Tuesday
18 April 2000
0830-1130 (LS)
- It is nevertheless indisputable that the command of the air can bring serious material and moral damage to the enemy, thereby contributing effectively to his defeat.
Giulio Douhet
The Command of the Air, p. 140
Purpose
The purpose of this case study is to analyze the recent war in Kosovo from the perspectives of both sides and to evaluate its implications for future military theory, US military strategy, and the joint operational art.
Learning Objectives
1. Comprehend the 'character' of Operation Allied Force - understand the limited goals pursued during the conflict.
2. Comprehend the operational implications in Operation Allied Force of suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), use of precision strike assets, ground force planning, logistics requirements and coordination of multinational strike assets, all overseen by the CJTF.
3. Evaluate the military strategy and conduct of Operation Allied Force by NATO, including its combined, joint operations to halt ethnic cleansing, compel the withdrawal of Serbian forces from the province, occupy Kosovo and begin peacekeeping operations.
Discussion
Napoleon was once asked what type of enemy he most liked to fight, and he gave a one word response: "Allies." Waging war by coalition is an enormously difficult undertaking, made even more so when the coalition consists of 19 nations. In Operation Allied Force the use of force was limited to an air campaign, seeking to achieve limited objectives. The alliance initially took a 'rational' approach, presenting 'rational' choices to a dictator and was caught flatfooted when he made his 'rational' choices.
The April 1999 policy statements of the North Atlantic Council illustrate the difficulty of forming a consensus, even against an enemy engaged in widespread atrocities. The accompanying articles, particularly those from the Washington Post, reveal how the disparate views of the NATO nations had a profound effect on the conduct of the air war. And within the US forces, an apparent unwillingness to risk casualties, doctrinal issues related to the use of Apache helicopters separated from a combined arms team, and the shear difficulty of the mission precluded Task Force Hawk from flying combat missions.
Use of the media took on great importance in this coalition effort against a ruthless opponent. NATO was unready for the challenge of early Serbian publication of 'video tape footage' which tended to frame public perceptions This dynamic and difficult process will always have greater significance for an alliance, which requires consensus.
Ultimately, Milosevic bent to NATO's will, but the jury is still out as to the specific reasons. We do not know whether it was his awareness of a potential ground offensive, pressure from the Russians, an inability to endure continued air attack, Serb internal politics, or other factors that caused him, eventually, to concede to alliance demands. Regardless, the nature of the coalition distinctively affected the use of force - and it will continue to do so the next time NATO goes to war.
Issues for Consideration
1. Military commanders had to take into account many conflicting views of the air campaign. Alliance concerns often impacted the conduct and character of the war, especially after the inadvertent bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. How did the concerns of various allies affect the structure of the air war? What would have changed had a member of the alliance refused to support the air campaign?
2. Requirements for multinational approval of target lists caused great difficulty as the conflict progressed. What action can be taken to preclude such micro-management in the future?
3. Was there a greater role for Information Operations in the Allied effort? Is it possible for a coalition of democracies to get ahead in the struggle for the 'hearts and minds' of the media viewer? What advantages might a democratic coalition have in an "info war" against a totalitarian state?
4. Analyze the factors that contributed to the "fog of war" in Kosovo. What steps can be taken to eliminate/reduce those factors in the future?
5. Did the level of effort in Kosovo and the number of assets engaged demonstrate that our current planning for a national 'Two MTW' capability is wrong?
6. What was the planning for and intended use of Task Force Hawk? Do you believe that rationales and factors preventing engagement were justified? Why or why not?
7. How did U.S. views regarding the character and conduct of the war differ from those of other NATO members?
Required Readings
1. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, "Joint Operations in War," Chapter IV, pp. IV-1 to IV-19, "Multinational Operations", Chapter VI, pp. VI-1 to VI-12. (Student Issue)
2. Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, "Executive Summary," pp. ix-xvii. (Student Issue)
3. NATO Handbook (1998), Chapter 12, "The Military Command Structure," pp. 243-273. (Student Issue)
4. NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC) press releases "The Situation in and Around Kosovo," April 12, 1999, "Statement on Kosovo," April 23, 1999. (Reprint)
5. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1239, May 14, 1999. (Reprint)
6. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, June 10, 1999. (Reprint)
7. Dana Priest, "A Decisive Battle That Never Was: The Commander's War", The Washington Post, September 19-21, 1999. (Reprint)
8. National Public Radio Interview with Lieutenant General Short, September 15, 1999. (Reprint)
9. Dana Priest, "Risks and Restraint: Why the Apaches Never Flew in Kosovo," The Washington Post, December 29, 1999. (Reprint)
10. Steven Lee Myers, "Minimum Use of Force, And Maximum Confusion," New York Times, June 14, 1999. (Reprint)
11. Molly Moore and Michael Dobbs, "Refugees Return, Troops Depart in Chaotic Exchange," The Washington Post, June 16, 1999. (Reprint)
12. William Drozdiak, "U.S., Russia Reach Military Agreement; Russians to Patrol NATO Sectors," The Washington Post, June 19, 1999. (Reprint)
13. Series of three FBIS articles from Serbia March-May 1999.
"Yugoslav Envoy Interviewed on NATO Strikes," Moscow Russian Television Network, March 28, 1999. (Reprint)
"2nd Army Sees 'No Choice But to Fight Against NATO," Belgrade Radio, April 25, 1999. (Reprint)
"Serbian Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the Serbian Radical Party Vojislav Seselj interviewed on Peace Prospects", Belgrade Television, May 14, 1999. (Reprint)
14. William Drozdiak, "NATO Peace Force Hastens Into Kosovo; Moscow Says Russian Advance Ahead of Allies Was a Mistake," The Washington Post, June 12, 1999. (Reprint)
15. General Sir Michael Rose, Commentary on a Ground War in Kosovo, The Daily Express, London, ____(Reprint)
Recommended Readings
1. Edward Stourton, "Spinning for Victory," The Telegraph, London, 16 October 1999.
2. Charles B. Shotwell, "Alliance Implications of the Kosovo Campaign", Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.
3. Raju G. C. Thomas, "NATO, the UN, and International Law," Mediterranean Quarterly, Summer 1999.
 |
 |
 |