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THE WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA IN THE YEAR OF ITS REVIEW: INTEGRATING RESOLUTION 1325 INTO THE MILITARY AND POLICE

An analysis based on three UN missions: MINUSTAH (Haiti), MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of the Congo) and UNIFIL (Lebanon).

Marcela Donadio and Juan Rial

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Fifteen years after Resolution 1325 was adopted in 2000, to what extent has it been integrated into peacekeeping operations? What approach has been developed for the military component? What achievements and pending challenges have been found in the implementation of this Resolution in the area of military and police tasks? Moreover, what role does the approach on women, peace and security have in the peacekeeping review process? These questions are central to this paper, based on information and perceptions collected in the fieldwork consistently carried out in DRC, Haiti and Lebanon. Thus, namely in the area of operations, with the authorization and support of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Heads of each Mission, interviews were conducted between 2012 and 2014 in the field with military commanders, officers, non-commissioned officers and/or soldiers from Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, China, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka and Uruguay. UNPOL staff and Formed Police Units, including three different formations of the female FPU from Bangladesh, were also interviewed, as well as the various civilian offices of the missions, particularly the gender units. All those interviews and our own impressions nurtured the ideas, recommendations and descriptions below.

In the late 2014, there were 91,620 military troops and 12,442 police officers from 113 different countries under the United Nations (UN) mandate, distributed throughout the 18 peace and political Missions undertaken by the Organization.¹

Although these far outnumber any other kind of agents commissioned by the international organization, there is little analysis made on their role on the ground, their training and specific tasks. Communication seems to be limited to the Mission's public affairs activities – which do not say much about the specificity of the military role but are rather focused on showing the image of a caring and compassionate peacekeeper. Or we could also mention the media, which is generally not benevolent and appear in the scene mainly when the public is claiming that the international forces were not present during clashes between combatants, pillaging or destruction of villages or facilities. Moreover, we do not know much about an essential condition for military personnel involved in any kind of conflict today: namely, the knowledge, understanding and connection with the local environment, the social and cultural roles that exist and are defined in every society (such as the fact that little boys and young men are mainly destined to fight wars whereas women and girls remain as the guardians of the family and are mostly left in a vulnerable situation, like the elderly, people with disabilities, small children and any man not capable of participating directly in the conflict).

We also know little whether such local context shapes military tasks or not, and about the perspective of the military component, made up of men and, though to a much lesser extent, also women. War, conflict, destruction and contempt for life make no distinction between men and women; they are all affected one way or another. However, and perhaps as a result of the traditional training of most armed forces in the world, initially conceived as eminently male institutions, we may fall into the trap of analyzing and appreciating only the part of the conflict related to the traditional military *métier* of waging war: the number of combatants, the weapons they carry, the kind of operations developed, etc. But success, or at least the positive progress in the development of an ongoing conflict, involves a more holistic approach, that includes all the population affected and which wonders about the military role within the framework of an international political strategy intended to promote and consolidate peace. Many national armed forces from various countries are already following this direction, though they have more questions than answers:

- How a conflict impacts men and women differently.
- How to recognize that difference, inserting it in the context of the conflict and not merely viewing women as victims.
- How to develop personnel’s ability to appreciate the richness of a social group and therefore incorporate the so-called gender perspective in their vision of the environment that surrounds them.

The international community has helped a great deal in this regard. In the past decades, the gender issue has taken an increasingly prominent space in the agenda of international institutions, and the UN in particular. Timidly at first, but more strongly later on, it became an iconic topic that was even recognized as a “cross-cutting issue” that applies to all the main aspects of the political, social and economic life.² Although the Commission on the Status of Women has existed since 1946, it took until 1979 to reach the **Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)**, which reveals the difficulties in address-

A LANDMARK RESOLUTION

More profound than it seems, Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325), adopted in October 2000, is the first Resolution that deals with the impact of armed conflicts on women. It addresses the need to incorporate the gender-based perspective in every peace operation and urges Member States to:

- Ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict.
 - Increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts.
 - When negotiating and implementing peace agreements, introduce inter alia the special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements;
- and measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the electoral system, the police and the judiciary.

Furthermore, it urges the Secretary General to:

- Appoint more women as Special Representatives and Envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf.
- Seek to expand the role and contribution of women in field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel.
- Ensure that field operations include a gender component.
- Provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the topic, and invites Member States to incorporate these elements in preparation for deployment.
- Periodically inform the Security Council on the progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions (these reports have been annual since then).

ing this topic, given the long-standing patriarchal traditions in many of the societies of the UN Member States that considered women as inferior. The CEDAW became the cornerstone for women's rights, always within the framework of human rights, and it is the basis for the development of numerous legislations in national States. More recently, and also promoted by the **Beijing Conference** in 1995 and its Action Plan, the consideration of the so called "gender perspective" in the agenda landed in one of the toughest sectors of international politics: security. For the UN Security Council this was revealed in a simple phrase that became famous with the adoption of **Resolution 1325** in the year 2000: **Women, Peace and Security**.

RESOLUTION 1325 WAS
LATER ENHANCED BY SUBSEQUENT
RESOLUTIONS:

- **SCR 1820** (2008), which condemns the use of sexual violence as a tactic of war, and declares that it is a war crime (a classification already contemplated in the Rome Statute); furthermore, it demands that all parties to armed conflict take immediate measures to protect civilians. It also includes the question of troop training and the enforcement of appropriate military disciplinary measures.
- **SCR 1888** (2009), which requires the Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative to address sexual violence in armed conflict and incorporate protection advisers, urges Member States to undertake reforms with a view to bring perpetrators of this crime to justice and to ensure that survivors have access to justice, and expresses its intention to ensure that mandates contain specific provisions to protect women and children from sexual violence in armed conflicts.
- **SCR 1889** (2009), which is a follow-up to the above and emphasizes the need to increase the participation of women in all phases of the peace process and calls upon the Secretary-General to develop strategies for increasing the number of women appointed on his behalf and to adopt measures to also increase women's participation in political, peace-building and peacekeeping missions.
- **SCR 1960** (2010), which reaffirms that sexual violence, when used as a tactic of war, can significantly exacerbate and prolong situations of armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security, and welcomes the work of gender advisers in the field.
- **SCR 2106** (2013) makes specific reference to military and police contingents: it recognizes their role in preventing sexual violence and calls for all pre-deployment and in-mission training to include training on sexual violence. It also emphasizes the need to continue to deploy women protection advisers and gender advisers to the missions and acknowledges the role of civil society organizations.
- **SCR 2122** (2013) is intended to focus more attention on women's leadership and participation in conflict resolution by addressing challenges linked to the lack of information and analysis on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution. It reiterates its intention to convene a high-level review in 2015 to assess Resolution 1325.

THREE UN PEACE MISSIONS, THREE VISIONS, ONE CONCLUSION

A description and analysis of the history, mandate, structure and specific activities –including interviews - of MINUSTAH and MONUSCO can be found in Engendering Peacekeeping: The Cases of Haiti and Democratic Republic of Congo, published by RESDAL in 2013.

1. MINUSTAH IN HAITI. THE TRANSFORMATION OF A MISSION

During the research carried out by RESDAL, the MINUSTAH was still structured as a peace mission where the military played a leading role and, though the mandate covered many other areas, it was still focused on security aspects. Rather than the result of a conflict between armed groups, Haiti reached an ungovernable and anomic situation as a result of constant social and political violence.³

The UN mission had and still has a predominantly police function.

Initially it was intended to disarm the various armed gangs that operated in the country, and particularly in the capital city. This objective was achieved, but in 2010 a devastating earthquake added a new problem. Besides the 220,000 casualties, 1.5 million people (of a total of almost 10 million) lost their homes. In 2010 and 2011, the consequences of the earthquake registered in the early 2010 were one of the main concerns for the international community.⁴ However, the need to transform the mission was already considered in 2012, given that the security situation had been stabilized.

The strong reduction in the number of military forces occurred in 2014. During 2015 the transformation will be stronger, since only two military units will remain in the country.⁵ One of them, based in Port-au-Prince and other detachments in the surroundings, will be an infantry battalion and an engineer company, contributed by Brazil and perhaps adding components from other countries. The other unit will be based in Cap-Haitien and nearby detachments, with Chilean military personnel and other forces contributed by Uruguay (a company of 250 soldiers), El Salvador, and Honduras. The contribution from Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru in the transformed MINUSTAH is still unclear. It is a type of small “intervention brigade” according to the prevailing ideas in the central countries about “robust peace missions”, rather than a deterrent force. Obviously development promotion activities remain exclusively handled by civilians, since it seems difficult for those military forces to continue conducting CIMIC activities (of promotion and cooperation with the civilian population) as they have done so far.

At the same time, the intention is to maintain the deployment of the Formed Police Units (FPUs), paramilitary structures, in other parts of the country although their troops are also reduced. The HNP (Haitian National Police) will increase its responsibility in the control of the territory as well as in the coastal areas.

The current concern about public security is whether the Haitian State is capable of providing it. The goal of recruiting a minimum necessary force for the HNP, estimated at 15,000 police officers, has not been achieved as of 2015. At the same time, the relations with the neighbouring Dominican Republic are far from reaching a proper level of cooperation. This is not unrelated to the resolution passed in 2014 by the Constitutional Court of the Dominican Republic that denied the Dominican nationality to the children of Haitian migrants born in national territory.

The most important change will be the emphasis of the UN peace mission on the economic and social development of the country, the poorest in the region. The civil structure of MINUSTAH is developing plans to implement these initiatives. Following the earthquake, the international community showed a strong commitment towards the reconstruction of the country, although it was not easy to implement given that over a third of the state bureaucracy had died in the disaster. Furthermore, a large part of the Haitian society got used to their condition of victims, and continued relying on international cooperation and assistance without showing efforts on their side to leave that condition. The goal is precisely to mobilize society to move towards development and overcome such dependence on international cooperation.

The acceleration in the Mission transformation process seems to be due to pressures from the dominant countries that will condition the Mission by reducing its operational budget, which amounts to 500 million dollars for the year July 2014-June 2015.

The institutional situation is far from satisfactory, since parliamentary elections were suspended, Congress was dissolved and there is a seemingly endless crisis in the cabinet of ministers. Within that framework, the government led by Michel Martelly promotes the re-creation of another military force in the country.⁶ Although the UN took clear actions against this idea in 2012, it has remained silent since then. Martelly's administration has contacted the Inter-American Defence Board to prepare a *white paper* on defence and security for Haiti as a way of legitimizing its intentions. In the meantime, with the support of Brazil and Ecuador, they sent officers to train in the Engineer Corps. Some of these training initiatives have already been completed, but the assignment of the trained personnel is still unclear.

2. MONUSCO IN DRC. AN INTEGRATED MISSION IN AN AREA AFFECTED BY ENDLESS CONFLICT

Although the studies on the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) focus on the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda (country that borders DRC to the East), DRC has a turbulent history that dates back to the Belgian colonization in the late 19th century. Extraction of natural resources, human rights violations and ethnic tensions were all part of the historical process that, following independence in 1960, did not manage to create a political, economic and social scheme to build a nation.

Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the already fragile balance in what was then the second largest country in Africa disappeared. Around 1.2 million Rwandese Hutus fled to the neighbouring provinces of South and North Kivu, in eastern DRC. In 1996, a rebellion led by Laurent Désiré Kabila, aided by military troops from Rwanda and Uganda, managed to depose dictator Mobutu Sese Seko that had dominated the country for over thirty years, and the country known as Zaire was renamed as the DRC.⁷

But shortly after that, a rebellion in the Kivu region triggered a conflict divided in two wars (1993-1998 and 1998-2003; the second war was also known as the African World War because it involved Angola, Burundi, Chad, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe, besides the DRC and various armed groups with their own agendas).⁸ It is estimated that 3.9 million people died between 1998 and 2004 as a result of this conflict and the consequent diseases and starvation and a total of 5.4 million died between 1998 and 2007.⁹

Subsequent agreements, starting with the Lusaka Agreement in 1999, were aimed at restoring peace; in July 1999, the Security Council established a mission (MONUC) initially made up of observers. Later, the mandate was expanded and in 2010 the mission was renamed MONUSCO, to reflect the stabilization phase.

SCR 1925, adopted on May 28, 2010, is based inter alia on resolutions 1325 and 1820, since one of the tactics in the conflict in Congo is sexual violence. The permanent conflict is expressed in constant clashes and the use of the body, particularly of women, as a “weapon of war”.

In 2012, a team of researchers from RESDAL travelled around the Democratic Republic of Congo during one month. The members of the team worked in the capital, Kinshasa, and the regions where most military troops were deployed: the East and North-East of the country, in the provinces of South and North Kivu and the Orientale Province.

The United Nations Mission in Congo has always focused on the challenge of the protection of civilians. The task is predominantly based on the presence of a strong military component and a developed civilian component, in what is perhaps the largest integrated mission in the world.

The task of this UN Mission is worthy of Sisyphus. It is all about starting over and over again and an example of this is the permanent redeployment in regions like Lubumbashi, Kisangani, Shabunda and Kindu, to name a few, to try to control a conflict that constantly reappears. Congo faces a continued conflict, a sort of “permanent war” or –as some veterans call these conflicts - “the war of the children of our children”. The conflict continues nurtured by the absence of the State, the dispute over the illegal and legal exploitation of natural resources, tribal disputes and the intervention of States and militias that respond to regional interests in the Great Lakes region.

