Chapter 5:

Hemispheric Relations
Organization of American States – Committee on Hemispheric Security (CHS)

In September 2008, the CHS decided to create a working group to unify the measures adopted in the Declarations of Santiago and San Salvador, and the Consensus of Miami. The work of such group resulted in a consolidated list of 36 confidence- and security-building measures to be reported by member countries every year, according to resolutions adopted by the OAS General Assembly (CP/CSH-1043/08). An inventory of such reports is communicated to the Inter-American Defence Board (IADB).

*On July 3, 2009, Resolution 1962 expelling Cuba from the OAS was abolished (Cuba ratified it would not return to the OAS). On July 5, 2009 Honduras was suspended by the OAS as an active member (currently in the process of readmission).

Source: Compilation based on information provided by the mentioned organizations in their web sites.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conventional Weapons</th>
<th>Meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: Compilation based on documents of the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security.

*On July 3, 2009, Resolution 1962 expelling Cuba from the OAS was abolished (Cuba ratified it would not return to the OAS). On July 5, 2009 Honduras was suspended by the OAS as an active member (currently in the process of readmission).
Chapter 5: Hemispheric Relations

Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas (CDMA)

Since 1995, the CDMA has brought together 34 countries of the Hemisphere to meet every two years. In 2010, Cuba was invited to participate in the meeting. The CDMA seeks to advance reciprocal knowledge, analysis, debate and exchange of views and experiences on defence and security, as well as any other interaction mechanism to allow its fulfilment.

Thematic Agendas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conference</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Agenda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV Manaus, 2000</td>
<td>(Brazil)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hemispheric security at the turn of the 21st century. Confidence-building in the American continent, current scenario and prospects for the next decade. Defence and development: regional cooperation possibilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII Banff, 2008</td>
<td>(Canada)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assistance in natural disasters. Assistance in major national or regional events. Peacekeeping operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Topics contained in Final Declarations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Williamsburg</th>
<th>Bariloche</th>
<th>Cartagena</th>
<th>Manaus</th>
<th>Santiago</th>
<th>Quito</th>
<th>Managua</th>
<th>Banff</th>
<th>Santa Cruz</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Condemning outlawed armed groups/terrorism.</td>
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<td>Civil society contribution.</td>
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<td>Inter-American Convention: transparency in conventional weapons.</td>
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<td>Cooperation on natural disasters.</td>
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<td>Defence: responsibility of all the society.</td>
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<td>Humanitarian demining.</td>
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<td>HHRR/IHL education.</td>
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<td>Military education/training.</td>
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<td>Promotion of meetings and exchanges.</td>
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<td>Civilian training/inclusion.</td>
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<td>Multiculturalism.</td>
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<td>Multidimensionality/new threats according to domestic laws.</td>
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<td>Non-proliferation.</td>
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<td>Peace operations.</td>
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<td>Gender perspective.</td>
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<td>Institutional modernization processes.</td>
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<td>Small arms and light weapons proliferation.</td>
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<td>Promotion of confidence-building measures.</td>
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<td>Protection of the cultural heritage.</td>
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<td>Subregional realities/flexible architecture.</td>
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<td>Democracy-security-economy relation.</td>
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<td>Budgetary transparency.</td>
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Williamsburg Principles

- Mutual security rests on the preservation of democracy.
- Military and security forces play a critical role in supporting and defending the legitimate interests of sovereign democratic States.
- Subordination of the Armed Forces to the democratically controlled authority.
- Openness in the discussion of defence matters.
- Dispute resolution through negotiated settlements.
- Greater defence cooperation in support of security needs.

*Draft Declaration as for September 2010

Source: Compilation based on the Conferences’ Final Declarations. The main subjects addressed in each Declaration have been considered. Santa Cruz 2010: Draft Declaration
Central America: Central American Armed Forces Conference (CFAC)

The CFAC is a specialized international body of military nature. It was created by the Presidents of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua on November 12, 1997.

Members: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Dominican Republic (joined in 2007).

Observer countries: Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Germany, Russia, Spain, Taiwan, United Kingdom and United States.

Mission: to promote a permanent and systematic effort of cooperation, coordination and mutual support among the Armed Forces for the professional study of shared issues and provide a high level of defence against threats to democracy, peace and freedom. To contribute to security, as well as to the military development and integration in the region, in order to conduct humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

Organization

- Higher Council: decision-making body of the CFAC, integrated by the military officer of highest rank and hierarchy from each member country.
- Executive Committee: body in charge of providing advice, control and follow-up of decisions taken by the Higher Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Joint Staff, or their equivalents, from member countries, and presided over by the host country.
- Pro-tempore General Secretariat: Conference administrative body; it serves on a two-year rotating basis. The Secretary General is a senior officer in the rank of Colonel, and Deputy Secretary General and representatives of the Armed Forces are members. The establishment and fulfillment of the Secretariat’s tasks are the responsibility of the military institution from the host country. Each country sends a delegate to the host country, generally of the rank of Colonel.
- Pro-tempore Secretariat for 2008-2009: El Salvador (the period was extended to November 2010).

Main Programs developed by CFAC

- Education exchange for cadets, instructors and officers.
- Training exercises (virtual and practical).
- Confidence-building measures’ annual programme.
- Peacekeeping Operations Unit.
- Humanitarian and Rescue Unit.
- Cooperation plan to prevent and combat terrorism and organized crime.
- Cooperation agreements with international institutions.
- Communication with SICA’s Secretary General.
- Military health.
- Logistics.
- Human rights.
- Intelligence and operations.
- Civilian affairs.

