazil, Peru, Uruguay and VenezuelaExchange of instructors and technicians of the telecommunication- and computer science service
2002Brazil (Pirasununga)Argentina and BrazilFlight simulation of the T-27 (Tucano)
2002Brazil (Rio de Janeiro)Argentina and BrazilGeneral staff course
2002 Argentina (Buenos Aires)Argentina and BrazilGeneral staff course
2003BrazilArgentina and Brazil (São Paulo)Flight simulation of the T-27 (Tucano)
2003ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilGeneral staff
2003Argentina (Buenos Aires)Argentina and BrazilOfficer Training Course for the air force intelligence

Own representation resulting from a comparison of the following sources: Centro de Estudios Nueva Mayoria 2004, Comisión de Seguridad Hemisférica de la Organización de los Estados Américanos 2002, Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas Argentinas 2004, Junta Interaméricana de Defensa 2001 as well as research interviews by the author with members of the armed forces, ministerial officials and academic experts on defence in November/ December 2003 and in May/ June 2004 in Brazil (see list of interview partners).


Table 5: Common training programs and personnel exchange of the Brazilian navy and the subregional naval forces between 1999 und 2003

YearPlaceParticipating CountriesMeasure Description
1999Argentina and BrazilArgentina and BrazilStaff course at the navy academies of the two countries with exchange of officers
1999Argentina and Chile Argentina, Brazil and PeruCourse for ocean navigation control
1999 Argentina and BrazilExchange of officers for educational trips
2000Argentina Argentina and BrazilNaval officer course
2000Argentina Argentina and BrazilOfficer Training Course
2000Brazil Brazil and BoliviaOfficer cadet from Bolivia participates in a course of the naval school of Brazil
2000Argentina, BrazilBrazil and ArgentinaExchange program for the training of naval infantrymen
2000   Brazil, UruguayParticipation in Officer Training Courses for naval pilots; two officers from Uruguay received certificates for the helicopter flight at the Brazilian navy
2000ChileBrazil and ChileCooperation in the field of the submarine navy: officer of the Brazilian navy participates in a course for future submarine-commanders
2000BrazilBrazil and ChileCooperation in the field of the submarine navy: officer of the Chilean navy participates in an evaluation course for future submarine-commanders
2000BrazilBrazil and PeruCooperation in the field of the submarine navy: officer of the Peruvian navy participates in a further training course for officers
2000ArgentinaBrazil and ArgentinaParticipation of a Brazilian naval officer as instructor at exercises by land, by water and in the Antarctic
2000Brazil and ArgentinaBrazil and ArgentinaParticipation of officers from both navies in operations by land, underwater and in the air of the respective other navy
2000Brazil and ArgentinaBrazil and ArgentinaOne officer of each navy participated in studies on the respective other submarine squadron
2000Brazil and ArgentinaBrazil and ArgentinaBrazilian officer takes over the command in the general staff for the naval infantry of Argentina for one year and vice versa
2000PeruBrazil and PeruBrazilian officer participates in a course of the Peruvian submarine navy
2000ArgentinaBrazil and ArgentinaOfficers of the Brazilian navy participated in courses on logistical organization of the Argentine navy, especially in the fields of health, psychology and household
2000Argentina and BrazilBrazil and ArgentinaOfficers of both navies participated in courses on science and technology; the aim is the development of common projects
2000PeruBrazil and PeruTwo Brazilian naval officers participate in courses at
   Peruvian shipyards
2000BrazilBrazil and PeruPeruvian officer participates in a course on the supply for the Brazilian navy
2000BrazilBrazil and PeruPeruvian officer studies at the DHN (Dirección de Hidrografía y Navegación) in the field of digital mapping
2001Argentina and BrazilArgentina and BrazilNaval officer course
2001Argentina and BrazilArgentina and BrazilOfficer Training Course on ocean navigation control
2001BrazilArgentina and BrazilCourse for naval infantrymen
2001ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilFoundation- and advanced course for naval pilots
2001ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilGeneral staff course
2001BrazilArgentina and BrazilGeneral staff course
2001ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilMeeting of the general staffs
2001BrazilBrazil and VenezuelaOfficer cadet from Venezuela visits the Brazilian naval academy
2001Brazil and PeruBrazil and PeruExchange of naval officers (observers) in the operative sector
2002BrazilArgentina and BrazilGeneral staff course for a commanding officer of the Argentine navy
2002ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilGeneral staff course for a commanding officer of the Brazilian navy
2003ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilExchange of officers with the Brazilian navy
2003ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilCourse on Antarctic navigation
2003BrazilArgentina and BrazilCourse for general staff command
2003ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilTraining trip with the training frigate Libertad"
2003ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilVisit to the training centre for special units in Cordoba

Own representation resulting from a comparison of the following sources: Centro de Estudios Nueva Mayoria 2004, Comisión de Seguridad Hemisférica de la Organización de los Estados Américanos 2002, Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas Argentinas 2004, Junta Interaméricana de Defensa 2001 as well as research interviews by the author with members of the armed forces, ministerial officials and academic experts on defence in November/ December 2003 and in May/ June 2004 in Brazil (see list of interview partners).