Significant changes have been introduced in the past two years. The military headquarters of the Mission were moved from Kinshasa (where only some small liaison offices remained) to Goma, to the East of the country. And in an unprecedented move, a Brazilian General was appointed as Force Commander although Brazil has no troops on the ground (Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz, who previously held the same position in Haiti).

The second big change was the creation of an **Intervention Brigade** to enforce peace in the region, made up of three infantry battalions, one artillery group and one company of Special Forces, composed of troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi. It was created by SCR 2098 adopted on March 28, 2013 and extended by SCR 2147 adopted in March 2014, with the objective of contributing to reducing the threat posed by armed groups and stabilizing the East region of DRC, operating either unilaterally or jointly with the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), in a “highly robust, mobile and versatile” manner.

With almost 3,000 military elements at its disposal, the Intervention Brigade is a unique initiative in peace missions.¹⁰ Its success or failure will be an important part of the discussions on the future of UN operations, with a central theme of debate that has even had an impact on the news: whether robust mandates will be the standard in the future and whether the military assigned to maintain peace should be involved in the combats.¹¹

Although the ad hoc intervention force has not engaged in harsh combats so far, only some small skirmishes, its presence seems to have mitigated the action of insurgent movements. A contributing factor may have been the deployment of a surveillance unit equipped with drones (UAVs) from an Italian private company hired by the UN. This deterrent force multiplier has led insurgent movements in this “hybrid war” type of conflict to consider that this is not the moment for engaging in combat. The situation in general remains mostly unchanged and, in times of financial constraints, it is not easy to carry out a peace mission whose way out is still unclear.

3. UNIFIL. A LONG MISSION WITH A TRADITIONAL MANDATE TRYING TO MAINTAIN STABILITY ALONG THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER

In 2014, RESDAL sent a research mission to Lebanon at the height of the Syrian conflict, with its impact on refugee flows. The conflict has been further exacerbated with the action of ISIS (DAESH) in the North of the country. One of the old UN peace missions, UNIFIL, was visited as part of the work. It was created by the Security Council in March 1978 to ensure Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area.

The mandate was modified twice due to the developments in 1982 and 2000, when Israeli forces invaded Lebanese territory again. Following another crisis in 2006, the Security Council increased the number of troops in UNIFIL and decided that in addition to the original mandate it would monitor the cessation of hostilities, support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they deployed in Southern Lebanon and extend its assistance to ensure the access of humanitarian assistance and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons. It is an interposition force between the Israeli Defence Forces (Tsahal) and the LAF that, given the development of events, also has to deal with other actors, the most important of which is Hezbollah with its political and militia branches.

Lebanon is the country in the region that, at a small scale and in a different institutional framework, reproduces the social kaleidoscope of the old Ottoman Empire, only excluding the Jews. Eighteen confessional groups coexist in the country, the most important being the Maronite Christians and the two main Muslim groups (Shiites and Sunnis) as well as the Druze. Striking a balance in this context is not easy, and although the successive agreements to manage the conflict among confessions have helped maintain the country's unity, Lebanon can be considered a "precarious state". It has been a cosmopolitan country since the old times, when Tyre was the port par excellence and a city open to the world through trade, followed by Byblos and Sidon. That role, played by

Venice in the Western world, was inherited by Beirut, now the centre of a country that is an area of clashes and encounters.

Whilst in the Arab world most countries have experimented with nationalistic, Marxist and, more recently, Islamic regimes, Lebanon has chosen the republican system of government where the political regime has to be based on con-

*Bordered by Israel to the South and Syria to the East, Lebanon is highly permeable to conflicts in one of the most unstable regions on the world. UNIFIL stretches between the Litani river in Southern Lebanon and the never fully identified and officialised border with Israel, the **Blue Line**. The presence of this large UN military force attempts, with as many successes as failures, to generate a conflict-free buffer zone with a traditional peacekeeping mandate.*

sensus though, in the context of a fragile stability, many times this consensus is lost and violence arises.

Unlike other Arab countries, Lebanon did not have an army that played a protagonist role in political power, though many leaders actually had a military rank. Today, having a young army –though managed within religious frameworks—it aims to have an armed corporation that may serve as a “moderating power” or arbitrator. The complex Lebanese demography exhibits a population of around 4,140,000 people, but the last “official” census was carried out in 1932. Such census was the basis for the institutional distribution of the free inter-religious State in 1943,¹² following the French conflict between the followers of the Vichy regime and those of General De Gaulle. The multi-religion system that implies the possibility of belonging any of the 18 cults, with few mixed marriages, does not reflect the more recent population distribution change in favor of the Muslims. The only religious group that has almost disappeared in the country is the Jewish community. A minority made “Aliyah” (immigration to the Israeli land) and most of them emigrated to France and the US, especially after the conflicts of 1958 and 1975.


Lebanon is a linking country in the Mediterranean. Intense conflict related to the pressures and expressions of its neighbors have led to constant violence in spite of the tolerance exhibited.

Within that framework, UNIFIL has a key role: to prevent a new Israeli incursion into Lebanon, while moderating the possible incursions of southern militias (Hezbollah) into Israel. But, precisely because of that role, the mission keeps a series of strong historical inertias, and it is important to remember that when the mission was created in 1978, there was no Hezbollah in the scene, the Shah of Iran was still in power, the Soviet Union has not been dissolved yet and Thatcher and Reagan had not become key protagonists of the international arena.


In a country with players that include political parties, coalition of parties, socio-political movements and their militias and correlates of sectarianism, and where institutions such as the armed and police forces exert their influence (and the various state and non-state actors of neighboring countries and their different interests also play their part), the UN force’s objective is to try to keep under control one of those factors –namely, Israel’s conflict with Lebanon—in a foreseeable framework.

For that reason, the mission has that particular form of organization, with a predominance of military staff, which makes the civilians in the mission consider it as a “semi-integrated” mission, thus making it considerably different from others.¹³ That precisely undermines the “soft power” aspects, including the promotion of a gender-based policy based on RCS 1325, which have been so relevant in other missions, and takes them to a lower level of importance. The interest of the Lebanese government –which claims that the use of rape as a weapon of war is unknown in the country—¹⁴ might also explain this situation.


PEACE MISSIONS WORLDWIDE IN 2015: YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT, ANNUAL BUDGET AND INTERNATIONAL FORCES



Ten largest missions in terms of military contribution
(including Observers and Troops)



Ten missions with the largest number of police officers
(including UNPOL and FPU)



Source: Compilation based on information provided by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations web site. Military members and police: data as at December of each year considered. Budget: United Nations, General Assembly. *Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015 A/C.5/69/17* (New York: January 14 2015).

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: A CIVILIAN PROTECTION MANDATE IN A CONTEXT OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND ARMED GROUPS

Authorized Strength for MONUSCO in 2010:

19,815 military troops, 760 military observers, 1,050 FPU members and 391 UN police officers.

January 2015:

19,475 military troops, 484 military observers, 1,101 members of FPU and police officers.

(In late 2014, the Secretary-General proposed a reduction of 2,000 troops in the military component, which was reflected in the force authorization issued by the Security Council at the end of March 2015).

The **military component** is under the command of a Brazilian General (Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz), who had previous experience in the MINUSTAH at the time of the earthquake. The predominant forces are from the main Asian troop-contributing countries (Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan,


which are in charge of the three large military sectors that make up the military component: South Kivu Brigade, North Kivu Brigade and Ituri Brigade). The Latin American presence consists in contingents from Guatemala and Uruguay, plus some observers from Bolivia and Paraguay.

A French **Police Commissioner** (Pascal Champion) heads the police component.


MONUSCO, headed by the **Special Representative of the Secretary-General** (SRSG) Martin Kobler, comprises 895 international civilians, 2,784 Congolese civilians and 429 UN volunteers, which makes a total of 4,108 civilians.

Budget for the period July 2014 - June 2015: US\$ 1,398,475,300. Both the number of personnel and the budget amount are the highest among all UN peacekeeping missions.

Military Forces Distribution in MONUSCO, 2014



Source: Compilation based on information provided on the ground as well as on mapping activities developed by the Cartographic Section of the UN Department of Field Support for July 2012, February 2013 and 2014, and September 2014. Cases of sexual and gender-based violence: République Démocratique du Congo, Ministère du Genre, de la Famille et de l'Enfant. *Ampleur des violences sexuelles en RDC et actions de lutte contre le phénomène de 2011 à 2012* (Kinshasa: June 2013).



Despite the amount of funds and the number of international actors involved in the DRC, the projects aimed at obtaining reliable and minimally updated information on sexual violence are failing to take off. The latest disaggregated data compilation published dates from 2012 and was produced by the Congolese government.* Once more, this invisibility denies the victims' rights, and the absence of records goes against the elementary concept of the human right to be acknowledged as an individual (each person counts).

The Secretary-General's Report on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (S/2014/181) reports **15,302** cases in 2013 for the **eastern and north-eastern** areas of the country (Katanga, the Kivus and Ituri), based on government data. On their part, national institutions have produced some significant events such as the effective prosecution by military justice of military and police commanders who, while serving in Congolese security forces, perpetrated human rights abuses, in late 2014.

47% of the victims are between 10 and 20 years old. **98%** of the cases reported involve women.

*These data refer only to cases treated in medical centers and are not country-wide. Moreover, it is not known whether there has been any liaison with security actors who might be informed about the occurrence of incidents. Technical support from UNFPA was received. The Ministry in charge of preparing the report points out that "Data sharing between actors and the transmission of such data to the coordination sector of the 'Data & Mapping' component is based on the will to cooperate of the actors on the ground; however, a significant number of actors participating in the struggle against sexual and gender-based violence have not reported any data." République Démocratique du Congo, Ministère du Genre, de la Famille et de l'Enfant. *Ampleur des violences sexuelles en RDC et actions de lutte contre le phénomène de 2011 à 2012* (Kinshasa: June 2013), page. 9. Original in French.



• - Area: **2,344,858 km²**.

- Eighth country in the world in terms of waterways (15,000 km).
- **2%** of the roads are paved
- **59%** of the territory is covered by forests.
- The Mission's military force design continues to be based on infantry troops.

• **5,4 million people** killed due to conflicts between 1998 and 2007.**

• **2,600,000** internally displaced persons in 2014.

• **Almost 4 million people** will need protection in 2015.

**Based on figures provided by the International Rescue Committee (deaths) and UN-HCR (displaced persons and population at risk), available at <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c366.html>.



DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) checkpoint in Dungu, Ituri Province. (Photo: RESDAL).



Guatemala Special Force troops on a mission. With his back to the camera, a civilian holds a rifle. (Photo: Courtesy of GUASFOR).

HAITI: SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT AND A STABILIZATION MISSION

Authorized Strength for MINUSTAH in 2004:
6,700 military troops
and 1,622 police officers,
 including FPU members.


After the 2010 earthquake, the deployment of up to
8,940 military troops and
4,391 police officers was authorized.

In 2004, the military / UN police officers ratio
 was **4 to 1**.
 For 2015, the ratio proposed is **0.9 to 1**.


January 2015 (currently in downsizing process):
4,763 military troops and
2,258 police officers including FPU members.
 The authorization issued in October 2014 covered
2,370 military troops and
2,601 police officers. The force level present at the
 end of 2014 will be maintained until the Secretary-General reports
 to the Council in 2015.

The military component has been under the command of Brazilian
 generals since 2004. Argentines, Chileans and Uruguayans have
 occupied vice-chief positions in the component. In addition to
 three Central American countries, eight out of the ten participating
 South American countries have contributed military contingents.
 The Police Commissioner is Mr. Luis Miguel Carrilho, from Portugal.
 The Mission is headed by Special Representative Sandra Honoré
 and it includes **343 international civilians,**
1,168 local civilians and **130 UN volunteers**.
 Budget for the period July 2014 - June 2015:
US\$ 500,080,500.

Deployment of the Mission's military and police components




Source: A Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America and Caribbean, 2014 Edition. RESDAL, October 2014, p. 128.




Security Council Resolution 2180 on MINUSTAH, adopted in October 2014, specifically raises the issue of the widespread existence of rape and sexual abuse against women and girls and calls for promotion and protection measures pursuant to SCR 1325 and associated resolutions.

Violence against Women and Girls, by Type, Haiti, July 2013-July 2014



Source: MINUSTAH / HCDH*.

MINUSTAH's evolution: strength over the years, 2004-2015



• As at December 2014, approximately **80,000 people** remained as internally displaced people in the camps created after the 2010 earthquake, especially in Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas.

• Programs aimed at relocating people living in camps have significantly decreased the number of displaced persons, which in 2010 was as high as **1.5 million people**.

IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, available at <http://iomhaitidataportal.info/dtm/>



*MINUSTAH - Haut-commissariat des Nations Unies aux droits de l'homme. La Protection des droits humains en Haïti Juillet - Septembre 2013, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/HT/MINUSTAH-HCHRJuilletSeptember2013_fr.pdf. La Protection des droits humains en Haïti Octobre-Décembre 2013, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/HT/MINUSTAH-OHCHROctoberDecember2013_fr.pdf. La Protection des droits humains des personnes déplacées internes en lien avec le séisme de 2010 (Janvier-Juin 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/HT/ReportMINUSTAH-HCHRJanvierJuin2014_fr.pdf.

SOUTH LEBANON: A TRADITIONAL MISSION TO SEPARATE PARTIES IN CONFLICT

Authorized Strength for UNIFIL:

1978: **4,000 military personnel.**

2006: **15,000 military personnel.**

January 2015:

10,236 military.

UNIFIL's personnel in 2015 includes **282 international civilians and 603 local civilians.**

Budget for the period July 2014 - June 2015:

US\$ 509,554,400.

