THE DECLARATION ON SECURITY AND THE PERSPECTIVES FOR HEMISPHERIC SECURITY AND DEFENSE

Marcela Donadio
SER en el 2000
RESDAL Executive Secretariat
March 2007

Draft prepared for the Meeting of the OAS Hemispheric Security Commission, March 20, 2007.


Context and Debates on Hemispheric Security
  1. Political dynamics in Latin America are nowadays characterized by a remarkable level of volatility (presidential and legislative elections results, political crisis, and Ministries of Defense changes, are some samples). When related to hemispheric security, debates and perspectives offer a mixed, complex scenario where positions appear to be rigid, oppositional, or even mutually exclusive.


  2. Different perspectives and situations can be identified according to the subregion we are focusing on. A clear example can be seen when referred to the armed forces missions and concerns. In Central America, the so-called “new threats” the purpose of the armed forces guide political debates as well as the design of the armed forces designs to focus mostly on problems like organized crime and public security. In the Andean Region, the purpose of the armed forces is likely to be dealing with political instability as well as with threats like narcotics or non-traditional types of guerrilla movements. The military institution is perceived (and more importantly, perceives itself) as the organized and stable institution contrasting with the “corrupt” and “disorganized” political elite. Thus, military doctrines and deployment are geared towards preserving order and stability, even if the political control remains at the hands of the government. In the Southern Cone, the legacies of the past have led to establishing clear distinctions between internal security and defense missions. Moreover, because processes of effective confidence building measures have been created among Nation States, this new scenario has set a clear role for the armed forces. What emerges from this context is a new doctrine of national defense, where the most traditional defense objective (territorial defense) is linked in some armed forces’ doctrines with the consideration on how resistance and insurgency using guerrilla tactics could be useful if an armed invasion were to happen, irrespective of who the invader is. This development is quite new and built upon disparate considerations such as the emerging urgency of defending of natural resources as a matter of national priority; the financial and economic constraints faced at the budgetary level when trying to maintain and modernize constantly the military apparatus; as well as the need to find a new foundational justification for the existence of the armed forces in countries where society is still grappling with the legacies of military dictatorships and processing the abuses of the past, in the frame of positions that challenge the very need for an armed institution.


  3. If political contexts are extremely variable, and the difference between subregions is increasing, why talk about hemispheric security? Is there still room for convergence?


  4. Convergence is precisely found in the diagnosis on the security and defense problems the region is dealing with. Divergence is found in the debate on how to deal with them. The multidimensional concept of security approved by the OAS members in 2003 brought new approaches to severe regional challenges as poverty, development and social concerns. But it also brought confusion about what the State should do about them, especially with regards to the role of the State’s instruments of legitimate force in addressing and solving economic and social problems. This concern arises from a hard and painful history, plagued with examples of events and processes where the State went against its own citizens. Any consideration touching upon memories of this history may be condemned to failure: societies deal with memories as fairly as they can. The same could be said about the role of the U.S. in hemispheric security. Internal reasons (government survival) are guiding most of the decisions on foreign policy.


  5. Thinking on a regional perspective might then require a different approach and expectations. The region could identify and work through issues where consensus is likely to be reached, instead of chasing after a regional agreement based on shaky foundations. The Americas, if any, need to think on elements for a win-win scenario, in a practical perspective which may not be perfect, but is based on what is possible and desirable.


  6. If we take into account the experience of the OAS work on hemispheric security, the Defense Ministerial process, or the different mechanisms operating in the regional arena, five axes may be used to describe what has been developing in the region:


  7. Issues and Perspectives

  8. Each of these axes provides elements to think in terms of regional needs, but also in terms of regional strengths. For instance, a baseline has been achieved at the regional level regarding the importance of cooperation based on shared values of democracy and pluralism. The OAS work on Hemispheric Security has been important in forging such a consensual basis for negotiations through concepts like cooperative security and confidence building measures.


  9. In the past ten/fifteen years, initiatives within the Inter-American system have prevented the emergence of inter-State confrontations, while intra-State violence has been encapsulated within a cocoon of standard operating procedures. At first sight, the Americas seem the most peaceful zone of the world. However, much remains to be done to deepen the democratic consensus in matters of security and defense, and extending the monopoly of force of the State to grey areas of the territory. These advances will only be possible by working on an issue by issue basis.


  10. Security Concepts: as said, the Declaration on Security in the Americas1 produced debates about the inclusiveness of the security concept, and about the relationship between poverty, security and development. After the multidimensional concept was adopted (and despite the fact that it was seen as a way to advance cooperation and common views), a perception of uselessness remains. But the debate has focused on which instruments have to be applied. Little has been done on the significance of the concept and, more importantly, on what such a multidimensional approach means for each country. Even in the academic arena, it’s difficult to find practical research to help a theoretical and political discussion which seems to have reached a dead end. Initiatives such as a compilation and analysis of national legislation according to what the Security Declaration established, or the promotion of national analysis on what the multidimensional concept means for each particular country, represent the kind of needed products which could be able to highlight practical shortfalls and identity pragmatic courses of action. Which kind of legislation we have, how can we share it through the OAS structure, or how could we bring parliamentarians to this debate, could be, for instance, lower cost and effective initiatives.


