CHAPTER III: NATO-THE ANCHOR FOR TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY
A fundamental tenet of U.S. strategy is that NATO will continue to be the anchor of American engagement in Europe. Therefore, we place a very high priority on working closely with our Allies to accomplish the goals set forth in the Strategic Concept. In particular, the goals of improving NATO's defense capabilities, strengthening the "European pillar" of the Alliance, and preparing for further enlargement of its membership are mutually supportive approaches to strengthening transatlantic security in the 21st century.
Improving Defense Capabilities to Meet Today's Threat... and Tomorrow's
To be an effective military alliance, NATO must fulfill certain key functions. Specifically, it must understand the likely threats to the security of its members, decide on the capabilities needed to address those threats, and develop and field those capabilities through a combination of national and Alliance-wide efforts. This will remain a dynamic process, since the threats-and tools needed to meet them- change over time.
Over the past decade, the threat of direct invasion of NATO territory has decreased significantly while other types of threats (including regional conflicts on the periphery of NATO, proliferation of NBC weapons, and terrorist attack) have increased significantly. These emerging threats are further complicated by the fact that they could emanate from a variety of sources, in combination or alone, and at any time. In response, NATO forces and structures have begun to change in important ways, and NATO Allies have agreed that the Alliance will need new capabilities applicable to both Article 5 and non-Article 5 contingencies.
Secretary of Defense Cohen introduced the idea of focused improvement of defense capabilities at the June 1998 meeting of NATO defense ministers. He called attention to lessons learned from NATO's experience in Bosnia, which suggested that future conflicts in Europe would place a premium on the ability to deploy troops and equipment to a crisis rapidly, often outside NATO territory, with little or no preexisting host nation support. In addition, the Allies have learned that when a military operation is conducted at a distance-even a relatively small distance-deficiencies in mobility, communications, and ability to sustain forces over an extended period of time can compromise mission goals. Secretary Cohen also reiterated that, in the face of NATO's conventional military superiority, hostile states are looking to NBC weapons and increasingly long-range and accurate ballistic and cruise missiles to offset that superiority. NATO, therefore, needs to develop and field the capabilities, doctrine, and plans to deal effectively with these growing threats.
Further intra-Alliance consultations based on the idea proposed by Secretary Cohen resulted in the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which was launched by President Clinton and other Allied leaders at the Washington Summit. Specifically, Allies agreed to improve capabilities in five functional areas:
- Deployability and mobility. NATO must improve sealift, airlift, and reception facility assets necessary to get forces to the crisis area on short notice and deploy them rapidly within their operational sectors, even where local transportation infrastructure is marginal (as in the Balkans.)
- Sustainability and logistics. Once NATO commits forces, it must be able to sustain their operations-with equipment, materiel, and personnel-until the mission is completed. This will require, for example, modern asset tracking systems and a multinational joint logistic capability to ensure that all Allies have critical supplies when and where they need them.
- Command and control information systems. NATO urgently needs a common architecture and assets to ensure rapid, secure, effective, and deployable command and control among all its forces.
- Effective engagement. This category includes both weapons (e.g., precision-guided munitions that can operate in all weather, day or night) and electronic capabilities (e.g., systems to suppress enemy air defenses). These capabilities are necessary to achieve our military objectives as quickly as possible with the lowest possible risk to NATO forces and the lowest possible collateral damage.
- Survivability of forces and infrastructures. NATO forces must be better prepared to defend themselves and their facilities, and to maintain operational effectiveness in contingencies where the adversary (including terrorist groups) could use chemical or biological weapons and information warfare.
The need for effective implementation of the DCI was underscored by NATO's experience in Operation Allied Force, which was underway during the Washington Summit.
On one hand, that operation was highly successful overall: NATO accomplished its mission through the most precise and lowest collateral damage air campaign in history, with no American or Allied combat casualties in 78 days of operations and over 38,000 combat-related aircraft sorties. The United States and its Allies were united in their strategy and determination to prevail. Operation Allied Force could not have been conducted without NATO and the air forces, infrastructure, transit rights, basing access, and political and diplomatic support provided by our Allies and Partners. Broadly speaking, other members of the Alliance contributed about the same or a greater share of their available aircraft for prosecuting the campaign as did the United States. They also contributed the bulk of the ground forces to help stabilize neighboring countries and to conduct humanitarian relief organizations.
