United States. National War College. Course 1, Syllabus

Title: United States. National War College. Course 1, Syllabus - Block B: Ends

"If you don't know where you are going, almost any road will take you there."

Chesire Cat to Alice

Most strategists would agree that the logical starting point for strategic analysis is to begin at "the end"-- to formulate a clear conception of one's strategic goals and objectives. Most --though not all-- would also agree that how one defines goals and objectives is broadly shaped by an appreciation of the national interest. The difficulty, however, is that any definition of the national interest is derived from the values one brings to the task of strategy formulation, a problem that makes interests highly contentious and opens the concept of national interest itself to challenge. Moreover, goals must be based not only on the nation's interests, but also on the power available to defend and advance those interests, a subject we will turn to in Block C. Thus, while we might agree to begin with "the end," specific objectives usually cannot be set until both interests and power are analyzed; it is a task we will defer until Block D.

Still, there is no escaping the concept of interest in strategy, if only because one needs some benchmark against which to justify action, and it is as good a place as any to begin strategic analysis. Topic 4 therefore focuses on the national interest and its utility as a concept in strategic logic. As part of that theoretical consideration it also looks at the twin concepts of threats to interests and of opportunities for advancing them, for the relationship between threats and interests is one of the most complex and tricky in strategic logic. (Please note that this topic, like the opening topics in Blocks C and D, is designed to introduce the major theoretical concepts that underpin the Block and to provide the opportunity for students to begin to grapple with the logical interrelationships between them.)

Threats and opportunities for national security strategy, of course, come from the international environment, which is part of the context for national security strategy. (The other part of the strategic context is the domestic environment, discussed above under Topic 3, "The Structure of Public Opinion.") The international environment is the subject of Course 5604, a two-month long core course examining major world powers and regions. Here we can get only an overview of how various experts see the structure and dynamics of the post-Cold War international system and their sense of the threats and opportunities it contains. For convenience sake we break the international environment into two parts: political (Topic 5) and economic (Topic 6). Several questions serve to unify Topics 5 and 6: How have the international political and economic environments changed in the aftermath of the Cold War? What are the defining characteristics, the structure and dynamics, of the contemporary international political and economic systems? And what threats to and opportunities for American interests must strategists be most aware of in the post-Cold War era? Careful attention to such questions will pay big dividends when the time comes to set objectives based on interests and power.

Block Objectives

Understand the nature and utility in strategic logic of the concept of the "national interest."

Define U.S. national interests today.

Appreciate the relationship between interests and threats, and between interests and objectives.

Understand the structure and dynamics of the contemporary political and economic environments.

Identify current threats to, and opportunities for promoting, U.S. national interests.

TOPIC 4: INTERESTS, THREATS, AND OPPORTUNITIES

"The perennial problem for the leaders of a superpower like the United States is to determine the outer boundaries of what is truly vital . . ."

Bernard Brodie

The most common form of human stupidity, as Nietsche once wrote, is to become so involved in doing something that one forgets what it is that one is trying to do. Our initial goal in this topic is to underscore the importance of national purpose in statecraft and to build an understanding of how that vital element of strategy can best be utilized.

The nation's purpose in foreign policy ought to originate in a clear-eyed conception of the national interest, but this task is often more difficult than that simple statement might suggest. Determination of what the national interest requires, either globally or in a particular situation, is an extraordinarily complex task. It requires not only the ability to interrelate often conflicting sets of fact and perception, but also an appreciation of national values, always highly debatable. Moreover, determining the national interest is not a one-time task which can be completed at the beginning of policy design but an ongoing responsibility of the highest political authorities as policy development and execution proceed. Still, most would agree that a clear definition of the national interest is an essential precondition to an effective strategy.

Equally important is the identification of threats to, and opportunities for advancing, the national interest. The passing of the Soviet threat has provoked a considerable debate over what future challenges American national security strategy may have to encounter, a debate which in turn has raised the fundamental issue of the role of threat in strategic logic. During the Cold War, threat seemed all-important; with the Soviets defined as having hegemonic aspirations, decisionmakers almost had to consider anything Moscow threatened as of interest to the United States. Watching post-Cold War presidents flounder in search of a new central organizing concept to replace containment, some analysts have argued that strategy without a threat is like a tire without air, even that the United States may have to create an enemy (Saddam Hussein? Slobodan Milosevic? Japan? China?) to replace the "evil empire." But strategies based exclusively on threats often produce dramatically escalating entanglements overseas and both human and monetary costs that the American people are not prepared to bear. Today, with threats more diffuse and less military in nature, the U.S. may find it more productive to design interest-based strategies, dominated by positive goals that advance rather than merely defend the national interest.