UNIFIL


- Established in 1978 and expanded in 2006.
- The only UN mission where the same person acts both as Head of Mission and Military Commander.
- Only UN mission provided with a Maritime Task Force.
- Most contributing countries are European.
- No police component.

UNIFIL is deployed only in south Lebanon. Two of the oldest UN missions, **UNTSO** and **UNDOF**, are in the same area or nearby.

UNIFIL supervises the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon.

UNTSO was the UN's first peace mission (1948). Observers supervise the truce between Israel and neighboring countries.

UNDOF consists of observers supervising the 1974 Israel-Syria agreement in the Golan Heights.



Creation of the State of Israel.

Palestine refugees settle mainly in Lebanon and Jordan

1944

Lebanon becomes independent from France.

PLO – Al Fatah is expelled from Jordan and settles in Lebanon.

1970

Syrian troops enter the country.

1975

Israel invades south Lebanon. UNIFIL is established.

1978

Israel keeps a security zone in the south of Lebanon. Hezbollah emerges as a resistance organization.

1976

Second invasion of Lebanon by Israel; occupation.

1982

1985

Full withdrawal of Israeli troops.

2000

Renewed armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. UNIFIL is expanded.

2006

Ceaseless flow of Syrian refugees to Lebanon.

2012

Civil war in Lebanon


The estimated Lebanese population is **4,140,000**.
 The total number of **Syrian refugees** registered as at February 2015 was **1,177,282**.

445,000 Palestine refugees are registered with UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

80% of the refugees are women and children.

In Lebanon, the situation of women differs according to their religion. Thus, cultural patterns typical of *Western consumerism* co-exist with the restrictive rules of the Sharia, a type of civil, criminal and conduct code that shows some variations among the different Muslim denominations following this rule.



Proportion of refugees in Lebanon's population



3 out of every 10 persons living in Lebanon are (registered) refugees.

Sources: UNHCR. *Humanity, hope and thoughts of home: Syrian refugees in southern Lebanon*, 25 February 2015, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/54ede4b16.html>. *Global Appeal 2015*, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486676.html>.

Location of refugees in Lebanon, 2015



A Syrian refugee asks for help from automobile drivers. (Photo: RESDAL).
 Shatila, one of the main Palestinian refugee camps. (Photo: RESDAL).


MILITARY AND POLICE WOMEN IN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Resolution 1325 stated the need to “to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel”. Increasing the number of women in military and police forces is probably one of the issues receiving the highest level of attention in the last 15 years, with varying but significant results. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations started to present disaggregated data on military personnel in 2006; it was only in 2010 that the same kind of data was provided on the police component.

Military Personnel in Peace Missions by Sex, 2006-2015


Year	Observers				Troops (including staff officers)				Total Military Personnel			
	Men	Women	Total	% Women	Men	Women	Total	% Women	Men	Women	Total	% Women
2006	2,290	53	2,343	2.26	68,349	981	69,330	1.41	70,639	1,034	71,673	1.44
2007	2,625	99	2,724	3.63	69,247	1,261	70,508	1.79	71,872	1,360	73,232	1.86
2008	2,346	93	2,439	3.81	76,061	1,701	77,762	2.19	78,407	1,794	80,201	2.24
2009	2,224	90	2,314	3.89	81,088	2,001	83,089	2.41	83,312	2,091	85,403	2.45
2010	2,202	100	2,302	4.34	80,084	1,930	82,014	2.35	82,286	2,030	84,316	2.41
2011	1,911	73	1,984	3.68	80,528	2,202	82,730	2.66	82,439	2,275	84,714	2.69
2012	1,898	73	1,971	3.70	77,520	2,230	79,750	2.80	79,418	2,303	81,721	2.82
2013	1,778	86	1,864	4.61	80,941	2,338	83,279	2.81	82,719	2,424	85,143	2.85
2014	1,701	71	1,772	4.01	87,116	2,732	89,848	3.04	88,817	2,803	91,620	3.06

Military Personnel in Peace Missions, 2006 and 2015



The change is more noticeable if the data are disaggregated by groups. A positive indicator is that the highest increase has been registered among the **troops**:

In the case of **military observers**, the percentage increase is not due to an actual increase in the number of women, but to a reduction of almost 25% in the number of observers assigned to UN missions. In this sense, and despite the fact that SCR 1325 specifically mentioned the need for observers, the situation is stagnant.



Although 3.06% is, at first sight, a very low percentage (and it is), the trend has been rising in the last ten years. The increased number of women serving in the military is proportionally higher than the overall increase of military personnel in peacekeeping missions.

Given the characteristics of the conflicts where the UN have deployed missions in the last ten years, the Troop Contributing Countries are constantly requested to assign more police officers to the missions. However, the trends are not encouraging and the number of police personnel on peacekeeping missions is in fact stagnating. As in the case of military observers, the percentage rise of policewomen under UNPOL relates more to the decrease in total personnel than to the increase in absolute figures.

Police Personnel in Peace Missions by Sex, 2009-2015

Year	Individual Police Officers				Formed Police Units (FPUs)				Total			
	Men	Women	Total	% Women	Men	Women	Total	% Women	Men	Women	Total	% Women
2009	6,249	576	6,825	8.44	5,700	269	5,969	4.51	11,949	845	12,794	6.60
2010	5,938	1,033	6,971	14.82	7,004	347	7,351	4.72	12,942	1,380	14,322	9.64
2011	5,447	982	6,429	15.27	7,399	474	7,873	6.02	12,846	1,456	14,302	10.18
2012	4,742	840	5,582	15.05	6,409	378	6,787	5.57	11,151	1,218	12,369	9.85
2013	4,435	846	5,281	16.02	7,293	483	7,776	6.21	11,728	1,329	13,057	10.18
2014	3,342	686	4,028	17.03	7,920	494	8,414	5.87	11,262	1,180	12,442	9.48

Total Individual Police Officers between 2009 and 2015



+19%
Total Female Police Officers between 2009 and 2014

+41%
Total FPU Members between 2009 and 2015

+84%
Total Women in FPUs between 2009 and 2014

Women in FPUs
The largest change occurred at FPU level and stems from the Government of Bangladesh's decision to create **Female FPU Units** operating in the DRC and Haiti

Source: Department of Peacekeeping Operations. *Gender Statistics by Mission*. Data as at December of each year considered.

LINKING RESOLUTION 1325 TO SECURITY ACTORS: WHAT HAPPENS ON THE GROUND?

Although the security components are structurally significant in peace missions, the huge efforts undertaken in response to Security Council Resolution 1325 rarely reach the level of battalions and police stations. In-depth studies on security are scarce. RESDAL's work and studies pioneered this area in Latin America in 2008¹⁵, but unfortunately they were not replicated in other regions, such as Asia or Africa, and it is only within NATO that data and analyses on women in the military and police forces can be found. The same may be said with respect to the linkage between Resolution 1325 and the practice of security institutions in peace missions: as far as we know, the only reports were conducted by the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs –NUPI- headquartered in Oslo¹⁶, and RESDAL's own reports ; in the training arena, DCAF's work on security sector reform is worthy of mention¹⁷. Too few examples for such a vast issue...

This situation is hardly the result of resistance within the United Nations: the Organization has actually sought to implement the guidelines contained in SCR 1325 in military and security forces, even if it takes years before the results of such efforts are seen, mainly due to the Organization's own internal dynamics. The DPKO Gender Unit promoted the production of the *Military Guidelines*, a central instrument given its operational nature which was published in 2010¹⁸, and has been working on the development of training modules along with the Integrated Training Service (ITS). UN Women also produced an inventory of practices, and later worked on scenario-based training activities¹⁹. However, it is difficult for them to find strategic allies in civil society and academia who may be willing to work on the military and police forces issue and maintain this line of work over time.

THE SCOPE OF THE RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY SECTOR

Addressing the issue of the military and the police -especially the military- is complicated, not only in a peace mission or gender-related environment, but also in the various national contexts, whatever the process of democratization. Civilians find it difficult to approach a professional rationale which they do not fully understand, and the same happens to the military vis-à-vis

the civilians. This is fertile ground for prejudices and resistance, which need to be dealt with in pursuit of a higher objective, such as the search for peace.

For many reasons, this is also reflected in the academia and civil society spheres, where gender and security issues hardly are brought together to the fore: security specialists look askance at gender issues, and the same can be said of gender specialists in the opposite direction. It should also be stressed that the traditional military culture exalts masculinity, and women's participation in peace missions can change the very typical view reflected in the old saying that boys join the army, more precisely the infantry, to become men. Thus, this view does not apply to girls, who do not become women because they have joined the military. Other cultural values resort to the "machismo" of corporations. US marines talk about their guns as something more important than their girlfriends, to give a well-known example. In the DRC, Mobutu told his soldiers -in order to justify the failure to pay them salaries, as the story goes- that instead, they were given a rifle.

The security sector includes actors such as police and military forces and -following a wider definition of the concept- intelligence, border management and customs services and penitentiary institutions. The spirit and text of SCR 1325 applies to many areas at the national level; thus, there is a requirement of National Action Plans in which the State institutions linked to the security area should participate.

At the international level and with regard to the implementation of Resolution 1325 to peace missions, based on the observation of the three missions covered in the present study, there are some major issues to be considered, especially with respect to military and police structures. Some specific tasks are identified in relation to military and police missions both in conflict and post-conflict situations.

THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN AND CIVILIANS IN GENERAL

The presence of international military and police forces always arouses the same question from the local population and the international community at large: What are they here for? Of course, the concern that triggers the question differs. In the case of the local population, the presence of a military or police force apparatus is usually perceived as an occupation force, or the opposite: this is a force that is going to protect me from those who wish to harm me. It is never innocuous.

Not to be seen as an occupation force is an ongoing concern for any mission and contingent, but it is not always possible to succeed in this effort. In 2011, MINUSTAH, for example, had a notorious number of military

Three spheres of action for security forces in international missions

PROTECTION OF WOMEN / CIVILIANS IN GENERAL

Patrolling.
Escorting humanitarian organizations.
Protecting mission personnel and facilities.
Military and police preventive and law-enforcement operations.
Assistance in case of natural or man-made disasters.
Protection of civilians against general or individual attacks.

PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN

Significant number of female personnel in military contingents.
Presence of female police officers (including higher possibilities of participation in the case of individual police officers).
Appointing of female personnel within the mission military staff officers.
Appointing of female personnel in staff positions within national military contingents.

PERSPECTIVES REGARDING WOMEN / CIVILIANS IN GENERAL

Initiatives involving civilian-military cooperation (health, dental care, engineering, water and food distribution services).
Tasks aimed at training military and police forces of the country in conflict (as part of the so-called security sector reform initiatives).
Disciplinary framework.

trucks and SUVs which had become part of Port-au-Prince's daily life. By late 2012, at the suggestion of the Head of Mission, this presence was significantly reduced. At the other extreme, in violent contexts such as Congo and even Lebanon, it should be easier for the population to perceive that the forces are there to protect them, provided that they carry out their duties properly.

The reason for the presence of international forces is explained by their functions. As regards protection, although the focus is usually on their intervention in a conflict situation, there is more to it. With respect to the military, two major questions arise: a) what should be expected from the military in relation to the protection of civilians, and b) which tasks/activities cannot be achieved without a military presence.

Security functions with regard to the protection of civilians comprise the following issues, among others:

- Defence against imminent threats to physical integrity.
- Allowing access to humanitarian aid (mainly medical materials and services).
- Roads connecting towns (in the case of Congo, protecting large swathes of unpopulated territory where violence and lawlessness prevail, and also allowing faster access by people who ask for help).
- Ensuring that the programs set up by the international community reach the beneficiaries when the infrastructure is challenging.
- Constructing a safe public space allowing the population to live in peace and develop economic activities.
- Strengthening border controls in order to combat the illegal traffic of weapons, drugs and persons, and control other factors that encourage lawlessness.

"It is very difficult to carry this forward without soldiers", we were told in MONUSCO.²⁰ In Bunia and Dungu the UN system organizations spoke of their essential need for military escorts: organizations like UNICEF, OCHA and the like could not move around in that area (which, among other things, faces the threat of the LRA) if the military were not escorting them. The discussion of the "humanitarian space" does not appear very often in interviews in the DRC. In early 2012, an unprecedented event took place: for the first time in its history, the Red Cross enlisted the assistance of military helicopters, which represented the only way to evacuate the wounded following a massive attack in Shabunda. They were, in that case, Uruguayan helicopters.²¹

Of the three missions under study, perhaps the military's role in civilian protection is best perceived in MONUSCO. The use of sexual violence as a weapon of war in Congo generates a specific focus on the need to protect women. It is no exaggeration to say that -despite the limitations and pending challenges of MONUSCO's strategy and military activities- it is virtually impossible to create a safe environment without the presence of international military forces. In addition to the escort tasks already mentioned, the main activities of such forces include the following:

- **Presence, albeit limited, in areas prone to conflict:** The strategy is based on the deployment of COBs (Company Bases) in inaccessible areas. Temporary bases (TOBs) are also established for a few days, however some end up remaining in place for much more than that. The Guatemalan Special Forces, for instance, are usually deployed in the middle of the jungle, from where patrols are deployed. The Bangladeshi battalion in Ituri also explained, how, in addition to patrols, many contingents also establish temporary bases as part of their patrols, spending two or three days at the site.
- **Data collection:** the military are often those who, due to their presence in the TOBs and COBs, are in communication with isolated populations, sending information to the civilian agents of the mission. The Uruguayan Riverine Company, for example, lands in various villages and performs data collection at the request of civilians as part of their routine work.
- Whilst formally it is discouraged, it provides **emergency medical care** to residents near the bases they use. All contingents generally have their own emergency medical care for military personnel, and it is common for the local population to approach them in search of medical assistance.
- **Transfer** of civilian and humanitarian personnel in impassable conditions (generalized). These are roads that even in 4x4 vehicles are traversed at an average of 5 to 10 km per hour. In the rainy season, even military trucks often get stuck.
- **Custody of public market spaces.** Whilst it is not the main activity that they carry out, the formation of safe corridors for men and women to go to the market, or the provision of security on specific days of spaces where goods are exchanged, is highly relevant to the provision of security.
- **The bases as "safe havens":** in remote locations, but also in cities, witnesses speak of how local people know that in the case of a clash between armed groups, or if there is an attack on villages, they are able to gain safer refuge near to MONUSCO military bases.

