Military missions and the post-conflict environment: a regional perspective on Colombia
The challenges facing the Colombian Army in its transformation to a post-conflict environment are focused around institutional matters that will certainly be addressed on the basis of the changes expected in 2018. These include:

### Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>View to the future</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In 2015, within the framework of the Armed Forces Education System (SEFA), the National Army adopted the ‘Minerva’ Strategic Plan for Military Education in order to strengthen both the training system and military doctrine. Minerva is based on the new Damascus military doctrine, oriented to the future transformation and projection of the Army as a multi-mission force. Minerva promotes the strengthening of five subsystems: education, doctrine, lessons learnt, instruction and training, and science and technology. The educational model is rooted in competency-based training at all levels and specialties. It is also based on a humanistic approach, highlighting processes for promoting Human Rights and IHL within the Army. It is hoped in this way to promote the formation of well-rounded soldiers, with principles, values, virtues and professional ethics; who are reflective and possess skills to undertake complex analysis using military criteria, as well as possessing skills in social service and working with communities.</td>
<td>Following the signing of a peace agreement with FARC guerrillas, considered to be the main military threat facing the country, Army education is designed on the basis of peace building and peaceful coexistence. In this sense, it envisages the development of greater capacities among soldiers for the tasks of neutralizing criminal phenomena associated with drug trafficking and the illegal exploitation of natural resources; as well as in defence and support to civil authorities. The Army’s involvement at the international level presupposes the training and preparation of soldiers to participate in and support peacekeeping and stabilization missions, trained to work in a group and in a multinational environment, able to operate according to a common doctrine and to communicate in a strategic, operational and tactical language. In this sense, bilingualism acquires importance within military education plans. In addition to changes in the curricula, all of this requires changes in the professional profiles required of teachers and instructors.</td>
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### Health

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<td>Law 352 (1997) created the Security System for Military Forces and National Police in order to provide a comprehensive health service in the areas of promotion, prevention, protection, recovery and rehabilitation of active and retired military personnel and their beneficiaries. In 2014, the Directorate of Health and the Army’s Military Health Establishments had more than 560,000 users.</td>
<td>With the peace agreement with the FARC, the number of soldiers wounded in combat has reduced by 97%. Although this trend may continue, the budgetary and financial limitations affecting the country’s General Health System could also affect the Military Forces Health System.</td>
</tr>
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### Retirement

**Data**

Current Colombian regulations provide a monthly pension allowance to military personnel who undergo forced retirement or those who have engaged in discretionary retirement after 20 years of service (25 years in case of withdrawals at their own request). The Military Pensions Scheme has 50,420 affiliates (2016), including personnel belonging to the three military forces.

**View to the future**

Bearing in mind that 92% of pension allowance payments are financed through the National General Budget, the Army’s benefit system could be affected by budgetary and financial limitations faced by the Colombian State with regard to pension matters.

### International missions

**Data**

The National Army projects itself onto the international stage through greater participation in stabilization and peacekeeping operations. The Colombian Army’s new Damascus doctrine recognizes NATO’s multinational doctrine as a reference for the conduct of multilateral operations.

**View to the future**

The National Army will seek to expand international experiences such as participation in the peace and stabilization mission in Sinai. Greater cooperation agreements are expected in the coming years with military peers in the region (relations with the United States, Mexico and Chile are especially fluid), as well as greater participation in multilateral peace missions.

### Coordination with other institutions

**Data**

The first Military Forces Joint Command was established in 2004, from where operations are planned that combine land, air and fluvial military power. Likewise, the National Army participates in various spaces for interaction with civil authorities at the national and sub-national levels, such as through Security Councils and Public Order Committees. The Army also forms part of inter-agency groups specialized in the fight against crimes such as drug trafficking, kidnapping and extortion. The Damascus Doctrine is based on the elements of Decisive Action, defined as the simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, stabilization and civil authority support tasks, aimed at avoiding or deterring conflict, prevailing in war and creating favourable conditions for its resolution.

**View to the future**

The Army’s participation in tasks based around support to the civil authority, the fight against organized crime, and assistance in the face of natural disasters, will promote a continuous interaction between military and civil authorities, as well as with the National Police and the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation (judicial authority). The political context of these efforts is positive for the Army; in all countries there is broad and almost unanimous support for this kind of involvement, and indeed a preference to see more, and not less, of it. This is related to the fact that both populations and governments see the likelihood of more and more of such phenomena being witnessed in the future, given climatic trends around the world.

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As of 2017, less than 4% of commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the Army were women. The admission of women into the career officer academy occurred only from 2009, and for this reason the number is naturally low, as well as the ranks to which they have currently been able to accede (Lieutenant).

The Infantry remains closed to women. In 2017, unrestricted access to Combat Arms was opened up to women who aspired to become non-commissioned officers.

Since 2017, the Army has possessed a Gender Office, and a Gender Observatory that was set up by the Military Cadet School.

The Ministry of National Defence has worked on the development of a gender policy, which is expected for release in 2018.

The training of personnel in human rights and international humanitarian law has been practiced in recent years. The issue of gender continues to be addressed, even now, as part of this larger framework.

The negotiating tables in Havana incorporated the issue of gender as one of those to be worked on in order to resolve the conflict; spreading an understanding of this relationship between armed conflict and women’s security is a pending issue in the military institution.

The impetus to participate in UN peace missions will lead to a greater consideration of numbers, and also of career patterns. At the same time, increasing exchange and cooperation with other Latin American countries can contribute to debates and the incorporation of a gender perspective, an issue on which these countries have worked considerably over the course of the last decade.

Research and policies regarding the manner in which women who have entered as career officers go on to develop their careers are matters that will require attention. This is especially the case with regard to the practices and perceptions held by men in positions of command regarding the role of women in hostilities, because this may affect - according to the rules of promotion - the future possibilities open to female career officers.

It will be necessary to define the location for the Gender Office within the Army structure, including the possibility of a more direct dependence on the offices of the General Staff.

The publication of gender policies by the Ministry of Defence will have a direct impact on the sensitization of staff on the subject. The same goes for any initiative from the Executive with regard to a National Action Plan on SCR 1325.

Mainstreaming will involve interaction with civil agencies, civil society, and academia, and the development of closer relationships with ministries such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Counsel for Women.

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The role of the Army in a post-conflict context: Colombia from a regional perspective

Disaster risk management | Public security | Gender perspective

Colombia is currently the most relevant Spanish-speaking national entity in South America, having surpassed Argentina in terms of demographics. It is placed second in the Hemisphere after Mexico, and if Iberian languages are taken into account, third after Brazil and Mexico.

Other indicators from Colombia are relevant. In 2016, and according to official statistics provided by DANE, 28% of the population were in a situation of monetary poverty, and 8.5% in extreme poverty. The Gini coefficient - which measures levels of inequality - reached 0.571 at the national level. Other figures drawn from various UN agencies also form important references. In 2016, the Human Development Index prepared by UNDP gave the country a rank of 0.727, placing it among medium-developed countries. According to ECLAC’s Statistical Yearbook, in 2016 life expectancy at birth stood at 74.6 years, while the mortality rate among children under 5 years of age was 21.8.

According to the 2005 population census (the next to be conducted in 2018), the majority of inhabitants are white and mestizo (85.94%), 10.62% are Afro-Colombian (most of whom reside in Caribbean or Pacific areas), 3.4% are indigenous, and 0.01% are Roma or gypsy. 87% of the population are Catholic, 11.5% Protestants, mostly evangelicals, and the rest either atheist or other religions.

Colombia provides a case characterized by nation-building within a territory that is little-integrated, where over a long period of time local oligarchs run the interests of the valleys from the urban centers (today metropolises, including Bogota – with a population of 9 million – Medellin and Cali). Key actors in the process include the Colombian oligarchy (which for a long time managed two parties of notables).
managed two parties of notables, the liberals and conservatives), while other actors have emerged since the mid-20th century.

