501. The Bundeswehr is the military instrument through which Germany takes precautions with regard to its external security, it helps the state to credibly honour its obligation to protect its citizens.
502. The Bundeswehr is one of several tools of German foreign and security policy. The aim of this policy is to advance international cooperation and to prevent crises and conflicts. German armed forces help to minimize risks to external security and to prevent conflicts or keep them at a distance, to contain and terminate them. They ensure that Germany can safeguard its security interests and remain capable of taking political action and meeting its Alliance commitments. A defenceless state would become the object of the policy of others, and cannot make its own contributions to shaping international policy.
503. The radically changed security environment and Germany's increased international responsibility have an impact on the role, mission, structure and equipment of the Bundeswehr. Since 1990, it has been undergoing the greatest transformation in its almost forty-year history. This is a lengthy process consisting basically of two phases.
Following German unification, the first thing the Bundeswehr had to do was to disband the National People's Army, build up the Bundeswehr in Eastern Germany, reduce the armed forces of the united Germany by one third and restation a considerable part of them, while at the same time orienting them to new tasks. This process will largely have been completed by the end of 1994, when the total strength of the armed forces' military personnel will have been reduced to the contractually agreed ceiling of 370,000.
Against the background of the continuing evolution of the security situation and limited resources, the challenge now is to define in detail the armed forces that Germany wishes to have and retain in terms of their capabilities and target structures and to adapt them in such a way that they will be able to accomplish their tasks in the future.
504. The first part of this chapter contains a description of the concept the Bundeswehr is implementing to establish its future target structures. This is followed by an account of the progress made so far in restructuring the Bundeswehr, the start that has been made on orienting it to a broadened task spectrum and a survey of the current situation in the Bundeswehr.
THE CHANGED ROLE AND MISSION OF THE BUNDESWEHR
505. The role of the Bundeswehr has changed. In the era of East-West antagonism, the armed forces' mission was confined almost exclusively to deterrence and defence against potential large-scale military aggression from the East. Security and defence policy revolved around nuclear deterrence. The mission of the Bundeswehr was to defend German territory at the eastern border of the old Federal Republic against an immediate military threat. Thus, while some of its forces were earmarked to defend NATO's flanks in Europe, its area of operations was essentially Germany and Central Europe. Detailed military plans and preparations had been made for the conduct of defensive operations.
506. The high concentration of armed forces which used to fare each other as adversaries in Germany and Central Europe no longer exists. The force potentials have since been virtually halved. Large-scale aggression is no longer the principal point of reference and yardstick for defence policy deliberations and military planning. The Bundeswehr, as a tool of German security policy, now faces a broad, varied and graduated spectrum of tasks.
507. The changes in the security environment have also allowed Germany to make cuts in the size of its armed forces and marked reductions in the standing strengths of many units. The bulk will be dependent upon mobilization and would only be employed, after a prolonged period of warning and preparation, to defend Germany or its allies.
508. The Bundeswehr must continue to credibly fulfil its purpose a tool of foreign and security policy. The foremost objective of German defence policy remains that of preventing an attack against Germany and its allies. While this is the most threatening risk to Germany's security it is today also the most unlikely.
509. Germany must be able to both retain allies and security partners and, at the same time, exert influence on NATO, WEU, CSCE and UN policy. The mission, orientation and size of the Bundeswehr an a crucial prerequisite for this.
510. In addition to its core function of collective defence, NATO now has to support international conflict prevention and crisis management measures. Today, as a matter of priority, NATO must be able to influence the course of crises and conflicts which, if they were to escalate regionally, could threaten one or more allies. The international risk and conflict potential places high demands on the capability to mount a swift and appropriate response to crises. Because of the many and varied crisis and conflict potentials, NATO and the WEU, more than ever before, must now be able to respond to and manage crises collectively
511. The Bundeswehr is an alliance army. It makes a major contribution to NATO's main defence forces and reaction forces. Military integration is being enhanced. European and US forces are being linked together by multinational structures. Common goals and similarities in the way Allied forces view themselves are also manifesting themselves in structures, as a token of solidarity within the Alliance. Burdens and risks are being shared fairly, because responsibility is being home by all the Allies and all are benefiting.
512. The Bundeswehr is also helping to foster international cooperation and integration, especially in Europe. It is helping to train the armed forces of the new democracies; it is promoting dialogue on military policy; it is participating in visits and exchange programmes for military personnel and in combined NATO and WEU exercises; and it is sending personnel to observe UN and CSCE missions and to verify compliance with arms control agreements. By doing so, it is helping to build confidence and stability in Europe. The Bundeswehr is cooperating with the states of Eastern, Central Eastern and Southeastern Europe in matters of military policy within the framework of the general military policy relations that exist with Albania, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania Kazakhstan, Slovenia and Belarus. The Bundeswehr is also engaged in cooperation programmes on the basis of "agreements on cooperation in the military sector" concluded with Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Ukraine.
513. Its participation in international peace missions presents the Bundeswehr with partially new tasks. Under the constitution and the Charter of the United Nations, the task spectrum of the Bundeswehr will range from the provision of humanitarian aid in areas hit by disaster or conflict, through participation in peacekeeping operations, to involvement in international crisis management activities.
514. This means that in the future the Bundeswehr will perform two principal defence functions. On the one hand, it must be able to cooperate with allies and partners in order to contribute at short notice to managing the likely international crises and conflicts; on the other hand, it must have the capability to build up and employ defensive forces adequate to deal with what is at present an unlikely contingency, but at the same time the worst-case scenario, namely having to defend Germany and the Alliance.
515. The mission of the Bundeswehr specifies these two principal functions in concrete terms. It is based on the obligation set forth in the Basic Law, under which Germany most preserve the unity of the nation and the state and serve world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe, it reflects Germany's security-related needs and security interests.
The Bundeswehr:
* Protects Germany and its citizens against political blackmail and danger from without;
* Advances military stability and European integration;
* Defends Germany and its allies;
* Serves world peace and international security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
* Provides disaster relief, saves life and supports humanitarian activities.
516. For this mission, it is of decisive importance that Germany has sufficient augmentable forces to accomplish the tasks of national and Alliance defence and that it has the standing and immediately available forces it requires to participate adequately and effectively in combined crisis management action, international peace missions and humanitarian operations. Participation in international peace missions will not be possible until the constitution has been clarified accordingly. The plans elucidated below will thus not be implemented until such clarification has taken place.
