Title: Democracy and Defense: civilan control of the military in the United States


Date: 31/07/1997
Language: english

DEMOCRACY AND DEFENSE: CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN THE UNITED STATES

By David F. Trask


In this adapted version of the USIA pamphlet, the former chief historian for the U.S. Army Center of Military History, explains how the concept of the citizen-soldier in a democracy helps to ensure the basic fundamental freedoms, without compromising the necessity of a military force.

In 1782, just after the Revolutionary War (1775-1781), certain officers who felt that they had received inadequate pay for wartime services contemplated a military revolt against the civilian government.

Hoping to secure the support of their commander, they gathered in Newburgh, New York, to hear the views of General George Washington. But Washington flatly refused to support a military mutiny, calling instead for disbandment of the army and continuing loyalty to the civilian government. Washington's firm stance forestalled the mutiny. Ever since, U.S. military leadership has accepted civilian control.

This enviable record results from the unshakable conviction of the American people that civilian control of the armed services is an essential aspect of government of, by and for the people. In a democracy, public policy is decided by the majority, subject to the rule of law instead of brute force. Civilian control of the military helps to ensure that decisions concerning defense policy do not compromise fundamental democratic values, such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of religion.

However, as George Washington recognized, democratic nations such as the United States must maintain armed forces. From time to time, external threats develop, and on occasion, internal conflicts also occur -- such as the American Civil War -- to which the government must respond by enlarging the military. These circumstances generated some tensions between military and civilian leaders, but the latter always prevailed.

Certain criteria have governed American civil-military relations from the beginning of the nation. Louis Smith, a leading student of civil-military relations, has summarized them effectively. They include:


• Civilian leadership of the executive branch of government. The national leadership is accountable to a popular majority through frequent and regular elections.
  
  
• Civilian leadership of the professional military services and departments. The professional military heads of the army, the navy and the air force are subordinate to civilian departmental heads, who are appointed by the president and confirmed by Congress. In other words, the civilian executive stands at the head of the military chain of command, supported by civilian subordinates who oversee the day-to-day activities of the armed forces.
  
  
• Statutory provisions to establish fundamental national security policies. Elected legislative representatives of the people enact laws that define the defense, organization and policies of the nation. The chief executive enforces these directives. In the United States, the Constitution provides basic guidelines, and the Congress passes legislation that defines the scope of military activity.
  
  
• Judicial defense of civilian control. The judiciary prevents the military from compromising civil liberties, including those of the members of the armed services. In the United States, the Supreme Court is empowered to hear cases that involve military infringements on the rights of the citizenry.

How did the American people come to establish civilian control of the military? How did they manage to preserve such control despite significant challenges to national security at various points over the last two centuries?


The Constitution and Civilian Control

The successful defense of the American colonies during the colonial era strengthened local confidence that a militia or volunteers sufficed and that a standing army was not necessary to ensure security. Colonial legislatures, which possessed the power of the purse, proved effective in preserving control over military matters and resisting the English Crown. These bodies became the principal exponents of American ideas about the dangers of permanent military organizations, and they were the main advocates of civilian constraints on the military.

Thus during the Revolution, civilian control of the military became an indispensable attribute of liberty and therefore of democracy. It also reaffirmed that citizen-soldiers, called to arms in emergencies, could provide needed military personnel without threatening the well-being of the state or civilian values.

In 1787, when the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, it devoted considerable attention to the question of national defense. The Founding Fathers sought to balance the need to provide the central government with the power necessary to ensure national security against the desire to uphold civil and political liberties.

Several structural devices chosen by the Founding Fathers to guard against an unduly powerful central government affected the Constitution's military provisions:


• Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution gives dual roles of chief executive and commander-in-chief to the president. This ensures that the civilian chief executive stands at the head of the military chain of command and through command authority, ensures civilian control over the making of military policy.
  
  
• Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives the power to the legislative branch to "provide for the common Defence," listing specific powers such as "To declare War," "To raise and support Armies" and "To provide and maintain a Navy." These provisions preclude the executive branch from making war without the consent of the legislature.