Another key actor in the process has been the Catholic Church, which since colonial times has occupied an important position within Colombian society and politics. According to data from the Episcopal Conference of Colombia, over five thousand parishes are found across the territory, with 13 Archbishops, 52 Diocesan Bishops, 13 Auxiliary Bishops—including the Bishop for the military—, and 10 Apostolic Vicars. Added to these is a large religious population whose maintenance requires a budget, albeit small when considering that it serves the estimated percentage of Colombians who consider themselves to be Catholic. There is no reliable data on the amount of land owned by the Church.

The third actor we will mention as a unifying factor is the country’s military force. The Armed Forces of Colombia are institutional. They are inward as opposed to outward-looking. They manifest no transcendent goals that would lead them to exercise political power, as has been seen in other cases in the Latin American region. Only the interregnum of Rojas Pinilla, who acted more as a “caudillo” over the armed forces while relying on important political allies, can be cited as a military intromission into day-to-day politics. But it was in substance an attempt by a reformist military sector along with its civilian allies which lasted only from 1953 to 1957. The presidency of Rojas Pinilla was similar to other “modernizing” efforts in the region: infrastructure projects were built, the television service was developed, El Dorado airport was constructed, as was Bogota’s Calle 26, etc. With regard to security, a process of depoliticizing the police was initiated, and an end was put to the first stage of the period in Colombian history known as La Violencia (with a truce reached with guerilla forces while the government was supported by the Army and the Colombian political class). It was also in this period that the right of women to vote was recognized (1954).

But Colombia’s history shows substantially little military intrusion into political life. In fact, while in several countries across the region military governments were succeeded by others of a military character, civil-military relations in Colombia over the course of the decades are better characterized as a tacit alliance between civilian and military leaders, in which the latter supported civilian governments without restriction in exchange for guaranteeing their autonomy. They were based on the formula expressed in 1958 by the then President Alberto Lleras Camargo in his famous speech at the Teatro Patria, known as the Lleras Doctrine.3

3 “‘I do not want the Armed Forces deciding how the nation should be governed, instead of what is decided by the people; but I also do not want, by any means, that politicians decide how to manage the Armed Forces in their technical functions, their rules, their personnel…’. Basically, simultaneous to the foundation of the National Front, a model for relations between the civil authority and the Military Forces was defined on the basis that military figures would not involve themselves in the affairs of political parties and the government, while civilians would not involve themselves in matters of ‘public order’, in other words security and defence.” Vargas Velásquez, Alejo (2006), “Alberto Lleras y los Militares”, in El Colombiano, 25th May 2006. (Own translation).
The professionalized military force currently has a significant footprint. According to RESDAL’s Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America and Caribbean, in 2016 its personnel numbered 265,050, of which 220,537 were located in the Army (4% within its officer corps, 81% enlisted troops and 15% non-commissioned officers). The Navy had 30,917 members, of which 22,000 were marine infantry, while the Air Force numbered 13,596.

**Military Forces Personnel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Non-commissioned Officers</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>201,365</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>31,061</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>12,663</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Army is organized into eight territorial divisions, an Aerial Assault Aviation Division that brings together the Special Forces brigade, two army aviation brigades and a counter drug trafficking brigade, as well as other specialized units and training schools. Since September 1981, the Army has participated in the Multinational Peace and Observers (MFO) force in Sinai through an infantry battalion, with this representing its second international incursion. Colombia was the only country from the Latin American region to participate in the Korean conflict of the 1950s. In the last two decades, by virtue of the security and defence policy applied in the context of the internal conflict, the strength of the Army has substantially increased, as is the case with the rest of the Public Force.

For its part, the Colombian Navy is made up of seven forces and commands deployed across the national territory: Caribbean Naval Force (covers Colombian territorial waters in the Caribbean Sea); Pacific Naval Force (territorial waters in the Pacific Ocean); Southern Naval Force (Putumayo and Caquetá rivers); Eastern Naval Force (navigable rivers in the departments of Arauca, Casanare, Guainía, Guaviare, Meta and Vichada); Marine Infantry Command (operates in the terrestrial jurisdiction assigned to the Navy - on the coast, island territories and in rivers). There is also a Coast Guard Command, Naval Aviation Command and the San Andrés and Providencia Special Command.

The Colombian Air Force is formed of seven aerial combat commands (CACOM), an Air Transport Military Command (CATAM) and an Air Maintenance Command (CAMAN), which operate throughout Colombian territory, as well as the Air Groups of the Caribbean (GACAR), and the East (GAORI). It also has four principle training centers.

With regard to troops, an 18-month military service is in effect in the Army and the Air Force, rising to 24 months in the case of the Navy, with this largely comprised of subordinate ranks. But responsibility for the majority of combat against subversive organizations lay in the hands of professional personnel (close to 30,000 in the Army and some 8-10,000 marine infantry, according to those interviewed – there are no publicly available statistics). Military service remains mandatory for men, while it is voluntary for women. While self-defence groups were active in a certain part of the conflict (such groups perhaps, on some occasions, informally coordinated their actions with the military), these constituted illegal movements that in more than one case operated in collusion with drug traffickers, and were engaged in their own internal conflicts. There was no community counter-insurgent recruitment controlled by the military force, as happened in the past in Guatemala and Peru.
We will not make a detailed reference here to the insurgency, the failed attempts at peace, and the legacy left behind by this process, instead only mentioning the elevated numbers of internally displaced persons (the figure is the subject of dispute, perhaps 7.4 million according to UNHCR\(^4\), registered victims (figure also controversial\(^5\)), and the some 60,000 disappearances. For recent developments we recommend the web page razonpublica.com (many of the main contributions were reproduced at www.resdal.org), as well as the articles that appeared on Semana.com, a national newspaper edited in Bogota.

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4 According to the UN Agency for Refugees (UNHCR) representative in Colombia, Jozef Merkx, “there were 7.4 million internally displaced persons registered at the end of 2016, a figure that represents an increase of approximately half a million compared with the beginning of the year, without there having been a return of internally displaced persons or other decreases having been reported. As a result, Colombia remained the country with the largest population of internally displaced persons.” Taking into account that there have been 65.6 million refugees globally since 1985, over 11% of this number of victims are located in Colombia. Declarations to Caracol Radio, on June 19, 2017. (Own translation).

5 According to the 16th April 2016 edition of El Tiempo, “Registrations at the Victims Unit indicate 12 crimes prevalent among the complaints: forced displacement, homicide, mutilation by mines, kidnapping, torture, recruitment of minors, dispossession of land, sexual assaults, threats and attacks, forced displacement and theft of property. Of the 8 million, over 6 million are displaced. The second largest group of victims by crime to claim reparations corresponds to that of homicides: 265,000 people were direct victims and a number of 704,000 has been given for indirect victims (family members). In the same manner, of the total number of people to make complaints, there is a group of 1.5 million people who will not receive reparations for various reasons. Among them there is a significant number of victims who have already died, who are missing, or to whom the delivery of aid will not proceed.” (Own translation).

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**The Colombian peace process**

**Territorial distribution of guerrillas in the stage of deadlock and marginalization**

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The Colombian peace process

Although the FARC have never held a clear objective of taking power, they have sought to attain the best balance of forces possible in order to attain advantages at the negotiating table (as they sought to do during the Caguán process with their agenda of “Re founding the State”).

The failure leaves a widespread sense of distrust in the country with regard to peace processes. Both the Government and the FARC strengthen their rhetoric and engage in actions that heighten the armed conflict. Álvaro Uribe takes office in 2002 and initiates the Patriot Plan, intensifying the armed effort against the FARC and promoting the argument that there is no armed conflict in Colombia, but instead a terrorist threat. Over the course of his two terms in power there are no attempts at reconciliation or peace talks with the guerrillas.

Exploratory meetings are initiated with the aim of reaching an agreement. The General Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace between the Government of the Republic of Colombia (National Government) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP).