517. The Bundeswehr is an army in a democracy. It is also integrated in the force structure of an alliance made up of democratic states. It will remain a conscript army -on historico-political, security-related, social and military grounds.
Universal conscription is part of the defence culture that has evolved over the decades in our country. It is an expression of the individual citizen's willingness to take his personal share of the responsibility for protecting his polity. The defence of freedom, justice and human dignity is a matter that concerns everyone.
Universal conscription firmly establishes the armed forces in society. Through its conscripts, the Bundeswehr remains in close contact with every segment of the population, particularly the young generation. Conscription creates a high degree of social awareness and interest in issues concerning security and the armed forces among policy-makers and in society. It enhances people's consciousness of their common responsibility for the polity.
Universal conscription ensures that the armed forces obtain all the manpower they need. Compared with Germany's partners and neighbours in Europe, the overall strength of its armed forces corresponds to its political and economic importance, its central location and the size of its population. The size of the armed forces contributes to Germany's political might in Europe and the alliances and is at the same time a factor of stability.
Universal conscription ensures that the Bundeswehr is operational. By enabling the Bundeswehr to call up reservists, it ensures the armed forces' mobilization capability and sustainability, in action. It establishes a firm base for recruitment and enhances professionalism in the Bundeswehr, because it can fall back on a cross-section of young men's abilities, skills and professional qualifications. The Bundeswehr currently recruits around one half of its regulars and temporary-career volunteers from its pool of conscripts.
In the new Länder, conscription is highly instrumental in anchoring the Bundeswehr in people's minds. It is promoting the exchange of views and ideas between young people in East and West and helping to complete internal unification. Conscripts take part in United Nations peace missions and humanitarian relief activities on a voluntary basis.
THE CONCEPT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUNDESWEHR
518. The concept for the armed forces is decisively determined by what capabilities they must have in the future as a tool of German foreign and security policy. The foundations and framework for this are the provisions set forth in the Basic Law, the way in which the security situation is likely to develop in the near future, Germany's interests and the operational requirements, Germany's membership of NATO, the WEU, the UN and the CSCE, the politico-strategic concepts of the alliances and the obligations of the international community, Germany's obligation to reduce the personnel strength of its armed forces to a ceiling of 370,000 by the end of 1994, and the provisions contained in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.
519. It is these factors that determine the basic capabilities, mandated by security policy, that the Bundeswehr must maintain, adapt and, where necessary, establish. These are:
* The capability to conduct national and Alliance defence operations in a NATO context;
* The capability to contribute to multinational NATO and WEU crisis management activities;
* The capability to participate in an appropriate manner in operations conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and the CSCE on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and the Basic Law.
National and Alliance defence in a greatly improved security environment, especially in Central Europe and the increased importance of effective preventive crisis management are the new parameters from which the quality and quantity of military capabilities are to be derived.
THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES
520. The primary task of the armed forces remains that of defending the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, its airspace and coastal waters. Accomplishment of this task will continue to be dependent on mobilization and interaction with allies.
To meet the requirements of national defence, Germany needs:
* A reconnaissance capability that allows indications of a threat to Germany and the Alliance to be detected in a timely fashion;
* Land forces that, after making full use of the preparation time available for mobilization, are able to protect Germany in cooperation with the Allies against what is at present the unlikely event of an attack on its territory;
* Air forces that are able, in peacetime, to conduct air surveillance and, in the event of a crisis or war, mobilize and cooperate with the Allies to perform defensive operations, conduct the deep battle and support the other services;
* Naval and naval air forces that can cooperate with the Allies to keep sea lines of communication open and prevent enemy landings on German coasts.
521. The aim of defending Alliance territory is to protect the population in that area, preserve territorial integrity put a quick end to any conflict that may arise and minimize damage. It is in Germanys particular interest to keep conflicts away from German territory whenever possible and to terminate them swiftly.
Given the radical changes in the geostrategic setting, national defence must be geared to a new operational concept. The previous concept of forward defence, which always covered entire areas and was, in operational terms, largely static, can be replaced by the principle of flexible counter concentration of forces commensurate with the threat, with close interaction between land, air -and naval forces assuming particular importance. The purpose of this is to rapidly wear down an aggressor's offensive power and terminate the conflict.
It is no longer possible nowadays to plan defensive operations in advance with any degree of accuracy. As a result, it is essential that forces are available with a high degree of mobility and that it is possible to exercise flexible command and control over them, so that they can be brought to bear at the right place at the right time. This requires timely reconnaissance, a long-distance combat capability and long-range deployment and transportation capabilities.
522. The substantial increase in the amount of warning time preceding large-scale aggression against the Alliance today allows further reductions to be made in the standing strengths of the forces required for national and Alliance defence. In Central Europe, there is no need to fill the collective defence structures to capacity. The augmentable defence forces will require preparation time to establish operational readiness. This readiness will be achieved by mobilization, unit augmentation and intensive operational training. These stages will be followed by deployment and the adoption of battle orders. long-range reconnaissance and surveillance as well as area and point protection area of particular importance.
523. In addition to making an appropriate contribution to the collective defence of Alliance territory, the Bundeswehr participates in crisis management and conflict prevention efforts together with other members of the Alliance. For this purpose, Germany needs standing, rapidly available and operational Army, Air Force and Navy contingents that can be employed quickly throughout the Alliance territory and commanded over long distances.
524. These contingents must be large enough for Germany to honour its NATO and WEU obligations. They must be capable both of taking action within a NATO or WEU framework and of cooperating effectively with partners under the auspices of the United Nations. To accomplish all the tasks within the spectrum of crisis management, peace missions and humanitarian aid in all kinds of operational areas, they also have to be versatile, adaptable and sustainable. The nature and scope of the contribution it makes are an expression of. Germany's willingness to share risks and shoulder joint responsibility in NATO and the WEU.