While our discussion of specific threats and opportunities will await our survey of the international environment in the next two topics, this is the time to consider the role of threat, the utility of national interest, and the relationship between the two in strategic logic. The two papers by Robert Blackwill assigned below will help in that task by discussing the history of the national interest and some of the methods used by strategists to determine it. Samuel Huntington then offers his views on the paucity of truly national interests in today's America, while the excerpts from the current national security strategy of the Clinton administration gives its views of U.S. interests and threats to them. Finally, Joseph Nye looks at the post-Cold War international threat environment, and the Reilly booklet opens a window on what the American people and their leaders think about the country's interests, threats, and foreign policy goals.

Topic Objectives

Critically evaluate the concept of the 'national interest' as a touchstone for national security strategy.

Define the United States' broad national interests in the post-Cold War world.

Understand the role of threats and opportunities in strategic logic, including the relationship between interests and threats.

Questions for Discussion

How do you define the term "national interest?" How does it differ from, and how is it related to, foreign policy goals or objectives?

Can one define vital national interests in an operationally useful way? How?

Why is it necessary to keep available resources (or power) in mind when setting policy goals?

Do national interests change over time, or are they relatively "immutable?" Why?

How have particular domestic groups helped shape our view of the national interest? To what extent is our definition of the national interest sensitive to these domestic inputs? What is the role of our nation's leadership in defining the national interest?

Why is it dangerous to identify threats before defining interests?

Has the demise of the Cold War and the consequent reduction in threats that typified that period created new strategic opportunities for the U.S. - or have they simply been replaced by other, newer threats?

Should the United States now move away from a threat-based strategy and towards one focused on opportunities for advancing our interests?

Required Readings

* Robert D. Blackwill, "History of the Term National Interest," and "Methodologies for Determining National Interest," unpublished Council on Foreign Relations Discussion Papers, 1995. (Reprint)

* Samuel P. Huntington, "The Erosion of American National Interests," Foreign Affairs 76 (September/October 1997): 28-49. (Reprint)

* A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 1998), pp. 1-7, 15-22. (Student Issue)

* Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Conflicts After the Cold War," The Washington Quarterly 19 (Winter 1996): 5-24. (Reprint)

* John E. Reilly, ed., Chapter 2, "The U.S. Role in the World," in American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999 (Chicago, IL: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), pp. 10-17. (Student Issue)

Supplemental Readings

* A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1996.

* Robert H. Johnson, Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.

* Thomas R. McCabe, "A Strategy for Unanticipated Threats," Strategic Review 25 (Winter 1997): 55-61.

* Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted: United States National Interests in the 1980s. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1985.

* Michael G. Roskin, "National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy," Parameters (Winter 1994-95): 4-18. (15)

* Fred A. Sonderman, "The Concept of the National Interest," Orbis 22 (Spring 1977): 121-138.

* Arnold Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," World Politics 4 (1951): 39-63.

TOPIC 5: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

". . . the unity of the international system contains a bewildering differentiation."

Stanley Hoffman

One way many theorists view the international environment is to think of it as a "system." Simply put, a system is any group of entities that interact with each other according to some regularized process. The utility of any model of the internationalsystem lies in its ability to explain the dynamics of the real world with which the policymaker must deal. Unfortunately, the vast complexity of that world makes it impossible for anyone to grasp it all, so every model of international politics hovers uncomfortably somewhere between perfect but mind-boggling accuracy and useful but misleading simplicity. Still, all strategists carry implicit system models around in their heads and rely on them for the answers to vital questions.