Table 7: Common training programs and personnel exchange of the armed forces joint staff from Brazil and those of the subregion between 1999 and 2003

YearPlaceParticipating CountriesMeasure Description
1999BrazilArgentina and BrazilCourse for politics and strategy at the Brazilian Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG)
1999CyprusArgentina and BrazilIntegration of Brazilian officers and corporals into the Argentine contingent of UN-peace missions in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
2000ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilArmed forces joint staff course
2000CyprusArgentina and BrazilIntegration of Brazilian officers and corporals into the Argentine contingent of UN-peace missions in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
2001CyprusArgentina and BrazilIntegration of Brazilian officers and corporals into the Argentine contingent of UN-peace missions in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
2001BrazilBrazil and ArgentinaOfficer Training Course
2001BrazilBrazil and ColombiaOfficer Training Course
2001BrazilBrazil and GuatemalaOfficer Training Course
2001BrazilBrazil and MexicoOfficer Training Course
2001BrazilBrazil and ParaguayOfficer Training Course
2001BrazilBrazil and PeruOfficer Training Course
2001BrazilBrazil and VenezuelaOfficer Training Course
2001BrazilBrazil and EcuadorOfficer Training Course
2001BrazilBrazil and SurinameOfficer Training Course
2002CyprusArgentina and BrazilIntegration of Brazilian officers and corporals into the Argentine contingent of UN-peace missions in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
2002East TimorArgentina and BrazilIntegration of Argentine officers and corporals into the Brazilian contingent of UN-peace missions in East Timor (UNMISET)
2002ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilParticipation of a Brazilian training officer in a training unit for peace operations in Central Argentina
2003CyprusArgentina and BrazilIntegration of Brazilian officers and corporals into the Argentine contingent of UN-peace missions in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
2003East TimorArgentina and BrazilIntegration of Argentine officers and corporals into the Brazilian contingent of UN-peace missions in East Timor (UNMISET)
2003ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilParticipation of a Brazilian training officer in a training unit for peace operations in Central Argentina
2003ArgentinaArgentina and BrazilParticipation of a Brazilian member of the general staff in a master course for National Defence at the Argentine general staff's academy

Own representation resulting from a comparison of the following sources: Centro de Estudios Nueva Mayoria 2004, Comisión de Seguridad Hemisférica de la Organización de los Estados Américanos 2002, Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas Argentinas 2004, Junta Interaméricana de Defensa 2001 as well as research interviews by the author with members of the armed forces, ministerial officials and academic experts on defence in November/ December 2003 and in May/ June 2004 in Brazil (see list of interview partners).

1. In the following the area of security policies implies all institutional and procedural aspects of political actions, which lead to the protection of the population against external dangers. This includes firstly potential transnational threats in the South of Latin America (drug- and arms trafficking, money laundering as forms of transnationally organized crime, transnational activities of guerrilla organizations, environmental risks, illegal migration, international terrorism, proliferation of means of mass destruction); secondly defence policies including the protection of the territorial integrity of a country against violent attacks of external actors; and thirdly all areas of foreign policies which aim at bilateral, subregional, continental or global cooperation in security issues, conflict resolution and the prevention of the organized execution of violence.

2. The majority of the information presented on the Mecanismo de Consulta y Coordinación entre Brasil y Argentina en materia de Defensa y Seguridad Internacional is in the Argentine as well as in the Brazilian ministry of defence rated confidential and thus not accessible to the public. However the Brazilian ministry of defence could not give the author plausible reasons for the secrecy of documents on the international collaboration. At this point it becomes already clear that the degree of transparency in the Brazilian ministry of defence ought to be increased to support the civilian research on defence political subjects. The following paragraphs are chiefly based on research interviews by the author with members of the armed forces, departmental officers and academic defence experts in November/ December 2003 and in May/ June 2004 in Brazil (see the list of interview partners), whom I would like to thank for their support at this point. Since most of the interviewed persons have asked for a confidential treatment of their given information, the following will have to do almost completely without naming the source.

3. The author has only got accesss to the meeting-record of the first meeting of the Argentine-Brazilian Grupo de Trabalho Bilateral de Defesa from 26 October 2001 in Brasília. The following parargraph is mainly based on a copy of the meeting-record, which the Brazilian ministry of defence has kindly made available.

4. The author has only got access to the meeting-records of the first two meetings of the Brazilian-Chilean Grupo de Trabalho Bilateral de Defesa from 14 December 2000 in Santiago de Chile and from 13 November 2001 in Brasília. The following paragraphs are mainly based on copies of the meeting-records, which the Brazilian ministry of defence has kindly made available for the author.

5. The data collection on irregular air traffic in the Amazon region is not yet completely reliable, since a sufficient number of radar devices has not yet been installed in this wide area. This problem will only be solved when the Amazon monitor program SIVAM functions area-wide.


Fuente:
Documentos de Trabajo Nº 20. Instituto de Estudios Iberoamericanos, Hamburgo.
ISSN: 1611-0188
Research Project: “Heading towards a regional Security Community? Acomparative analysis of the national security policies in the South of LatinAmerica”.