525. These forces must be such that individual elements of them can form part or the core of multinational major units for NATO, WEU, UN or CSCE missions. Their primary role within Alliance territory is to operate on the flanks of the Alliance. The likelihood of their being employed as force multipliers or to reinforce the permanently stationed forces on the southern flank would at present appear greater than their employment in Central or Northern Europe. The most likely force multipliers are electronic warfare, long-range reconnaissance and long-range artillery units, attack helicopters, ground-based air defence, air offensive forces and air transportation. Steps must also be taken to enable a German contingent to be employed as a self-contained unit anywhere in NATO Europe.
526. The armed forces' crisis reaction and national and Alliance defence capabilities are rounded off and complemented by a basic military organization that is responsible for dealing with matters of training and service support, performing central, inter-service tasks and discharging the function of an intermediary between civilian agencies and the armed forces, it has the function of an armed forces basis.
527. The structure of the Bundeswehr is being brought into line with the changed security environment and the capabilities required. The new concept distinguishes between three categories of forces:
* The standing reaction forces;
* The largely mobilization-dependent main defence forces;
* The basic military organization of the armed forces.
These categories form a conceptual entity.
528. The main defence forces (MDF) comprise all the augmentable and standing forces that would be employed in the defence of Germany and its Allies. The augmentable elements of the main defence forces are the foundation of national defence. The main defence forces are to be kept at graduated levels of readiness and must be augmentable, so that they can establish operational readiness within the time available to make military preparations for national and Alliance defence. They are composed of active duty personnel and, to an even greater extent than before, reservists of all ranks who receive basic and continuation training during their active military service and periods of reserve duty training. Selected units of standing MDF, particularly from the logistic and medical corps, will be employed in support of the reaction forces.
529. The reaction forces (RF) are those elements of the armed forces that can be employed for conflict prevention and crisis management within an Alliance framework and as a contribution to international peace missions. As standing defence forces, they contribute to national defence and protect the augmentation of the mobilization-dependent main defence forces, if necessary, they can receive specific support from augmentable elements or from forces of the basic military organization.
530. The basic military organization is the third category of armed forces; it is required to exercise command and control, to support the operation of the armed forces, to discharge training and service support functions, to perform civil-military cooperation tasks and to support the Alliance forces stationed in Germany. Individual units and agencies of the basic military organization, in particular from the communications and medical sectors, will be called upon to support reaction force missions. Given the need for rationalization, some inter-service tasks will be performed by individual services as pilot functions, while others will be performed on a centralized basis.
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ARMED FORCES
531. The necessities and possibilities of national and Alliance defence and of crisis management will in the future lead to a distinct differentiation in operational readiness and training in line with the mission. The Bundeswehr is being oriented to these two primary functions, which have been harmonized and which, acting together, ensure that Germany remains capable of taking political action and fulfilling its Alliance commitments by virtue of its defence -and crisis reaction capability. .
532. With the exception of the standing forms assigned the task of air policing, the national defence capability is being systematically geared to Germany's improved security situation and the long warning time. The strategic situation allows a substantial reduction to be made in the levels of readiness of the armed forces for national defence. It also allows NATO's air attack and nuclear strike capabilities dating back to the days of East-West confrontation, i.e. the number and role assignment of the German Air Force's fighter bombers, to be adapted as agreed with the Alliance.
The amount of time available to make military preparations for the extremely unlikely event of major; deliberate aggression suggests rescheduling the operational training for certain formations of the augmentable main defence forces and conducting it in a period of crisis. This would relieve some of the main defence forces of their operational mission in peacetime. The planning approach for the MDF must therefore lay the foundations in peacetime for the augmentation of the defence forces during the warning time available. This includes mobilization and supplementary training designed to establish full operational readiness of the formations. It is the standing reaction forces of the Alliance that can and will have to assume responsibility for military defence preparedness in the event of unforeseeable developments considered to be less of a threat and to conduct crisis operations.
533. Germany's strategic interests lie primarily in Europe and the neighbouring regions. Because of Germany's Alliance commitments, most of its military contributions are made by providing troops for multinational units or participating in integrated command structures. Given Germany's geostrategic position, however, a special contribution to the mobilization-dependent main defence forces in Central Europe is one of the factors determining Germany's influence in the Alliance. The mobilization capability of the main defence forces is a decisive element of national defence and Germany's standing in one of NATO's core tasks, namely collective defence.
534. Given the current security situation, there is little likelihood within the foreseeable future of all NATO forces being employed simultaneously or for an indefinite period. Nor is it likely that Germany's armed forces will have to conduct major operations on their own. What is probable is that operations will be limited regionally and in tens of scope and time. They will be performed in multinational structures in which the national elements will not necessarily have to be totally self-sufficient. It must therefore be possible for the German contingents involved to receive support not just from national structures. Nor will German reaction force contingents automatically be relieved by other German forces. By the same token, German forces must be able to relieve those of other nations.
535. In the field of crisis management, the Bundeswehr must therefore be capable of making an appropriate and operationally effective contribution of its own to a major operation within the Alliance framework and, at the same time, assigning smaller contingents to participate in operations conducted under the Charter of the United Nations.
536. Crisis reaction capability within a NATO or WEU framework is a task. for all the armed services. The priorities are as follows:
* The land forces must be capable of employing light airmobile and air-mechanized forces for multinational conflict prevention and crisis management;
* The air forces must be capable
537. In coordination with the Alliance, Germany intends to provide an adequate number of rapidly employable and deployable forces for multinational crisis management and UN peace missions:
* In the Army, as Germany's contribution to NATO's reaction forces and the European Corps, standing mechanized and light airmobile brigades. In addition, the necessary combat support and logistic troops and the German element of the Franco-German Brigade; in the Air Force, flying air attack and air defence squadrons, mixed ground-based air defence units and the air transport wings; in the Navy, forces for task groups with surface forces, submarines and naval air forces as part of multinational naval forces, including the necessary mine countermeasure and support components;
* In the armed forces as a whole, a basis of standing forces to provide comprehensive combat service support to the reaction forces of all services;
* In the Alliance, appropriate contributions to the discharge of functions associated with long-distance transportation, strategic reconnaissance and command, control and communications (C3); the national elements must permit limited contingents to have an assessment capability and to exercise command and control on their own.
These contingents must be adequate in comparison with those of other allies.
538. The German reaction force contingent must be equipped with the appropriate materiel to conduct triservice operations in cooperation with the Allies, covering the entire spectrum of possible missions ranging from modern guerrilla warfare to operations against forces equipped with advanced technology. It must therefore be able to carry out ground operations with battalion- to division-strength forms together with appropriate air and naval forces. It must also be able itself to command and control similar operations conducted by a multinational contingent of this sin.
