Friday
17 March 2000
0830-1130 (LS)
All military men who have seen the Prussian army at its annual reviews of late years have unequivocally declared that France would walk all over it and get without difficulty to Berlin.
Lord Palmerston, British Prime Minister, 1863
What you must discover then is why they've marched. Who set them on, and for what purpose? If it's war . . . what's behind it, and how came it to begin? That's what I must know. . . You see . . . to know precisely why your enemy is making war, what he hopes to gain and fears to lose . . . is to be half-way to winning. Mind that.
Major George Broadfoot
1845 Regarding the Sikh Khalsa
Hurrah, boys, we've got them! We'll finish them up and then go home to our station.
Gen. George A. Custer, upon first sighting Indian encampment near Little Big Horn
Purpose
The purpose of this lesson is to explore some of the key tools used to calculate a regional military balance-to judge the relative military power of one state compared to another state or coalition.
Learning Objectives
1. Analyze how the tools of "net assessment" are used to estimate or forecast the current and potential military and strategic power of a state.
2. Develop knowledge and skills to probe others' estimates or forecasts of relative military power, including an understanding of the types of data used, analytical approaches and techniques, and key assumptions.
3. Evaluate the military threat and potential of North Korea compared to that of South Korea and United States forces committed or potentially available for use in the peninsula.
4. Examine how calculations of the military balance shape options for U.S. military strategy.
Discussion
The requirement for the United States to conduct two, nearly simultaneous major theater wars (MTW) is a foundation of current and projected strategic planning. It derives in part from the existence of vital interests-and plausible threats to those interests-across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Two specific regions that drive these planning assumptions are the Persian Gulf and the Korean Peninsula-regions where the U.S. has fought wars, maintained forces and undertaken security obligations. Simultaneous crises in both places, especially should they occur while major US forces are engaged elsewhere (e.g., in the Balkans) would pose a serious challenge to our forces.
It is therefore important for military strategists to judge the degree and character of threats posed by regional powers. The emergence of one or more additional regional competitors in the not-too-distant future would increase the need for a thorough, rigorous assessment of potential enemy capabilities.
In this lesson, we will examine the case of North Korea. Our intention here is twofold: first, to evaluate in greater detail the specifically military nature of the threat posed by North Korea, and, second, to understand how intelligence analysts and military strategists measure and assess, in net terms, the "threat" posed by any other state.
Issues for Consideration
1. How would you characterize the current military balance between North Korea on one side, and South Korea with United States backing on the other? What are the key indicators you would identify to track changes in that military balance?
2. What military capabilities, when acquired by a nation, should we use as indicators of a potential threat? Why? Are some of these harder to detect than others? Is capability measured by the acquisition of platforms and other equipment, or does it take more than that? If so, what?
3. How would you measure the military potential of a nation state over time?
4. How predictable is the outcome of an engagement or a small-scale battle between two combined-arms forces? Do you think combat outcomes become more or less predictable as you move up the scale in terms of size of forces, size of battlefield or theater, variety of engaged forces? How would you characterize the "confidence range" of an estimate of the outcome of a division-sized engagement, for example?
5. From the perspective of the North Korean leadership, is the United States a current or potential threat? What would it identify as our military and political-military strengths, vulnerabilities and weaknesses?
6. Archer - Assess the DPRK's potential in our scenario. Iraq's? What more do you need to know in each case?
Required Readings
Michael O'Hanlon, "Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea Is Easier than the Pentagon Thinks," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 135-170. (Reprint)
Recommended Readings
1. John L. Mearsheimer, "Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4, Spring 1989, pp.54-89. If you look at the footnotes to this article, the following articles, plus the Correspondence in that issue ("Reassessing Net Assessment"), you'll have more than enough to keep you busy for months.
2. Joshua M. Epstein, "The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4, Spring 1989, pp.90-127.
3. Eliot A. Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the Conventional European Balance," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1, Summer 1988.
4. Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139-179. On the relative importance of training and technology, see Stephen Biddle, Wade Hinkle, and Michael Fischerkeller, "Skill and Technology in Modern Warfare," 20 May 1999. This article is due to be published in Armed Forces Quarterly.
5. Stuart K. Masaki, "The Korean Question: Assessing the Military Balance," Security Studies, Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 1994/95, pp.365-425. This article takes a "Posen-Mearsheimer" approach to the Korean balance, providing ADE scores for DPRK and ROK units, comparing them, etc.
 |
 |
 |