Special mention should be made of **patrols**. Patrols are a central theme both to the protection of civilians and the creation of trust within the local population. The accusation that the military is locked up in their military bases or in their trucks runs like wildfire in any peacekeeping mission, and unfortunately often it is justified. In the three missions under study, we received feedback from civilian society on this subject. In MINUSTAH, this was a “hot” topic even then when the military component has been substantially reduced. We still remember an episode involving a military truck on patrol duty, stuck in the traffic in Port-au-Prince because a vehicle had stopped in the only available lane. Suddenly, two soldiers alighted from the truck and we thought they would move the vehicle in front; but what they did was to stand in the other lane and stop the traffic coming from the opposite direction, so that their truck could move. Then they climbed onto the truck again and left. The image they left was hardly that of a force serving the community. In the case of UNIFIL, people frequently throw stones at patrols to such an extent that these incidents are regularly reported by the Secretary-General: the local population clings to the belief that patrols are there to spy on them. Perhaps the command of the mission (in this case, contrary to other UN missions, the same person exercises both civilian and military command) should pay heed to the need to work on the contingents’ perspective as regards their engagement with the local population, instead of dealing with this subject solely at mission headquarters level. In the area covered by UNIFIL there are 108 municipalities, of which approximately 90 are governed by Hezbollah and others by Amal and other Islamic groups. Obviously, the mission leaders’ main concern is to try to maintain the fragile balance among the various factions moving within the region, and this objective limits what they can or cannot do.

MONUSCO also faces some complicated issues, but as its territory is substantially more extensive, the various localities generate relations with and impressions about the military contingent assigned to their area and end up appreciating its work. From the interviews carried out, the perception gained was that there are different interpretations about the mandate. While some argue that even in cases where there is no FARDC (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo) presence there is a necessity to act, others believe they should avoid situations that, to the Government, resemble any type of imposition (it should be noted that, in general, civil officials inside the country mostly lean towards the option of more action than that which is currently carried out). In this context, the main victim is the local population, which continues to suffer the effects of the conflict, and, secondly, the mission itself, whose image becomes tarnished.

“There is a feeling amongst the population that we are not doing as much as we should be doing” said a civilian official interviewed in Bukavu. “They have a base there and do nothing”, said a representative of an organization of the UN system in the North. “They could do more but they don’t” was a phrase heard in three interviews.

Until contingents are encouraged (by the military command of the mission or by the TCCs themselves) to avoid routine patrol schemes, increase the frequency and number of patrols, or take the risk of getting out of the vehicle, little will be achieved by patrols, and even less so in relation to generating confidence in the local population.

Due to the characteristics of the conflict and the operational scenario, it is clear that in order to at least minimally meet the requirements dictated by the protection of civilians, there is a need to conduct foot patrols in areas which are located outside of the cities, as

well as the need to intensify the use of night patrols. Or, as it was put in a more direct fashion by the director of the Panzi Hospital, “What kind of protection do they provide if they only provide it to those who are closest to them?”²²

Although the commanders’ permeability and flexibility influence the situation, some contingents still stick to routine patrolling schemes, following timetables and routes known to the whole population. It is also the case that sometimes military personnel are reluctant to get involved, for fear of becoming engaged in combat. This latter issue touches upon the question of the “double hat”, and what kind of instructions or support is received from their own countries regarding carrying out certain riskier actions, such as a foot or night patrol. If, given the terrain, mobility and flexibility within


the contingents is necessary, the question that this implies regards the willingness of the TCCs to use the appropriate force and accept the risks that this entails. This issue -observed in 2012 and included in the recommendations made by RESDAL at the time- is still part of the scenario, to such an extent that it has taken up several paragraphs of the Secretary-General’s latest report:

“The performance and effect of some MONUSCO contingents has drawn much criticism, especially from national interlocutors. MONUSCO’s deployment is mainly static and passive. Neither the Force Intervention Brigade nor the framework brigades were found to operate at the optimum level. Many framework brigades were

described as not having conducted patrols to the most vulnerable areas on several occasions, while limiting their patrolling activities to daylight hours only. There were reports of certain contingents being reluctant to engage militarily against armed groups despite orders from the MONUSCO leadership to do so” [See the

SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE - TIMES OF OCCURRENCE

As regards Congo, the afternoon is the time that shows the highest incidence of sexual violence in the Kivus (the provinces with the highest troop concentrations), according to data provided by the Ministry for Gender.



Source: République Démocratique du Congo, Ministère du Genre, de la Famille et de l’Enfant. *Ampleur des violences sexuelles en RDC et actions de lutte contre le phénomène de 2011 à 2012* (Kinshasa: June 2013). Percentage of cases reported in 2012.

MONUSCO map in previous pages, to differentiate among the Brigades].

“MONUSCO’s framework brigades must also play a more active role in protecting civilians by deterring and, if necessary, preventing and stopping armed groups from inflicting violence on the population. Measures will be taken to prepare troop-contributing countries to conduct operations aimed at mitigating the threat from armed groups and protecting civilians, including through the use of lethal force. Troops and police should be better prepared to engage in protection tasks, including the prevention of conflict-related sexual violence. Troop and police contributing countries should therefore ensure, including through self-certification, that personnel being deployed have received pre-deployment training on protection of civilians.”²³”

A SPECIAL INITIATIVE INVOLVING MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES

Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) operating in MONUSCO consist, basically, of sending a team of representatives from different civilian sections, police and the military, to a site that has been assessed as being medium or high risk. There they assess the needs of the local population, make recommendations, and establish immediate initiatives both for their own offices and for the overall Mission. They are also deployed following news that some event has taken place (in this case they are called **Joint Assessment Teams** - JAMs). All these operations take place under the

direction of the Mission's Office of Civil Affairs. The JPTs principally include the Offices of Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, DDR, Human Rights, and Child Protection; Gender and Sexual Violence Units are added according to the case and system agencies also participate. What is new and interesting about the initiative is the level of integration and the role of the military: to protect the team, as well as share with it the information they have received and know about the local population (as it is often the military who receive information during their patrols).

MILITARY AND POLICE WOMEN IN PEACE MISSIONS

Increasing the participation of women in peace missions has been one of the major issues surrounding Resolution 1325 in the security area. All contributing countries are dealing with this theme at present, regardless of whether they speak publicly about it or not, and of whether they actually send women on peace missions. The subject is here to stay; in the case of military forces, it is linked to professional transformations being undertaken by the forces, and the rate of progress of those processes depends on many factors, including national gender policies, the weight of civil society organizations, public opinion and the need of the armed forces to increase their proximity to society.

2014 witnessed the first designation in UN missions of a woman as Force Commander, for UNFYCIP (Cyprus).

The Chief of Mission is also a woman.

Cyprus is thus the first case of female leadership in the two highest positions of a mission.

As already mentioned, the figures illustrate the attention paid to the subject, the progress made and the challenges still to be overcome. In addition to numbers, it is relevant to investigate the situation of female personnel and the practical issues surrounding their incorporation

into a peace mission. Thus, one of the objectives in the field work performed on the three missions was to observe the presence of women in contingents, their positions, their tasks and their perceptions, as well as those of their male colleagues (including the commanders). Similarly, during 2014 military women and men with experience in peace missions deployed in eight Latin American countries were interviewed; after having had the possibility to investigate contingents in very distant and diverse places and after interviewing military of many nationalities, the following observations are worth mentioning:

The first subject raised by a commander in the field is that they are working against sexual abuse. In the second place, they explain why there are so few women in the forces and where they are.

The belief that the military are against the incorporation of a gender perspective is a myth

The largest difficulty seems not to relate to the gender issue per se, but to the fact that this subject feel rather abstract in the military mentality, which is built around operational tasks.

Military women do observe and speak of the number of women, which seems logical for any individual wishing to join a group without being in a minority position.

- Perhaps this is due to natural resistance processes. But it may also be caused by the fact that these subconscious associations respond to the way the message was received. In the early years, the approach was to take advantage of different training opportunities by gathering all these matters in similar sessions, but now the review process of Resolution 1325 should necessarily work to separate what the mind has naturally united.
- Attitudes depend to a large degree on the personalities of both areas (the military and civilian specialists). There are military members that resist and others who do not, even from the same country. In our first field work, we ran into the huge resistance of a military commander who came from a country that applied one of the most dynamic gender policies in peace missions. And he was an exception. A larger degree of involvement by the capital cities is needed in order to find out what is happening in their contingents. It would also be advisable to develop in-mission efforts on civilian-military relationship (which could include training civilians in basic military issues).
- Discussions about whether the presence of women helps to relate with local populations or not, if women show more empathy, etc., developed in the sphere of academic and/or civilian debates that take place within the international community are not so easy to find in the field. Even military women are seldom interested in discussing these matters.
- What is mentioned, however, is the possibility of strengthening contacts with local women and of building trust (which is precisely one of the arguments put forward in the UN when advocating for the presence of women in the field). Both the women and men we interviewed acknowledged that whenever there is a woman in the group, the possibilities of increasing proximity improve; women say that people touch them (especially their hair), that they look at them unbelievably, and that, time and again, they are asked if they have a husband and children, and how it happened that they let her come.
- An outstanding task is to carry out some serious work, based both on theory and practice, describing in military language the issues surrounding the incorporation of women in peace missions. Current explanations are accepted in a politically correct way, but do not permeate the professional military perspective.
- Women being so few, some of the deep-rooted concepts in the traditional military career seem to lose their influence. One example is the separation between officers and non-commissioned officers. This generates different reactions. In MINUSTAH, the only female military officer of a contingent lodged together with non-commissioned women officers and the subject was not perceived to raise any problems. In UNIFIL, we were told about a female officer who was lodged with non-commissioned officers and demanded a room of her own, which the mission had to provide, since it was her right, even though the room had to be built especially for the purpose.

The small number of women deployed in missions is concentrated in a few countries that send many women, and differences between regions have been observed.

- Important contingents exclude women altogether. The main reason invoked is that they have no women in the infantry component.
- The countries which are in better conditions to contribute female personnel are European countries, not only in terms of numbers but especially because they have been assigning women for many years; these countries can contribute senior officers. However, in the mission in which those countries are predominant (namely, UNIFIL), as the gender issue is not considered part of the substance of the mission but rather as an internal matter pertaining to each contingent, the possibility of European countries to transmit their mainstreaming experience, perspective and practice to contingents from other regions is lost.
- Latin American countries are in conditions to contribute troops and officers up to the rank of captain or major (not many), but: a) the dissemination of experiences and lessons learned, which could encourage women to enlist (the system is voluntary), is almost non-existent, and b) further work needs to be done as regards transparency in the personnel selection process.
- Asian countries, if they chose to assign a higher number of female military personnel, would substantially increase the number of military women in peace missions, mainly because: a) their handling of voluntary enlistment is different from other regions, and b) in general, they send units which are already conformed.

The assignment of women to peace missions does not necessarily mean that their presence has an impact on specifically military tasks or on the local population.

- Of the three missions under study, only a few of the women assigned carried out duties outside their bases. Most of them worked in the nursing, administration, translation, medical care and cooking sectors.
- The low contribution of female personnel by contributing countries to a mission like MONUSCO is striking: bearing in mind the significance of the sexual violence problem in the area, one would expect a higher presence of women among the troops.
- Male military commanders have a notion which is exclusively associated with women: they are afraid to send them away from the security offered by base, because they feel that women should be “protected”. Further work is needed on this and similar subjects, for example, by producing studies contributing data on the issue and dispelling these notions; these studies could be disseminated in military training centres.

At the same time, positive discrimination raises significant fears among military women: they do not want to be treated differently or enjoy any privileges, and do not believe they should be entitled to any.

- Maybe the fact of knowing that they are observed at each step they take has a bearing on this attitude. This issue was raised on many occasions.
- Being a woman does not necessarily mean having different perspectives. Many of them avoid talking about the gender issue or are reluctant.
- In an interview with a Uruguayan riflewoman who, together with a helicopter pilot, is one of the few women who have been in actual combat situations in Congo in a military instead of a supporting position, she said that she would do it again any time. She was willing to exchange the comforts of the battalion for that isolated location in the middle of the jungle, surrounded by conflict and by men in a country where women are one of the targets of armed groups. Her male colleagues present at the interview nodded and spoke of her all the time.
- One major difficulty resides in cultural differences, that is to say, the way other cultures see women. Two cases of female officers who were not saluted by component commanders during military parades were mentioned to us.

Although the argument that women do not participate because they are unwilling to leave their family is invoked once and again in the capitals, this contrasts with the statements of both men and women in the field, all of whom voiced how much they miss their families.

