6.1. Level and Size of Contribution
In principle, the level and size of South African contribution to any particular peace mission will depend on how closely the mission relates to national interests and the type of demand that exists for the type of contributions outlined above. Indeed, where core national interests are clearly at stake, the level and size of the South African contribution may well exceed that of the envisaged potential contributions.
In the case of contributions involving individual civilians, the level and size of contribution will depend largely on demand by the UN or other international organisations and agencies and the efficacy of the civilian standby mechanism outlined above. Civilian police contributions will be somewhat more politicised and military contributions even more so. The larger the contribution in terms of weight of personnel and equipment deployed, the more politicised the decision to deploy will become. On the other hand, with the exception of perhaps key high-level diplomats, the deployment of civilians to international peace missions should be flexible and responsive to demands, and not be subject to political controls. In each case, the level of national and international politicisation involved in decisions to deploy will determine how thoroughly the principles outlined below are weighed against requests for a particular contribution.
The principles outlined below are derived largely from the lessons learnt by more experienced contributing countries and the UN Secretariat. This means that South Africa should feel fairly secure in contributing to an established UN mission (especially for the sake of gaining experience) and that careful consideration of principles is far more important when the country is approached to contribute towards the establishment of a new mission. These principles are:
- A clear international mandate;
- Sufficient means;
- A domestic mandate and budget;
- Volunteerism;
- Clear entry and exit criteria;
- Regional co-operation; and
- Foreign assistance.
6.2. A Clear International Mandate
The framing of a realistic and appropriate mandate for any peace operation is essential to the success of any mission. If a peace operation has a clear and realistic mandate, and the means to achieve this mandate, then there is every chance that the mission will be successful. On the other hand, if the mandate is patently unrealistic, the mission is doomed to failure from the outset.
The mandate for the peace mission in question must therefore be clear and agreed to between the UN, regional bodies (where applicable), the host country and conflicting parties and contributing countries. The mandate should be linked to concrete political solutions and the deployment of a peace mission should not be seen as end in itself. South African participation in peace missions should only occur when there is a clear threat to and/or breach of international peace and security and/or a disaster of major humanitarian proportions and/or endemic causes of conflict, which, unless addressed, may cause long-term instability.
Despite the application of these principles, it must be noted that many recent UN mandates have not been static, but have been frequently adapted or changed after deployment. Some of these mandates have, in many respects, been contradictory and the UNSC has often decided upon changes with little explanation to member states, troop-contributing countries, the humanitarian community, or the host nation. South Africa therefore requires a clear mandate that can be translated into a detailed operational plan, leaving no room for ambiguity or differing perceptions as to the roles and tasks of various elements and national contingents. Moreover, once a commitment is made to participation, South Africa will insist on being consulted before any substantial changes are made to the original mission mandate.
6.3. Sufficient Means
The commitment of South African forces to service in peace missions is contingent upon comprehensive mission planning with the relevant national and international authorities to ensure that the form and function of forces committed to such operations are both necessary and sufficient to attain the stated goals and objectives. South Africa will not commit itself to participating in any peace mission which is patently under-resourced and which does not have sufficient means to achieve the set mandate.
At the national level, military resources and police personnel earmarked for contribution to peace missions must be available for international service, and should not be committed elsewhere. The possible expansion of the SANDF's other secondary roles - for instance, support to the SAPS and border protection - should be considered prior to any agreement to participate in a particular peace support operation. South African contingents will be self-sustaining for a period of at least six months and adequately structured and equipped to carry out the tasks they are assigned.
6.4. A Domestic Mandate and Budget
The securing of a mandate for South African participation in a new peace mission involves three distinct spheres - the international mandate as provided by the UN; the regional or sub-regional mandate (where relevant); the approval of this international mandate by the appropriate regional and sub-regional bodies and vice versa (where relevant) and the securing of a domestic mandate for South Africa's participation in the peace mission. In the case of an established or on-going international peace mission, the first two elements will, of course, normally be secured, and the decisional emphasis will fall almost entirely on the domestic mandate.
In determining whether South Africa should participate in a particular peace support operation, the Executive should operate on the basis of the principle of shared responsibility. This principle dictates that participation in peace missions is never the prerogative of one state department or one set of actors alone. Contemporary peace missions require a combination of political, civilian, military and police elements, and South Africa may contribute to one, more or all of these elements in one or more missions. The key players in authorising such participation are Parliament, the President's Office, the Department of Foreign Affairs, diverse civilian state departments, the Department of Defence, and the intelligence community. As any form of participation in peace operations is an extension of South African foreign policy, the Department of Foreign Affairs will be the lead department in co-ordinating such participation. The role of civil society is also acknowledged as a key element in securing the overall success of peace missions, as evidenced in the proposal for a non-government civilian standby mechanism.
Parliament plays a critical role in securing approval for South African participation in international peace missions. Acceptance of this White Paper by Parliament will be regarded as sufficient authorisation for the participation of South African individuals in peace missions, subject to the directions and guidelines determined by the Department of Foreign Affairs and other departments (such as Safety and Security, and Defence) where applicable. Where South African military contingents are involved however, Parliament has additional key responsibilities, as outlined below under "Military Deployment".
South Africa will not participate in any mission that is inconsistent with South African values, or that cannot be justified to the South African public. Parliament must be responsive to the opinions of the broad electorate, which are not always easy to gauge with respect to specific elements of South African foreign policy, such as participation in peace missions. In this regard, the results of a nation-wide opinion survey conducted in 1997 on public attitudes towards South African participation in peace missions revealed that the overwhelming majority of South Africans - nearly two-thirds - are indeed in favour of such participation.