539. For the Bundeswehr, the capability to participate in international crisis management is one of the main conceptual and planning tasks. It is important to establish in the short term an appropriate national inter-service military crisis reaction capability as Germany's contribution to NATO's and the WEU's crisis reaction capability, building up the minimum required operational and support capabilities and keeping them operational.
540. The multinationality of forces in NATO and the WEU, the aim of establishing a European Defence identity and the need to make efficient use of scarce resources lead to the demand for a division of roles and tasks or the performance of tasks in a combined Alliance effort. There are basically two possible approaches for operational units:
* The integrated approach, for instance AWACS, NATO's Airborne Early warning and Control System, under which the Allies operate and fund a force together;
* The modular approach, under which each participating nation provides national elements and the command and control and support echelons are multinational.
541. The multinationality, of units, the possible areas where roles and tasks can be shared and the combined performance of functions have an impact on training and logistics, which in the future will be planned, organized and carried out on a cooperative basis to a greater extent than in the past. This will result not only in more efficient use being made of scarce resources, but also in a further standardization of the doctrines and procedures for the European reaction form. Making training and logistics increasingly multinational is a further step towards a European Security and Defence identity.
RESOURCES AND PLANNING
542. The conflict between the responsibility for security policy and financial constraints, as well as universal conscription and the ceiling of 370,000 military personnel agreed under international law constitute the framework for Bundeswehr planning.
PERSONNEL
543. Given 2 ceiling of 370,000 active duty military personnel, a balanced armed forces personnel structure commensurate to the tasks they have to perform will not exceed the following manpower levels:
* 39,700 officers
* 133,300 NCOs
* 38,000 temporary-career enlisted personnel other than NCOs
* 155,000 conscripts in basic military service/ 15- or 18-month enlistees
* 4,000 reserve duty training spaces
This personnel structure ensures a balanced regeneration for the many different assignments in the armed forces. It offers attractive training and assignments and better career opportunities, increases the number of military leaders and instructors and meets the demands for more professionalism.
If the need arises, the armed forces can be augmented to a wartime strength of 650,000 and 700,000 men.
Personnel Structure Model for a Strength of 370,000
544. Roughly one half of regular and temporary-career personnel requirements will be met by enlisting volunteer who have not served previously; the other half will be met by enlisting or taking on personnel already serving in the forces.
545. A major parameter for personnel planning in the armed forces is the trend in the numbers of conscripts eligible for military service each yew. In 1990, 470,000 nineteen-year-old men were registered. By 1992, this figure had dropped to 377,000; this figure will bottom out at around 350,000 in 1994. It will not rise to 400,000 again until the year 2000.
Twenty-five to thirty per cent of conscripts are found to be "unfit for military service" when they undergo their preinduction examinations, or are exempted from military service on legal grounds. A further 25 to 30 per cent serve in the police or Federal Border Guard, the civilian disaster control organization or the development aid service, or are recognized conscientious objectors performing civilian alternative service. This means that today only about one half of the members of an age group registered are available for service in the armed forces.
546. If the recruiting requirements for temporary-career volunteers and regulars are included, this structure requires about 180,000 to 190,000 men fit for military service to serve in the armed forces. They will, however, not be available unless the numbers of men unfit for or exempted from military service can be significantly limited. Virtually all the young men declared fit for service after undergoing their pre-induction examinations are actually called up. Nevertheless, the physical strains of general basic training should no longer be the sole criterion for a young man's fitness for military service. All those fit to work should be called up for military service. Initial steps have therefore been taken to broaden the fitness criteria.
THE DEFENCE BUDGET
547. The central task of German policy, namely to complete Germany's internal unity, will absorb large amounts of funds for the foreseeable future. Every department must accept the Federal budget priorities for German unity. This also applies to the defence budget. Responsibility for preventive security measures must harmonize the changed security policy requirements with the limited resources. This conflict calls for definite priorities. Anything that does not serve to make the Bundeswehr operationally ready for its new tasks must therefore be deferred.
548. Defence expenditure rose continually from 42.6 billion DM in 1981 to 53.6 billion DM in 1991 when manpower figures peaked in the all-German Bundeswehr. It subsequently fell steadily to 49.85 billion DM in 1993. Over the same period, the percentage of Federal spending allocated to defence fell from 18.3 to 10.9; expressed as a percentage of gross national product, this represented a decline from 2.77 to 1.61.
The defence budget for fiscal year 1994 has bun fixed at 48.481 billion DM. Taking into account the ordered saving of 1.25 billion DM, the Bundeswehr is left with only 47.231 billion DM for 1994. This is a drop of 2.5 billion DM compared with 1993. When these imposed savings have been made, operating expenditure A account for 78.2 per cent and investments for 21.8 per cent of the budget.
549. The Bundeswehr is therefore not going through with a number of important planned projects. It will continue to rationalize, cut redundancies and privatize wherever savings are likely to result for the Bundeswehr. The object is to keep the armed forces efficient and modern by putting its funding on a more even keel, Medium-term financial plans underline the credibility of Germany's security and Alliance policy. Under the 27th Federal Financial Plan, the defence budget for the years 1995 to 1997 mounts to 47.5 billion DM per annum.
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUNDESWEHR
Defence budget from 1984 to 1994
Operating Expediture/Investments in 1994
550. The need to adapt the Bundeswehr is due to the necessity to effectively establish the core capability for crisis management, make intelligent use of universal conscription and, in vim of the scarce resources, establish a reliable basis for planning. There must be harmony between the mission and the means available.
Task-related, purposeful and demanding training and the operation of the armed forces are assured. Steps are also being taken to improve the national capability to participate in international crisis management activities and peace missions and to provide humanitarian aid.
551. The Bundeswehr is being further developed as an overall organic system. This involves establishing priorities that reflect the changes in the Bundeswehr's tasks and initially concern the military core capabilities required to accomplish them.
Of key importance are the capability to exercise command and control and conduct strategic reconnaissance; the mobility to deploy and support force contingents over long distances by sea and air transport; a general logistic support and communications capability; and effective missile defence. To acquire these capabilities, it is essential that inter-service approaches be adopted and multinational solutions be found for development, procurement and operation.