Principle points:
- Initiate direct and uninterrupted talks on the items covered by the established agenda, with the aim of achieving a Final Agreement to end the conflict.
- Establish a negotiations table.
- The Cuban and Norwegian governments are guarantors of the process, while Venezuela and Chile are accompanying countries to the process.

The table is able to consult experts on the issues covered by the agenda. The table produces periodic reports. The National Government provides the necessary resources for the functioning of the table.

The National Government and the FARC strengthen their rhetoric and engage in actions that heighten the armed conflict. Álvaro Uribe takes office in 2002 and initiates the Patriot Plan, intensifying the armed effort against the FARC and promoting the argument that there is no armed conflict in Colombia, but instead a terrorist threat. Over the course of his two terms in power there are no attempts at reconciliation or peace talks with the guerrillas.

The long Colombian conflict has registered the following statistics:
- More than 130,000 threatened
- Close to 75,000 lost some property
- More than 90,000 disappeared or with family members who have disappeared
- More than 540,000 affected by the killing of a loved one
- 10,500 victims of anti-personnel mines
- 6,500 cases of torture
- Almost 7,000 cases of forced recruitment of minors
- 4,000 cases of sexual violence


Agenda:
1) Comprehensive agrarian development policy: comprehensive rural reform including the creation of collectively owned “peasant territories” managed by leaders who would be chosen by the community for this specific purpose.
2) Participation in politics: the creation of new political parties and mechanisms to promote transparency in electoral processes as well as greater voter turnout, with the possibility for the FARC and their leaders to participate in politics.
3) Conflict termination – demobilization: The “handover of weapons” by the FARC, with the aim of reinsertion into civilian life and security guarantees.
4) Solution to the illicit drugs problem: The FARC proposed giving priority to “manual eradication” as the main method of drug eradication, in agreement with those who cultivate and produce illicit drugs. It is agreed that crops that correspond to ancestral uses will not be eradicated.
5) Victims of the armed conflict: The formation of a truth commission, and the subsequent assignment of compensation, is a key aspect of this issue, as well as having significant symbolic meaning.
6) Mechanisms to endorse agreements: The FARC insisted on the creation of a National Constituent Assembly comprised of 141 members to approve the agreements. In the end, a plebiscite is chosen.

El Caguán: a peace process whose principle stage was a 47,000km² demilitarized zone covering the municipalities of Mesetas, La Uribe, La Macarena, Villahermosa and San Vicente del Caguán. It began with a meeting held by then President Pastrana with the most senior FARC commander, Manuel Marulanda Vélez, in which both expressed their willingness to initiate dialogue in order to achieve a negotiated settlement to the armed conflict.
Disaster risk management | Public security | Gender perspective

The Colombian peace process

Establishment of the Historical Commission for Conflict and its Victims
August 2014

Humanitarian Agreement for the decontamination of territory. Both sides agree to the clearing and decontamination of territory from anti-personnel mines, improvised explosive devices, unexploded ordnance, or explosive remnants of war in general (Communique No.52).

Agreement to provide legal security and stability to the Final Agreement; ensure its introduction into legislation and to provide guarantees regarding compliance with said Final Agreement, both in relation to Colombian domestic law and international law (Communique No.69).

The Gender Subcommittee, made up of members of each delegation, is established to ensure that all the agreements reached, together with the Final Agreement, incorporate an adequate gender focus. To achieve this, they receive the support of national and international experts.

Given the request presented by the parties to the United Nations, Security Council Resolution No 2261 establishes a political mission that participates as an international component and coordinator of the aforementioned tripartite, headed by a special representative of the Secretary General. Formed of unarmed international observers, it monitors and verifies the abandonment of arms.

The following agreements are reached (Communique No.76):
1. “Agreement on the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities”.
2. Security guarantees and the fight against organizations responsible for homicides and massacres or that threaten human rights defenders or members of social or political movements.
3. Endorsement.

The Protocol and Annexes to the chapter on WEAPONS ABANDONMENT of the Agreement on the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities and Arms Abandonment are signed (Communique No83).

The Government and the FARC conclude the negotiations in Havana. The Final Agreement is presented to Congress to authorize the announcement of a plebiscite, and the President then issues the decree announcing and formulating the question.

The locations of the Transitory Rural Zones for Normalization are split among 15 departments

- Antioquia
  - Medellín
  - Ituango
  - Dabeiba
- Cauca
  - Cali
- Nariño
  - Tumaco
- Putumayo
  - Villavicencio
- Meta
  - Tunja
- Guaviare
  - Vichada
- Guainía
- La Guajira
- Magdalena
- Chocó
- Caquetá
- Viguera
- Chocó

Municipalities where FARC were located

Transitory Rural Zones for Normalization (23)
1. La Paz (César)
2. Tibú (Norte de Santander)
3. Remedios (Antioquia)
4. Ituango (Antioquia)
5. Dabeiba (Antioquia)
6. Planadas (Tolima)
7. Villancar (Tolima)
8. Buenos Aires (Caqueta)
9. Caldas (Cauca)
10. Policarpa (Nariño)
11. Tumaco (Nariño)
12. Puerto Asis (Putumayo)
13. Montañita (Caquetá)
14. Cartagena del Chirí (Caquetá)
15. Araracu (Arauca)
16. Tame (Arauca)
17. Macarena (Meta)
18. Mairipor (Meta)
19. Mesetas (Meta)
20. Vistahermosa (Meta)
21. Cumarico (Vichada)
22. San José del Guaviaré - Este (Guaviaré)
23. San José del Guaviaré - Centro (Guaviaré)

Zones of normalization
- Camps

Camps (8)
1. Fonseca (La Guajira)
2. Vírgia del Fuerte (Antioquia)
3. Bucareo (Chocó)
4. Tierra Alta (Cordoba)
5. Corinto (Cauca)
6. San Vicente (Caquetá)
7. Lourada Macarena (Meta)
8. Puerto Colombia (Guainia)

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- Magdalena
- Chocó
- Caquetá
- Viguera
- Chocó

In 2016 a peace agreement was reached with the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), which entails:

- Agrarian reform (difficult to achieve, given the changes that have occurred in the Colombian rural environment).
- Political participation of the FARC (transformed since 2017 into the Common Alternative Revolutionary Force), which presumably can present Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri, alias Timochenko, as candidate for President, as well as guaranteeing them a minimum of five seats in the Senate and five in the Chamber of Deputies. Special peace constituencies were also created, guaranteeing 16 seats in the Chamber to regional leaders, which it is assumed will be in line with FARC.
- The agreement meant an end to insurrectionary armed violence. A DDR process monitored by the UN was responsible for this. Apparently, only 5% of FARC personnel failed to comply with the demobilization agreement. The obvious doubts that exist are those around a change in the nature of the violence, which could take on a purely criminal character.
- In a simple manner, FARC agreed to disassociate itself from drug trafficking. However, an increase in the cultivation of illicit drugs was registered in 2017, leading to “decertification” by the United States, and thus a loss of financial assistance.
- The agreements create a Special Jurisdiction for Peace, whose composition is mixed, with both Colombian and international judges. Those guerrillas who recognize their participation in the most serious crimes and collaborate in the
Judicial process will be sanctioned by the Peace Tribunal, with sentences ranging from five to eight years of effective restriction of liberty (domiciliary, geographic or work). In addition, they will be obliged to carry out works that benefit the victims. Those who do not recognize the entirety of the truth will be sent to prison for up to 20 years. The benefits of amnesty, pardon or their equivalents will be restricted to those who have not committed crimes against humanity. It was also agreed to create a special unit for missing persons in the context and as a consequence of the conflict. The implementation of this transitional justice mechanism has not advanced. Security guarantees were also proposed for demobilized combatants, and the fight against “criminal gangs” (BACRIM) who represent an “imminent threat” to the implementation of the agreements.

