



The shifting role of security institutions and civil society

By Amna Kausar and Stephanie Wallace

A study based on 10 national compared cases:
Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Serbia, Syria, Uganda and Venezuela.

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Executive Summary

The security context has fundamentally changed in recent years, with new and complex threats emerging. These include an increase in the frequency and sophistication of cyberattacks conducted by and against a range of state and non-state actors and the changing international power dynamics which is generating new and exacerbating existing interstate competition. An additional example is the increasing polarization of societies and a growing dissatisfaction with governments, leading to civil unrest in many cases. Many of these threats have assumed a different shape to conventional security threats and, therefore, the typical means of responding and mitigating the threats are no longer as relevant and effective.

There is widespread and profound uncertainty across the regions and countries seem to be increasingly adopting an inward-looking perspective at a time when international cooperation and diplomacy is paramount. This has been compounded by the fact that democratic countries, typically considered to be secure and established, have been challenged by new security developments and do not seem to have clear solutions.

In this context and over the last 3 years, security institutions, in this case military and police institutions, have been granted and/ or assumed increasing autonomy and their role has evolved in many countries across Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and MENA. Their missions have increased in number and diversity in the quickly evolving and unpredictable security context. A key example is the security forces' response to the threat of COVID-19; in most countries, the military and/or police stepped up to administer vaccines, deliver food and medical supplies and enforce emergency legislation, amongst other tasks. This demonstrates the importance of their existence and the dependency on these institutions. Although, with quickly moving and often chaotic situations of emergency, there have been issues with the undertaking of their duties and the intention to provide security to the country. Some argue that these issues are related to an increase in and normalization of autocratic tendencies which have detrimentally impacted democratic practices in civil society. In line with this, there have been also been concerns raised regarding the shrinking space for civil society advocacy and activism.

This research describes the state of security and the democratic context according to the following dimensions of security: **cybersecurity, economic, environmental, health, personal** and **political**. In doing so, it analyzes how the police and military institutions have been deployed increasingly to respond to new security threats in these dimensions as well as highlighting key trends in the development of their missions which impact the democratic environment.

Each researcher collected data by completing a questionnaire and conducting one interview with a representative from a civil society organization (CSOs). The questionnaire contained 60 questions and was divided into the following sections: diagnosing the state of national security, diagnosing the legislative capacity of the security institutions, the practical application of this legislation and diagnosing the state of civil society. These sections considered the following thematic dimensions of security: cyber, economic, environmental, health, personal and political.


The interview consisted of 7 questions and covered the following topics: support for civil society, challenges for civil society and the capacity of civil society. Each researcher was encouraged to provide all sources where possible and record the interview to improve the transparency of the overall process.

Dimensions of security and role of military and police forces

Cybersecurity

According to the experience of major cyberattacks against critical infrastructure, cybersecurity is becoming an increasing concern for the regions considered. This is demonstrated through an increase in the frequency and/ or severity of cyberattacks identified. Even the countries –Colombia, Hungary and Indonesia- with dedicated units and trained personnel are still experiencing significant numbers of cyberattacks against government institutions. In particular, financial institutions were identified most frequently amongst those targeted. Countries which have not taken appropriate precautions to mitigate potential risks in the cyber domain are particularly vulnerable. Some vulnerabilities cited include a lack of legislative infrastructure, knowledge and expertise.

Has the country taken appropriate precautions to prepare for cyberattacks?



Source: Own elaboration based upon findings from the questionnaires collected from the ten national cases.

In terms of the legislation surrounding cybersecurity, this was the only security dimension where no emergency legislation had been implemented. Generally, the legislation prescribed greater involvement of the police forces. This was true for 5 countries, whilst other countries acknowledged the legislative capacity as being shared between the police and military, or in 2 cases, solely the responsibility of the military. When considering the programs undertaken by the security forces in practice, the issues mentioned were rooted around the legislation enabling instances of curbing individuals' freedom of expression. This was exemplified in one case through the police conducting cyber patrols on social media and reprimanding certain users. Violations of personal data were also highlighted through governments penetrating the privacy policies of their critics and civil society organizations, and the mass surveillance of the general public.

All cases indicate that there is potential for security forces and the State to violate human rights of both opponents and their own citizens in the cyber domain. Cyber-attacks are becoming more frequent and increasingly sophisticated in nature and given the rate at which current technical advances are taking place, this domain represents a significant threat for both national and individual security.

Economic security

Provision of basic infrastructure and socio-economic development

All countries considered are experiencing a period of economic insecurity and deteriorating economic conditions; this in addition to a desperate humanitarian crisis for Venezuela and Syria. The majority of countries had demonstrated a longer-term strategic vision through the development and implementation of strategic infrastructure plans. According to the legislation in most countries, the military have missions related to basic infrastructure.¹ However, various issues were highlighted around the programs undertaken by the military. These predominantly concerned a lack of transparency around the use of public funds, including awarding infrastructure contracts to supporters of the regime, as well as doubts about the military's ability to effectively deliver the programs. As noted for one case, there is certain flexibility in the legislation which allows the military to expand their capacity and use certain infrastructure projects to consolidate their economic power. This results in reduced accountability for security institutions to carry out certain infrastructure projects.

Migration flows

Migration emerged as a prominent concern affecting national security and contributing towards destabilizing the economy. Conflict within or in the surrounding countries was the main driver for migration for Colombia, Hungary, Lebanon, Nigeria, Uganda, Pakistan, Syria and Venezuela. Other push factors included deteriorating social and economic conditions and extreme weather brought about by climate change. Migration has already had a notable impact on the political landscape, particularly in Europe, and with these factors expected to worsen it is likely migration will continue to affect security and the economic landscape of these countries. Venezuela and Syria have seen significant outward migration flows, 6 and 6.8 million respectively, since the beginning of the crisis and war. These flows are now impacting other dimensions of security. For example, Syria has a dearth of health professionals which resulted in the country being extremely vulnerable to the impacts of Covid-19.

