The success of U.S. strategy for strengthening transatlantic security will depend in large measure on how we approach relations with our NATO Allies and Partners. Getting these relations right has not always been an easy task. Even during the height of the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s, NATO was at the center of heated-and sometimes very public-debates over military strategy, command structure, and "burdensharing."
One explanation for this has been well understood since the founding of the Alliance: NATO's unity ultimately rests on the enlightened self-interest of each participating nation, but sovereign and democratic states do not necessarily have identical interests in every security domain. Differences in geography, history, political culture and, of course, in military capabilities still count-and they always will. The United States, which has contributed far more resources and capabilities to NATO than any other single Ally, cannot be expected to act as if these differences did not exist and did not influence our policies. Nor can we expect our Allies to match our military power in every category or to act contrary to their perceived interests. The Alliance has proved so strong precisely because its members have not allowed their differences ever to rival, in scope or in depth, their shared interests.
A second explanation is less self-evident: in far too many instances, the substance of our transatlantic cooperation is overshadowed or even impeded by differences in tone. Americans, for example, frequently refer to their "leadership" of the Alliance. For many Americans, this concept is essentially an accurate reflection of objective facts-in particular, the real disparities in military capabilities between the United States and our Allies. But for many Europeans, who in recent years have made important commitments on the ground to crisis response operations in the Balkans and have every reason to be proud of their strong, expanding economic and political links (as well as their rich cultures), "American leadership" has come to be understood, at best, as a somewhat outdated notion from the Cold War era or, at worst, a grating expression of a "dominating" or "overbearing" superpower.
What can or should be done to address this situation?
First, we must continue to set an example, by word and by deed, that convinces others to join efforts described in previous chapters to strengthen transatlantic security. If America does not demonstrate the political will and devote the resources necessary to sustain these efforts, it will be harder for Allies and Partners to do so.
Second, the watchwords of transatlantic security relations must remain "inclusion" and "cooperation," not "competition" or "confrontation." Historically, there have been very few instances when the United States has been at odds with Europe as a whole over a significant security policy issue. More often, we have disagreed with certain Allies or Partners over aspects of a particular policy and received either full or qualified support from others. In short, there are no grounds for portraying U.S.-European relations as an "us against them" dynamic.
Third, we must anticipate that as NATO and the EU enlarge, their internal decision-making processes will become more complex and possibly slower. While this should not be a problem in normal circumstances, it cannot be allowed to lead to paralysis in a crisis. We will work with all our Allies-and, where appropriate, Partners-to ensure that they have the fullest possible access to information necessary to participate meaningfully in transatlantic security deliberations and to take effective and timely collective action. This will require more, not less, contact between U.S. officials and their counterparts in national capitals as well as in NATO and EU headquarters in Brussels. In this context, and without prejudice to our special ties to larger Allies, we should not forget that smaller Allies frequently have made invaluable contributions to the Alliance. Indeed, several of these smaller Allies are pursuing joint and multilateral defense cooperation and acquisition programs that stand to increase their relative weight within the Alliance- a development that we will recognize and encourage.
Fourth, we must be straightforward in acknowledging that the United States-like every other country-reserves a right to act alone, or within a coalition of the willing, when our vital interests are at stake and an Alliance-wide consensus for action simply does not exist. We will do what we must to defend these interests, including, when necessary, using our military might unilaterally. In practice, however, this has occurred very rarely. We see a broad and growing spectrum of issues that are important to our security and where close cooperation with our Allies and Partners is a requirement-not an option. While some foreign policy commentators on both sides of the Atlantic seem quick to level charges of American "unilateralist" or "isolationist" tendencies, the facts almost never support such claims-and we should not be reluctant to point this out.
Finally, while recognizing that America's unique political, economic, and military strengths will continue to ensure a preponderant role for our country within the transatlantic community-and most Europeans accept and welcome this fact-we need to be prepared to share responsibility and leadership. Our self-interest will not be served by rhetoric or actions that encourage some Europeans to abdicate their security responsibilities and encourage others to affirm their "European identity" by weakening transatlantic bonds. Indeed, we seek to encourage greater leadership by Allies in areas-such as improvements in defense capabilities, outreach to Partners, and support for democratic values beyond the transatlantic community-that reinforce our common security.
In the 21st century, America can best achieve its long-term goals by doing more of what it does so well: acting resolutely-and always in a spirit of true partnership-as a catalyst, builder, symbol and defender of an ever-growing coalition of democratic, prosperous, and secure Euro-Atlantic states and peoples.
 |
 |