- A young Bolivian woman officer said that “if I had the chance to repeat the experience, I would do it again”. A Paraguayan non-commissioned female officer that participated in the Argentine Task Force in Cyprus, when asked about her highest aspiration in the career, answered: “Attain the maximum rank and participate in another mission. In that distant place, I gained a lot of experience about serving and contributing to peace. It opened my mind and I was able to realize how cultural differences can spark conflicts”. A Brazilian support officer who participated in the Haiti mission stated that “My main motivation was to participate in an extremely interesting experience. But it was also a matter of personal achievement, of knowing that you can do much more than you think”.
- In the interviews, men and women alike described how they are affected by being far from their families and by what they see around them.
- At the same time, the vast majority of the people interviewed affirmed they would be willing to participate in another mission.

A UNIQUE EXPERIENCE: FEMALE POLICE UNITS

Bangladesh deploys two Formed Police Units consisting exclusively of women: one in Haiti and one in Congo. Both officers and non-coms are women. The few men present in the camp carry out cleaning tasks and the like.

These FPU protect UNPOL police forces while performing their duties, they control places and are deployed in prevention and law-enforcement tasks, for example in case of riots or uprisings. They carry out specific police work and

have the chance to be in direct contact with the population. They are a militarized force, with quasi military means and training and have a similar doctrine.

Three different units were interviewed (two in Haiti and one in the DRC), and both at commander and unit level the concerns did not differ from those of their male colleagues; they perform the same professional duties as policemen. They are mostly very young women and highly enthusiastic about their job.

Police personnel face other challenges and they are also present. Individual police officers –UNPOL- live on their own and are sent to missions individually; for this reason, they take more notice of the inhabitants and naturally they engage with them. They work at police stations, provide training on the treatment of victims and participate in police academies, both in Haiti and Congo. This proximity to the population leads to mixed feelings in the international personnel, and no differences were detected between men and women in this sense. For example, in Haiti, a Brazilian policewoman said: “At the beginning, the things I saw made me cry. I lived in a hotel and always bought more things

*In 2011, a **Mobile Gender Unit** was created within MINUSTAH. It consisted mostly of women, but there were some men also. Of the 15 officers we met in late 2012, most of them came from French-speaking African countries and were thus experienced in post-conflict environments. Three teams were deployed in the field, visiting displaced persons camps. If a case came up, they carried out police procedures and referred the victim to a hospital. Observing Mobile Unit personnel in the field, we saw they generated considerable interest on the part of local women.*

than necessary so I could give something to the children; this was a way to relieve my feelings”, while a male officer from another country made similar comments: “I saw terrible things, like children fighting for food with dogs. I visited a home for children; the children were abandoned. When I returned to my place, all I did was jog, jog and jog”.

THE MISSIONS' GENDER UNITS: WHAT THEY DO

During the last decade, one of the advancements made was the creation of a Gender Unit within the structure of each peace mission, or at least, the incorporation of a Gender Advisor directly linked to the DPKO's Gender Unit.

The institutionalization of the links between this Unit with the military and police component is an ongoing process. In practice, both civilian and military personalities carry weight, but the main point is the drive the Chief of Mission gives to the issue. Also important is the mission's mandate.

In MONUSCO, a clear example of an integrated mission, the Gender Office has a significant structure in a mission where civilian protection is the core of the mandate, as is the issue of Government assistance. The Office operates under the direct command of the Special Representative. It supports and assists the Congolese Government, particularly the Ministry for Gender, Family and Children, in the development of gender policies and actions and also works to implement a gender perspective in the various Mission offices and activities. Even with undermanned teams, the Office's tasks range from promotion seminars to the provision of assistance in the strengthening of political participation. The office interacts with the mission's components, including the military.

The Office's action plan is vast and comprises the following areas, among others:

- The **protection of civilians**, where they play a part in the Joint Protection Teams, collaborating to build capabilities within the military forces within the framework of a gender perspective, linking up with local women and also connecting them with the contingents.
- Providing **support to the electoral process**, in the design of security strategies for women who decide to vote, and in promoting greater female participation in politics.
- The **development of the security sector and the fight against impunity**: a key issue, in which codes of conduct are developed and gender training is carried out, not only of the military and police forces but also of judges.
- **Gender and DDR**: especially the issue of the women that - as discussed above - mobilize themselves along with their husbands and families. Also, the rehabilitation of soldiers' widows, no minor issue in a historical situation of intense conflict.
- The work of **gender focal** points within MONUSCO.

In MINUSTAH –as stated by Mission authorities- given the needs of the overall scenario, the gender subject has to be considered as a cross-cutting

LINKS BETWEEN GENDER OFFICES AND MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES IN MISSIONS

In MONUSCO and MINUSTAH, Gender Offices have established a regular working relationship with military and police forces at senior officer level, and joint activities. The persons in charge of the Offices have direct access to the Head of Mission and that (whether shown or not in the organization chart) is a fundamental element of respect and prestige within the Mission, as would be the case in any other institution. In field practice, this was also observed in details such as the natural gesture of taking up a phone to arrange a visit to a contingent (observed, for example, in MONUSCO),

the unscheduled visits of U9 military to the Gender Unit in MINUSTAH, or, also in MINUSTAH, the fact that UNPOL has an office in the same premises as the Gender Unit. During RESDAL's visits, the persons in charge of these offices exhibited excellent relations with local organizations, with the Head of Mission and with military and police forces; personalities somehow manage to overcome the scarcity of resources. Dealing with the gender issue in a mission environment requires a certain degree of sensitivity and skill, as it could be seen both in MONUSCO and MINUSTAH.

issue in the mission and in UN system agencies. In this context, the Gender Unit **reports directly to the Special Representative**. It supports the Ministry for Women and Family and the implementation of programs geared towards violence reduction; assists during elections; provides training and the joint work carried out by UNPOL with PNH; and supports CIMIC programs in favour of women, where the military also participate. Since 2011, it maintains a **Gender Focal Point Network** and applies a strategy aimed at facilitating the implementation of the mission's mandate and ensuring effective gender equality in all the activities. Focal points have been established in each mission office, which makes for effective coordination.

A striking aspect of this mission is the convergence of civilian, police and military components to develop the activities. The **Gender Unit**, the **UNPOL Gender Adviser Office**, and the **Gender Focal Point of the military component (G9)**, responsible for the gender issue in each component respectively, in the last few years have built an intense relationship which is transmitted to the activities. This is reflected both in the number of initiatives developed as in the benefits stemming from these relationships (mainly as regards the exchange of views among civilians, police and military personnel, which are naturally different).

In **UNIFIL**, the Gender Unit reports to the Civil Affairs Office, not directly to the Chief of Mission. In 2014, it was not observed to exercise a significant influence in mission headquarters. Perhaps this is partly due to the fact that the Unit's own position is that gender issues are not part of the mission mandate and are limited to events occurring inside the contingents.

The three Gender Units cultivate their own relationships with contingent commanders through **gender focal points**. This appears to be an intelligent strategy to achieve consensus and develop contact and action networks.

GENDER-BASED PERSPECTIVE IN POLICE AND MILITARY WORK

During the work carried out between 2011 and 2014, the efforts made by UN civilian, military and police personnel to uphold an adequate gender policy following the guidelines set out in Security Council Resolution 1325 could be observed.

In MINUSTAH, the U9, staff officers dedicated to civilian-military relationships, provided training on the issue. However, the reaction of most military unit chiefs was to restrict to the minimum any contacts between their personnel and the local population, except for personnel members that provided specific aid (for example, health care or water and food distributions to needy sectors or refugees). Although these tasks fall outside the mandate, they are relevant activities in every peace process.

Police senior personnel also endeavour to apply an adequate gender policy. What is more, as already mentioned, Bangladesh contributed a FPU consisting exclusively of female personnel. However, the same as with the military, a substantial barrier arises: although the country's official language is French, the neediest sector of the population speaks Creole, a language unknown to military and police contingents, who lack the time to learn it because their stay in the country is at most 6 or 9 months. Most civilian personnel, who stay longer with the mission, in general cannot master the local language either. The official mission language is English, which in many cases creates a linguistic ghetto which adds to the closed corporate patterns of a body embedded in an unfamiliar society. If to this situation we add the persistence of the traditional patriarchal culture, the slow progress of the gender issue comes as no surprise.

The situation of women within MONUSCO contingents remains within the same parameters as described for Haiti. Both police and military commanders train their people following the basic ideas established in SCR 1325. And they also struggle with the language barrier problem. In the DRC the situation is even more complicated, because although French is the official language, at popular level local languages are spoken. Thus, *lingala* is the dominant language in Kinshasa, while in the Kivus, local variants of *swahili* are spoken, in addition to other dialects used by smaller communities. Therefore, working with the local population is no easy job. Another factor to be taken into account is the predominance of the traditional patriarchal culture, which complicates MONUSCO's work as well as that of the many ONG's working in the field.

In Lebanon, the historical conflict with Israel combines with the effects of the intense conflict in Syria, which caused a huge flow of refugees to this Eastern country. The scenario is worsened by the action of ISIS (DAESH) in

UNPOL GENDER UNITS IN HAITI AND THE DRC

The **Gender Advisor Unit** operating within MINUSTAH has an office in the premises of the mission's Gender Unit since 2010. This unit develops its work based on:

- **Pillar I, Operations:** consisting of the permanent relationship with the MINUSTAH Gender Unit, the UNPOL Gender Mobile Unit at the IDP camps, and the Gender Focal Points deployed at 13 police stations in Port-au-Prince and 10 Departments in the country.
- **Pillar II, Development:** with the SGBV project and the work at the Police Academy as the main tools for training the HNP.

- The presence of a **Gender Advisor** as reporting officer to the Police Commissioner.

In the DRC, UNPOL does not have an executive mission, i.e. they cannot carry out police actions, which remain entirely in the local police's hands. Its strong points are training and assistance. Every UNPOL member receives training on the sexual violence issue and every province hosts a focal point that also works with system agencies and NGO's. A Sexual Violence Unit deploys specialized police officers in different sectors, participates in protection clusters and checks the background of candidates wishing to join the PNC.

north Lebanon. UNIFIL is deployed between the Litani river in south Lebanon, and the Blue Line, the still unmarked and unofficial border with Israel. As mentioned this country, a sort of residual miniature Ottoman Empire, is home to 18 confessional groups. The main ones are the *Maronite Christians* and the two main Islamic denominations (*Shiites* and *Sunnis*), as well as the *Druze*.

*A **Sexual Violence Unit (SVU)** was created within MONUSCO with the special mandate of combating sexual violence and assisting the Congolese government to implement the Strategy on this issue. This led to the request made by the Security Council in 2008 (SCR 1794) to develop a Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo. With the civilian redeployment of the mission, it has been proposed to reconfigure this initiative in 2015, and incorporate the **Women Protection Advisors** promoted by the UN for the missions.*

The situation of women differs according to their religion. Thus, cultural patterns typical of *Western consumerism* co-exist with the restrictive rules of the *sharia*, a civil, criminal and conduct code that shows some variations among the different Muslim denominations following this rule. In UNIFIL,

given the fact that almost half of its force come from European military forces which are members of NATO, the gender guidelines are very similar to those established by the UN. The rest of the personnel must be governed by the rules set out in SCR 1325, although this instrument was adopted when the mission had already been operating for 23 years. This fact, combined with constant political negotiations with Israel, the Lebanese government, their military forces and the militias, pushes the gender issue down to a lower place in the agenda.

Conduct and discipline: a responsibility for the mission and the contributing countries

This is one of the toughest issues to handle and, at the same time, it influences the idea that the local population has of a peace mission. But also, in the words of a conduct and discipline officer in MONUSCO, “*We cannot inflict, on people who are already traumatized, the additional burden that those supposed to be protecting them abuse them. Countries have to adopt pre-deployment measures. Here, we assume that arriving troops already have a certain level of training on the subject, that they were given a basic understanding of the situation in their countries*”.

The impact makes itself felt both in the mission itself (when there is an idea that the troops are occupation forces that have nothing to do and therefore commit abuses), and in the contributing countries, where the same arguments can be found in media reports when a case of this kind hits the headlines. In addition to taking preventive measures, more exhaustive studies should be developed. Some testimonies from military contingents indicate that when

they have a lot of work to do, they feel more satisfied and their mental stress decreases. It is therefore essential that Mission commands and the capitals **assess the activity level of their contingents.**

As regards indiscipline and abuse cases, it is pointless to discuss statistics or if there were many or just a few such cases; in the eyes of the population, one single incident creates an impact, and can destroy every positive achievement of a mission.

Some contingents have access to psychological and/or religious support, and this seems to help the personnel to channel their concerns. In other cases, psychological evaluations are conducted prior to deployment, but this is not often the case. Any type of relationship with the local population is highly discouraged in the case of civilian or police personnel and directly banned in the case of the military. However, it is clear that it is impossible for a mission to maintain absolute control, more so when the personnel is on leave (in the Dominican Republic, Beirut, Cyprus or Uganda, to quote a few examples). For all these reasons, it is important to develop activities related to the codes of conduct. It is also important that police and military commanders, as well as civilian chiefs, acknowledge the need to develop a sense of individual responsibility among the personnel as regards good conduct, and also that the **most fruitful action in this sense is the one taken prior to deployment.**

Transmitting the gender perspective in local forces training (security sector reform)

In the three cases, the missions have security sector reform programs which are carried forward not by national contingents but from the headquarters of the mission, mostly in relation to international cooperation ac-

tions. To establish lasting peace, it is important that the gender perspective be incorporated into local security reform processes right from the beginning

CIMIC and development activities: another entry point for a gender perspective

Most military contingents carry out different CIMIC tasks, such as supplying water to IDPs or needy areas, providing food rations or delivering the materials required to prepare them. They can also provide health and dental care services. In addition, they carry out recreation activities, especially for children, in critical places. These activities allow them to interact with the local community and get a sense their feelings and ideas, in this case with the help of translators. The military component has a clear notion about this: although these activities are promoted as a means to win the population's respect and at the same time to channel the personnel's desire to help, CIMIC activities are a complement that each country can implement with its own resources, taking into account that the military are the last resource in this area and that this responsibility lies primarily with the Mission's civilian component and with system agencies.

