25. V. Stepankov and Ye. Lisov, Kremlyovskiy zagovor. Versiya sledsviya (Moscow: Ogonek, 1992), pp. 92-93.

26. Transcript from the 22 August 1991 interrogation of Yazov, published in Izvestiya, 11 October 1991, p. 7. The role of Yazov's concern over what he saw as the impending breakup of the union in his decision to join the coup conspiracy was also stressed by his Defense Ministry colleagues. (See A. Krayniy, "How and Why Did Marshal Yazov End Up As A Plotter?" Komsomolskaya pravda, 27 August 1991, p. 3.) An interesting assessment of Yazov's gradual alienation from Gorbachev is provided by Stepankov's account of the coup. Stepankov depicts Yazov as a "marshal who became a toy in the hands of politicians." According to this account, Yazov (like many other military officers) had great hopes for Gorbachev and perestroyka from 1985 to 1988. However, Yazov gradually came to see Gorbachev as a threat to the integrity of the state. The November 1990 meeting between Gorbachev and military deputies was a turning point in Gorbachev's relations with the officer corps and with Yazov. Stepankov portrays Yazov's 27 November 1990 television address as a key to Yazov's position. In the address, Yazov pointed to the actions of republics that threatened the defense capability of the country, in particular their demands to withdraw Soviet troops. The army, Yazov promised, would remain wherever needed to fulfill its main function: the defense of the state and ensuring of state security. See Stepankov and Lisov, , pp. 25-29.

27. After the coup, the Defense Ministry Collegium issued a statement denying that the Collegium had approved Yazov's membership on the State Committee for the State of Emergency. Members of the Collegium, it claimed, were not even informed of Yazov's decision. Furthermore, according to the MOD Collegium, "The actions of the military-political leadership of the Army and Navy . . . did not go beyond the law." "At the USSR Defense Ministry Collegium," Krasnaya zvezda, 23 August 1991, p. 3.

28. Varennikov was among those who detained Gorbachev at Foros. His motivations appeared to mirror those of Yazov, since he justified his actions to Gorbachev by arguing that the draft union treaty that Gorbachev was slated to sign upon his return to Moscow contradicted the results of the March referendum. He also complained that Gorbachev was allowing separatists and extremists forces to act against the country. Stepankov and Lisov, p. 14.

The chief of staff of the Air Defense Forces, Colonel General Maltsev, was another alleged participant in the detention of Gorbachev. See "A Chronicle of the Coup and the Resistance," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 23 August 1991, p. 7.

Presidential advisor Marshal Akhromeyev was also among those who joined the coup conspiracy. He committed suicide after the coup failed. His suicide note indicated that, beginning in 1990, he became convinced that the country was being ruined. Stepankov and Lisov, pp. 236-243.

29. Deposition of Pavel Grachev on 25 September 1991 in "Why the Thunder Did Not Rumble," Moskovskiye novosti, No. 29, 17-24 July 1994, p. 8. Grachev's testimony confirms earlier assertions by coup conspirator Kryuchkov and others that Grachev was involved in coup planning. On Kryuchkov's testimony, see Moscow Interfax, 30 November 1993. See also I. Kadulin, "The Lubyanka Theater," Komsomolskaya pravda, 21 December 1991, p. 3. According to foreign intelligence agent Aleksey Yegorov, the list drawn up by Grachev and others at the 16 August meeting became the basis for the introduction of a state of emergency by the State Committee for the State of Emergency. (Komsomolskaya pravda, 29 August 1992, p. 2.)

30. Among those later charged by journalists or participants with supporting the coup was the commander of the Volga-Urals Military District Colonel General Makashov. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 27 August 1991, p. 1; Komsomolskaya pravda, 27 August 1991, p. 1; and Izvestiya, 3 September 1991, p. 8.) According to General Konstantin Kobets, who was head of Russia's State Defense Committee and one of the White House defenders, the Strategic Rocket Forces Commander "did not let us down," but his chief of staff Major General Chibisov "literally bellowed for joy" that the democrats were about to be crushed. Kobets also charged that the SRF political organs actively supported the coup conspirators. (Interview with Konstantin Kobets in Moskovskiy novosti, No. 35, 1991, p. 4.) Commander of the Air Defense Forces Army General Tretyak was among those who allegedly gave the coup conspirators his active support. Although Far Eastern Military District Commander Novozhilov reportedly withheld support, several generals in the district's political apparatus strongly supported the coup. (Izvestiya, 27 August 1991, p. 3.) The commission appointed by the USSR Supreme Soviet to investigate the coup events charged that the command of the Transcaucasus Military District had worked with the Georgian Internal Affairs Ministry to support the efforts of the emergency committee. (Interfax, 27 December 1992.) Lithuanian sources charge that the chief of the Baltic Military District actively supported the coup in Lithuania. (See Radio Vilnius, 2130 GMT, 5 September 1991 and Ekho litvy, 1 September 1991, pp. 1-2.)

31. Interview with Leningrad Mayor A. Sobchak in Argumenty i fakty, No. 34, August 1991, p. 6.

32. Pravda, 20 August 1991, p. 3; Sovetskaya rossiya, 20 August 1991, p. 2; and Moscow TASS, 19 August 1991.

33. Under pressure from Mayor Sobchak, Samsonov ordered troops to halt outside the city. Sobchak address on 21 August 1991; and Rossiyskaya gazeta, 23 August 1991, p. 6. For findings of a city council commission investigating the coup, see Interfax, 6 September 1991. See also Aleksandr Nevzorov, "August 1991," Zavtra, No. 28 (33), July 1994, p. 3.