552. The alliances must make collective efforts to close existing gaps in the military capabilities that are of crucial importance for providing effective contributions to crisis management. NATO and the WEU are therefore searching for common solutions. None of the European states that are allied in NATO and the WEU can afford to continue the practice of simultaneously developing several main battle tanks, helicopters, aircraft, frigates and submarines and thereby competing with each other. They all face the same basic problem: they require less and different materiel than before and all have fewer resources at their disposal. This situation demands common solutions more urgently than ever before.
553. Funding levels, efficiency, duration of military service, size and structure of the Bundeswehr are closely interrelated. Whenever one factor changes, the Bundeswehr invariably changes as an overall system. Eliminating deficiencies in some areas may exacerbate the situation elsewhere and will not necessarily improve the overall situation of the armed forces. The result is that specific changes can only be made as part of a holistic approach that must take account of all the factors involved.
554. In 1993, the Federal Minister of Defence therefore ordered comprehensive studies to be conducted and measures taken in order to identify potential savings and to adapt the structures and procedures at the Ministry, within the Territorial Defence Administration, in the Armaments Organization and in the operation of the armed forces to the changes in the Bundeswehr's role.
ADAPTATION OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
555. The orientation of the leadership to new tasks, the reduction in the size of the armed forces and the need to economize make it necessary to adapt the organizational structure of the Federal Ministry of Defence. The first step involves gradually reducing the number of posts by 1,000 by 1997. Over and above these adjustments, the FMoD's organizational structure itself is being reviewed. The object is concentration on the ministerial functions of defence policy, planning, management and supervision. Wherever possible, non-ministerial functions will be transferred to subordinate commands and agencies. In this way, it would appear possible to reduce the personnel strength of the FMoD again by a similar number of posts. The FMoD will stay in Bonn. At the same time, the reorganization of the FMoD takes into account the fact that the Federal Minister of Defence is establishing an office in Berlin, the capital of Germany. This will provide the Executive Group as well as elements of the military staffs and civilian directorates with the facilities needed to ensure cooperation with the Federal Government and to exercise responsibility to parliament.
ADAPTATION OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE ADMINISTRATION
556. On 8 March 1993, a working group was tasked with examining the structure of the Territorial Defence Administration and generating ideas on how the Territorial Defence Administration could be streamlined and restructured. As part of their activities, the working group took account of the recommendations made by the commissions on "Defence Administration in the 1990s", the "Recruiting organization Concept" and "Accounting, Pay and Quartermaster Sections in the Year 2000". The starting point for the examination was the departmental concept of 3 December 1991 on the reorganization of the Territorial Defence Administration and of the Armaments Organization. This departmental concept was the response to the reduction of the authorized peacetime strength of German armed forces to the ceiling of 370,000 personnel, the restationing of units and agencies in the united Germany and the changes in the armed forces' role.
Given the changes in the long-tem conceptual orientation of the armed forces and their target structures, it is now important to adapt the Defence Administration and provide an organizational concept as a sound foundation for its long-term tasks. At the same time, account must still be taken of Article 87 b of the Basic Law, which states that the function of the Defence Administration is to administer personnel matters and to meet the material requirements of the armed forces. To establish the necessary nationwide organization, the basic organization of the Defence Administration must also take account of the division of the Federation into Länder, as stated in Article 36, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law.
The working group has identified a broad spectrum of opportunities for making savings and has proposed a new target structure for the Territorial Defence Administration. Measures centre on a reorganization of the Military District Offices of Defence Administration, a marked streamlining of organizational structures and further adaptation in the number of selection and induction offices. The changes as against the 1991 departmental concept are designed to produce more effective and economical organizations.
RESTRUCTURING OF THE ARMAMENTS ORGANIZATION
557. As part of the planned reorganization of the Federal Ministry of Defence, the responsibilities of the Directorate General of Armaments will concentrate on the ministerial core functions. Most of the implementation management functions associated with the development procurement and use of defence materiel and research and technology projects will be transferred to the Federal Office of Defence Technology and Procurement (BWB).
The Directorate General of Armaments will in the future concentrate on contributing to Bundeswehr planning and thus chiefly on armaments planning, international armaments cooperation, aspects relating to the defence industry, project steering and controlling. This allows the size of the Directorate's staff to be markedly reduced.
The BWB is being organizationally streamlined and adapted to its new functions. The staff of the Bundeswehr technical and research centres, too, can be markedly reduced by concentrating the specialist capacities and as a result of the decline in the testing and evaluation of defence materiel.
Rationalization, the concentration of functions in the non-ministerial sector, organizational streamlining and the concomitant marked reduction in manpower levels will result in significant savings in the Armaments Organization.
LIMITATION OF OPERATING EXPENDITURE
558. In March 1993, the Federal Minister of Defence established the "Operating Expenditure Limitation Work ing Group". This working group has since developed proposals for limiting or reducing operating expenditure in the armed forces and sections of the Federal Defence Administration in order to save financial resources and thus release them for urgent investments. It has ascertained that there is a substantial potential for economizing. To exploit this potential effectively, a dual approach must be adopted. On the one hand, thinking in categories of business management right down to battalion and company level must be developed even further than before. It is for this ream that, on 9 November 1993, the Federal Minister of Defence took the necessary steps for this long-term process to be set in motion. He ordered a "cost and performance responsibility system" to be devised, the purpose of this being to establish transparency and tap the forces' creativity for optimizing procedures. The Bundeswehr is thus following in the footsteps of large industrial enter prises which consider a gradual but continuous improvement in performance and a decentralization of responsibility the best way to achieve maximum rationalization.
On the other hand, competition must be encouraged, both within the Bundeswehr and with industry. This approach is being tried out in the British armed forces where it is known as "market testing".
Since the middle of 1993, the Federal Ministry of Defence has been engaged in a dialogue with the German defence industry on privatization options. The comparison thus initiated between that which industry can accomplish and that which the Bundeswehr can accomplish using its own resources has yielded cost-cutting proposals from the Armaments Organization, particularly the Naval Arsenal, and the forces. Acting in accordance with this approach, the Army, Air Force and Navy are looking into ways of making better me of the logistic and technical facilities and reducing their number by means of centralization and a reduction of multiple capacities.