For the countries that have legislation about managing migration flows, the military either have the authority to act independently or lead programs with the police supporting within their normal law enforcement capacity. For Hungary, the declaration of a 'refugee crises' granted the military authority under emergency legislation to step in. In Indonesia, there is no national legislation yet security forces are still undertaking related programs. Both instances represent an increasing militarization of borders. Concerns around the application of this legislation were noted in the majority of countries where the military were undertaking programs. These mostly concerned human rights violations within the contexts of the treatment of migrants and disputes with neighboring territories.


¹ Where basic infrastructure is defined as the basic system which allows the country to function economically e.g., transport, water systems and communication channels.

Environmental security

Managing risks and responding to disasters

Whilst both natural and anthropogenic adversely affect the health and economic security of a country, some risks can be mitigated and the impacts reduced through implementing appropriate disaster risk management systems. This is particularly true for some anthropogenic disasters which could be avoided. However, natural disasters will increase in frequency and severity and the impacts of these will be exacerbated by climate change. Many of the countries considered are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change which is playing out in different ways. In Nigeria, this is also affecting socioeconomic dynamics which is demonstrated through violent disputes between herders and farmers over resources. An increasing number of Ugandans are facing food insecurity which was already a concern. In Hungary, extreme weather has brought drought and the desertification of agricultural land, whereas water scarcity has become even more pronounced for Pakistan and Syria.

Natural and anthropogenic disasters during the last three years



Country	Natural disaster	Anthropogenic disaster
Colombia	Hurricanes	Deforestation
Indonesia	Earthquakes, tsunami, volcano eruption, landslide	
Nigeria	Flooding	Oil spills and explosions
Pakistan	Earthquakes, flooding, drought	
Serbia	Flooding, forest fires	Explosions
Syria	Water scarcity	Oil spills, use of chemical weapons as warfare
Uganda	Drought, flood, landslide, extreme heat	
Venezuela	Torrential rain and flooding	

Source: Own elaboration based upon findings from the questionnaires.


Generally, the security forces have a role according to the legislation around disaster risk management. The military seems to have more involvement in some cases, while the police assume a supportive role. For Indonesia and Hungary, it is worth noting that there is no specific legislative infrastructure for managing natural and/ or anthropogenic risks/ disasters. For the other countries, the plans they have in place are still to translate into environmental security and many activities seem to be reactive rather than proactive, which is particularly problematic in the context of climate change.

Health

Provision of basic essentials

Based upon the population having access to water and nutritious food, most of the countries analyzed did not meet the minimum standard. The reasons given were based around water scarcity, water contamination and issues with food production. Another key factor impacting health security in many of these countries is the outbreak of infectious diseases. In addition to Covid-19, Ebola, tuberculosis, dengue fever, malaria, diphtheria and measles caused considerable harm to populations and their impacts have been exacerbated by breakdowns in local health infrastructure, particularly so in Syria and Venezuela.

Is there access to nutritious food and water in the country?




Source: Own elaboration based upon findings from questionnaires.

During Covid-19, the military was the main force in charge of providing essentials. Other programs included enforcing restrictions and vaccine distribution. In Pakistan, the military were deployed on an ad-hoc basis and developed similar programs yet without the legislative authority; notably, they were only called to intervene where attempts to impose restrictions by law enforcement were deemed ineffective. Emergency legislation was implemented in Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Serbia and Venezuela. According to the data collected, the security forces' development of this kind of programs was problematic in four of the cases. The main theme to emerge was related to the use of excessive force to enforce public health restrictions. In most cases, the lack of legislation defining specific roles has led to over-involvement of security actors without legal basis.

Personal Security

The countries analyzed did not report an increase in crime, in general. This should also be analyzed, considering the quality and homogeneity of data sources, which is one of the biggest problems around the globe: having reliable statistics, in series of years and with homogeneous characteristics between different national sources -such as prosecutors and police- is the great challenge for many countries.



Source: National Police (Colombia); Central Statistical Office (Hungary); Bureau of Statistics (Indonesia); Ministry of Interior (Pakistan); Statistical Office (Serbia); Police Force (Uganda).

The availability of disaggregated data sources, in which we can analyze gender-based crimes, for example, are, according to the responses obtained, a pending issue in most cases. All countries reported issues and controversies related to the security forces maintaining public order during the last three years, and a regression of civil rights that was exemplified through restrictions to protests; violations of human rights, especially those of activists and journalists which led to self-censorship in some cases. For example, there were multiple instances across the cases considered where the security forces illegitimately disturbed meetings with alternative political motives, including also interrupting rallies and raiding NGOs. It is important to note that these civil rights regressions mainly occurred within the context of Covid-19 so could be justified as repercussions of imposing safety measures to protect the public. However, it is also worth highlighting that in some cases, the security forces still appeared to use excessive force even when it was not interfering with health restrictions, e.g., shutting down political protests despite not violating preventative measures.

Political

Conflict and terrorism

Most of the cases had experienced some level of internal/ external conflict in the last 3 years. All - apart from 2 countries - had experienced a terrorist attack and were particularly vulnerable along this dimension of security. There have been significant numbers of attacks in Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria specifically. Furthermore, there is a complicated political landscape in some countries, with paramilitary/ non-state armed groups committing terrorist attacks against populations yet also performing state-like functions and serving the populations needs where the state has not.


Most of the cases had experienced some level of internal/ external conflict in the last 3 years. All - apart from 2 countries - had experienced a terrorist attack and were particularly vulnerable along this dimension of security. There have been significant numbers of attacks in Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria specifically. Furthermore, there is a complicated political landscape in some countries, with paramilitary/ non-state armed groups committing terrorist attacks against populations yet also performing state-like functions and serving the populations needs where the state has not. The image provided by ten countries that are politically and culturally diverse, as well as in its geographical location, illustrates that conflict remains on the agenda in many countries, and that this means preparing the security sector for it.

With regard to legislative capacity in response to tensions and terrorist threats, the responsibility for this security dimension tends to be shared between the military and police, with a trend of increasing militarization. For example, the Hungarian police and military used to share the legislative capacity but the military has been increasingly mobilized in practice. It is worth highlighting that Hungary, Nigeria, Pakistan and Serbia reported no issues or controversies surrounding these programs. There are reports on violence during the development of these programs though. For example, in some cases, this manifested as violence against citizens, including extrajudicial killings as it was reported in Indonesia.