- Finally, it was agreed that the mechanism for endorsing the agreements would be through a plebiscite. On July 18, 2016 the Constitutional Court provided its endorsement, and the plebiscite was held on October 2nd, with negative results. However, both the Colombian government and the FARC continued to push onwards, transferring the issue to the 2018 electoral campaign and the elections that will be held, on different dates, for the position of President as well as Congress.
- In the meantime, dialogue is being held with the other insurgent organization, the National Liberation Army (ELN).

Together with the Police and the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI), the Armed Forces integrate a single force known as the Public Force. It is this force that has historically managed a monopoly over the state’s employment of violence, exercised within the democratic framework. There is now a need to confront the new-old criminal forms of violence to which Colombia is exposed, which implies debates around the role that corresponds to each institution in terms of post-conflict security.

All bodies are under the legal authority of the Ministry of Defence. It is the only example from the Latin American region in which the National Police depends on the Ministry of Defence. Beyond the chain of command, in practice each organization exercises a high degree of autonomy; the administrative-bureaucratic body must also manage the different competencies held by each force, which is logical in any public force.

The Public Force’s overall budget – security and defence – stands at close to nine billion dollars. According to RESDAL’s Comparative Atlas, 2016 edition, the 2016 defence budget was USD 4,916,000,000. Colombia’s defence budget has decreased over the course of the last decade, both as a percentage of GDP and in relation to the overall State Budget. It decreased from 2.97% of GDP in 2008 to 1.94% in 2016, with the annual State Budget falling to 7.64% from 9.3% over the same period.

Even so, it continues to represent an important proportion of resources, and is above the Latin American average, which stood at 1.3% of GDP in 2016. It is almost double the 3.79% average that Latin American countries devote to defence as a proportion of their respective state budgets. This implies a challenge facing the Army, and all forces in general, of transforming themselves in accordance with the post-conflict scenario, because for representatives and those in government, of any political leaning, the peace dividend will surely involve responding to societal demands for the urgent satisfaction of basic needs. In an environment characterized by insecurity, certain discussions over budgetary resources may not arise. But when perceptions of the security situation begin to improve, demands over needs that worsened over the course of decades of conflict may reappear with greater force. In financial terms, the current situation cannot be maintained. On this issue the armed forces behave like the Grande Muette, having to resort to indirect approximations.

It must be taken into account that the police force is of a very significant size, with some 184,000 personnel as of August 2017. Added to the three armed forces, this provides a total of 448,000 personnel in addition to some 3,000 DNI members and other common services personnel.
The relationship between personnel numbers in the Army and the National Police has varied greatly over the course of recent decades. For example: For each 15 soldiers in the Army, in the National Police there were:

- 2005: 9 Police
- 2008: 9 Police
- 2011: 10 Police
- 2014: 11 Police
- 2017: 13 Police

The variation between Army troop numbers recorded in 2002 and at the end of 2017 is 19%. In the case of the National Police, it is 63%.


The Army, acting within a more or less purely technical framework, perceives itself to be victorious. Anti-militarist sentiment has not been expressed by the public. A 2016 Gallup survey showed military forces to have a popularity rating of 60% while the police, who are more greatly exposed to the public in urban environments, registered a disapproval rating of 59% (elcolombiano.com, 5th May 2016). The 2017 Latinobarómetro indicates that 57% of those interviewed in Colombia have confidence in the armed forces, and 42% in the Police (data collected by the National Center of Consultancy). And the survey commissioned by the Ministry of Defence to Invamer Gallup, which measures public sentiment towards the Army (confidence in the institution and personnel behaviour) registered a level of 74% in December 2016.
The peace agreement represents a political achievement, despite the fact that weapons condition and lever it. This fact will condition future military policy, to which we must add the issue of responsibility for issues in the past, particularly for the abuse of human rights; despite perceptions, this issue will be a prominent theme during the 2018 political campaign. This is especially the case because, being a monopolistic, legally legitimate actor, the military is unable to offload alleged responsibility onto other actors (and here they resemble other armed forces from other Latin American countries during the transition period). Discussions over *las violencias* will be a theme of the 2018 campaign.

The police force, which today occupies a very much secondary role in rural areas, would like to end up playing the central role in security management in the post-conflict context. But the Army’s plans see it seeking to maintain the institution’s primary role. However, it is aware of the need to transform the institution: it is not possible to continue paying to fight an enemy with whom a political agreement has been reached, and both the public and those in power will demand that other needs are met.

Experience indicates that an approach of drastically reducing an armed force and not providing it with an adequate future can bring about very undesirable consequences. Work must begin before the social agenda is filled, leaving a Public Force lacking in resources. Elsewhere in Latin America, an approach of steadily reducing budgets has been utilized, especially in relation to the military, in order to control military commanders, an approach that has
led to new problems arising that are difficult to confront. The present situation is developing in a context that differs greatly from that of other transitions in the region; there no longer exists a notion of triumphalism with regard to liberalism, democracy and elections, while on the international level we live in a globalized but “sovereign” world.

**Military missions and the post-conflict environment: a regional perspective on Colombia**

**Future of the Army’s Employment Policy**

- Clear leadership, precise guidelines and synergies between each institution.
- Sustainability of territorial control (in coordination with other military, police or state entities and with the population).
- Community organization and participation in security tasks, conversion and development (in preventing the recurrence of crime, and territorial control, applying coercive measures within the current legal framework).
- Maximize the linkages and impacts at the subnational level of key actions at the central level (e.g. provide the country with an Internal Security Law).

**Political Constraints**

- The coherence of results.
- The rationality of resource allocation (the balance between approaches with differing scopes).

**Institutional Capacities for Implementation of the Policy**

- Ability to catalyze the Army’s effectiveness (its results) at subnational levels.
- Ability to improve key tools / mechanisms for inter-institutional management to ensure effective operations.
- Ability to effectively put in place an effective the system of surveillance and monitoring (results and operational levels).
- Reflection and management of bottlenecks in mechanisms for: a) inter-institutional coordination, b) administrative, and c) financial.

**Level of party political polarization** (problems of overlapping peace and electoral processes).
- Financial problems. Influence of the international community.

**Ability to show coherence, transparency and accountability in the use and impact of Army resources.**

**Ensure maximum compliance with human rights during the execution of security operations.**

**Ability to manage the permanent tension that exists between more repressive orientations and those favoring prevention (across a variety of dimensions).**

**Effectiveness of communication (internal and external) with regard to policies in the area of security and preventing the recurrence of violence. Managing both traditional media and social networks.**

**Level of collaboration and coordination with the judicial and other sectors.**

**Political Constraints**

- • Clear leadership, precise guidelines and synergies between each institution.
- • Sustainability of territorial control (in coordination with other military, police or state entities and with the population).
- • Community organization and participation in security tasks, conversion and development (in preventing the recurrence of crime, and territorial control, applying coercive measures within the current legal framework).
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**Effectiveness of communication (internal and external) with regard to policies in the area of security and preventing the recurrence of violence. Managing both traditional media and social networks.**

**Level of collaboration and coordination with the judicial and other sectors.**

**• Coordinated and coherent institutional communications by the distinct “operators” of foreign policy with regard to the Army’s actions.**
- • Transparent internal institutional communication directives for the “operators” of the Army across different areas and levels.
The role of the Army in a post-conflict context: Colombia from a regional perspective

### Participation in Public Security

Although the term public security does not feature within governmental and academic parlance in Colombia, the preservation of public order is a fundamental concern for the country’s authorities. Beyond its central role of defending the sovereignty, independence and integrity of the national territory, the National Army has been involved in the containment of internal threats that affect the current constitutional order. In addition to border control,\(^7\) the violence and presence of illegal armed structures in the interior of the country, which exceeded the technical and operational capacities of the National Police, led the Army to undertake functions around guaranteeing internal security. This military action within the country’s borders relates not only to military combat against the guerrillas, but also to the fight against crimes such as drug trafficking, terrorism, the illegal extraction of natural resources, kidnapping and extortion.