All these considerations are based on the assumption that the changed security situation will allow logistic units to be skeletonized to an even greater extent, functions to be transferred to industry, as well as stocks and facilities to be pooled.
559. The object is to improve the current ratio of investments to operating expenditure in favour of investments so as to allow the Bundeswehr to be reshaped. To that end, the savings the Bundeswehr achieves as a result of its economizing and rationalization measures must be available for investment.
560. The future sin of the reaction forces, the greater degree of differentiation within the main defence forces, the rationalization of operating procedures and the streamlining of structures open up options for the future internal structures of the armed forces, for manpower levels and for stationing.
When the individual studies for the further development of the Bundleiwehr have been completed, the next Bundeswehr plan will contain a detailed description of the Bundeswehr's target structure and how it is to be achieved.
THE BUNDESWEHR PLAN
561. The Bundeswehr Plan is the foundation for the annual defence estimates submitted by the Federal Ministry of Defence for the Federal budget. Each year it apportions funds to the capabilities the armed forces require and sets priorities for equipment.
In its presentation and assessment, the Bundeswehr Plan makes a distinction between medium-term and long-term periods of planning. As far as the long-term, period of planning is concerned, only the essential developments are presented. The conceptual criteria reflect the radical change in the security situation and the capabilities the Bundeswehr needs most.
562. Possible and foreseeable long-term changes in the situation demand flexibility in planning. Binding commitments for the long-term period are confined to those tasks and structures for which continuity or long lead times are indispensable. The fundamental concept for the Bundeswehr is therefore based on long-term priorities, but can still be adapted flexibly to meet changes in security requirements.
563. The priorities reflect the changed tasks of the Bundeswehr. The question as to which inter-service tasks take precedence and how this precedence is translated into planning priorities is becoming increasingly important. The sequence of functional priorities is laid down in such a way that the plan also allows for new kinds of tasks to be taken on. The aim is for new kinds of tasks to be performed on an international basis wherever possible.
564. Possibilities for sharing responsibilities in the Alliance are becoming more important. Where tasks are performed adequately by allies, it should be considered whether and how the Bundeswehr can narrow its own task spectrum and what conclusions are to be drawn from this for planning. In the interest of mutual assistance, it is also considered whether and how the Bundeswehr can take on tasks for other armed forces.
565. The approach whereby fixed rates of funds were apportioned for materiel investments for the services virtually without change over fifteen years is being abandoned and will soon be converted into a primity-based, project-related concept of planning. Here it is important that the military requirements concerning the materiel be based more than in the past on economical solutions that do not require lengthy development.
566. The priority assigned to the reaction forces is such that there will be no unreasonably high concentration of resources on this force category in the long run. The main defence forces will therefore receive adequate consideration over the length of the planning process.
567. This adaptation necessitates drastic cuts; this is why it can only be implemented step by step. The savings achieved by rationalization measures will be presented in the Bundeswehr Plan in such a way that it is apparent how the new scope can be used for investment purposes. The target concept allows longer-term priorities to be established and investments to be made in the short-term planning period solely with this target structure in mind.
EQUIPMENT PLANNING IN THE ARMED FORCES
568. The fundamental changes in the general conditions also necessitate a new approach to armed forces equipment planning.
The priority of crisis management outside Germany, the restructuring of the armed form, the will to cooperate and promote European integration, the success of the arms control process and the long-term drastic restriction of resources constitute the framework and set the standards for the future equipment of the Bundeswehr. In the future, it will require less and in some cases different kinds of materiel. As a result, the spectrum of equipment will on the whole be more diverse rather than narrower The equipment of the armed forces will be functionally differentiated and adapted.
PRIORITIES OF THE NEW CONCEPT FOR MATERIEL
569. In the light of the changed security situation, the Bundeswehr will no longer pursue armaments projects tailored to the special conditions of military confrontation in the East-West conflict. Today, the first priority is to enable the Bundeswehr to accomplish tasks within the scope of joint crisis management within the Alliance and in the context of peace missions. The capabilities required by the armed forces as a whole and their contributions to multinational forces determine their equipment. What is more, because of the widespread proliferation of advanced weapons, the reaction forces in particular will be issued materiel enabling them to hold their own against warring factions in possession of such weapons. Advanced technology therefore remains a necessity in selected areas where there are compelling military reasons for it.
570. By concentrating research and development on key areas of technology, it will still be possible to modernize the equipment at a later date as required. On the whole, however, equipment must be so designed that it can be adapted quickly and in a timely fashion to the concrete requirements arising at my given location where forces are employed in international crisis management and for national or Alliance defence against a military threat.
571. At the moment, the Bundeswehr is adequately equipped for national defence. Since the main defence forces have modern major equipment at their disposal, they will not need much new materiel in the 1990s. Only after the year 2000 will there be further, step-by-step modernization of their equipment.
572. Equipping the reaction forces has priority. At the moment, there are still deficiencies regarding their command and control capabilities and equipment, but these are being remedied. The high value attached to the crisis reaction capability determines the principal requirements for the equipment of the Bundeswehr. Priority is given to the capabilities required for international crisis management operations but which the Bundeswehr does not yet have on the necessary scale. This prioritization also paves the way for Bundeswehr participation in international peace missions.
573. Together with partners, the Bundeswehr must be able to deploy, employ, exercise command and control over and provide support to a limited number of force contingents in a short period of time, under extreme environmental conditions and over large distances.
Military personnel must have the equipment and personal gear appropriate for climatic and geographic conditions outside Europe. This applies show all to the equipment issued to personnel in the units that form part of international task forces and perform their missions side by side with servicemen from other form. Their equipment must meet the changed requirement profile and high quality standards. German troops in multinational units are after all representatives of the modern industrial state of Germany.
574. To identify regional crises at an early stage, to ensure the proper and adequate preparation of national decisions and to safeguard its interests whenever common concepts are devised by the alliances or the UN, the Federal Government needs a picture of the situation that is accurate at all times. Long-range reconnaissance capabilities and communications are also needed to conduct ongoing crisis management operations of the Bundeswehr.
National means alone are not adequate to endow the comprehensive all-service reconnaissance capability required for crisis prevention with the necessary analytical capability and geographical dimension. A cooperative approach within the alliances is needed.