With the adequate coordination, this can be used to implement activities with a gender perspective, as some contingents did in Haiti, such as the Brazilian component (celebrating Mothers Day, or holding the Bombagay market in the BRABAT's jurisdiction on Saturdays, which provided employment for a large number of women), or the Bolivian contingent, which provided health care services for pregnant women.

For several contingents, in practice, CIMIC activities are narrated with the emotional load generated by an important activity. This seems to be particularly true in the case of infantry contingents. Perhaps due to their close proximity to the local culture, they express the need to carry out these types of actions mainly for


the emotional sake of the troops. On the other hand, collaboration in engineering works, such as road repair or reconstruction, is also a way to build a vision from and towards the local population. These are areas which still remain to be explored from the gender perspective point of view, and it is important that both from international organizations and contributing countries acknowledge this need.

Strengthening UNSCR 1325: Contributions from Security

1

The security sector accounts for the highest percentage of personnel deployed in PKOs. It is large enough to deserve higher attention.

Proportion of personnel in PKOs in early 2015





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

Make explicit reference to the gender perspective and/or SCR 1325 in mandates.

It is not enough to say that gender and SCR 1325 are crosscutting themes in all UN activities. Those on the ground usually look to the mission's specific mandate and the absence of a specific provision on gender adds to their resistance. The goal for the medium term should be that no mission directives state that gender is not a part of the mandate. If it is evident that the population is almost symmetrically divided and its distribution is almost identical, why do we still accept to approach gender issues collaterally? To what extent do we take into account demographics when considering the image projected by the Mission?

The Missions, and their personnel, project an image on the local population and should act in accordance. Institutions are not gender neutral, let alone when the majority of their personnel are men.



The ability to view the context with a gender perspective is a pending issue both for men and for women.



Source: United Nations, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. *World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision. Total population (both sexes combined) by major area, region and country, annually for 1950-2100 (thousands). Estimates, 1950-2010.* June 2013.

3

Diagnose the presence and rank of women in the Armed Forces from contributing countries in order to project the incorporation of women within the missions, both in number and in non-administrative positions.

Although an increase in the number of women in peace missions is largely dependent on the decisions made by contributing countries, other factors are important and require further analysis. Women are currently deployed mostly in administrative positions, and there is a combination of resistance and objective factors such as the absence of women in command positions given their recent incorporation within their ranks. A diagnosis of the following issues will lead to a more fruitful discussion among civilians and the military, and national and international authorities:

- What are the career patterns in each armed force regarding the incorporation of women?
- What are the requirements included by the UN during force generation for, for example, staff positions?
- How many years from now –according to each region– can we expect to have women with military rank of captain and above?
- How many women in the service career are currently prepared to be deployed and in what specialties?

Evolution: 6 largest troop contributing countries in MONUSCO (base 2010)

2010			2012			2014		
Country	Contingent	% women	Country	Contingent	% women	Country	Contingent	% women
India	4,004	0.17	India	3,704	0.00	Pakistan	3,744	0.00
Pakistan	3,570	0.00	Pakistan	3,695	0.00	India	3,719	0.27 ↑
Bangladesh	2,524	0.24	Bangladesh	2,528	0.55 ↑	Bangladesh	2,555	0.55
Uruguay	1,261	5.71	South Africa	1,234	12.24	South Africa	1,260	13.81 ↑
South Africa	1,196	13.55	Uruguay	1,180	6.02 ↑	Tanzania	1,251	3.60
Nepal	1,023	1.17	Nepal	1,023	1.66 ↑	Uruguay	1,177	9.35 ↑

Evolution: 6 largest troop contributing countries in MINUSTAH (base 2010)

2010			2012			2014		
Country	Contingent	% women	Country	Contingent	% women	Country	Contingent	% women
Brazil	2,187	0.64	Brazil	1,896	1.11 ↑	Brazil	1,356	1.11
Uruguay	1,136	2.90	Uruguay	954	3.56	Sri Lanka	1,134	0.00
Nepal	1,075	1.49	Sri Lanka	861	0.00	Uruguay	595	4.54 ↑
Sri Lanka	959	0.00	Argentina	722	6.93 ↑	Argentina	567	6.70
Argentina	704	4.97	Chile	499	2.61	Chile	412	4.85 ↑
Jordan	612	0.00	Peru	373	2.14	Peru	372	4.03 ↑

Evolution: 6 largest troop contributing countries in UNIFIL (base 2010)

2010			2012			2014		
Country	Contingent	% women	Country	Contingent	% women	Country	Contingent	% women
Italy	1,722	4.47	Indonesia	1,439	1.11	Indonesia	1,286	1.56
France	1,426	5.26	Italy	1,102	6.08	Italy	1,100	3.82
Indonesia	1,423	0.91	Nepal	1,018	1.96	India	900	2.22
Spain	1,074	9.87	France	899	5.56	Ghana	869	8.40
Nepal	1,020	2.16	India	898	1.11	Nepal	869	2.42
India	899	1.11	Ghana	876	8.22	France	827	4.59

Source: Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Gender Statistics. Data as at November of each year considered.



Personnel from the Uruguayan Battalion in Goma, DRC. (Photo: RESDAL).

Some case studies from Latin America could contribute to the diagnosis, such as:

- Military women on the ground: the experience of Bolivian female military officers.
- Design of a National Action Plan: the Chilean experience.
- Directives for personnel with a gender perspective: the case of Brazil.
- Implementation of gender policy in the Armed Forces: the case of Argentina.
- Female personnel deployed in operations: the case of Uruguay.
- Incorporation of auxiliary female personnel in complex scenarios: the case of Guatemala.

4

Uncover the actual incidence of current training and suggest more comprehensive methods to be adopted by Troop Contributing Countries.

Contributing countries send their troops with pre-deployment training based on the pre-deployment training modules (CPT), whose content is basic and universal; this may take a maximum of 3 hours.

The so-called induction training that is received upon arrival to the mission takes two days: the first day is dedicated to military issues and the second to thematic affairs, including gender. The gender component lasts 40 minutes.

All the relevant actors interviewed –including military contingents- expressed that such training was not sufficient.

Economising efforts and costs: Promote readily available resources

Military training modules based on the 2010 *Military Gender Guidelines*

The weakness of basic training led the DPKO and the Integrated Training Service (ITS) to propose supplementary modules that could be provided to deployed personnel (and, if approved by the Member States, even to personnel in pre-deployment). They are developed in accordance with the Directives for military personnel issued by DPKO/DFS in 2010, and were drafted by civilians and military officers with the participation of civil society organizations.

They have a strong practical component, since the guidelines on which they are based operationalize the gender issue within the practice of military personnel in peace missions. Unfortunately, the results have not been translated into an effective application, despite having dedicated significant efforts and budget to their creation (we are aware of their existence as RESDAL was one of the two organizations that participated over two years in the laborious drafting of the modules).

These modules are divided in to three levels:

- **Strategic level:** the various offices and units within the DPKO/DFS Office of Military Affairs at UN headquarters. Military activities at this level include strategic directives, military planning, force generation and the provision of support to contributing countries.
- **Operational level:** at staff level in the missions themselves. Activities involving the incorporation of a gender perspective range from the translation of strategic directives to operations on the ground to the field tasks assigned to the mission. These may include protection, information, monitoring, and support activities to local security forces, etc.
- **Tactical level:** training is targeted at military personnel deployed on the ground (contingents) to perform tasks assigned to them by the commanders and staff officers, requiring the implementation of the guidelines within daily tasks.


They were tested in regional training centers in Africa, Latin America and Asia, and on the ground with the Irish/Finnish battalion and other detachments in UNIFIL in 2013.²⁴

Training on reducing and containing gender-based violence used by UNPOL in Haiti

Besides actively supporting education and training at the HNP Academy, UNPOL has undertaken a project for training on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) for the national police, in this case under the auspices of Norwegian cooperation. The project is targeted at developing the capacities of the HNP in this area with respect to two central aspects:

- Generate capacities within the HNP to investigate and prevent sexual and gender-based violence by strengthening criminal investigation units dedicated to the area through specialized training. Training is provided by HNP members themselves, applying the concept of « train the trainers ».²⁵
- Contribute to the professionalization of the HNP in the area through the construction of a **National Coordination Office for Gender and Women's Affairs** at police headquarters to work on policies and gender mainstreaming in the police

The UNPOL sexual and gender-based violence project team in Haiti, in the first office constructed. Front: PNH Head of National Coordination. (Photo: RESDAL).



New methods for new generations

Standard training methods follow a traditional format based on presentations and dialogue. They also make use of cases and scenarios, which is essential. But this is not enough. When thinking about the actual implementation of a gender perspective, and particularly considering the younger generations that constitute the troops of today, wouldn't it be advisable to consider the use of interactive methods to enhance existing training methods?



In the military:

In the police:

5

Continue with dissemination and efforts on zero tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), focusing on three main aspects:

Professional training / Judicial systems / Pre-deployment evaluations

Military and police personnel should be aware of the role they are playing and what society expects of them. The security institutions of contributing countries –and particularly military institutions- should focus on the professional status assumed when becoming a military or police officer, in addition to the moral and legal aspects involved.

Progress on conduct and discipline will also be related to the military justice systems in force in contributing countries (and depend on the Memorandum of Understanding signed with each contributing country).



In this theme there also exists a series of clichés, such as “they are many months”, arguments that do nothing but talk about poor military professionalization and the lack of understanding of what a peace mission is in the world today. Those who cannot meet the demands of a mission environment should not participate in it, whether they are young or old, male or female, civilian or military.

National constitutions or specific legislation in each contributing country may deal with the issue of sending troops abroad. It would therefore be important, if such information does not already exist, to conduct an international survey to collect this information. The image of impunity usually held by the local population responds to the fact that personnel are generally repatriated and not prosecuted in the local jurisdiction. It is undoubtedly a complicated issue. Conduct and Discipline Units in the missions may conduct investigations on civil or police personnel but not on military personnel. To what extent has the legislation on military justice been updated in contributing countries so as to deal with the challenges of sending personnel to a peace mission?

Pre-deployment evaluation: Conduct and discipline problems are not solved through training alone. They are related to values, personalities, and the psychological and cultural aspects of the individual and to whether they expect misconduct to go unpunished or not. Individual responsibility must be reinforced. Psychological tests and the evaluation of latent variables by specialized civilian personnel might contribute to a task that is primarily the responsibility of contributing countries. Some contingents – such as the Brazilian – conduct interviews of this nature prior to deployment.

6

Separate SEA from gender issues in training, mission directives and documents.

Most contingents associate gender to the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). They all indicate that they have permanent meetings and communications on this topic. Whatever the motives, this shows that contingents and their authorities need to deal with the topic and a specific time should be assigned to it.

The gender perspective should be treated as a separate topic and in a comprehensive manner. And contingents want to work on this issue. Those contingents that do not deploy women showed an open attitude to discuss the topic. They do understand gender as an operational need. In other words, the contingent can and should develop a gender perspective even if they do not have female personnel, and that perspective is related to their daily activities and what they can contribute to the situation of women from the local population. During the fieldwork we conducted, we were invited on several occasions to make presentations to the troops on SCR 1325 and the gender perspective.



Troops from the Sri Lankan company in Killick, Haiti, participating in the session on gender with the RESDAL team. (Photo: RESDAL).



Some of the members of the Bangladesh Support and Signals Company in Bunia, DRC, following the interview. (Photo: RESDAL).

7

Work country-by-country on the design of military and police tasks with reference to SCR 1325 in a mission environment.

The gender perspective of a military force in a peace operation involves both the activities and projects conducted with the local population (protection, CIMIC activities, for instance), and the perspective within the contingent itself (basically, the situation of female personnel and of conduct and discipline). In the context of the three missions under analysis, the most developed part was the perspective within the military force, whereas the development of a perspective related to activities and projects is still at its initial phases.

Several years after its adoption, SCR 1325 is now well known and has been partially implemented. Until 2011, most military contingents interviewed were not aware or had very little knowledge of the Resolution, but that situation has changed over the years and it is now familiar. There is fertile ground for more training and for reflection by security institutions themselves on how to implement SCR 1325 within their daily practices. With support from the products already created by DPKO/DFS, programs should be promoted in contributing countries to evaluate things such as:

Incorporate language skills which make it possible to communicate with the local population and Mission staff as one of the evaluative factors when deciding locations and tasks.

Encourage a greater presence of women among local translators.

Make sure that reports prepared by patrols are immediately sent by the contingent to the offices responsible for gender and/or sexual violence in the Mission.

Encourage, in the case of MONUSCO, the formal and systematic involvement of military officers in Protection Groups.

Include specific provisions regarding tasks related to natural resources and border control in the instructions to contingents.

Schedule patrols according to an evaluation of the vulnerability of women in certain areas.

Increase non-routine and foot patrol activities.

Evaluate critical steps in each contingent for the incorporation of women into operational roles or patrols.

Enable housing facilities for female Mission staff in all operational bases, in particular in risk areas.