Challenges for civil society

The ability of civil society to mobilize and advance prominent issues is largely based upon the support granted, whether that be institutional funding to build capacities, guidance to facilitate programs and training or international support for expanding and developing additional projects.

In the current context of security dimensions, the role of civil society is of the utmost importance since it is in the greatest position to detect and eliminate risks to national security, for example, particularly during existing or prospective wars. The promotion of communication between states and diplomatically unrecognized entities, such as rebel groups, militias, warlords, and clan chiefs, is one of the primary functions of civil society. In addition, certain non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which have a reputation for being impartial and independent actors, can help reduce tension during times of crisis. Campaigns to raise awareness encourage local stakeholders and grassroots institutions to participate in cultural, educational, and capacity-building activities. Civil society organizations (CSOs)



Source: National Police (Colombia); Central Statistical Office (Hungary); Bureau of Statistics (Indonesia); Ministry of Interior (Pakistan); Statistical Office (Serbia); Police Force (Uganda).

encourage this participation by their backing of development efforts. The promotion of discourse and human rights, the empowerment of marginalized communities and vulnerable groups, the advancement of sustainable development, the enhancement of local government, the increase of political involvement, and the provision of a forum for the resolution of disputes are all areas in which civil society can be shown to be effective. But, at the same time, CSOs are facing particular challenges; some of the issues that were addressed during interviews with CSOs representatives are quoted below.

Weaknesses

“There are now more legal provisions to regulate, restrict, and limit the operations of civil society organizations (CSOs), religious bodies, faith-based organizations, and individuals, than in the past.” “There are cases that currently prohibit from registering for or renewing licenses with any names that include the words governance, security, human rights, empowerment, etc.”

“Complications occur when it comes to setting up or scaling up operations. CSOs require considerable resources or constant financial backing in order to be viable in the long run, while in practice they function on a project-by-project basis.”

“There is a need for CSOs to continue to highlight citizens’ concerns and their solutions and/or recommendations with full impartiality. CSOs help to lift up societies by carrying out various socioeconomic development programs at the community and policy levels.”

“The future of CSOs in some countries is problematic, including dwindling civic space, threats of criminalization and dissolution of organizations.”

“There is disparity between organizations that are based in capital cities and the countryside, where local initiatives have a short lifespan.”

“There is a lack of activist regeneration. Knowledge mastery and issues in CSO activists for security sector reform are not followed by regeneration in youth activist groups. It takes regeneration, especially female activists, to maintain advocacy consistency and build inclusiveness on security sector reform issues.”

“CSO activists in security sector reform have academic and theoretical tendencies and fail to address and communicate simply to the public. This condition has an impact on the lack of acceptance in the community so that the range of support becomes very limited.”

“A negative political narrative portraying CSOs as pursuing a foreign agenda, seeking money, or even being traitors might be common. This narrative is not always there but it does emerge from time to time, particularly during periods of political and social upheaval.”

“Finance, feasibility, and sustainability of CSOs are major issues, because governmental grants do exist, but they are frequently too tiny, not publicly visible, and often difficult to obtain.”

“Lack of adequate capacity and in-depth knowledge of the issues in the areas of interest. Very few have such in-depth knowledge and understanding of the issues as they are evolving.”

“Most CSOs have tendencies to work in silos instead of working together to pursue a common interest/goal.”

“While the state is generally cooperative with CSOs involved in service delivery, advocacy-related CSOs are met with less tolerance and discomfort.”

How could international cooperation collaborate to address these weaknesses?

“Practical trainings to professional fundraising could have a great impact---usually HU CSOs have no dedicated staff for fundraising, hence the leaders of NGOs have sometimes a hard time reinvent the wheel in how to access funds.”

“Periodic support is needed, especially in terms of funding. Considering that one of the important roles of CSOs is the democratic development process in the midst of the tendency of authoritarianism that is currently growing.”

“A better mapping of who is doing what. This would reduce duplication of efforts.”

“Creating opportunities for CSO peer learning and exchange programs which will help promote the mentorship.”

“Understand the need for staff funding. Additional issues develop at the international level (EU for instance) because of the arrangement of finances. For example, a modest percentage is set aside for personnel, who typically work long hours, even after hours. Furthermore, it normally requires some amount of co-funding, which is difficult for most CSOs, which are non-profit organizations. All of this results in a significant turnover of CSO staff.”

“Seek for diversity and new perspectives. There are many voices, not just the most known one.”

“Develop specific programs to support democratic values and gender perspective.”

“Support regular national CSO conferences to map out advocacy strategies.”

“Considerate funding support to CSOs in the area of institutional strengthening.”

Several aspects of security, including cyber, economic, environmental, health, personal, and political, have become more precarious during the last three years in all of the many scenarios that have been taken into consideration. Certain nations have pointed to systemic problems, a lack of or inadequate enabling circumstances, and certain instruments of foreign policy as potential threats to national security.

It is also interesting to note that global themes like terrorism, the use of force, climate change, and cybersecurity concerns are regularly brought up as developing risks. This phenomenon is noteworthy for a number of reasons. It seems that temporary acute crises are to blame for the decreased frequency with which other dangers are brought to light. For instance, concerns over health were in the forefront of discussions throughout 2019 as a direct result of Covid-19. It is important to note that even though there has been a trend toward increasing insecurity, security institutions have stepped up their efforts. However, there has also been a trend toward the security institutions using excessive force and abusing their power, which has resulted in a violation of the human rights of citizens and a threat to the democratic principles on which many states are founded. In situations characterized by instability and the retreat of democratic norms, civil society has the potential to serve as an efficient instrument for the promotion of democracy and the maintenance of peace.

There was a perception that there is more room for civil society to play a role in addressing regional security issues, and that the need for civil society engagement is increasing. The world has evolved, and governments can no longer oversee or address all concerns, including conventional and non-traditional security issues. Particularly, government officials need to incorporate civil society in the process of formulating policy, especially security policy, as even if the concept and function of civil society vary from nation to country, their future actions will be key to the stability of all nations.