575. Furthermore, to exercise command and control over units outside Germany and Europe as part of multinational forces or in integrated command structures, the Bundeswehr's military command needs efficient, long-range and internationally interoperable communications and command, control and information systems for disseminating information quickly through several echelons of command.
576. The Bundeswehr must have the capability to deploy force contingents and their equipment over long distances. For this purpose, appropriate land, air and sea transport capabilities are needed. While the Bundeswehr generally relies on ships for long hauls, it also needs wide-body, aircraft to rapidly deploy elements of its reaction forces. It is likely that civilian capacities will primarily be relied on for transportation by sea.
577. The increasing proliferation in crisis areas of long-range missiles that can also be equipped with weapons of mass destruction and the emerging capability of foreign forces to use them as a threat to parts of Europe and Germany or Allied forces during operations call for the build-up of a tactical missile defence capability.
578. To provide logistic and medical support for units engaged in crisis management operations, international peace missions and humanitarian aid activities, steps must be taken to ensure that - even under extreme environmental conditions - supplies can be transported, stored and used and high-grade medical cam can be provided at all stages.
579. The procedure for the development and procurement of materiel will be brought into line with the changed situation. The objective of the new procedure is to make the development and procurement cycles more dynamic and shorter, to lower system costs, to simplify procedures and on the whole to achieve greater economy in the use of substantially reduced funds for investment.
580. The reaction forces are being built up and equipped step by step. To ensure the Bundeswehr's capability to act, the availability and quality of individual organic units capable of being employed at the operational level and of being integrated into other forces is more important than providing all units with the same equipment. This applies especially to the converting and equipping of those units that are also earmarked for international peace missions and humanitarian operations.
EQUIPMENT PLANNING IN THE SERVICES
581. By raising reaction forces, the Army is creating a balanced mix of mechanized, airmobile combat troops capable of conducting the air-to-ground fire fight. They must have efficient combat, logistic and medical support and be suitable for employment at least under all the climatic conditions likely to be encountered in the Alliance area.
In the near future, a new light helmet made of Aramid, new mottled camouflage clothing, protective vests providing even greater safety and new NATO 5.56 mm calibre small arms (rifles/machine-guns) will be procured for the individual equipment of servicemen. NBC protection will be improved. Priority will be given to the reaction forces.
The reaction forces will he equipped with a new armoured transport vehicle, a highly mobile scout vehicle and transportable medical shelters. The planned TIGER support helicopter and the NH 90 transport helicopter will improve the mobility of and support to the reaction forces during operations. They will also receive a light air defence system, the MULTI transport vehicle and the KEILER armoured mine-clearing vehicle.
Elements of the Army's reaction forces will be equipped with a LEOPARD 2 main battle tank with improved protection and upgraded fire control system, and their artillery support will he improved by a limited number of new self-propelled howitzers. In addition, they will receive a wide array of special equipment to improve command and control, reconnaissance and night vision capabilities. The introduction of simulators in the next few years will make a major contribution to the professional training of servicemen and improve environmental protection.
582. Crisis reaction capability is also a priority matter for the Air Force. The main areas in which adaptation and modernization me required are air defence, precision weapons and long-distance command and control capability. To meet the major technological challenges of the next decade, air defence will in the long term be assigned a high percentage of the volume of funds planned for modernization and procurement.
The importance of fighter aircraft in air defence has increased. Thus, all the Air Force's F-0 PHANTOMS and MiG 29s will be employed in an air defence fighter role in the future. The upgrading of the F4-F required for this purpose will be completed by 1996. Its particular value is its future multi-target engagement capability. This will be complemented by the provision of medium-range guided missiles. These are intended chiefly for the upgraded F-4F PHANTOMS assigned to the reaction forces. For reasons of combat effectiveness and economy, it will be necessary to replace the present F-4F PHANTOMS and MiG 29s with an advanced fighter aircraft, beginning in the year 2002. The decision on the production and procurement of the EUROFIGHTER 2000 will be made in 1995.
At the beginning of the next decade, Germany will require a new surface-to-air missile system to replace the aging HAWK weapon System. It must be highly mobile, air-transportable and capable of engaging both aircraft and tactical missiles.
A central item of combat service support for the reaction forces is air transport. It is an essential prerequisite for the broadened tasks of all services to support crisis reaction operations, peace missions and humanitarian actions. The air transport forces already have a heavy workload in peacetime, and make available a large proportion of their capacity for other armed Services and for the Government and Parliament.
When determining the reaction forces' future transport requirements, it must be assumed that, while the bulk of the equipment and part of the personnel will normally be sea-lifted to their destinations, it must be possible to airlift battalion-strength units and their support elements rapidly and over long distances. Therefore, all the medium-range capacities available for employment will be maintained and improved. Studies are currently being conducted into how requirements for wide-body aircraft can be satisfied.
Of the three A-310s taken over from the holdings of Interflug, the former GDR airline, in are reserved for use by the Government and Parliament and are thus not available for military airlifts. Pending parliamentary approval, the four B-707s of the Federal Ministry of Defence's Special Air Mission Unit are to be retained for long-range transport purposes and converted to perform a secondary function as aerial tankers. Air refuelling is an important force multiplier for crisis reaction operations.
583. The new materiel the Navy is to receive is also based primarily on the task of contributing naval and naval air forces to the crisis reaction capability.
Four BRANDENBURG-class frigates will replace the almost thirty-year-old HAMBURG-class destroyers. In addition, delivery will continue of new FRANKENTHAL-class minehunters and ELBE-class tenders, thus allowing replacement of old and cost-intensive weapon systems requiring a great deal of manpower.
It is planned to replace the LÜTJENS-class destroyers, which will be over thirty years old by the end of the century and which have proved costly to operate, with the Class 124 frigates that are to be developed under an international armaments cooperation programme. Looking beyond the year 2000, there are also plans to replace the Class 206 and. 206 A submarines with Class 212 submarines equipped with air-independent propulsion systems. Special task group logistic support ships will have to be procured to ensure support for task groups comprising destroyers and frigates operating far from their home bases. To complement the frigates, it is also planned to add corvettes to the fleet for marginal sea and littoral operations. The SEA KING SAR helicopter is intended to be replaced by the middle of the decade by a successor model from the NH 90 NATO helicopter family. There are long-term plans to replace the thirty-year-old BREGUET ATIANTIQUE long-range maritime patrol and ASW aircraft with a modern aircraft.
RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY CONCEPT
584. Defence research and technology (R & T) are indispensable if the armed forces are to have modern equipment. Under the research and technology concept of the Federal Ministry of Defence, priorities for work are established in accordance with military requirements; these priorities take account of civilian research and technology activities of the Federal Government, international cooperation and the results of private-sector research. In this context, care is taken to ensure that the conditions in this specific branch of German industry and international cooperation are given due consideration, always bearing in mind aspects of security policy. Germany's armaments policy will have to be adapted accordingly in keeping with developments in Europe.
585. Up to one third of all investments in research and technology are used for reaction force reconnaissance and command and control capabilities. The objective is to make use of advanced civilian technologies to ensure efficient long-distance navigation and communication and to increase the performance of sensors. Within the scope of arms control, technical means to support verification are being examined. This is part of the studies on a European earth observation satellite system.
The capability to deploy armed forces rapidly and over long distances calls for appropriate transport systems. Research activities focusing on mobility and transport are therefore laying the technological foundations for the tactical and operational deployability and mobility of reaction forces. These activities range from the examination of materials and individual components to the development of new concepts.
586. The activities concerning the employment and effect of weapons concentrate on studies on missile defence and the purposes for which new kinds of weapons, including smart ammunition, can be used. There is very little scope here for using work done in the civilian sector as a basis for these activities.
587. The research and technology programmes of the Bundeswehr contribute substantially to ensuring that the armed forces have the equipment they need. If German industry is to be able to cooperate with the industries of allied nations, it is essential that it retain its technological competence in once areas that are to be coordinated within an Alliance framework. This makes it easier for Germany and its allies to coordinate the equipment their armed force; are to have and enables them to design it both economically and efficiently.
COST MANAGEMENT AND UTILIZATION OF CIVILIAN CAPACITY
588. The weapon systems of the Bundeswehr must be developed, procured and used at reasonable cost. Effective cost management and a set of advanced management tools, above all for measuring progress and controlling costs, are indispensable for this.
The essential element is a concept to minimize the lifecycle costs of defence materiel. This concept provides for costs to be considered on an equal footing with other parameters, such as operational and technical requirements and the timeframe in which a project is to be realized. In this context, all costs incurred by a weapon system during its entire life cycle are to be considered.
589. Work, time and costs will be monitored using a data and cost notification procedure agreed by the Association of German industry and the Federal Ministry of Defence in 1990. Together with project cost transparency and the ability to make reliable cost estimates, this cost monitoring procedure will enable continual action to be taken to minimize costs and avoid undesirable developments in projects. A customized and efficient system of controlling based on this procedure will make it possible to keep within the specified limits on an inter-project basis and to properly plan, monitor and control the projects in their entirety.
590. Costs can be further limited by making increasing use of civilian technologies in the armed forces. In some sectors of military equipment, the speed at which one generation follows another is influenced by ever greater and faster leaps of innovation in civilian technology. This is particularly true of command and control, communications and reconnaissance systems.
In the future, the armed forces will be making greater use of systems and components of civilian technology. Thus, the Bundeswehr will benefit from the innovatory power and the competition of the civilian markets.
NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN ARMAMENTS BASE
591. Germany remains reliant upon a modern, competitive and efficient defence industry for its preventive security measures. Security policy considerations Call for a national armaments base, it prevents undesirable dependencies in the armaments sector and is indispensable for armaments cooperation. Without such a bag, Germany could not be a credible member of the Alliance, Germany's defence technology base thus helps to keep its domestic industry competitive to the extent that armaments and civilian technology have an innovative influence on each other.
592. As part of the measures to satisfy the requirements of the armed forces, the Federal Government intends above all to preserve the technological capabilities in which Germany occupies a leading position internationally and for which them is a continued need in the armed forces. The future of Germany's arms industry lies in systems and high technology, for instance in command and control and weapon delivery systems, sensors and electronics. The technological trend is towards high-grade force multipliers, in other words systems that greatly enhance the effectiveness of weapon systems.
593. The Bandeswehr does not make economic and structural policy; it is nevertheless aware of the effects of its decisions on industry. However, the state's monopoly in placing orders, the tying-up of capacities that are barely used, the high quality of products produced in small quantities and the need to determine budgetary appropriations each year anew require coordination between policy-makers and industry. When funds are scarce, national industrial armaments capabilities and capacities must be carefully determined. This is essential in order to support the necessary structural changes in the defence industry; which must adjust to the new demands in terms of quality and quantity. Accordingly, Germany's future arms export policy will have to fit in with developments in Europe.
594. The diminishing materiel requirements, the scarcity of funds and the excess capacities in the defence industry mean that European nations have to pool the capabilities of their defence industries. In the future, self-sufficiency in armaments will therefore make less sense than in the past. This is another reason why armaments cooperation with our allies is becoming more important.
All the European allies agree that armaments Cooperation at the European level within the WEU should be continued and intensified in the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG). The aim is to concentrate effort and avoid unnecessary parallel activities. Germany advocates a further opening of the European Defence Equipment Market on fair and equal terms. Initial steps in this direction were taken as early as 1990 in the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), which is now known as the WEAG. Since then, rules for a European Defence Equipment Market have been reviewed to determine whether they are feasible.
The European Armaments Agency is a further organization that serves the objective of concentrating European armaments tasks and combining them organizationally.
595. The most important forum for armaments cooperation in NATO is the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD). It is directly subordinate to the North Atlantic Council. The CNAD is responsible for all tasks concerning armaments and also draws upon industrial expertise via a special advisory group. There is thus constant close coordination and cooperation throughout the Alliance.
The Federal Government will further increase its efforts to seek every possible opportunity to cooperate with Germany's partners in equipping the armed forces. Such cooperation helps to bring the members of NATO closer together, to consolidate the Alliance and to enhance the European Defence identity. From the military point of view, cooperation is absolutely essential to achieve further improvements in interoperobility and standardization of equipment and procedures. From the economic point of view, armaments cooperation allows effective use to be made of scarce national resources by sharing the costs incurred for research, technology and development, by producing higher quantities and thereby cutting production costs, and by means of common training and logistics once, the equipment is in service use.
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