Nevertheless, an extensive media campaign should be launched prior to the deployment of a national military contingent for service in international peace support operations to ensure that requisite levels of popular and political support are sustained for the operation. This campaign should be spearheaded by the Office of the President in consultation with relevant parties.
In all cases, Parliament must authorise finances for South African participation in peace missions. Once again, the legislature will play a minimal role in this regard with respect to the deployment of individuals who may be directly employed by the UN or seconded by the Department concerned. In the case of the latter, acceptance of this White Paper by Parliament will be regarded as sufficient authorisation for Departments to fund the participation of individuals within such Departments in peace missions, within reasonable limits and provided that such funding is included in the annual Departmental Budget.
Where troop contingents, equipment and other personnel are made available for UN missions, South Africa will be reimbursed for such participation. However, troop contributors to past UN missions have sometimes had to wait an inordinately long time for such reimbursement. In this regard, it must be noted that subscribing to the UN Standby Arrangements will greatly facilitate the budget planning process at the UN Secretariat and expedite the reimbursement of contributing countries. The Standby Arrangements will be linked to the budget planning process by identified personnel, equipment and services. With this information entered into the Peacekeeping Database, budgeting for the participation of a troop-contributing country is facilitated by simply transferring the Standby Arrangement of the selected troop-contributing country into the budgeting module of the database, identifying the financial resources required and creating at the same time the related annexes of the Contribution Agreement.
Bridging finance will, however, be required for participation in UN operations (to sustain the contingent until the UN logistic system "kicks in" and to cover the delay in UN reimbursements). Moreover, if the operation is only endorsed and not conducted by the UN, alternative mechanisms of funding will have to be explored for the reimbursement of some or all of the costs of South African participation. This could include collateral payment (use of the infrastructural facilities of another country) or alternative payment by countries not participating in the operation but supportive of the operation in question.
In all cases, the Department of Foreign Affairs will take the lead in securing finances for South African participation in specific peace missions. The Department of Finance, on instruction from either the President or the Deputy President, will authorise the necessary funds. The Department of Defence and the Department of Safety and Security will be responsible for budgeting for and meeting the pre-deployment costs, as well as a six-month post-deployment cost of the potential contribution earmarked for each department.
6.5. Volunteerism
The very nature of the civilian readiness arrangement proposed for South Africa means that willingness to participate in international peace missions in general and participation by civilians in any particular peace mission are matters of individual choice. This is equally true for members of the SAPS.
The Defence Act currently provides that SANDF personnel may only be compelled to serve outside the borders of the RSA "in time of war ... against the enemy". Individual officers may thus apply voluntarily for international service as military observers through the SANDF readiness system in much the same way as civilians or police personnel will apply for such service.
The principle of volunteerism must, however, be applied somewhat differently with regard to military units or sub-units, which are required to train together as a team for long periods in order to be proficient. Individuals must therefore volunteer for service in those units or formations that are earmarked for participation in international peace support operations, with the full knowledge that they are likely to be deployed on such operations during their time of service. In the case of existing units (such as those of the Rapid Deployment Ground Force) which are earmarked for participation in peace support operations, personnel must be consulted on this issue and given the opportunity to transfer to other units if unwilling to perform international service.
6.6. Clear Entry and Exit Criteria
Entrance into the mission area of any multinational peace mission should be preceded by a sound assessment of the situation within which it is proposed South African forces be deployed. The intelligence community must provide decision makers with a thorough evaluation of: the nature of the conflict at hand; the prospects for a political resolution of the conflict; the extent to which third-party political and military involvement will facilitate or impede conflict resolution; and the political objectives of the mission, if any, and to what extent these accord with South African national interests and domestic responsibilities and capacity.
South Africa should also be assured of clear exit criteria before committing a national contingent to any peace mission. This aspect refers to the achievement of a desirable political end-state to the involvement within an acceptable period of time, rather than to the technicalities of any military withdrawal plan. Political decision-makers must be reasonably assured that South African involvement will not be open-ended and that such involvement will not be regarded as part of a larger diplomatic or political failure on the part of contributing nations.
6.7. Regional Co-operation
South Africa will continue to co-operate with regional partners, especially those within the SADC, in enhancing its capacity to participate in international peace missions. This is particularly important with regard to the SANDF. Indeed, the Defence Review states that: "It may therefore be worthwhile to establish a small peace support operations centre, under the auspices of regional defence structures, to develop and co-ordinate planning, training, logistics, communication and field liaison teams for multi-national forces".
Continued co-operation in the realm of preparation may eventually lead to a joint and combined SADC contribution to a peace mission under the auspices of a larger international organisation (the UN or the OAU), or indeed, to the launching of a peace support operation as part of a SADC peace mission. However, the foundation of South African policy on peace missions is one of national contributions to international efforts, whether these be at the level of the UN, the OAU, or SADC.
In the spirit of co-operation, it is important that information on South Africa's capabilities, intentions and deployment with respect to peace missions be shared with the secretariats of all three organisations.
6.8. Foreign Assistance
South Africa, as a newcomer to the realm of international peace missions, is grateful for the foreign assistance it has received for the purpose of building capabilities for participation in peace missions. Such assistance has ranged from the provision of expert speakers at seminars, to the funding of participants on foreign courses and support of training exercises. It has been non-intrusive and has aimed at long-term capacity building in South and Southern Africa. South Africa will continue to welcome such offers of assistance, particularly those that may expedite and add to the quality of the type of contributions to international peace missions outlined in this paper. This may include assistance with establishing appropriate structures, new and ongoing training and may even extend to assistance with equipment and deployment.
In principle, South Africa will not depend on any single donor for the provision of assistance with participation in peace missions. All such assistance should be compatible with regional interests in the realm of peace and security and none should be accepted which may be interpreted as threatening by our regional partners.
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