The Bill of Rights also includes two items of considerable importance for the military:


• The Second Amendment reemphasizes the role of the citizen-soldier, that is "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms."
  
  
• The Third Amendment protects U.S. citizens from the pre-revolutionary custom of quartering soldiers in private homes "without the consent of the Owner."

With the exception of the American Civil War, perhaps most important to the continuing commitment to civilian control was the absence of significant and sustained threats to U.S. national security until the 20th century. The stable balance of power in Europe from the defeat of Napoleon to 1914 contributed immeasurably to the security of the United States. By discouraging European meddling in the New World, it allowed Americans to concentrate on domestic affairs: political consolidation, westward expansion and economic growth. The nation required only tiny armed forces that emphasized peacetime missions, because it could count on geographic barriers -- the surrounding oceanic expanses -- to ensure security.

In these circumstances, the national preference for citizen-soldiers instead of long-serving professionals remained firm. In 1826, a secretary of war summarized the views of the people precisely: "Among the political maxims which the United States had adopted as unquestionable, there is no one more universally subscribed to than that a well-organized and well-disciplined militia is the natural defense of a free people."


The Civil War and Beyond

The American Civil War from 1861 to 1865, forced both sides to put large, full-time armies into the field and to devote most of their resources to the war effort. The principle of civilian control, which had proven remarkably durable in times of peace, was put to the test. What would happen during a profound national emergency? Would military priorities and values overwhelm established civil institutions?

President Abraham Lincoln made extensive use of his powers as commander-in-chief. No previous chief executive had faced a comparable challenge; no one had anticipated the extraordinary measures, both civil and military, required to wage a great war.

Lincoln had to field a huge army and to build a powerful navy. Despite this massive war effort, he was firm in preserving civilian control of the military. During his long search for an effective commander of the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln in communications to field commanders never hesitated to assert his supremacy. In addition, when, at the end of the war, the Confederate army commanded by General Robert E. Lee was about to surrender, the president sent a sharp message through his secretary of war to his field commander, General Ulysses S. Grant, that fully captured the president's views on this question. "You are not to decide, discuss, or confer (with General Lee) upon any political question," Lincoln said. "Such questions the president holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conferences or conventions."

At times, Lincoln's use of his powers as commander-in-chief seemed to endanger civil liberties. He suspended the right of habeas corpus (the common-law injunction against imprisonment without trial) and authorized the use of military tribunals to try citizens accused of supporting the rebellion. Only after the war did the federal judiciary interpose its authority and overrule some serious wartime violations of personal freedoms. Among other things, the courts limited the scope of martial law and prevented persecution of political prisoners. Even in a moment of maximal danger, the fundamental democratic values to which the nation had committed itself were upheld.

Although Confederate President Jefferson Davis denounced the "tyranny" of Lincoln, in 1862 he obtained from his own Congress the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Southern civil authorities, however, so feared the interference of the Confederate government, that they hamstrung Davis in prosecuting the war of secession.

The Civil War was viewed as a one-time catastrophe. The public did not discern a need to make permanent changes in military policies and practices in reaction to a threat that would never recur. Soon after hostilities ended, the powerful wartime forces were demobilized, and the armed services reverted to the prewar status quo.

By the end of the 19th century, the United States had become recognized as one of the great powers when using such measures of strength as industrial production, national wealth and population, but its armed forces lagged far behind those of its rivals. This circumstance reflected the continuing belief that the nation, thanks to the protection afforded by the great oceans and the polar regions, could avoid involvement in warfare and thus the costs of huge and highly professional warfighting armed services comparable to those maintained by other great powers.


The Two World Wars

When war comes infrequently and causes little disruption, it is easier to establish and maintain civilian control over the military. The extensive warfare of the post-1914 period, however, greatly increased the priority and the prestige accorded to the armed services. What, then, happened to civilian control in World War I and World War II?