In Topic 2, we looked at some competing theories about the international system and about how it is structured and operates, as well as at the policy prescriptions that flow from those different conceptualizations. This topic puts some flesh on those theoretical bones by providing several different portraits of today's international system. The reading by Robert Harkavy leads off by comparing seven different images of the international system drawn from an exhaustive survey of the post-Cold War literature on the subject. Then Samuel Huntington presents a portrait of international relationships based on the combined effects of cultural differences and power distribution, while James Rosenau's piece offers striking insights into forces that are changing the dynamics of world politics. Finally, Jean-Marie Guehenno looks at the effects of the information age on the international political environment, posing the interesting question of whether the decline of traditional political communities like the nation-state and the rise of non-state actors makes strategy in its traditional form impossible.

Today's seminar provides an opportunity to discuss which of these various views of world politics is right and what kind of international system we can expect as we approach the turn of the century. The radical changes that have taken place since 1989 in the international political environment make this discussion particularly important, for assumptions about the structure and operation of the international system go far in determining strategic outcomes. Indeed, as the readings below show, many of the radically different positions taken in the contemporary debate over the future of U.S. national security policy can be explained by dramatically differing assumptions about the likely shape of the emerging international environment. There is no better time than now to begin to puzzle out what we think that world will look like.

Topic Objectives

Identify likely threats and opportunities for U.S. statecraft.

Understand how the rise of non-state actors has altered the character of the international political system.

Begin to develop a personal model of the structure and dynamics of contemporary world politics, including the distribution of power in the international system and the nature of interactions among the actors.

Consider the possible impacts of the information age on the context for American national security strategy and statecraft.

Questions for Discussion

What is your own sense of today's world power distribution? Are relationships between the great powers the only things that matter, or is the Third World important?

Which non-state political actors are particularly important to the United States today? Can American national security policymakers make use of non-state political actors as instruments of their policy? Is there any way in which the rise of non-state actors may help U.S. policymakers serve the broader national interest of this country?

In what ways will the international system of the 21st century differ from that of the 20th? How should American policy take account of those changes? Can it influence them?

Which of the models of the international political system described by Harkavy seems closest to international reality, and why?

What threats to American interests do you see coming from the international political environment in the years ahead? What opportunities will it present for the advancement of U.S. interests?

What is the likely effect of the information revolution on the context within which American statecraft must operate? To what degree has the sovereignty of states been eroded by their growing inability to monopolize the production and distribution of information?

How, in your own mental construct of the international system, would you answer the following questions:

Required Readings

* Robert E. Harkavy, "Images of the Coming International System," Orbis 41 (Fall 1997): 569-590. (Reprint)

* Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Affairs 78 (March/April 1999): 35-49. (Reprint)

* James Rosenau, "Security in a Turbulent World," Current History 94 (May 1995): 193-200. (Reprint)

* Jean-Marie Guehenno, "The Impact of Globalisation on Strategy," Survival 40 (Winter 1998-99): 5-19. (Reprint)

Supplemental Readings

* Hugh De Santis, Beyond Progress: An Interpretive Odyssey to the Future. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

* Francis Fukuyama, "The End Of History," The National Interest (Summer 1989): 3-18.

* Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993): 22-49.

* John Ikenberry, "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos," Foreign Affairs, 75 (May-June 1996), pp. 79-91.

* Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly (February 1994), pp. 44-46, 48-49, 52, 54, 58-60, 62-63, 68-70, 72-76.

* Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs: America and the World, 1990/91, 70 (No. 1,1991): 23-33.

* Richard Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers," Foreign Affairs 71 (Spring 1992): 64-82.

TOPIC 6: THE GLOBALIZED ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

"Made in one or more of the following countries: Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Mauritius, Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines. The exact country of origin is unknown."

Shipping label for integrated
circuits made by an American firm

The international economy may be conceptualized as several subsystems, on at least two different levels, each somewhat self-contained yet interacting. In a geographic sense, the world economy can be divided into the industrialized countries, corresponding roughly to the membership of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD: United States, Canada, Japan, Western Europe); the developing countries, a subsystem which may itself be subdivided into the oil producers, the newly industrialized states (NICs), the bulk of Third World cntries still struggling against developmental constraints, and the 30-odd poorest states sometimes labeled the "Fourth World"; and finally, the countries that used to be part of the socialist economic bloc (COMECON),once dominated by the Soviet Union and including the former East European satellites and some Third World allies. (One of the critical issues in the post-Cold War economy is the extent to which this third geographic subsystem will be integrated into the first - or come to resemble the second.) In functional terms, often cutting across those geo-economic subsystems, one can identify the international trading system for the exchange of goods and services; the international financial system, which supports both that exchange and investment with monetary transactions; and an increasingly international production system, consisting of complex product, direct investment, and materials networks, often under the management of multinational firms.