### Employment of the Army in Public Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment of the Army in Public Security</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of public order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes. Combatting illegal armed structures such as guerrillas and organized criminal groups. Operations to guarantee permanent territorial control in rural areas, especially in those where there is a presence of illegal armed structures. Monitoring and patrol operations in certain strategic urban centres. In extraordinary cases where grave threats to public order are presented, the National Army supports the National Police in controlling large demonstrations and countering terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of strategic national infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, since the 1990s. Permanent operations to safeguard and control oil and gas pipelines, energy installations and strategic road networks. Also carried out are special security operations and assistance to businesses – public and private – that operate the infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes. Operations to protect national territory and control borders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight against drug trafficking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, since the 1970s. Combat operations against armed drug trafficking structures, destruction of laboratories used for producing cocaine, and aerial, maritime and land interdiction of drug loads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight against the illegal extraction of mining deposits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes. The 2015 National Strategy against Illegal Mining confers upon the National Army a principle role in combating criminal structures dedicated to the illicit extraction of natural resources, especially gold, as well as the destruction of machinery and illegal deposits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contraband and trafficking of arms, ammunitions and explosives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes. Responsible for controlling the trafficking and commercialization of firearms and ammunition. In addition, carries out humanitarian mine clearing operations and the deactivation of non-conventional explosives laid by guerrillas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping, extortion and human trafficking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes. Joint operations with the National Police to combat crimes against personal liberty. Special anti-kidnapping groups (GAULA) are in existence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of leaders of social groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes. The Army has been tasked with the protection of demobilized FARC members.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^7\) It is worth remembering that the last international military conflict to compromise Colombia’s national territory was that with Peru in 1932. Territorial disputes with Nicaragua, which have passed through the International Court of Justice and produced rulings against Colombia, and which concede a section of Colombia’s territorial waters to Nicaragua, revived public concern over the defence of the country’s borders and its territorial integrity. These concerns held a preeminent emphasis on strengthening naval capacity for the exercise of sovereignty in maritime spaces.
The involvement of the National Army in public order enforcement tasks in Colombia’s recent history can be traced back to the events of the Bogotazo, April 9th 1948. Within a highly polarized climate involving the Conservative and Liberal political parties, the assassination of liberal leader Jorge E. Gaitán unleashed a great popular revolt against the Conservative government of President Mariano Ospina. The gravity of the disturbances and the participation of members of Bogota’s police force in the uprising led to the deployment of Army units to aid in containment, to recuperate public order and, later, to assume the police functions of maintaining the status quo and surveillance in the city.  

In June 1954, in the context of several major student demonstrations, Battalion No. 1 of the Army’s Military Police was formed in order to carry out riot control activities. However, over the years, this force has been reoriented towards internal control with respect to the activities of the Military Forces, with the National Police’s Mobile Anti-Disturbance Squad (ESMAD), created in 1999, assuming the function of controlling riots and disturbances.

In any case, military units are involved in actions to restore public order when a given situation exceeds the police’s response capability, as was the case during the 2014 National Agrarian Strike. Military units are also deployed in the face of terrorist acts, such as the siege of the Palace of Justice in 1985 by M-19 guerrillas, or the 2003 FARC attack on Bogota’s Club El Nogal with the use of explosives. In other cases where levels of violence have become critical as a product of the actions of organized criminal structures, as in the cases of Buenaventura or Tumaco (populations on the Colombian Pacific), a permanent military presence has been put in place, seeking through this to reinforce the State’s deterrent capacity and to maintain a minimum level of public order.

8 Police forces were disbanded and their members discharged, and they were ordered to restructure as a National Police force through Presidential Decree 1453 of April 30, 1930. Throughout this process, the Police were under the direction of military commanders and placed under the Ministry of War.
Beyond the fight against illegal armed structures, especially the guerrillas, the main public security functions carried out by the Colombian Army are related to the fight against drug trafficking. Since the 1970s, the Military Forces have actively participated in activities such as controlling the cultivation, production and trafficking of illicit drugs. “Operation Fulminante” of 1978 represented the first major military offensive in the fight against drug trafficking, with some ten thousand soldiers mobilized together with support from the Air Force and the National Navy, and with the aim of counteracting the production and trafficking of marijuana along the Colombian Atlantic Coast.

During the 1980s, the escalation of violence unleashed through the criminal actions of drug cartels resulted in the introduction of a variety of emergency measures, granting extraordinary powers to the Army in the fight against drug trafficking. Thus, in addition to the provision of operational support to National Police activities, the military also held powers to destroy goods and supplies used in the manufacture of psychotropic drugs and clandestine airstrips used for the aerial transport of drugs, as well as judicial police powers with which “it was established that the reports or minutes documenting the actions of the Military Forces represented judicial evidence against drug trafficking”.

This participation of the military in the fight against drugs was extended in 1989 with the signing of the Andean Initiative, a package of economic aid provided by the United States Government to support the capacities of the Colombian and Peruvian Governments to control illicit crops and to interdict shipments of illicit drugs in transit to the United States. The Initiative actively promoted military participation in anti-narcotics efforts.

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Participation in Public Security

tasks and allocated weapons, resources and training to improve their capabilities in the field. This trend was consolidated in 2000 with the entrance into force of Plan Colombia, an extensive anti-drug policy supported by the US Government.

Some milestones in regulatory evolution

- **1978**
  - Decree n° 2.535
  - Empowers the General Command of the Military Forces to authorize the purchase, possession and carrying of firearms, munitions and explosives by civilians.

- **1993**
  - Law n° 282
  - Creates the Unified Action Groups for Personal Liberation “Gaula”, involving the participation of the National Army, for controlling and combating crimes against personal liberty, especially kidnapping and extortion.

- **1996**
  - Law n° 578
  - Endows upon the President of the Republic extraordinary powers to issue laws related to the Military Forces and National Police.

- **2000**
  - Decree n° 759
  - Adopts measures for action against antipersonnel mines. The National Army assumes humanitarian mine clearing functions.

- **2002**
  - Presidential Decree nº 2144
  - Establishes measures leading to the reestablishment of public order, empowering military authorities to undertake operations to control drug trafficking and contraband activities.

Political Constitution:

Art. 217. The mission of the Military Forces is to defend the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the nation as well as its constitutional order.

Plan Colombia would become the engine of reform, modernization and the quantitative and qualitative growth of the Military Forces. Given the guerrilla’s involvement in drug trafficking, counterinsurgency and anti-drug strategies were inextricably imbricated, and these marked the adoption by the Army of a particular focus in the fight against illicit drug trafficking. This materialized with the creation of special units, such as the Counter Drug Trafficking Special Forces Brigade, the No. 1 Antinarcotics Battalion and the BG Rodolfo Herrera Luna Marine Corps Antinarcotics Battalion.

This was accompanied by plans, doctrines, and structural reorganization. The most relevant plan of the last decade was the Sword of Honor, which over the course of subsequent updates would outline the manner in which the Army’s response should be organized in accordance with the guidelines laid out by the security and defence policy. This included the formation of Task Forces across the territory. Since the signing of the Peace Accords several of these Task Forces have been reformulated, while others were transformed into operational commands for stabilization and consolidation.
The Army also plays a fundamental role in the protection of strategic infrastructures such as roads, energy towers, aqueducts and pipelines. Since the 1980s, this infrastructure has been a main target for the terrorist actions of illegal armed groups, intensifying the isolation and delayed economic and social development of large areas of the country. To counteract this form of systematic terrorism, Special Operations Centers for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure (COPEI) were created over the course of the 1990s, with their main ob-
Objective being to maintain opportune surveillance and to improve intelligence and reaction capabilities in the face of any suspicious act that threatens energy infrastructure and the transportation of hydrocarbons. COPEIs also provide security services and support to the activities of companies - public and private - that operate those infrastructures.