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Ms. Amna is an experienced Project Manager with a demonstrated history of working in the non-profit and think tanks industry for the last 12 years. She has been associated with PILDAT since 2014. She has served on Pakistan's first-ever Prime Minister's National Youth Council from June 2019-2021. She served as Lead Manager & Curator of Pakistan's first-ever Young Politicians' Fellowship Programme (YFPF) and currently heading the 17th Youth Parliament Pakistan (YPP) apart from other PILDAT projects on Youth Engagement. Amna is skilled in Public Policy Analysis, Political Analysis, Project Management, Technical Writing, Donor/Client Reporting and Business Development. Her key suits are in working on the Role of Security & Defense institutions; Political Parties, Role & Participation of Youth in Electoral Processes, Government (especially provincial/territorial youth departments), Parliament and other state institutions.

Amna is trained in Environmental Science from the prestigious Kinnaird College, in Monitoring and Evaluation from LUMS and in Transparency and Accountability in Government from the World Learning, Washington DC, United States through the State Department's IVLP. She has a penchant for writing and has recently authored the first ever parallel report on Pakistan's compliance with UNCAC for its second review cycle (2015-2020). In addition to having a number of publications to her name, she has written for different national online and print media.



Steph Wallace

Steph currently works as a Policy Officer within the Health and Social Care Directorate of the Scottish Government. Previous to this role, she worked with RESDAL as a Research Assistant on several main projects including the series of newsletters, developing the website and preparing a white paper on security trends in the post-pandemic environment. She also worked as a consultant on the main program to develop and expand the Global Partnership for Security and Peace.

Steph has a Master's degree in International Relations from the University of Glasgow, where she undertook modules on international aid, human rights and comparative public opinion. She also holds a Bachelor's degree in Modern Languages and Cultures from the University of Edinburgh.

Annex 1 | Regional Insights. The State of National Security

► Africa

There is no doubt that the African continent has undergone numerous changes in the last few decades, including improvements in communication technology, rapid economic growth brought on by an expanding market for Africa's commodities, and a growing youth population capable of innovating in this setting. The ongoing threat of armed conflict, along with its transformations, limits our ability to translate these transitions into stable peace and development for Africans. Since independence, armed conflicts have increasingly become a reality in Africa. Fifty percent of the states in Africa have experienced some kind of conflict between 1960 and the present. Particularly unsettling is the revival of post-Cold War conflicts. Various categories of armed conflicts on the continent have been proposed by peace and security researchers, some of which, naturally, only appear in our discourses in a historical sense.

Nigeria and Uganda, by Cecil Griffiths

Nigeria faces a multitude of security challenges ranging from violent extremism and religious intolerance, to farmer-herder conflict, banditry, a revived secessionist movement, police repression, maritime piracy, and attacks on oil infrastructure, terrorism, and communal conflicts, among others. There have been violent disputes between nomadic animal herders and farmers in Nigeria for many years. But disagreements over the use of land and water, as well as grazing routes, have been exacerbated by climate change and the spread of the Sahara Desert, as herders move further south looking for pasture. Thousands have been killed in clashes over limited resources.

One of the most serious threats for families in Nigeria is the frequent kidnapping of schoolchildren from their classrooms and boarding houses. More than 1,000 students have been abducted from their schools since December 2020, many only released after thousands of dollars are paid as ransom. Some of the kidnapers are commonly referred to as "bandits" in Nigeria. These criminals raid villages, kidnap civilians and burn down houses. A separatist group called the Indigenous People of Biafra (Ipub) has been clashing with Nigeria's security agencies. Ipub wants a group of states in the south-east, mainly made up of people from the Igbo ethnic group, to break away and form the independent nation of Biafra.

Other forms of violent criminal activities such as armed robbery, assault, carjacking, hostage taking, banditry, and rape, is common throughout the country. Kidnapping for ransom occurs frequently. Terrorists continue plotting and carrying out attacks in Nigeria, especially in the Southeast. Terrorists may attack with little or no warning, targeting shopping centers, malls, markets, hotels, places of worship, restaurants, schools, government transportation hubs and other places where crowds gather. There is civil unrest and low-level armed militancy in parts of Southern Nigeria, especially in the Niger Delta region. Armed criminality, including kidnapping and maritime crime, is also pervasive in this region. These conflicts and violence have not only hindered the speedy development of the country but have continued to retrogress the pace of its growth and development, thereby threatening national unity.

Uganda has seen multiple attacks and bombings since October 2021, targeting soft targets and security personnel notably around Kampala and the surrounding area. The Islamic (IS) claimed responsibility for the November 16, 2021 bombings in the capital, which killed at least seven people including three suicide bombers. Uganda also faces an increasing threat from the IS-linked Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) which operates mainly in the DRC, and attributed to the November 2021 bombings in Kampala. In response to these threats, the Military has intensified security operations along the borders to prevent assailants. Security measures are most significant at the border with the DRC. Opportunistic crimes like burglaries, muggings, drive-by bag snatches and thefts from vehicles occur in Uganda. Violent crimes, including armed robbery, home invasion and sexual assault are also common. Cyber-attacks are also on the increase, particularly against financial institutions and mobile money businesses.

Although Uganda has experienced relative political stability and economic growth under President Museveni, there are significant human rights, governance and democracy deficits. Security forces used intimidation tactics to suppress political opposition members and supporters in the context of the January 2021 elections, including arbitrary arrests, prolonged detentions, enforced disappearances and prosecutions. The right to freedom of expression and assembly and association were severely restricted. The country faces other challenges as well, including an explosive population growth which greatly affects living standards and creates urban slums, land ownership, power and infrastructure constraints, climate changes and its effect on agricultural output and food security, and unemployment among the youth.

Uganda hosts the largest refugee population in Africa, and the third largest population in the world with 1,494,505 refugees and asylum seekers, as of May 2021. The majority (82%) are women and children. Most of the refugees come from South Sudan, followed by the DRC, Burundi, Somalia, and other countries. Considering ongoing conflicts and increased food insecurity in South Sudan, Uganda's refugee population is expected to continue to rise, having grown by over 35,000 since December 2020.