The U.S. intervention in World War I in April 1917 signalled a departure in the nation's security policy. Enhanced concern for national security required improvements in the means of coordinating the efforts of the civilian sector and the military establishment since both were faced with the task of conducting a rapid mobilization on an unimagined scale. On the military side, the War and Navy Departments underwent reorganization and expansion. On the civilian side, President Woodrow Wilson created many emergency agencies to mobilize and deploy the armed forces as rapidly as possible.

A definite division of responsibility for the war effort emerged during the short period of combat from April 1917 to November 1918. On the one hand, military leaders were allowed considerable freedom of action in conducting field operations when tactical measures did not compromise the larger political objectives of the nation. On the other hand, civilian leaders largely controlled the mobilization, working hand in hand with military departments.

Despite the remarkable expansion in the size and prestige of the armed forces, civilian control was never relaxed during World War I. Wilson retained firm direction of the armed forces, acting through the civilian heads of the military departments. Only one breach of the traditional pattern occurred. Just before the end of the war, General John J. Pershing, the commander-in-chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, broke from Wilson's policy of seeking an armistice with Germany. With the war's end, however, Wilson did not seek disciplinary action against Pershing.

Some violations of civil liberties did occur during the war. Political radicals, conscientious objectors and German-Americans sometimes encountered persecution as popular passion overcame good sense in the heat of conflict. Fortunately, the judiciary, as it had during the Civil War, managed to mitigate some of these serious errors and eventually made amends.

Along with the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, and thus the League of Nations, was the unwillingness of the American people to countenance Wilson's revolutionary departure from the old foreign policy of isolation. Not yet convinced that the United States should participate extensively in the affairs of the Old World to guarantee America's security, Americans were also reluctant to maintain large combat-ready armed forces in support of an activist foreign policy. Hence, during the period between World War I and World War II, the United States reverted to its 19th-century policy of isolation.

Developments during World War II paralleled those of World War I in many respects. Following the precedent set during 1917-1918, President Franklin D. Roosevelt created many emergency agencies to manage what he called "the arsenal of democracy." The professional heads of the armed services came together in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which organized essential inter-service cooperation, and arranged distribution of resources between the theaters of war. Although civilians dominated the emergency agencies, uniformed military leaders remained free to direct operations in the field, provided that their actions were consistent with the president's policy and strategy.

Although the wartime crisis enhanced military participation in national planning and decision-making, military leaders displayed no inclination to supplant appropriate civilian influence. The much-enlarged defense establishment included many civilians and citizen-soldiers, who identified with established traditions of civilian control. As it had during World War I, the judiciary interposed its authority to control violations of civil rights. After the war ended, indemnities were twice distributed to Japanese-Americans, in at least partial recompense for their internment during the war.


Conclusion

What accounts for the preservation and even the strengthening of civilian control of the military in the United States?

Americans view the expansion of the military establishment as an unavoidable measure to ensure the preservation of their freedoms. They perceive civilian control of the military as an indispensable aspect of the democratic process they seek to preserve.

During the last years of the 19th century and continuing into the 20th century, the U.S. military services became thoroughly professionalized. Professionalism requires of each officer a commitment to professional excellence -- the observance of the highest technical standards in meeting the requirements of his or her chosen field. Hence, by definition, professionalism embraces the commitment to civilian control of the military.

Both ideological commitments and professional creeds helped prevent undue military influence in the U.S. government during World War I and World War II. The preservation of civilian control did not stem from impersonal forces. It flowed from the active and sustained commitment of both civilians and military professionals to an idea that had proven itself in good times and bad.

Louis Smith has written that "civil dominance, regardless of how securely grounded it may be in the Constitution and in the statutes, is not self-implementing. Like any other principle, it must be cherished in the public mind if it is to prevail. Like any other policy, it requires translation into effective administration." The U.S. national experience in civil-military affairs confirms this judgment.


Source:
Issues of Democracy, USIA Electronic Journal, Vol. 2, No. 3, July 1997
Democracy and Human Rights - I/TDHR
U.S. Information Agency