Other fronts in the military’s intervention in internal public security tasks are related to the fight against kidnapping, extortion and human trafficking, as well as the illegal extraction of resources. In the first case, the intervention of the Army to combat crimes violating people’s liberty was formalized through the creation of specialized GAULA groups in 1996. This, in the context of the so-called “massification” of kidnapping by the guerrillas, according to the periodization carried out by the Historical Memory Center, was either as a means of war against the State (kidnapping of soldiers, policemen and public officials), or as a method for financing their illegal activities (kidnapping members of civil society for extortion purposes). The formation of the GAULA implied coordinated, joined up work between the Army and the National Police, especially as far as intelligence is concerned.
Illegal mining is a phenomenon that has become one of the main sources of financing - together with drug trafficking - for illegal armed groups. It is in this way that, within the framework of the 2015 *National Strategy against Illegal Mining*, the National Army has assumed roles in combating criminal structures dedicated to the illegal extraction of mining deposits, especially gold.

The employment of the Colombian Army in matters of public security is broad in nature and is rooted in the history of the conflict and its derivations with regard to security. In the post-conflict framework pursued by the Peace Accords, national defence authorities have issued policy of transforming the manner in which the Public Force is employed, with the Army, party to this. In this context, the design of the Victory Plan mentioned above is indicative of actors’ perceptions of how to achieve what is referred to as “institutional control of territory”. It is a path that will be marked by the need to coordinate capabilities, not only between different military forces, but also with the National Police and other State institutions.
The role of the Army in a post-conflict context: Colombia from a regional perspective

Disaster Risk Management and the Role of the Army

The Colombian Army has not escaped the regional and international tendency towards the sustained participation of military forces in risk management systems that provide prevention and assistance in cases of natural and manmade disasters. In this case, defence sector support to civil authorities is defined as that provided by the Colombian Military Forces and all those institutions that form part of the defence sector in response to requests for assistance from national civil authorities in the face of domestic emergencies of any kind, as well as support to law enforcement and other activities involving entities trained for exceptional circumstances.

In 2012, Law 1523 created the National Disaster Risk Management System, through which the Colombian State adopted an action plan that transcends emergency response, focusing also on understanding and reducing disaster risks and promoting improved coordination between national institutions and territorial bodies. The System is headed by the President of the Republic and coordinated by the National Disaster Risk Management Unit. Broadly speaking it involves all public bodies at national and subnational levels, as well as private bodies (profit and non-profit) engaged in economic, social and environmental activities.
Colombian Civil Defence, an entity attached to the Ministry of National Defence, is responsible for carrying out imminent prevention and immediate response in the primary phase of disaster situations. Although Civil Defence forms part of the defence sector, it does not depend hierarchically on the Military Forces and maintains administrative and financial autonomy.

NATIONAL DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Law 1523, 2012

The Public Force is called upon to prepare for immediate humanitarian response in the event of a disaster. However, it should be noted that national regulations establish that all operations carried out in the event of a disaster, including those involving the Army, be coordinated and directed by the National Disaster Risk Management Unit, a special administrative unit attached to the Presidency of the Republic that coordinates and directs the National Disaster Risk Management System.
The Army is thus one of a number of defence sector institutions that operates within the framework of the national system. In 2017, it constituted 1% of the activities carried out, with the principle actor being Colombian Civil Defence.

**Disaster Risk Management Activities, 2017**

Institutions within the Ministry of Defence carried out a total of 9,783 activities in 2017.

**Percentage of Activities Carried Out According to the Institution, 2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombian Navy</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombian Civil Defence</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Maritime Directorate</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombian National Army</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombian Air Force</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombian National Police</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Support to the civil authority within the Army’s doctrine includes a risk management role. The doctrine states that “the Army seeks to strengthen civil-military cooperation through tasks in support of the civil authority, on the basis of a shared understanding of principles and guidelines, in order to aid coordination of the military-humanitarian interface and to guarantee that any military support offered is complementary to the humanitarian agenda or the requirements of the competent civil authority”. This definition of support to the civil authority, which includes risk management, assumes that “tasks are focused on the employment of non-lethal means in as much as the conditions and the operational environment allow it”, and that “the support has two purposes: to guarantee the ability of authorities to enforce the law in an emergency situation in order to restore governance, and to assist in restoring basic services to the population in order to improve their quality of life”.

Disaster Risk Management and the Role of the Army

The Handbook of Doctrine states that:

“Even though each assistance mission is unique, four characteristics always define and shape the actions of commanders and leaders in any of them:

1) The legal framework defines the nature of support provided by the National Army to civil authorities.
2) Civil authorities are in charge while Military Forces support them.
3) The National Army ends its mission when civil authorities are able to continue without military support.
4) The National Army must document the costs of all direct and indirect support provided.”

In terms of the Army’s organizational hierarchies, risk management is found within the Military Engineers Command. The Disaster Risk Management Directorate (DIGER) and the Disaster Prevention and Response Battalion were set up within this command. It possesses an NBQR company (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Radiological); construction team; works technicians; and related activities such as plumbing and electrics, as well as search and rescue in collapsed structures, an immediate response company, and a healthcare company.

In addition to emergency response, support activities include an important commitment in terms of mitigation, and together these produce a noticeable outreach by Army personnel towards the local population. Hence the importance also that the doctrine itself refers to the concept of civil-military cooperation. On this issue, the point to which personnel education and training is taken in the future is worth observing.

In which situations?
- Crises or emergencies caused by disasters.
- Grave public order disturbances.
- In support of national civil institutions responsible for law enforcement.
- Response to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents.
- Civil-military cooperation, transport or additional security in special circumstances such as VIP visits or large sporting events.
- Aerial transportation of medical assistance to remote communities.

With what aims?
- Save lives.
- Restore essential services.
- Maintain or restore public order and support law enforcement.
- Support the maintenance or restoration of local governance.
- Protect infrastructure as well as public and private property.
- Support the recovery of territory. Guarantee humanitarian conditions and human rights.

Characteristics
- Interventions are always carried out within the existing legal framework.
- Military interventions occur in response to requests from civil authorities and/or following an order from the President of the Republic.
- Civil authorities take lead of the situation and establish the priorities. They coordinate activities with the military authority, but do not impart orders on military units.
- Military intervention ends when civil authorities are able to continue without military support.
- Unrestricted respect for the fundamental rights of the civilian population.
- The use of lethal weapons is exceptional. Force is employed within the legal framework laid out by International Human Rights Law.
- Respect for different ethnicities, genders, religious beliefs and customs.
- Respect for the constitutional powers of civilian authorities.

The Disaster Prevention and Response Battalion, assigned to the Special Brigade of Military Engineers, was created in 2009 with the mission of bringing immediate medical and humanitarian assistance to people and areas affected by natural disasters. This unit forms an active part of the Operational Committee of the National Disaster Prevention and Response System.

Since 2010, the School of Military Engineers has taught a Master’s Degree in Risk Management and Development, a postgraduate academic program accredited by the Ministry of National Education and based on the study of natural and anthropic phenomena that give rise to catastrophes.

The objective of the master’s course is to train professionals in disaster prevention, early warnings and timely communication with local authorities and communities, as well as efficient response and recovery of persons and areas affected by the occurrence of such an event. According to the School of Military Engineers, the program’s design has been based on management and operational components so that graduates can participate in the conception, planning and development of actions required in a specific area in the event of a catastrophe. Training includes scientific, technological and administrative components.

The master’s degree is taught in person and is open to military and police personnel, as well as civilian members of the public with professions related to engineering, business administration, economics or law.