Instruct base and battalion commanders to incorporate links with gender and/or sexual violence offices in their area of responsibility into their routine operations, exchanging data and providing the means and security available to them.

Elaborate a list of the key names and organizations to attend to gender and sexual violence emergencies in their area of responsibility, making it available to each section leader, or battalion.

Develop guidelines for gender focal points in each contingent.

Some commanders are reluctant that visitors speak with female members of the contingent and invite them to speak about their experience in front of, for instance, high-level officials. Other commanders place them in the foreground, or invite them to speak in private. Whilst it should be recognized that such cases are dwindling, *situation still remains more dependent on individual personalities* than upon nationality or the number of women deployed. What the commander does and thinks is a supervision task that should also involve the TCCs.

Some contingents are beginning to develop CIMIC programs within which they incorporate a gender perspective: actively seeking the participation of local women, whilst placing emphasis on the involvement of women deployed within the contingent, albeit in the service sector. As a result, doctors and nurses are increasingly in personal contact with young local women, speaking to them about issues such as HIV prevention, or pregnancy etc. Much of this seems to be a result, at least in part, of the work carried out by the Command of the Mission's military component.



CIMIC activity by the Bolivian contingent in Haiti. (Photo: RESDAL).



Italian Head of Military Outreach of UNIFIL together with a military colleague from Indonesia showing the female and male 'Blue Barrels' which they use during school activities. The barrels mark the Blue Line that separates Lebanon and Israel (Photo: RESDAL).

8

Work globally on integrated designs for all missions for their incorporation of a gender perspective into military and police tasks.

During the past 15 years, significant efforts have been made from UN headquarters for the dissemination and implementation of SCR 1325, although many pending aspects remain.

The main observation is that, in practice, missions follow a general guideline but the degree to which a gender perspective and SCR 1325 are institutionalized is low: individuals and the evaluation of particular missions and their activities are highly relevant, and the relevance of a gender perspective is dependent on the type of mission.

Thus, as already indicated, and understanding that three very different missions represent a fairly good sample of the global situation, we can say that the gender perspective had a very low relevance to UNIFIL, whereas (and based not only on the actions of the UN mission but also of NGOs) in DRC and Haiti, it has had a much stronger relevance and is integrated into all mission activities.

In this context, and to build on the progress already achieved, we propose the consideration of achievable and concrete initiatives that lead to a fuller implementation of SCR 1325 on the ground in the area of security:

The appointment of a **gender focal point** in each military unit represents an important progress within the missions, and this has been promoted by the Office of Military Affairs of DPKO, particularly since 2011. The appointment of an officer in charge is an initial step, which should be followed by a clear description of their tasks and responsibilities: when asked about their role, they do not seem to have a clear idea. It is a task that should surely be undertaken by the mission's Gender Unit and the G9 of the military component.

A serious piece of work rooted in theory and practice that **operationalizes in military language** the questions surrounding the incorporation of women into peace missions. The current explanations are accepted as politically correct, but they fail to overcome the military professional perspective.

This includes the materials provided to contributing countries:

- Some contingents are already producing "cards" in a small format (the size of a credit card or similar), in their own language and the format of a military order specifying "what can and cannot be done". There should be one card specifically on gender, or else include some gender considerations in the general guidelines. It is also important to make sure that the troops will follow them as an order and as a standard procedure (SOP).
- It would be important to provide manuals and documents adapted to the military language, without the "nuances" of the civilian one. Some officers regard some manuals intended for their training as "too long" and "vague in nature".

More research on civil-military coordination for a more integrated approach to the gender perspective.

Perhaps one of the clearest problems in every PKO is the "distant attitude" of uniformed and civilian personnel. Despite the physical proximity of barracks and offices, cultural patterns are, due to training, very different. A military force, even if used for peaceful purposes, has an ethos that is closely connected to war. Police components follow concepts related to prevention. They are forces that serve the citizen through their proximity, but that also use force in a very restricted manner. Civilian components must be purely focused on peaceful principles. It is essential to understand the culture and the dominant personality of the other. This is also true of gender. Civilian components normally include several female officials, many of them in high positions. They are not so commonly found among the military components, while the police are somewhere inbetween. It is important to encourage the presence of more women among uniformed personnel and provide training to promote a better understanding of the objectives, duties and predominant cultural traits in each Mission component.



HINDI	ENGLISH	FRENCH	SWAHILI
आपके परिवार में कौन-कौन है?	Who all are there in your family?	कौन तो है परिवार में कौन शामिल?	अम्पामो वाको एवो कटोवा टोकोली वाको
आप कहां पढ़ चुके हैं?	Up to what level have you studied?	कौन ए सीन नीरो देतु कसोचो?	अम्पामो पापो जे अन्तिसोपा
आप किस कौले से सम्बन्ध रखते हैं ?	You are from which tribe?	तु अपार तेन अड कत कौतु	वेरे अम्पामो कतौवा
क्या आप मुझे रास्ता बता सकते हैं?	Could you please give directions to reach.....?	कौना नरा तु चुने.....?	उम्पामो लरावो कौको तु ली कुतौवा माली
कितनी दूर	How far is.....?	एत कन् लौवा ?	नीकोली तपो लरा वे टो अम्पामो
क्या आप कुछ सोचें ?	Would you like to have some thing ?	चुने तु.....	जे कत कुतु जिकी

Translation card uses by Indian troops in MONUSCO. (Photo: RESDAL).

Female doctor from Bangladesh's FPU in MINUSTAH, chatting in the Unit with one of the team members. (Photo: RESDAL).

9

Increase exchange and cooperation among regions (particularly South-South) to discuss and advance the implementation of SCR 1325 in military and police institutions across differing environments and cultures.

An effective implementation of SCR 1325 can only be achieved through a comprehensive and global understanding of its meaning and motivations. The challenge is to show how its provisions apply in different environments and cultures. This can only be achieved with the collaboration of the actors involved: countries and regions.

South-South cooperation is still an unexplored field in this area but troop contributing countries are gradually considering how to be a part of the solutions. Building bridges between different regions may help lead to a more inclusive international security. There are national and regional experiences on women, peace and security that should be shared and taken into account in bilateral and international cooperation projects.

International Conference “Peace Operations: Views from the South”

This Conference took place in Santiago, Chile on December 9 and 10, 2014, and was organized by RESDAL under the auspices of the local Ministry of Defence, as a first cross-regional effort to contribute to the review processes taking place in 2015: both SCR 1325 and peacekeeping operations. The objective was to gather the impressions of the participants on the future of peacekeeping and its relation to gender in building a lasting peace.

The countries represented at the conference contribute over 60% of the troops to peacekeeping operations. Participants from Bangladesh, Lebanon and Pakistan joined an inter-regional debate with other participants from 10 Latin American countries and representatives from DPKO and MINUSTAH.

Main aspects to be considered by the reviews

1. The need for permanent updating of diagnostics, both on the peace missions and their problems, and on the situation of women. This does not imply simply a quantitative vision (how many there are) but a survey of the quality of the tasks they perform, particularly in decision-making positions.
2. The need for greater coordination among the ministries of foreign affairs and defence in contributing countries.
3. Enhance the transmission of experiences, particularly with regard to the difficulties faced by peace forces in performing their mission when they are unfamiliar with the culture, language, religion, and expressions of daily life in the target countries. A big gap exists between what is proposed at headquarters as guidelines and what can actually be done in the field.
4. Greater responsibility among States to obtain consensus and political support to act in a multilateral environment, particularly in the United Nations.
5. The two panels proposed by the UN for these reviews should consider the opinion of civil society organizations involved in these issues.
6. Consider multidisciplinary deployments, which include not only military personnel but also diplomatic staff and other specialists in economic and social development.
7. Generate exclusively female military units and send them to some United Nations peacekeeping operations.
8. Facilitate coordination between the United Nations, ministries of defence and foreign affairs, armed forces and training centers for the preparation of peace forces.
9. The need to conduct studies on the role of women in decision-making positions at the various ministries related to the area.
10. Conduct thorough studies on some paradigmatic missions, such as MINUSTAH, to evaluating and elaborating lessons learnt. For comparative purposes, conduct a similar study on one of the complex missions in progress in other parts of the world, such as in Africa.
11. Promote similar conferences in other regions of the world.

The message sent by the current President of Chile and former Executive Director of UN Women, **Michelle Bachelet**, emphasized the country's commitment to the issue and the need for these regional dialogues. The following is a summary of the message:

"I would like to welcome you and to express my deep satisfaction for this opportunity of discuss and reflect offered by the International Conference: *Peacekeeping Operations: Views from the South after 15 Years of Resolution 1325*. I would love to have shared this encounter with you, but unfortunately I will be away from the country.

This is a necessary and pending subject of discussion in the mission that we have assumed towards peace-building and peace-keeping in the world. Two years have passed since we last met in Buenos Aires to discuss gender, peace and security. [International Conference Promoting gender to build a lasting peace, April 2012]²⁶ At the time, we talked about the work already done and the progress attained, discussing the future steps and challenges in protecting vulnerable women and girls in armed conflicts, as well as seeking to increase women's involvement in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.

Today, 14 years after Resolution 1325 was passed, we need to consider new guidelines to make this a reality. And that is our main aspiration, as each of us has made a commitment to every woman on this planet.

For this reason, it is essential for us to introduce a gender-based approach in the design, implementation and execution of our international cooperation policies, in particular the actions aimed at helping end violence against women.

Along these lines, I am proud to mention that Chile was the first country in Latin America to create an action plan on women's security and protection in cases of armed conflict. I feel even more satisfied to tell you that the second action plan on UN Resolution 1325 regarding the protection of women and children in conflict and post-conflict situations has already been completed.

We certainly have many challenges ahead of us and many measures to be further improved.

Hence, I welcome this encounter as it offers a great opportunity to exchange experiences and reach conclusions regarding women's participation in decision-making positions, the protection of girls and boys and their post-conflict recovery.

I wish you all the best for this conference and trust that the resolutions arising from it will highly contribute to the respect of human rights for every woman in armed conflict zones."



Participants of the International Conference, December 2014.

10

Achieve a higher involvement of civil society in UN mechanisms and those of contributing countries.

Few civil society organizations in the various regions deal with the issue of the security sector and fewer still in relation to SCR 1325. The UN and contributing countries face many challenges in this area. A synergy of efforts is advisable, as well as the promotion of the work these kinds of organizations can offer, bridging security forces, public opinion, academia, governments and international organizations.



Member of the Pakistani Battalion escorting civilians from the RESDAL team in Bukavu (DRC).



Non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance programs with refugees, here in the local offices of **Association Najdeh** in the Shatle Palestinian camp in Beirut (Photo: RESDAL).

11

Undertake a review of SCR 1325 that targets the military and police forces of future peacekeeping.

	<i>Acknowledge the progress achieved</i>	<i>Free-up blocked issues</i>	<i>Identify gaps and work on current needs</i>
<i>Protection of women</i>	Acceptance of the notion of sexual violence as a weapon of war. Production of escorts in some missions and by certain countries.	Specific military and police plans integrated within an overarching strategy. Attention to civil-military coordination problems.	Use of non-conventional training to generate gender perspective (concept of "strategic corporal"). Use of practical over theoretical methodologies to relate the topic to the security sector's role and logic.
<i>Women as actors</i>	Calls for local women to work in several missions.	Specific look on demobilization and reintegration processes.	Security of female candidates. Security of women working in civil society. Gender perspective in CIMIC activities.
<i>Participation of women military and police personnel in peacekeeping operations</i>	Collection of statistics. Calls for National States to send more women. Female Police Units.	Increase in female personnel. Send officers from the command corps. Greater participation of female officers in staff positions.	Full integration in specific professional tasks, and outside the barracks. Diagnosis of the incorporation of women into the armed forces in contributing countries. Considerations on possible formation of female military units.
<i>Force behaviour</i>	Awareness of problems surrounding sexual abuse. Zero tolerance.	Collaboration of countries in prosecution. Greater knowledge among capitals regarding the level of activity of their contingents.	Gender perspective implemented across the entire component to aid in their tasks and for a proper appreciation of the mission area. Awareness on the image that a peace mission projects to the local population.

FINAL THOUGHTS: THE CONTEXT FOR THE REVIEW OF SCR 1325

The discussion and implementation of SCR 1325 and the development of a gender perspective in the security sector are not insulated issues but are instead produced in a context of the sector that must be taken into consideration. The first element is that we are not experiencing the change of an era, a discernible stage in the historical process, more or less expected or predictable in general terms, but the change of an era upon which future narrators will bestow a name. We are living in a liquid, unpredictable society with constant changes of scenarios that we insist on analyzing using institutions and concepts from the past.

The imposition of globalization frameworks, the “mondialisation” as the French call it, coexists with mentalities and “imagined communities” that lead to provincial conflicts that, nevertheless, have an impact beyond their place of origin.

With a population that continues to grow and concentrate in urban areas and increasingly in coastal areas, the conflict adopts new features.