► Asia

Although there are still disparities in their extent and methods of attack, security challenges in the Asian region are coinciding. This means that inter-state wars and other conventional security threats (such as territorial disputes and arms races) have subsided in the last ten to fifteen years, while the region is increasingly confronted with non-conventional security risks emanating from international terrorism and organized crime, separatism and piracy, irregular migration, environmental issues, energy shortages, economic crises and epidemics. Some of these problems are interconnected, which increases the risks and makes it more difficult to find solutions. The ambiguities of globalization may be the cause of the rising similarity of security concerns. Asian countries (including regional superpowers such as China and India) seek economic development. They promote policies that encourage economic growth because they think doing so will draw capital and investors, advance technology, protect or create jobs, and increase their credibility. The best environment for achieving these goals is one that is free of armed conflict, tensions, and expensive defense obligations. Their rising interdependence, which results in many of the border-crossing pathologies of globalization outlined above, is the flip side of their expanding incorporation into the global economy. The nations of Asia only hesitantly agree to appeals for new, cooperative security approaches.

Indonesia, by Hussein Ahmad

The current state of national security in Indonesia is still focused on traditional security through maintaining military power in the country itself and facing threats from the military forces of other countries. Meanwhile, non-traditional approaches related to human security have not become the focus of the Indonesian government. In fact, Indonesia faces various real threats in terms of human security, both physical threats such as natural disasters, social and non-physical relations such as economic activities that must be faced. Threats to human insecurity in Indonesia are still amounting. These conditions mean that Indonesia is still far from secure.

In general, the Indonesian government is still using a security approach in dealing with and solving various problems in Indonesia. For example, conflict resolution in Papua through operations that violate the law and are not in accordance with the rules of non-military operations areas and not based on state political decisions, legal rules that provide space for the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) in countering terrorism even though they are not part of the criminal justice system and other regulations and involvement TNI and POLRI in handling Covid-19 and various other health issues.

In the Indonesian constitution, the division between the duties and role of TNI and POLRI has been regulated. More specifically, the division is putting TNI as a defense actor to deal with threats from abroad, while POLRI is a security actor responsible for law enforcement in the country. This separation of roles is very important considering the past history where the military regime ruled for 32 years, and it is relevant to prioritize the professionalism of the TNI. The large amount of military involvement in the civilian domain today shows that the post-reform security sector reforms in Indonesia stopped with an incomplete agenda.

Pakistan, by Areeba Mahmood

Overall, the state of Pakistan's security is rather fragile. Not one dimension of security can be labelled as heading towards a positive direction. As many of the dimensions are interlinked in Pakistan, when one weakens others are affected as well. For example, political insecurity has affected the economy as well as personal security. A lack of infrastructure, planning and execution have deprived Pakistan of being a stable and secure country. There is a lack of digital infrastructure, knowledge and expertise within the country which has led to a continuous streak of cyber-attacks on financial and state institutions, putting in danger sensitive information of citizens and state security.

Pakistan has more of a reactive approach towards its environmental concerns. The country has a history of environmental disasters and climate related NGOs have predicted how it is only going to worsen for the country if no actions are taken. Water scarcity, specifically, is an issue that has persisted for a long time and has now regressed to impact more regions of the country.

Radicalism and extremism have been on the rise which has threatened the safety of women and minorities of the country. The common man has become the judge, jury and executioner as individuals accused of blasphemy are being lynched publicly while cases of harassment, kidnappings, assault and murders of women, transgender persons and other minorities are either not making any progress with the police or going unreported.

While Pakistan has never been able to achieve political stability, it has become much worse in the past 3 years. Terrorist attacks have increased in every province which can be attributed to religious extremism and the recent Afghan Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. Internal conflict within the government has also contributed to political insecurity; the events leading up to the public ousting of former Prime Minister, Imran Khan, has weakened the country politically and economically as well. While the new government is trying to control the aftermath, it has still made the country vulnerable to further internal and international strife.

► Eastern Europe

A region with similar cultural characteristics, shared histories, and a connected past, Eastern Europe may be seen as a homogeneous sub-unit. During the past three decades, it has started a joint process of European integration. But even a superficial probe of this surface reveals that reality is a far more heterogeneous, complex combination. A deeper study indicates that there are major discrepancies concealed among the numerous fissures, in spite of recent regional political initiatives that were intended to promote sub-regional unity. The nations of Central/ Eastern Europe differ greatly in two important areas: their strategic cultures and their ties to Russia. Because of this diversity, regional cooperation is particularly difficult.

Hungary, by Gergely Hideg

Hungary is a safe country, with a low and decreasing level of violent criminality, high level of health services and without major issues of food security. Hungary still has fertile lands and striving agriculture, although the effects of climate change are starting to show- with declining rainfall and increasing temperatures desertification of agricultural land has started. However, the times we are living in are increasingly unsafe, particularly when considering the raging war in the neighboring Ukraine, although active hostilities are some 1500 kms away. Another important issue affecting human security has been the Covid-19 pandemic that hit Hungary hard, producing mortality rates that were among the highest globally.

However, the Hungarian government displays a tendency to securitize issues that are not dangerous, such as LGBTQI+ issues; through-flowing migration (very few international migrants consider Hungary as their final destination); or NGOs and watchdogs that work in the areas of human rights and rule of law.

The Hungarian national legislation is---it must be---coherent with the European Union Acquis de Communautaire, therefore it is overwhelmingly democratic by nature. There are pieces of legislation that are contested by the EU, for example the law against civil society organisations, of those that would criminalise providing any assistance to persons who are migrating and do not yet have a visa or a legal status of refugee or at least asylum seeker, or the instance that the government initiated that the Parliament voted to not implement the Istanbul convention about violence against women---something that the government previously already ratified. These issues are not systemic, not really enforced, and only serve the purpose of dominating the political agenda with the messages related to these legislative actions (NGOs represent foreign interests, there is an invasion of migrants going on, genderism kills society, etc.) that are otherwise expendable, if the tides are changing and there are new, better symbolic enemies to fight.

The mandates and missions of the police and the military are totally distinct. Hungary has witnessed increased autocratic tendencies, but these were not really aligned with its security services or armed forces. Their missions are regular professional missions, such as campaigning for safety belt usage by the police, or deploying military troops to the East in response of military activity in Ukraine. The Hungarian state and its armed forces are extremely centralized and the dominant overarching sovereignty over these organizations lies with the prime minister.