34. According to Air Force Colonel V.S. Smirnov, a USSR people's deputy, "All the commands were transmitted without a hitch from top to bottom. And I think that no one should have any illusions the army would have obeyed any orders it was given." "Serving the Fatherland," 2230 GMT, 31 August 1991.

35. Describing the first meeting at the Defense Ministry (apparently in the early morning hours of 18 August), Shaposhnikov later conceded that he didn't feel there was anyone there with whom he could safely share his feelings of unease. Later, he spoke with some members of the Defense Ministry Collegium. "From these conversations, it became clear that I would have difficulty in finding allies." (Interview with Shaposhnikov, Komsomolskaya pravda, 27 August 1991, p. 3.) On the absence of high command refusal to comply with GKChP orders, see also Stepankov and Lisov, p. 20.

36. Stepankov and Lisov, pp. 108 - 109. Most of the military leaders who attended the morning meeting on 19 August appeared to have been unaware of the plan to declare an emergency. When a Komsomolskaya pravda reporter spoke with Colonel General N. Kalinin, commander of the Moscow Military District, that day, Kalinin acknowledged that troops had advanced into the city. Acting Commander of the Ground Forces Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov said that "the Defense Minister's report came as a surprise to me, but the troops are undoubtedly ready to perform the tasks assigned to them." (Andrey Krayniy, "Military Provincial Chronicle," Komsomolskaya pravda, 22 August 1991, p. 1.) Speaking of the morning meeting on 19 August, Shaposhnikov recalled that everyone was in a state of shock and even Yazov was not enthusiastic. Shaposhnikov justified the lack of response from other Collegium members by claiming that Yazov did not allow questions to be asked. "And, in any case, to be honest, nobody showed any wish to do so." (Shaposhnikov interview in Le Monde, 13 September 1991, p. 8.)

37. Ibid.

38. Stepankov and Lisov, p. 160.

39. Deposition of Pavel Grachev, 25 September 1991, in "Why the Thunder Did Not Rumble," Moskovskiye novosti, No. 29, 17-24 July 1994, p. 8.

40. Deposition of Boris Gromov, 25 September 1991, in "Why the Thunder Did Not Rumble," Moskovskiye novosti, No. 29, 17-24 July 1994, p. 8.

41. For instance, the chief of staff of the Moscow Military District (Lt Gen Leonid Zolotov) reportedly told an Izvestiya correspondent on the morning of 20 August that the coup was hopeless and criminal. N. Burbyga, V. Rudnev, and S. Mostovshchikov, "Actors and Roles: How a Coup D'Etat Was Accomplished in the USSR," Izvestiya, 23 August 1991, p. 6.

42. There is conflicting evidence on Grachev's role during the coup. According to Shaposhnikov, Grachev was one of the few Defense Ministry leaders who shared his uneasiness with the emergency measures. (Interview with Shaposhnikov on Moscow Television, 2230 GMT 24 August 1991.) Shaposhnikov and Grachev, according to Shaposhnikov's account, "agreed under threat of death not to carry out any orders that might bring about irreparable actions." (Interview with USSR Defense Minister Shaposhnikov in Komsomolskaya pravda, 27 August 1991, p. 3.) However, when Shaposhnikov suggested that Grachev order his paratroopers to attack the coup leaders by besieging the Kremlin, Grachev "expressed doubts about the success of such an enterprise." (Interview with Shaposhnikov in Le Monde, 13 September 1991, p. 8.) Grachev himself claims that he started having doubts on the morning of 19 August. When Yeltsin got in touch with him at 0630, he promised that he would use his paratroopers to guard the "White House." (Interview with Grachev in Krasnaya zvezda, 31 August 1991, p. 3; and Interview with Grachev in Izvestiya, 5 September 1991, p. ) Yazov, in an interview nearly three years after the coup, reports that both Grachev and Lebed conducted themselves appropriately (from his viewpoint) during the coup. After Yeltsin called Grachev and asked him to send troops to protect the White House, Grachev who (according to Yazov) could not do this on his own authority, called Yazov and asked for permission to do so. Yazov interview in Zavtra, No. 21 (26), June 1994, p. 3.

43. At the Collegium session, Shaposhnikov, chief of the Navy Admiral Chernavin, and head of the Strategic Rocket Forces Army General Maksimov called for troops to be withdrawn from Moscow. Andrey Krayniy, "Military Provincial Chronicle," Komsomolskaya pravda, 22 August 1991, p. 1.

44. Stepankov and Lisov, pp. 180, 186. For the order adopted by the Defense Ministry Collegium meeting on 0800, 21 August, see Komsomolskaya pravda, 27 August 1991, p. 3.

45. Even those who saw the coup as ill-conceived acknowledged that the military complied with orders. For instance, Moscow Military District Chief of Staff Zolotov, responding to a question as to whether officers and servicemen went over to the side of the Russian government, said "Commanders and servicemen carried out all order of the Minister of Defense to the letter." (Izvestiya, 23 August 1991, p. 6.)

46. For instance, then Vice President Rutskoy met with the Major Sergey Yevdokimov, the commander of a tank sub-unit, and talked him into joining the White House defenders. Six of the ten tanks in Yevdokimov's subunit moved to the White House building. Stepankov and Lisov, pp. 152-153.

47. According to Gromov, it was Achalov (one of the most enthusiastic Defense Ministry participants in the coup) who argued most forcefully that the projected operation could not be carried out. Grachev, too, acknowledges Achalov's role in convincing Yazov of the risks of storming the White House. See depositions in Moskovskiye novosti, No. 29, 17-24 July 1994, p. 8.