Many are “permanent” conflicts that, though evolving in their stages and forms, endure with time. They lack a visible solution and their management also

presumes the employment of instruments that also endure the time. Among these, we may mention UN peace missions or of other organizations, such as the African Union. Many conflicts are transformed and assume different characteristics.²⁷

This situation of permanent conflicts without foreseeable solutions exhausts decision-makers in central countries as well as donors, and leads to a reduction in the allocation of resources for long-term missions. There is a temptation to confront them with “robust missions” whose purpose is to impose solutions and not just to monitor and deter. Many countries in Latin America are considering whether they can follow that path. The initial response is negative, but the point for the armed forces is how to adapt to the change in scenario. Another tried and tested option is to make use of technology, as we have seen with the use of drones in the DRC. Various ideas are floating along DPKO corridors in New York, while operators of private security companies see an opportunity in the lack of convincing state responses. New problems, such as the expansion of maritime and port piracy, seem to escape intergovernmental organizations.²⁸

Beyond asking ourselves who is, or who are, the actors to be faced, it is important to know why the processes work or not. Many conflicts clearly include violence against people, but the most relevant aspect is that of

armed propaganda. To be at the center of the global scene, through social media, videos and movies shown on TV, is the objective of many political and social movements today. In the face of this, the mechanisms employed in the past century, which imply the use of traditional military or police forces, are not necessarily efficient. The commission that reviews peace-keeping operations should consider these new forms in which conflict is expressed.

Now, 15 years after the adoption of SCR 1325, it is important to continue considering the role of women in these armed conflicts. And not only as victims, but instead understanding that on various occasions the female body has formed part of the language of violence, using it as a “weapon of war” to affect the outcome of the conflict.²⁹

When evaluating the impact of these 15 years of SCR 1325, it is pertinent to assess what has been accomplished, but while taking into account that this is a very long term task. To go from a situation in which women are viewed as objects before social subjects is

part of an educational process, and of the new living conditions in urban centers. This implies a tireless endeavour: the preconceptions about women, just like conflicts, also endure with time.



Rural-urban setting in Goma, DRC.

NOTES

1 United Nations Organization, Department of Peacekeeping Operations. *Gender Statistics by Mission for the Month of December 2014* (New York: UN, 7 January 2015). The totals mentioned include the military members in UNAMA (Afghanistan) and UNAMI (Iraq), political missions under the jurisdiction of the UN Department of Political Affairs. The number of missions under the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is 16.

2 Recognizing the specificities of the topic – including the implicit or explicit associations between gender and women, which are conceptually wrong since it is an issue that involves both men and women-, the truth is that both in the documentation and in the daily practice of the institutions, the reference to gender issues is immediately related to the situation of women. The debates on this topic among the feminist academia itself are numerous and exceed the purpose and scope of this article. Another interesting discussion refers to whether women are placed as victims and whether this has an impact on the agenda. For instance, with reference to SCR 1325, Puechguirbal suggests that in UN texts “women are primarily represented in a narrow, essentialist definition that allows decision-making men to maintain them in the subordinated positions of victims, thus removing women’s agency.” See Puechguirbal, Nadine. “Discourses on Gender, Patriarchy and Resolution 1325: A Textual Analysis of UN Documents” in *International Peacekeeping* 17-2 (London: Taylor & Francis, 2010), page 173.

3 In February 2001, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president of Haiti by an overwhelming majority of the votes (91.69%), but apparently voter turnout only reached 10%. However, this “popular” leader lost support very soon. He was accused of not containing corruption or improving the country’s economy, which was dying. Parliamentary elections were supposed to be held in the late 2003 but the opposition boycotted them forcing the president to rule by executive orders. In December 2003, under a growing pressure, Aristide rejected the opposition’s request for his resignation and promised to hold new elections within six months. But the opposition also organized protests. Anti-Aristide demonstrations in January 2004 ended with several casualties in violent clashes in the capital, Port-au-Prince. That was followed by a revolt in February 2004 in the city of Gonaïves, promoted by an armed group called the National Front for the Liberation and Reconstruction of Haiti, a group that had supported Aristide but then turned against him after their leader was killed in September 2003. The rebels seized Gonaïves and expelled the –ill equipped- police from the city. The rebellion spread soon: former exiled soldiers from the army dissolved in 1994 and several militia leaders joined the rebels. Once Cap-Haitien was controlled by the rebels, the situation developed rapidly and Aristide was deposed in late February. The US government declared that the crisis was motivated by Aristide, that he was not acting in the best interest of his country, and that his expulsion was necessary for the future stability of the country. Furthermore, and for fear of a new wave of refugees and the use of the territory by criminal groups, particularly drug traffickers, they encouraged the UN to send a peace mission, the third since 1994.

4 Although it only presents the Brazilian point of view and, more precisely, that of the Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations Joint Center, we recommend reading the document *Ten years of MINUSTAH and the CCOPAB*, whose author is Lieutenant Colonel (R) Carlos Alberto de Moraes Cavalcanti, published in 2014. Available in <http://www.ccopab.ab.mil.br/index.php/pt/>

5 On October 14, 2014 SCR 2180 extended the mandate of MINUSTAH for one year, reducing the force level from 5,200 to 2,370 and adding 200 police officers (to a total of 2,601). Several Latin American ambassadors expressed their concern for the future security situation in the country, despite voting for the change of mandate with a reduction in the number of troops, as was the case of the representatives from Argentina and Chile. Argentine representative Marita Perceval clearly expressed opposition to conducting “robust” missions beyond deterrence. In November 2014 the mission comprised 5,218 troops (152 women), 1,571 members of the FPU (none from Latin America) and 736 members of the UN individual police (74 women).

6 Martelly (also known popularly by his stage name Sweet Micky) was an old student from the military academy dissolved in 1994, from where he was allegedly expelled, and a musician. In May 2011 he was sworn in as President following a controversial electoral process where he participated in a run-off after the ruling party candidate withdrew. Under the Constitution the President can be elected for two 5-year terms, so he is running for reelection in 2015.

7 For the history see inter alia: Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold’s Ghost: a story of greed, terror and heroism in colonial Africa* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998). Joseph Conrad, *El corazón de las tinieblas* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Sol, 2006). Martin Ewans, *European Atrocity, African Catastrophe. Leopold II, the Congo Free State and its Aftermath*. (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002). Jason Stearns, *Dancing in the glory of monsters* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

8 See the diagnosis on armed groups produced by MONUC in 2002 at the request of the Security Council. It refers particularly to the groups from Rwanda and other neighboring countries, but also to local groups like the Mai-Mai (armed groups formed locally with the intention of protecting the territory). United Nations Security Council, *First Assessment of the Armed Groups operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/341* (New York: UN, 5 April 2002).

9 International Rescue Committee, *Mortality in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. An Ongoing Crisis* (New York, IRC, 2008).

10 A thorough analysis of the resolution that created the brigade and its legal implications and on peacekeeping operations can be found in Lamont Carina and Skeppström Emma. *The United Nations at War in the DRC? Legal Aspects of the Intervention Brigade* (Stockholm: FOI, December 2013).

11 See for instance Verini, James. “Should the United Nations Wage War to Keep Peace?” in *National Geographic* (Washington DC: National Geographic Society, 27 March 2014) available at <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/03/140327-congo-genocide-united-nations-peacekeepers-m23-kobler-intervention-brigade>. Or “In Congo, peacekeepers at war” in *The Boston Globe*, 28 November 2014, available in <http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/11/28/congo-peacekeepers-war/zfBirYjxsk0tdZahfWCJ/story.html>.

12 The balance of power based on population distribution led to a Maronite Christian President, a Sunni Prime Minister and a Shiite Speaker of Parliament. After the Taif agreements, which ended the deep internal confrontation, they decided to have 128 seats in Parliament: 64 Christians and 64 Muslims. They work, however, with inter-religious alliances. As of June 2014, there were 57 representatives of the Coalition of *March 14* –anti Hezbollah– and 57 of the Coalition of *March 8*, with a “bridge” group of 11 centrists. In total, 27 different parties could be counted.

13 For example, the conduct and discipline unit, based in UNIFIL's command headquarters in Naqoura, which has a regional scope and covers the mission in Cyprus, UNTSO and UNSCOL, has two military members in its staff. A military officer from Ghana was precisely the person who presented the unit to RESDAL' delegates.

14 At the world conference held in London in 2014 by invitation of the Foreign Office and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (represented by W. Hague and Angelina Jolie respectively), the Lebanese foreign minister Gebran Bassil so expressed. See Fleihane Khalil, « Bassil. 'Le viol comme arme de guerre est inconnu au Liban' » in *L'Orient- Le Jour*, 14 June, 2014, available at <http://www.lorientlejour.com/article/871721/bassil-le-viol-comme-armede-guerre-est-inconnu-au-liban-.html>.

15 Donadio Marcela and Mazzotta Cecilia. *Women in the Armed and Police Forces: Resolution 1325 and Peace Operations in Latin America* (RESDAL: Buenos Aires, 2008). English and Spanish versions available at http://www.resdal.org/wps_sp/

16 Solhjell Randi (coord.). *Turning UNSC Resolution 1325 into operational practice: A cross-country study on implementing Resolution 1325 in military operations* (Oslo: NUPI, 2012), <http://english.nupi.no/Activities/Organizaton/Department-of-Security-and-Conflict-Management/Projekter/Turning-UNSC-Resolution-1325-into-operational-practice-A-cross-country-study-on-implementing-Resolution-1325-in-military-operations>.

17 Bastick Megan y Valasek Kristin (eds.). *Gender & Security Sector Reform Toolkit*. (DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR UN INSTRAW: 2008). Available at <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Gender-Security-Sector-Reform-Toolkit>.

18 DPKO/DFS. *Guidelines. Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations* (DPKO/DFS: New York, March 2010).

19 UN Women. *Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice* (UN Women: New York, 2010).

20 A story told by a gender officer deployed in the East illustrates how the military role is perceived amongst civilian personnel: "One day, in a meeting with a group of women in a village in the interior, we were discussing a major problem, the stigmatization of women regarding matters of witchcraft. Often, women who present a nuisance to the family or the husband or the community are accused of being witches and sometimes stoned by the community without anyone intervening. Then, one of the women who was at the meeting raised her hand and asked me if I could give her my phone number to call me and come to support them in the case of an attack. I gave it to them, but that night I was thinking about it. The place is about two hours from where I am based. I feel responsible for the protection of these women, but it is impossible in such a case to take a car and drive two hours on these roads to go to defend a woman, I probably wouldn't make it or I'd arrive late. As a result, many of my responsibilities as a gender officer cannot be fulfilled if I am working alone; I need to be supported by both the police and the military. This collaboration is absolutely necessary if civilians are really going to be protected."

21 "(...) various population centers were attacked and burnt, transcending news reports of 30 deaths. The survivors, the majority women and children, found themselves fleeing from the two locations which had been attached in order to seek refuge in another population centre, Nzovu, which is located some 120 kilometers to the west of Bukavu.

"On the 6th of January UN support is requested to evacuate large numbers of people from the village of Nzovu, because health conditions had declined and resources been used up due to the large number of wounded from other locations that had taken refuge there."

"At 17:45 both aircraft landed at Kavumu airport, moving a total of 16 people (13 adults and 3 children), with traumas and wounds of differing severities. They were treated and taken to hospital by members of the International Red Cross." *Fuerza Aérea Uruguaya realiza su mayor evacuación aeromédica en la RDC*, http://www.fau.mil.uy/20120106_medevac_congo.html.

22 During an interview, the Director of Panzi Hospital, managed by the Swedish Pentecostal Church and present in Congo since 1921, asked "what is MONUSCO's plan of action?" adding that he considers it opportune to maintain the mission but that it must be used to stop the violence. He said that many of the soldiers "know more than they say". Dr. Mukwege is known for being very "vocal" in his criticism of Rwanda and their actions in the Congo, and later in the year he was forced into temporary exile.

23 United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo submitted pursuant to paragraph 39 of Security Council resolution 2147, S/2014/957* (New York: UN, December 30, 2014), p.30 and 52. P. 31 adds that "MONUSCO's leadership and members of the diplomatic corps noted the need to remove the distinction between the Force Intervention Brigade and the framework brigades. While it may be impractical for all contingents to be authorized to conduct targeted offensive operations to neutralize armed groups, urgent measures are required to ensure a more active contribution by the framework brigades to activities in the context of the neutralization of armed groups and the protection of civilians."

24 UNIFIL. *Women, Peace and Identifying Security: Piloting Military Gender Guidelines in UNIFIL*. Final Report. June 2014.

25 Jon Christian Moller. *Performance evaluation, MINUSTAH Police Component / HNP Development Pillar, Project 19 – Gender Based Violence – Strengthening sexual and gender based crime police cells and units*. (UNPOL MINUSTAH. SGBV Team: Port-au-Prince, June 2012).

26 See the publication by RESDAL *Engendering Peacekeeping. the Case of Haiti and DRC*, and the report of the International Conference available at <http://www.resdal.org/ing/assets/resdal-internationalconference-april2012-finalreport.pdf>

27 We can mention some examples from Latin America. The successful UN missions (ONUSAL in El Salvador and MINUGUA in Guatemala) accompanied the peace processes that ended the insurgency in both countries. New developments, some related to the previous conflict, led to problems with urban security, gangs, etc. expressed in high levels of homicides and other crimes. See RESDAL. *Public Security Index: Central America: Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama* (RESDAL: Buenos Aires, 2013), <http://www.resdal.org/ing/libro-seg-2013/index-public-security-2013.html>

28 For instance, the control of piracy off the coasts of Somalia was assumed by NATO in a military alliance with private security companies. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea in Africa led to a UN study about the possibility of deploying a maritime mission, but the conclusion was there were no resources for that kind of operation.

29 In the 17th century, Baruch Spinoza wondered "What can a body do?", thinking about the difficulty to identify, unpredictable and variable, what individuals can be in their relations with others and the environment. This concept of the Dutch philosopher, the body as a political force, was then assumed by Gilles Deleuze, suggesting that the body can accomplish the opposite of what the system determines, victims (often glorified) and victimaries, that more than once exchange their roles.