Serbia, by Oliver Toskovic

Serbia was a part of Yugoslavia, socialist country which was not a part of the so-called Eastern Bloc, but a founder and a member of Non-Aligned Movement. After the crisis and the war in the last decade of 20th century, Yugoslavia fall apart, and several independent countries were created out of former Yugoslav republics. Serbia officially did not participate in wars, but it was engaged in conflicts in neighboring Croatia and Bosnia, since in these former republics (now independent states) a lot of ethnic Serbs used to live. Also, in the same period a huge political and economic crisis occurred in Serbia, as a consequence of authoritarian rule of Slobodan Milošević and his party SPS and economic sanctions applied to Serbia due to its interference in wars in surrounding countries (former republics). On the year 2000 massive demonstrations occurred because Milošević tried to steal elections and his rule ended.

Ever since, Serbia is trying to establish democratic institutions and to join European Union, with periods of progress and regression. Starting from 1990. when first democratic elections were held across Yugoslavia, up to now, Serbia is in the transition process from socialist to capitalist system and economy. Unfortunately, even 32 years later we cannot say that this process is fully ended, having in mind current state of institutions, including political and economic stability. After some 12 years of relative progress in democratic process (2000-2012), last 10 years brought Serbia on a list of so-called hybrid regimes (have democratic elections but autocratic governance is present). Although economy is relatively stable now, without huge regressions in the past 20 years, it is too dependent on foreign investments and none of the governments managed to push production in some noticeable amount (not even close to what was going on in Yugoslavia period). Also, Serbia still did not manage to solve Kosovo crisis, which was the reason for NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999. Although Kosovo region declared its independence in 2008, Serbia did not recognize it, as well as certain number of countries in the world.

The unresolved problem with Kosovo region is a big obstacle on the path towards joining the EU. More than 80% of Serbia's population is against recognizing the independence of Kosovo, since the region has an important historic role in the beginning of first Serbian state, in medieval times. The situation is becoming even more complicated after the war in Ukraine started, since Serbia has had good cultural and political relations with Russia throughout their history and it is heavily dependent on Russian energy, but it strives at the same time for becoming a EU member. The current situation is demanding from Serbia to choose between the two options, the EU (western countries) or Russia, while until now it had tried to balance between them.

Having all of this in mind, Serbia is experiencing a heavy political crisis, since the role of institutions is so diminished that most people have an impression as they even do not exist. Our hybrid political regime is dependent on the president's authority, deeply corrupted and sometimes described as a partocracy. Along with the unresolved crisis with Kosovo region on the south, makes Serbia relatively unstable.

► Latin America

Security in Latin America has changed significantly since the conclusion of the Cold War. Latin American nations have been shifting away from the traditional conception of a security challenge posed by an external danger to the state, toward the concepts of multidimensional security, security of the individual, and security of society. The region has the highest murder rate in the world due to the widespread use of illegal drugs, the growth of guns, other international threats, ungoverned areas, and the weak state

syndrome. Additionally, criminality has a significant negative impact on democratic government and economic prosperity. The institutions of public security—the police, military, and judicial systems—are struggling to deal with this cross-border threat. The problem’s symptom and possible exploitation vector is the privatization of security. Due to American demand for illegal drugs and the fact that it is a supplier of weaponry to Latin America, the United States bears a portion of the blame for the bloodshed. The international coalition that is leading Operation Martillo, the anti-drug operation in the Caribbean and Central America, demonstrates the rising consensus in favor of coordinated action. In addition, a number of Latin American nations participate in international peacekeeping missions. The new strategic agreement reached by the nations of Latin America should therefore be an impetus for coordinated action.

Colombia and Venezuela, by Nathalie Pabón Ayala

An ongoing, internal armed conflict in **Colombia** has served as the country’s primary threat indicator for the past five decades. As Marxist guerrillas began to oppose the government in the 1960s, the struggle grew over time to encompass threats from the drug trade, narcoterrorism, and paramilitary organizations (Human Rights Watch, 2017). The 1990s saw an increase in the amount of violence brought on by the various wars as guerrilla attacks on government troops increased in frequency and organized crime’s capacity for terror and harm increased.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the oldest guerrilla organization in Latin America, and the government of Colombia (GoC) signed a peace agreement in November 2016. Terrorist activity has lessened since a previous ceasefire was reached. The armed conflict has not yet been resolved, and achieving citizen security continues to be difficult. Colombia faces the issue of successfully implementing the peace accords while also dealing with ongoing hybrid and conventional threats. Another long-running guerrilla organization, the National Liberation Army (ELN), is still active and just started a dialogue process with the newly elected administration of Gustavo Petro.

Organized Armed Groups (GAO) and Organized Delinquent Groups (GDO) are two new classifications introduced by the Ministry of Defense in 2016. In addition to organized crime organizations that adhere to the Geneva Convention Protocol for Combatants, which means they have a structure, an area under their control, and a military structure, GAO also includes certain former and current rebels who do not uphold the peace agreements. The National Army now participates in the war against the GAO, although the Police had previously sole duty for the combat against them.

In addition to the existence of violent non-state entities, there has also been a notable rise in violence resulting from illegal activity, notably in areas that the FARC previously controlled. These include illegal mining, extortion, smuggling, drug and human trafficking, and other hazards. These organizations are connected to global organized criminal networks. Local leaders, primarily environmentalists and human rights activists, continue to face threats and are frequently murdered, which is a sign of the ongoing social effects of armed conflict and persistent human rights crimes. Human rights violations and local leader assassinations are grave concerns.

The evolving nature of the armed conflict in a post-agreement environment that has boosted hopes of peace and stability is one of the primary difficulties the Colombian military is now confronting. Traditional risks to Colombia, such as insurgency, terrorism, and drug trafficking, are evolving, but more current dangers, such those brought on by organized crime (illegal mining, arms trafficking, human trafficking, and smuggling), are becoming more prevalent.