On the other hand, Operation Allied Force highlighted some worrisome imbalances and shortfalls in Alliance capabilities. There was a significant gap between U.S. capabilities and those of our Allies in areas such as precision strike, mobility, and command, control, and communications capabilities. Because only a few of our Allies possessed or could employ precision munitions in sufficient numbers (or at all), the United States conducted the preponderance of the strike sorties during the early stages of the conflict. Over the course of the campaign, the United States conducted roughly two-thirds of all support sorties and half of all combat missions. The lack of fully interoperable communications equipment forced occasional reliance on non-secure methods that could have compromised operational security. Insufficient air mobility assets among our Allies contributed to the slow buildup of the NATO-led Kosovo Implementation Force (KFOR) ground forces in Kosovo once Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic agreed to NATO's terms to end the conflict.
DCI implementation has made some noteworthy progress since the Washington Summit, especially in setting clearer priorities for, and improving coordination among, NATO's defense-related bodies. The Allies have agreed on 58 tasks to improve specific capabilities. Most of these have been translated, within NATO's ongoing defense planning process, into new "Force Goals" (3). Our goal is not to develop similar capabilities for every NATO member, since not every member needs or can afford the newest or best fighter aircraft, long-range tanker aircraft or surveillance systems. Rather, our goal is to provide NATO forces with compatible and complementary capabilities that meet our collective requirements.
As we encourage our Allies to improve their defense capabilities, we are also taking important steps to improve our own capabilities and reform our national policies to facilitate the sharing of technology. For example:
- We are augmenting or accelerating procurement in major areas identified by the DCI, such as strategic airlift (we will acquire 130-135 C-17 aircraft by 2006), ground surveillance (we will field an additional Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System), electronic jamming (we will add a squadron of EA-6B electronic jamming aircraft), and precision guided munitions (we will purchase additional Tomahawk cruise missiles and accelerate procurement of precision guided bombs.) Overall, the United States has embarked on its largest sustained increase in defense spending in 15 years.
- We have provided commanders and staffs with policy, strategy, and doctrinal guidelines for the planning and execution of joint and multinational military operations in NBC environments. The guidelines effect not only passive defense capabilities, such as medical capabilities, but also active defense and counterforce capabilities to enable U.S. military forces to survive, fight, and win in NBC-contaminated environments.
- We also have begun implementation of the Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI). Launched in May 2000, the DTSI will streamline our export control process, improve the ability of industry on both sides of the Atlantic to share critical technologies while reducing the risk of their diversion to potential adversaries, and improve the ability of our respective military forces to operate together across the range of Alliance missions.
The Alliance will not remain healthy if the United States is alone in this effort. At this point, the "jury is still out" on Europe's willingness, as a whole, to follow through on all agreed DCI objectives. Several Allies have taken useful steps, including efforts to restructure their forces consistent with both DCI and NATO's Strategic Concept. In addition, the United Kingdom, Canada and others have announced increases in defense spending, in real terms, over the next several years-the first such increases since the end of the Cold War. Still, many Allies have indicated that their current plans are to implement fully a disappointingly small number of Force Goals. Moreover, some Allies are headed in the wrong direction, either seriously considering or carrying out real reductions in defense spending.
This trend will have to be reversed.
The success of Allies in meeting DCI goals ultimately depends upon the provision of sufficient resources. Allies will need to make the necessary investments to field a 21st century force. Defense budgets always will be a function of national priorities, but they also must realistically address international challenges and the capabilities needed to address those challenges as an Alliance. In some areas, Allies' military capabilities can be increased through innovative, more efficient, and better-coordinated use of resources. Resources for needed capabilities can be found, in some cases, through restructuring and reductions in military personnel. A number of mobility and logistics capabilities can be met through commercially available assets and off-the-shelf technology- for example, by harnessing commercial transport assets in an emergency for military airlift or sealift support. Joint procurement of certain defense equipment and technologies by a group of Allies is another promising approach, which the United States will continue to support.
For many Allies, however, smarter spending will not be enough. To meet the agreed DCI objectives, nations that reasonably can afford to do so will need to inject additional resources into their defense budgets. Through a combination of an effective DCI and force planning process, we will help assure our respective legislative bodies and publics that our need for additional resources is well founded and that those additional resources will be well spent.