  11. Confidence Building and Conflict Prevention: it may be one of the most salient issues where advances can be observed. Through several hemispheric initiatives, the need and importance of confidence building measures has been adopted, and bilateral agreements have been changing the prior conflictive environment. Most of the countries have published White Books, and some of them have implemented measures on military expenditures, as the CEPAL conducted Methodology between Argentina and Chile. Its salience and feasibility appears in the process of the regular Defense Ministerial Meetings and Conferences: it represents a regular agenda issue, where most of the consensus can be found. It still remains then a wide spectrum to work on: White Books don’t always tell enough, and defense budgets continue to be closed and complex to understand. How is confidence building translated to political decisions, and how is it implemented in the armed forces doctrines and organization? Promoting political and budgetary transparency (especially for the provision of clear and organized information) can help to further debates between and inside countries. It could represent a non-hard point for consensus, where most of the difficulties are not related to political decisions but to weak institutional capabilities.


  12. Subregional Approaches: the difference between subregions on security matters is also related to geographical and historical dynamics, and to national environments and purposes. As presented above, the Southern Cone security agenda promotes a focus on conventional threats and subregional dialogue; the Andean Region deals with political instability, drug trafficking and guerrilla; Central America reveals its proximity with the US, migration, narcotics and a domestic security tied to economic and social problems, along with natural disasters. It shares this last concern with the Caribbean countries. While the homogenization of these agendas seems improbable, countries have chosen the promotion of subregional cohesion, and then the regional approach. This may be seen in the variety of bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, as the consultations that countries regularly have before a regional event like the DMC or an OAS meeting. Building up regional approaches using the subregional bricks have been recognized, for instance, during the DMC held in Quito in 2005, when countries established that subregional agreements must be respected and considered when conceiving a cooperative security system in the Hemisphere.2 Promoting subregional agreements on CBMs could be a possible way to advance, as it combines the feasibility of some kind of CBMs with the subregional approach actually developing. Subregional White Books, for instance, with a clear and common index, doesn’t seem as an improbable measure if we think in a medium-term basis.


  13. Civilian Control of the Military: the "Williamsburg Principles" declared during the first DMC recognized that democracy is the basis for mutual security and –linked to this principle- the need for subordination of the armed forces to democratically elected governments. This recognition is the basis for the development of the DMC process, which has held seven hemispheric meetings to this date. It is widely known that the military played a strong political role in Latin American history, situation that had a turning point in the 1980s, when countries readopted the democratic rule. Despite different political situations (like governments breakdowns in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia or Ecuador, for instance), democracy rule was and is respected as the way that societies choose for their political organization. This represents an advancing and developing process that may be observed in the way the principle has being set: while in Williamsburg (1995) subordination should be implemented, the Declaration on Security (2003) affirms that “Representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace, and development of the states of the Hemisphere.” 3 Civilian control means, in practice, the development of civilian capabilities, and that has been the objective of several programs in the region for the past twenty years. It should be necessary to strengthen these capabilities (and given the will to advance in civil-military relations), to work on a stronger institutional framework. Little has been done, for instance, on institutional diagnosis like focusing on the Ministries real dynamics and structures. Supporting programs for research and sharing experiences on civilian training, what does actually a Defense Ministry have within its structure, how civilians are being incorporated, which civilian roles could be reinforced, or which are the dynamics that may sustain a political decision, could be undertaken in the near future.


  14. Civil Society Involvement: the last axis we may observe through the hemispheric security debates is a progressive, advancing incorporation of civil society to the agenda. The OAS makes civil society consultations on a regular basis. During the past few years, different countries undertook national consultations on defense and security, especially linked to White Papers processes. They emerged as governmental initiatives and received an immediate, positive support from civil society participants. The role of the international community (UNDP in several cases) proved to be helpful, as it encourages different State institutions to participate in the process. And despite the fact that involvement of civil society may sometimes be objected to on the basis of national security argumentations, there is less room for that kind of reasoning, at the time when the hemispheric environment recognize a commitment “to strengthen civil society participation in considering, developing, and implementing multidimensional approaches to security”.4 This strengthening also supposes to open the national defense sphere to societal consideration, but the provision of proper and transparent information represents a major challenge to this linkage between State and society. The institutional culture remains generally tied to a closed conception, where citizens are kept in the dark about the inner functioning of the defense apparatus, even when specialized sources are publishing it. Civil society involvement is someway also linked to civilian capabilities: building up leaders and staffers also supposes to invite new actors to the arena. Countries could share experiences on White Papers national debates. Promoting internal dialogues and incorporation of actors (mainly, from universities and NGOs) as new civilian capabilities into ministries, congressional staff, and academic structures, should be encouraged by the hemispheric initiatives, as long as educational programs allowing the participation of young researchers (who are not always linked to the State connections that generally open the gates to courses or scholarships). Nowadays, all over the region there are experts prepared to deal with defense and security issues. This capability could be strengthened by preparing new, future leaders. If institutional building is the choice, the region should be thinking on how countries will find the needed human resources to fill and develop those institutions.


  15. The initiatives presented above are only examples representing different ways to see that the hemispheric security approach do still make sense. The Declaration on Security expressed questioned issues, but it also took central developments that were actually operating in the region. Any consideration should take into account flexible parameters for activity plans, and the incorporation of different points of view and analysis on a regular basis. The hemispheric vision, even in the present context, can still be encouraged if we look for fruitful convergences instead of desirable but unrealistic objectives.


(1) ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. SPECIAL CONFERENCE ON SECURITY. Declaration on Security in the Americas. Mexico City, October 28, 2003.
(2) VI DEFENSE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAS. Quito Declaration. Quito, November 21, 2004, p. 10.
(3) ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. SPECIAL CONFERENCE ON SECURITY. Declaration on Security in the Americas. Mexico City, October 28, 2003, p. 4,b).
(4) ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. SPECIAL CONFERENCE ON SECURITY. Declaration on Security in the Americas. Mexico City, October 28, 2003, p. 33.