By subordinating the individual interest to the public and social interest, the Constitution of **Venezuela** develops a new concept of property, possession, and use of natural and economic resources. Natural resources, land usage, and international trade planning are all tightly related to the State under this paradigm, which abandons the liberal notion of the “gendarme” State and instead creates a more interventionist situation.

According to the spirit of the Bolivarian Constitution, a nation’s riches must be used for a common good rather than being subject to exploitation and the principles of private usufruct. (Constitutional Article 12). The state’s cultural patterns have changed, embracing multiculturalism and the consolidation of “being national” while promoting the identity of the new hegemonic social group. In order to do this, Simón Bolívar and the indigenous peoples are portrayed as the two cornerstones of the revived Venezuelan nationality. A new international strategy is established that prioritizes the “anti-imperialist” and “anti-colonial” struggle while supporting Latin American unification.

It has been established that everyone in Venezuela, whether natural or legal individuals present within the national geographic space, bears some responsibility for the nation’s security in addition to the State. According to Article 322, the defense of the Nation is the responsibility of Venezuelans; also, of natural and legal persons, both public law and private law, who are in the national geographic space.

The security of the Nation is an essential competence and responsibility of the State, based on its comprehensive development. The nation’s security is based on the State and civil society sharing responsibility for upholding the principles of independence, democracy, equality, peace, freedom, justice, solidarity, promotion and environmental conservation, affirmation of human rights, as well as the progressive satisfaction of each Venezuelan’s individual and collective needs on the basis of those principles, as stated in Article 326 of the Constitution. The co-responsibility paradigm is applied to the military, economic, social, political, cultural, geographic, and environmental domains.

Numerous national and regional actors have criticized this all-encompassing vision of the nation’s security and defense. The law defines comprehensive defense as “the set of defense systems, methods, measures and actions, whatever their nature and intensity, that the State actively formulates, coordinates and implements with the participation of the institutions public and private, and natural and legal persons, national and foreign, in order to safeguard the independence, freedom, democracy, sovereignty, territorial integrity and comprehensive development of the Nation.”

MENA

The evolution of MENA countries’ armed forces and internal security, the security alliances, and the influence of foreign powers in determining regional forces and conflicts are all not clearly regional trends. Every MENA country substantially and alone pursues its own unique course of military and security force development. Each has varying degrees of military assistance from minor assistance to the deployment of significant deterrence and warfighting assets, or the support of civil conflicts and non-state actors. However, the interactions between the governments within the three main sub-regions and the security developments within the MENA region can be roughly classified. They exemplify the variety of distinct national issues and demands that currently shape the military dynamics of the region, the United States’ efforts to provide security support, and the evolving roles of Europe, Russia, and China.

Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the general degree of security and stability in each MENA sub region has decreased recently, and that the internal and civil facets of security in the region have continuously gotten worse. There have been significant increases in major internal conflicts, degrees of outside interference, and issues with civil strife, political tension, governance, and economic development as a result of the changes and upheavals in the region's political stability since 2011. Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, and Yemen have all had protracted civil wars or serious issues with national unity. Algeria, Egypt, and all of the Gulf states have all spent a sizable percentage of their budgets and economies on bolstering their armed forces and internal security forces, or on fighting wars, which has severely hampered their ability to advance their societies and economies. The Covid-19 issue, which began at the start of 2020, has made this scenario significantly worse in at least half of the MENA region's states. In addition, many MENA countries that have prioritized internal security have developed more oppressive regimes as a result. As a result, the balance between military buildup, conflict, and civic growth has worsened rather than increased the region's security and stability.

Lebanon and Syria, by Rabha Allam

Ever since the independence in the fifties of the twentieth century, **Lebanon** had suffered long cycles of internal violence and civil wars, the last one from 1975-1990. The current formula of government is strengthening the confessional system and dysfunctional to the state. Most of the essential state organizations are replicated along the confessional lines due to the weak nature of the state and at the same time this is building towards more weakening of state institutions.

The case is very unique and there are a number of challenges facing both the State and the society on the security level:

- 1) The deteriorating economic conditions and its impact on security conditions and the rise in crime rates.
- 2) The expansion in the army jurisdiction under emergency laws and the implication on personal liberties and rights.
- 3) The attack on activists and personal and political liberties.
- 4) Confessional dynamics and the rising tensions on the ground.
- 5) The inability of the state to provide services or to secure people.
- 6) The influx of refugees due to the continuation of the crisis in Syria and Palestine.

National security in **Syria** is threatened by a devastating long war that lasted for almost a decade resulting in the death of ½ of 1 million, displacement of ½ of the population (internally and externally) and most of the vital economic activities and infrastructure was destroyed. The reconstruction plan is frozen until the two parties of the conflict and their international backers reach a final political solution for power distribution. The West, backing the opposition, insists on a substantial regime change, and Russia and Iran, backing the regime, see a change in the constitution as substantial.

Cyber security was not a big issue during the last few years, as the main issue was the actual security of the population. Despite that the most dangerous hostilities have more or less de-escalated since 2019, and most of the lands controlled by ISIS have been re-captured, the security condition in Syria is still critical. Syria is still one of the most dangerous places, where Damascus has the second highest rates of crimes in the world, after Kabul. Syria also faces a challenge of separatism and disengagement and it is

split into three different parts, where every part has a different ruling norms and authorities; one under the control of the regime, the second under the control of the opposition and the third under the control of the Kurdish forces who aspire for independence.

The country was deeply affected by the coronavirus crisis since the medical and health infrastructure were already destroyed by the war and a good proportion of medical professionals had fled the country. Gender-based violence and crimes occur systematically in all three parts of the country but the respective authorities do not keep track of the exact rates. However, the media widely covers the most controversial cases. Likewise, human rights violations are recorded in the three main parts of the country, while the most obvious cases were recorded at the regime's prisons such as torture to death, starvation and arbitrary detention and forced disappearance.




The legislation concerning security and defense during the last three years did not change much, the regime has already passed most of the legislations validating the role of the military in the public sphere in the 1970s and right after the beginning of the uprising in 2012. The military takes part in fighting the rebel armed groups, along with pro regime militias backed by Iran and the air raid coverage provided by Russia.