Strengthening the European Pillar
The DCI's objective of improving Alliance military capabilities (and reducing the "capabilities gap" between the United States and the Allies) is closely linked to efforts to develop a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO. It also is linked to the EU's decision to develop a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (4).
The broad military goal of ESDP is for European Union members to establish a military capability to perform a range of crisis response operations either within a NATO framework or, in cases where NATO as a whole is not engaged, on their own. Whether engaged in a NATO-led or EU-led operation, European nations will still have only one set of forces and capabilities to deploy. Hence, our long-term objective is to nurture and sustain strong and mutually supportive links between NATO and the developing military crisis response capabilities within the EU.
The EU also plans, as part of ESDP, to build a civilian crisis response capability, to include the rapid deployment of 5,000 civilian police from EU states to crisis spots and assistance to local authorities in rebuilding effective judiciary and penal systems. Such a capability would be of tremendous long-term benefit to NATO or EU-led forces involved in post-conflict crisis response operations such as the Stablization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and KFOR.
The EU has made clear it has no intention for ESDP to challenge the core NATO mission of, or responsibility for, collective defense. Rather, ESDP represents an acknowledgement by our European Allies that their economic and political success is not matched by their ability to respond to crises in their own backyard, such as the long-simmering Balkan conflicts, and that this situation needs to be addressed. It remains overwhelmingly likely that, in any situation where military involvement on a significant scale is justified and where there is a European consensus to undertake a military operation, the United States would support a |
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The European Union (EU) in brief
The European Union is the latest permutation in a process of European integration that began in the wake of World War II, when leaders of former Allied and Axis countries searched for an effective means to rebuild their shattered economies and prevent future wars. The United States consciously promoted this process by encouraging Western European states to cooperate among themselves as part of the Marshall Plan launched in 1947.
A first step toward achieving a united Europe occurred in 1951, when Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands created the European Coal and Steel Community to regulate coal and steel production. By 1958, "the Six" agreed to establish a European Economic Community (to bring about the free movement of goods, people, capital and services) and a European Atomic Energy Community (to advance the peaceful use of nuclear energy). Under the treaties of Maastricht (which entered into force in 1993) and Amsterdam (which entered into force in 1999), the EU reformed and strengthened its institutions to include a single currency and European Central Bank (in which 11 of its 15 members currently participate), systematic cooperation on major foreign policy issues, and close cooperation on a range of justice, immigration, and social issues.
The EU is governed by a Parliament (directly elected in EU-wide elections, but with relatively limited legislative powers), the Commission (an EU "cabinet" of 20 Commissioners appointed by their respective governments and a President chosen by consensus), the Council of the EU (comprised of Ministers from member governments, it enacts EU laws based on proposals submitted by the Commission), the Court of Justice (the EU's "Supreme Court"), and the Court of Auditors (overseeing the financial management of the EU budget).
In certain areas, such as agricultural policy and trade, EU members have "pooled" some of their sovereign powers, allowing the Union to negotiate directly with the United States and other countries. In other areas, including defense and security, members retain their sovereignty. Since the EU system is based on international treaties and not a Constitution, it remains an essentially "supranational" entity-not a "federalist" structure like the United States. |
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NATO role and would be part of the operation. Conversely, it is highly unlikely that, in any such situation, Europe would ask the United States to step aside and not participate. Still, for some Europeans, ESDP also represents an "insurance policy" that would allow Europe to take independent action to deal with a non-Article 5 type of contingency in the unlikely event that the United States (or any other member of NATO) did not join a consensus for NATO action.
As a centerpiece of ESDP, EU leaders agreed in December 1999 to develop, by 2003, the ability to deploy a force of 5060,000 troops within 60 days and to sustain that force for at least one year. To reach this objective (known as the EU's "Headline Goal"), EU members will need significant new capabilities in the same five areas identified in the DCI. This coincidence of requirements should not be surprising, since 11 of the 15 EU members are members of NATO and every nation has but one defense budget and one set of forces. No European country, for example, would be in a position to purchase one set of airlift assets for NATO collective defense purposes or NATO-led crisis response operations and a separate set of assets for EU-led crisis response operations. The same holds true for communications and surveillance equipment, precision guided munitions, and so on. Simply put, it is clear that when it comes to building and maintaining real military capabilities, DCI stands to make a vital contribution to both ESDI, which seeks an improved European pillar within NATO, and ESDP, which seeks to foster a European capability to act where NATO as a whole is not engaged.
[See Figure 1