The Army has recently intervened in the context of two major natural disasters. When a forest fire affected the eastern hills of Bogota in February 2016, the Army was directly involved in its management given that the fire occurred in areas adjacent to the Logistics Battalion. On this occasion, military action on the ground focused on supporting the clearance and cooling of hot spots to avoid the reactivation and spreading of the flames, while the Air Force participated through the use of helicopters to dump thousands of gallons of water over affected areas. The second case is the recent disaster that occurred in the city of Mocoa, capital of Putumayo department in the south of the country, which was produced by mud and rock slides caused by incessant rains over several days. On this occasion, the Army participated in the search and rescue effort for wounded persons and bodies trapped in the debris produced by the landslide; meanwhile the Air Force concentrated its efforts on the provision of air support to search, rescue and ground control tasks.
The Army’s role in risk management may contribute to its positive standing with the public. One of the challenges for the future, and one for which the doctrine is already being prepared, is how the organization and its current role connect to the construction of a professional mentality that incorporates its role in the system and the need for personnel to be trained in coordinating among agencies, including non-governmental and/or humanitarian agencies.
The role of the Army in a post-conflict context: Colombia from a regional perspective

The participation of women in the Army and the incorporation of a gender perspective

As in other Latin American cases, the incorporation of women into the Colombian Army - beyond their participation in the wars of independence - has occurred across different stages: the first begins in 1976 with the admission of women into the administrative ranks. These were women with university degrees in different specialties such as medicine, psychology, dentistry, nursing, law and education, and which undertook three-month preparatory courses before entering the institution as support officers responsible for administrative tasks.

In 2000, the Ministry of Defence promoted reforms to the regulations governing the careers of commissioned and non-commissioned officers and of the armed forces in general. In 2001 the Constitutional Court ruled that references in these rules to the condition of being “Colombiano”, as a minimum requirement for admission to commissioned or non-commissioned officer careers in the Military Forces, cover both men and women. The lawsuit filed, and in whose consideration the Court ruled, planted among other things that “women have the right to hold the rank of Officer in the Military Forces”. And although the Court found that “a literal reading of the provision in question leads to the conclusion that when demanding Colombian nationality as a prerequisite for admission into the Military Forces as an officer of non-commissioned officer, this does not exclude the possibility of female Colombians”, it reiterated that “the criteria previously stated [by the Constitutional Court] in relation to the rights to equality and to the free development of both sexes with respect to access to the training schools for officers and non-commissioned officers of the Military Forces”, declaring the constitutionality of paragraph 1 of article 33 “under the condition that said expression [colombiano] is understood as covering both male and female Colombians”.

Admission of women to the military academy as Army career officers was provided in 2009, some years following the above ruling. (According to Art.12 of Decree 1790, “Army career [de armas] officers include all those educated and trained with the principle objective of exercising command and control over combat and combat support units”). Only career officers are able to reach the rank of Army Commanders, or General Inspector of the Force, or to command an operational unit. 16% of the cadets admitted in 2009 to the Military Cadet School were women: 62, of which 48 completed the course within three years. The National Army and the Air Force, for their part, opened their academies’ doors to women in 1997.

12 Presidency-Ministry of National Defence (2000). Decree 1790, 2000, modifying the decree that regulates the careers of commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the Military Forces. Diario Oficial N° 44161, September 14th 2000. The version that compiles the later modifications including pronouncements of the Constitutional Court can be consulted at https://www.ejercito.mil.co/?idcategoria=400124&download=Y.

13 In Spanish the term ‘Colombiano’ in singular form refers to a male of Colombian nationality, while ‘colombiana’ refers to a female of Colombian nationality.

14 The ruling of constitutionality was not extended to the term “soltero” (single male) that is also planted in the article, with this ruled to be unconstitutional. See: Constitutional Court of the Republic of Colombia. Sentence C-1293/01. December 5th 2001. Retrieved from http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2001/C-1293-01.htm. (Own translation).

In the case of non-commissioned officers, it was in 2017 that the Military School for Non-Commissioned Officers opened up admission into combat arms and combat support arms to women. Colombia differs in this respect from other countries in the region, which generally opened up admission to commissioned and non-commissioned officers almost simultaneously.\(^\text{16}\)

On the other hand, since 1993 women have been able to engage in military service voluntarily, with the possibility for this to become obligatory should circumstances require it, “in the areas of logistical support, administrative, social, cultural or environmental protection, and generally in activities contributing to the country’s modernization and development” (Law 48, Art 10). This limitation in terms of the category of tasks was eliminated through Law 1861, August 2017, which updated the regulations governing recruitment and mobilization. Prior to the introduction of this law, a ruling by the Constitutional Court in November 2016 had recognized that “it is possible to conclude that there is a difference in treatment between men and women in terms of the activities in which they are able to advance their military service”, and that “the provision of military service does not require, in itself, a specific sexual condition, since none of the activities or related functions are linked to conditions of one sex or another. Obviously the ideal provision of physical activities involved in military or police work requires certain health conditions and physical and psychological preparations that must be evaluated at the time of incorporation, but these conditions have no relationship to the sex of each person. In other words, men or women may meet, or not meet, the objective requirements for the provision of military service activities, regardless of their sex”. Sentencing as “UNCONSTITUTIONAL, the expression ‘in the areas of logistical support, administrative, social, cultural or environmental protection, and generally in activities contributing to the country’s modernization and development’ contained in the paragraph of Article 10, Law 48, 1993”. The incorporation of female personnel as professional soldiers is thus one of the issues to be addressed in the future.

With respect to admission into officer academies, female aspirants present themselves on equal conditions as males, in the absence of specific conditions. Once the admission process is complete, they take the same courses, including receiving the same combat and aerial assault training. However, physical training may be more flexible at the discretion of instructors. They receive their training in the same facilities, although they have access to separate showers and dormitories; in this sense Colombia is aligned with other cases from the region and the world more widely.

In any case, the difference lies in the continued differentiation in the role assigned to women in direct combat positions, which feeds into two questions:

a. Opening up the Infantry Arm. In the case of the Colombian Army, the Cavalry and Artillery - variations are evident in the extent to which different armies across the world incorporate women in such Combat Arms – have already opened their doors to women (for example, the first Lieutenant of the Cav-

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The Infantry remains closed, although this is expected to change in the near future (the then Head of the Army, General Mejía, provided assurances in 2016 that “it is very likely they will be in infantry and combat courses”).

b. The question of participation in hostilities, and arguments over whether a woman may or may not operate directly on the ground in such cases (the majority of these refer to physical and physiological conditions that would make it unfit for a woman to operate, for example, for a long time in jungle territory). In the case of non-commissioned officers, this was changed in 2017, as mentioned. For soldiers, the sanctioning of a new law, also in 2017, opens up the opportunity for them to present themselves as volunteers. This will make it necessary to redefine the issue of women as professional soldiers. In the case of career officers, although as future officers they will exercise command over troops and will be able to aspire to reach the rank of General of the Republic, in practice their participation sometimes remains restricted in relation to direct participation in hostilities. This may mean that in the future (if tendencies to keep them away from conflict zones continue) their career possibilities are compromised since certain conditions for promotion must be met, including those related to posts and command roles previously held. For example, the requirement of having commanded a basic or special unit or having been second in command in the so-called technical and special units in order to be eligible for promotion to the rank of Captain. It may therefore be, in the presence of the well known “glass ceilings”, a subject that requires personnel policies that go beyond the generation of norms.

Projection of the career pattern of female career officers in the Colombian Army. Estimated year for reaching each grade.

Source: Decree 1790, 2000. The projection is a theoretical estimate based on the times established in Art. 55 of the aforementioned decree. The estimate does not take into account the additional requirements for promotion established in Art. 57, which will affect the projections according to the individual cases.