Just as dramatic changes have occurred in the international political environment, recent fundamental changes affecting all these systems have created a new, globalized economic environment. New information technologies and production processes, together with the deregulation of markets for goods and capital, have inextricably linked national economies. Technological change has altered rapidly the goods and services produced, the costs of production for those goods, and the shape of international trade. Financial markets today operate worldwide around the clock, moving vast quantities of funds instantaneously and dwarfing the ability of governments to countermand their activities. Finally, the American economy is far more involved in all this than ever before; just as one example, U.S. international economic transactions have tripled as a share of our gross national product since the 1960s.

Economics has always been an important dimension of statecraft, not only because domestic prosperity is in itself an key element of the national interest (as noted in Topic 4), but also because the state of domestic economic health has an obvious and direct bearing on overall national power (see Topic 7). But today the increasingly interdependent nature of the world economy has much more significant strategic consequences than ever before. Nations now require international, as well as domestic, economic strategies.

The readings below attempt to describe the nature of this globalized economic environment and capture its implications for the future. Jeffrey Sachs, the Harvard economist so well known as advisor to FSU states, defines globalization along four dimensions and discusses its implications for economic growth, stability, equality, and governance. Susan Strange argues that globalization will have the most profound effects on state sovereignty, while Robert Wade describes the political struggle between Europe, America, and Asia over rules for the new global economy and Benjamin Schwartz highlights the importance of that struggle, contending that protecting the globalized economy is in fact the whole purpose of American national security strategy in the post-Cold War world. The selections from the Reilly booklet conclude the readings with a look at the views of the American people and their leaders on globalization and foreign policy.

Topic Objectives

Understand the structure and dynamics of the globalized international economy.

Critically evaluate the effects of global economic interdependence on U.S. national interests.

Identify likely threats and opportunities for U.S. statecraft flowing from the international economy.

Questions for Discussion

How can one best describe the structure of the contemporary international economic system? How does it compare to that of the current world political system?

What exactly is globalization? What are its downsides? Its benefits? What kind of policy actions are needed to minimize the first and maximize the second?

Has the growth of a globalized world economy diminished the power of the nation state? In what ways?

How important is relative economic standing among nations? Should American strategists be more concerned about relative or absolute gains?

What are the major problems and sources of instability in today's international economy? What degree of international and transnational coordination is needed to deal with them?

What vulnerabilities, dependencies, and threats to American interests does the globalized economic environment pose for American strategists? What opportunities does the new global economy offer for the promotion of American national interests?

Required Readings

* Jeffrey Sachs, "International Economics: Understanding the Mysteries of Globalization," Foreign Policy 110 (Spring 1998): 97-111. (Reprint)

* Susan Strange, "The Erosion of the State," Current History (November 1997): 365-369. (Reprint)

* Robert Wade, "The Coming Fight Over Capital Flows," Foreign Policy 113 (Winter 1998-99): 41-54. (Reprint)

* Benjamin Schwarz, "Why America Thinks it Has to Run the World," The Atlantic 277 (June 1996): 92, 94, 96, 98, 100-102. (Reprint)

* John E. Reilly, ed., Chapter 3, "Globalization and Foreign Policy," in American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999 (Chicago, IL: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), pp. 18-22. (Student Issue)

Supplemental Readings

* Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.

* "Global Finance: Time for a Redesign?" Economist survey (January 30, 1999): pp. 3-8, 11-18.

* Paul Krugman, "The Return of Depression Economics," Foreign Affairs 78 (January/February 1999): 56-74.

* Michael Mastanduno, "Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship," International Organization 52 (Autumn 1998): 825-854.

* Robert B. Reich, Todd Hixon, and Ranch Kimball, "Who Is Us?," Harvard Business Review (January/February 1990): 53-64.

* Robert B. Reich, "What is a Nation?" Political Science Quarterly 106 (Summer 1991): 193-209.

* Saskia Sassen, "Global Financial Centers," Foreign Affairs 77 (January/February 1999): 75-87.

* Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations, 4^th Edition. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.