The military has an officially announced mission in fighting terrorism and securing the civil population, but in fact the wide definition of the terrorism encompassed as well the opposition groups in rebel areas which made these counter-terrorism campaigns threatening the lives of the civilians in these very same areas. The military industries and construction companies are already controlling a big part of the market; Iranian companies are competing for this market as well. The military along with the Russian military police co-organized the human transfer through "the green buses" from the areas subject to the de-escalation zones to Idlib, where all rebels were transferred (exiled) there.

Annex 2 | Overview of security legislation

POLICE DUTIES ACCORDING TO LEGISLATION IN EACH COUNTRY

Country	Police Force	Police duties according to legislation
Colombia	The National Police Force of Colombia	<p>The National Police is typically solely in charge of maintaining public safety and managing large-scale gatherings of the general public. The police may only ask the military for help under special circumstances and for a short time. The use of force by police must be appropriate, proportionate, and reasonable under the circumstances, as stated in Article 8 of the 2016 Police Code. The National Police is required by Article 10 to uphold and respect the rights guaranteed by the Colombian Constitution. A specific regulation on the use of force, firearms, ammunition, and non-lethal weapons was approved in 2017. The 1990 UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms and the 2016 Police Code are particularly mentioned in the rule, which was enacted by Resolution 2903/2017 of the General Directorate of the National Police. According to the law, the use of guns is only permitted when necessary to protect oneself or others from an immediate threat of death or serious bodily harm or to stop a criminal act that could endanger life. A later rule forbids police officers working to control demonstrations from having access to firearms. The National Police of Colombia is not specifically subject to the control of any independent civilian organization. Disciplinary offences are handled by the Attorney General's office, whereas criminal charges fall under the purview of the military tribunals.</p>
Hungary	The State Protection Authority	<p>The Police Act: XXXIV 1994 Law; In addition to the tasks specified in the Basic Law, the task of the police is to control border traffic, to combat terrorism and to control for the purposes of crime prevention and detection specified in this Act.</p>
Indonesia	POLRI	<p>The Indonesian National Police's main duties include: uphold law enforcement, public order, and security while protecting and serving the community. In performing these fundamental duties, police must:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i) perform as necessary community and governmental activity supervise, guard, escort, and patrol; ii) provide all necessary actions to guarantee the security and efficiency of vehicular traffic on all types of roads, raise public knowledge of the drafting of national legislation; iii) enforce law and order and guarantee public safety; iv) coordinate, supervise, and provide technical direction to the investigators, public servants/authorities, and private security measures; v) carry out all criminal investigations in line with the criminal procedure law and other laws;





Uganda

Uganda
Police Force

- (a) to protect the life, property and other rights of the individual;
- (b) to maintain security within Uganda;
- (c) to enforce the laws of Uganda;
- (d) to ensure public safety and order;
- (e) to prevent and detect crime in the society;
- (f) subject to section 9, to perform the services of a military force; and
- (g) to perform any other functions assigned to it under this Act.

(2) Subject to section 6(1)(c), a member of the force is authorized to carry arms in the performance of his or her duties.

(3) No person shall arrest, detain or institute criminal proceedings except as is provided for under a written law or the Constitution.

To ensure that citizens can exercise their individual and collective rights and to uphold the law. Public order, transit, control, and customs, tourism, airport, diplomatic custody, and protection of VIPs, incarceration, migration, maritime, anti-corruption, narcotics and psychotropic substances, environment, organized crime, anti-kidnapping, food security, irregular armed groups, and any other area related to crime prevention are its areas of service. It has been placed all around the country.


Regulations: LOSPCPNB Articles 34, 35, 36, 36, 37, and 39.


The Special Action Forces are a fairly well-known unit within the PNB (FAES).

Source: Own elaboration based upon results from researchers and official websites for the police in respective countries.

MILITARY DUTIES ACCORDING TO LEGISLATION IN EACH COUNTRY

Country	Police Force	Police duties according to legislation
Colombia	The Military Forces of Colombia	<p>The Army, Navy, and Air Force are the three branches that make up the Colombian military. The prevailing service is the Army. Although all services participate in the counter-insurgency operation, they do so to a lesser extent than the Army. The Minister of Defense has operational and administrative supervision over the armed forces, with the Colombian President serving as its Commander-in-Chief. The military commander of the armed forces, who has always been an Army three-star General given the size and prominence of the Army, is the next in line of command. The Colombian military's highest rank is also this one. Officially, the Army is in duty of protecting Colombia from outside aggressors. Actually, since 1999, its mission has undergone a significant amount of change, and it is currently almost completely focused on fighting counterinsurgency.</p>
Hungary	The Hungarian Defense Forces	<p>According to Article 45 of the Hungarian Constitution, the main responsibilities of the Defense Forces are "military Defense of Hungary's independence, territorial integrity, and borders; performance of collective Defense; peacekeeping; and carrying out humanitarian activities in accordance with the rules of international law." The head of the Defense Force is referred to as the President. The National Assembly must give its approval before any deployments overseas, with the exception of missions with the EU or NATO, are made by the Government (headed by the Prime Minister). The Defense Force, which includes the Hungarian Ground Force and Hungarian Air Force, is managed by the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff.</p>
Indonesia	TNI (Indonesian National Military)	<p>Terrorism poses a threat to national Defense and security, and the Republic of Indonesia's 1945 Constitution required the creation of two state institutions, the Police and the TNI, with the responsibility of addressing this threat. The 1945 Constitution sets forth the distinctions between the Police and TNI's roles and responsibilities. The integrity and sovereignty of the state must be upheld, protected, and maintained by the TNI. By defending, protecting, serving the community, and upholding the law, the police serve as a tool of the state that keeps the peace and order of the populace. The Anti-Terrorism Law has served as the foundation for handling terrorist acts up to this point.</p>
Lebanon	The Lebanese Armed Forces	<p>The Army is tasked with three missions: Defense, security, and development, in accordance with the National Defense Law (Decree number 102 on September 16, 1983, and its revisions). These missions seek to maintain the constitution, the nation, and the State's authority while also defending national security and stability and promoting social development.</p>





Source: Own elaboration based upon results from researchers and official websites for the military in respective countries.



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