As of December 31st 2016, women represent 3.8% of all Colombian army personnel in officer and non-commissioned officer bodies: 1,466 women. The low nature of the figure does not stand out given a context in which women have only recently entered career military (2009). This partly explains the significant differences observed between the number of women in the case of Colombia and those of other cases in the Latin American region (Argentina, Chile or Guatemala made the same openings during the 1990s). Mexico, for its part, opened up admission in 2007, not so far from the Colombian case in this respect, but it does differ when it comes to the design of institutional gender policies, and these also impact on the quantitative aspect:

Since admission was opened up, the number of women accepted as cadets from the José María Córdova Military School of Cadets has followed an erratic tendency. There are no specific formal quotas, but various factors may influence the numbers. These range from the difficulty for those applying to meet certain parameters, to the existence of informal, latent and non-manifest quotas (a topic on which it is necessary to carry out a region-wide investigation that goes beyond the Colombian case). According to data from an investigation produced by the Military School itself, between 2009 and 2015 a total of 410 women entered the Military School of Cadets, representing 12% of Army admissions over the course of this period. And by 2015 Colombia already had 130 female career officers, 52% of which were in the logistics Arm.
In 2017, the ratio between women and men in the Cadet School was 1 to 4 (which is significant for the future). In the first convocation of 2018, 45 women joined, representing 16% of the entrants. If this tendency is maintained, the percentage of women in the Army will progressively approach those in other Latin American cases.

With regard to orientations in those careers that also have a civilian derivation, Law and Logistics Management are the most favoured among women (all students who enter the military academy obtain a Degree in Military Sciences at the end of their course, and a complementary career can be chosen from among the two previously cited in addition to Physical Education, International Relations and Civil Engineering). Meanwhile, if we refer to the groups according to careers, as shown in the graph, the highest proportion of men is observed in Physical Education (90%, 336 students) and Civil Engineering (89%, 195 students).
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In 2016, the National Army Headquarters promoted the creation of a Gender Office within the institution, becoming the first of the three armed forces to create this type of office. It is placed within the Personnel Department and was created “based on the need to align the institution’s policies with the national and international agenda with regard to the issues of gender equality, differential approaches, and the prevention of gender-based violence, and with guidelines of this type issued by the General Command of the Military Forces and bodies that deal with this subject in the country”, and on the basis of permanent directives for gender equality emanating from the Military Forces Command.22 This Office is working in areas such as awareness, research, and training.

Other initiatives also show how those in command are incorporating a gender perspective. For example:

a) Within the Military Cadet School there is a Gender Observatory, which is expected to be incorporated into the jurisdiction of the Force’s Gender Office. This Observatory is testament to the initiative within the Military School in recent years to address the issue. This includes producing data such as that cited here as well as research carried out by the cadets themselves.

b) The Force, through the Personnel Command, has developed a Gender Program whose stated objective is to “provide tools that contribute to the strengthening of women and men in terms of their individual, family, social and work spheres from the perspective of co-responsibility and gender equality, and that promote appropriate practices for the prevention of domestic violence”. Its actions include the creation of 42 family centers to provide services to personnel in these areas.

In this sense, mainstreaming a gender perspective can be further promoted through the concentration of these initiatives. For example, through the Force’s Gender Office. Greater action and influence can be achieved by establishing this Office within the force structure, especially if its institutional placement sees it depend more directly on the General Staff or on the Force Headquarters. In the experience of other Latin American cases such a move has greatly promoted mainstreaming. It should be considered, furthermore, that as of 2018 a ministerial gender office and policy remain pending.

Thus, the Army in particular, but also the Military Forces in general, have made progress in terms of integrating women, a process which implies not only logistical issues but also the modification of patterns of behaviour and of perceptions within military institutions that—as in other parts of the world—are traditionally masculine in nature. Meanwhile, and paradoxically, the presence of women in illegal armed groups could help to work against the stereotypical view of women’s weakness, especially in relation to their presence in hostile situations. All this forms part of the transformation process that for the Armed Forces means “an increasingly careful observance of human rights, a greater inclusion of a gendered approach within the Armed Forces, and an inclusive conception of the relationship between military institutions and civil society. This modernization process has taken on an even greater magnitude in the face of the Government’s peace negotiations with the FARC and, potentially, with the ELN. The role of the Colombian Military Forces in a post-conflict context arouses some of the greatest interest and expectation among the public, and in this context the participation of uniformed women has been fundamental.”

The Ministry of Defence’s development of a gender policy is another of the topics on which the Colombian experience differs from that of other countries. In the last decade, this issue - as well as that of the possible elaboration of a National Plan of Action on UNSCR 1325, at the Executive level – has featured on the agenda but has not produced observable definitions or results. In 2016, gender was finally included in the Ministry of Defence’s Strategic Plan, within the goal of “Maintaining the legitimacy of the Public Force through respect for Human Rights and compliance with the norms of International Humanitarian Law.” Three strategies are included, one of which is “To develop working groups with CGFM and PONAL with the aim of generating a diagnosis that allows for the identification of strengths, weaknesses and/or advances in the subject of gender equality and state defence before the Inter-American Human Rights System, so that policies can be issued that address the needs of the sector in relation to these issues.” A sectoral policy regarding a gender perspective will be derived from this, which according to interviews conducted for this report will be available in 2018.

The Ministry of Defence forms part of the process of formulating policies and national plans within the Executive. For example, it articulates the mechanism regarding the “Route of access to justice in cases where women are kidnapped due to reasons relating to their gender”, in which various ministries participate, including the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation, the Comprehensive Victim Care and Reparation Unit, and the National Police, among others. This mechanism led to the production of a manual covering cases of kidnapping, and the Military Forces are among the institutional actors that may intervene, especially in terms of receiving allegations.

The principle laws that have been sanctioned in the field of gender in Colombia include:

- Law 823 (2003), on equality of opportunities.
- Law 1257 (2008), on violence and discrimination against women.
- Law 1719 (2014), on access to justice for victims of sexual violence, especially sexual violence in armed conflict.
- Law 1761 (2015), specifically categorizing the crime of femicide.
- It is also worth mentioning Decree 164 (2010), which created the following cross-sector commission: “Inter-institutional Board for the Eradication of Violence against Women”.

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The Ministry also participates in the Inter-institutional Board for the Eradication of Violence against Women, which is coordinated by the High Presidential Council for Women’s Equality. All this forms part of the National Public Policy on Gender Equality and the Comprehensive Plan for guaranteeing women a life free from violence, which have been generated by the current Government. In Colombia the gender issue has also been closely linked to the need to address violence against women, especially in relation to the internal armed conflict and its consequences. This was evident in the installation of a Gender Subcommittee within the negotiation tables for the peace agreement.

In this context, and given the variety of jobs within the Army in terms of public security, the Force itself has an important role to play in terms of generating action, but it is fundamentally for external institutions to promote mechanisms and activities to sensitize personnel.

Finally, all reforms and initiatives to boost a gender perspective within the Army require a social, political and normative framework that is general to the country as a whole. Experience shows that it is society that drives change, through its culture and through the three branches of the State. For example, through laws that promote gender equality and equity, through the judgments passed by the Constitutional Court, and through policies and plans prepared by the Executive. In relation to the latter, and with regard to the incorporation of a gender perspective in the armed forces, perhaps the greatest challenge is to open up the institution to greater interaction with political and social actors that can provide an array of different views to an institution that wishes to reform. Such a process could be favourable in the post-conflict context.


28 This is especially so if considering data such as the statistic showing that the Army registered 1% in a survey by COPES that measured trust with regard to the actions of state institutions in terms of protecting victims of sexual violence, while the Attorney’s Office and the Police registered 20 and 18% respectively. If from an urban perspective this can appear as a consequence of little linkage to the issue, it acquires a greater significance when considering the Force’s rural coverage. See: Presidency of the Republic. High Presidential Council for Women’s Equality (2015). Informe Ejecutivo de seguimiento a los indicadores del tablero de control del CONPES 161 de 2013. Retrieved from http://www.equidadmujer.gov.co/ejes/Documents/Informe%20Ejecutivo%20de%20Seguimiento%20A%20Los%20Indicadores%20Del%20Tablero%20De%20Control%20De%20Equidad%20Para%20Las%20Mujeres%20%20De%202013-2015.pdf, p. 17.