Humanitarian and Rescue Unit (UHR-CFAC)

It was created by the end of 1999 and started operating in 2000. It conducts humanitarian and rescue operations in any Central American country wherever a natural or anthropogenic disaster occurs, upon request of the President of the country afflicted by the disaster.

The Unit is made up of elements from each member country, which, once an operation is launched, operate under the operational command of the UHR-CFAC Commander of the host country. Operation costs are borne by each one of the countries that provide their assistance unit to the site. Since its creation, it has provided assistance in:

- Fumigation, dengue outbreak. Honduras and Nicaragua, April, 2002.

Central American Integration System (SICA) – Defence Sub-Committee

The Defence Sub-Committee includes representatives of the Ministries of Defence of SICA countries that have their own armed forces and representatives of the SICA’s General Secretariat. Panama and Costa Rica participate as observers. Although the Defence Sub-Committee and CFAC have not established any formal mechanism, bilateral meetings are often held.

The Sub-Committee is mainly responsible for regional security matters, including: demining, reasonable balance of forces, confidence-building measures annual programme, models for promotion of weapon/armament inventories, Central American information mechanism and security communication, studies on peaceful settlement of disputes, and crisis and peacekeeping.

The main working areas as of 2010 are:

- Natural disasters.
- Peace missions.
- Confidence-building measures.

It meets every six months at the location selected by the Pro-Tempore President.

UNASUR’s South American Council

Creation
December 2008. A Forum for Cooperation, Consultation and Coordination. It is attended by the Ministers of Defence of UNASUR member countries.

Miembros
Argentina*, Bolivia*, Brazil, Colombia, Chile*, Ecuador*, Guyana*, Paraguay, Peru*, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela*.

Objectives
- Consolidate South America as a “peace zone”.
- Build a South American identity in the area of defence, based on sub-regional and national characteristics while contributing to the strengthening of Latin America and the Caribbean unity.
- Generate consensus to reinforce regional cooperation in the area of defence.

*Countries that have ratified the UNASUR Treaty.

Centre for Strategic Defence Studies (CDS)
Its Statute was approved at the II CDS Ordinary Meeting held on May 2010 and its permanent office is located in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Confidence- and Security-building Measures
The document was approved at the CDS II General Meeting in May 2010*. Its main guidelines are:
- Information exchange and transparency (systems and defence spending).
- Intra- and extra-territorial activities.
- Security measures.
- Assurance.
- Compliance and verification.

(*) Pending approval by the Council on Foreign Relations of UNASUR.

Action Plan for 2010-2011

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<tr>
<td>Establishment of a consultation, information and immediate assessment mechanism in the event of situations where peace is at risk.</td>
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<td>Arg.</td>
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</table>

R: responsible. JR: jointly responsible.

Thematic Meetings

2009
- First South-American Meeting of Strategic Studies (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) November 11 - 13
- Seminar “Modernization of Defence Ministries” (Quito, Ecuador) November 19 - 20
- Seminar “A Vision of Defence Conceptual Approaches, Risks and Threats to the Region” (Caracas, Venezuela) May 26 - 28

2010
- “Participation of the Ministries of Defence and the Armed Forces in case of Natural Disasters” Seminar (Ica, Peru) June 8 - 11
- Defence Industry and Technology Workshop (Quito, Ecuador) June 29 - 30
- Seminar on Lessons Learnt in Peace Operations (Montevideo, Uruguay) August 31 – September 3

Source: Compilation based on information provided by the Pro-Temore Secretariat of the South American Defence Council (Ecuador 2009-2010).
The Conference of American Armies (CAA) was created in 1960, with the aim of becoming a debate forum for the exchange of experiences among the Armies of the American continent. This Conference has twenty Member Armies (Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela); and 5 Observer Armies (Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica and Suriname). The Central America Armed Forces Conference (CFAC) and the IADB are observer organizations.

Since 2004, the Conference cycles have been working on the development of manuals related to peace operations. Thus, products have been developed on lessons learned, procedures, terminology, education and training.

### Thematic Evolution in the CAA (1960-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nbr. - Year</th>
<th>Subjects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-1960</td>
<td>Operations, information, logistics, control, research and development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-1961</td>
<td>Personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil action and military policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-1962</td>
<td>Logistics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-1963</td>
<td>Establishment of communication networks in order to disseminate and exchange information on subversive movements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-1964</td>
<td>Administration of training and intensifying preparations of armies in revolutionary wars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI-1965</td>
<td>Cooperation between the army and government organizations for better interaction with the social order of the people and organization and training of the army for internal security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII-1966</td>
<td>Military system improvement and its incorporation to the Charter of the OAS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII-1968</td>
<td>Hemispheric security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX-1969</td>
<td>Communist subversion in the Americas. Education on democracy and training on fighting a revolutionary battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-1973</td>
<td>Strategies against subversion in the Americas for the security of the Hemisphere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII-1977</td>
<td>Integration of the Inter-American system. The fight against communist subversion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII-1979</td>
<td>Improvement of professional education of soldiers. Administrative training. Approval of CAA Regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV-1981</td>
<td>Psychological war. Member Armies guarantee they will not allow other countries’ subversive organizations into their territories.</td>
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<tr>
<td>XV-1983</td>
<td>Cooperative action to identify, isolate and neutralize external support to communist subversion in the Americas. Communist threat to hemispheric security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVII-1986-87</td>
<td>Combating international terrorism: threats, policies and responses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIX-1990-91</td>
<td>Democracy maintenance in the continent faced with the ideological opening of the communist world. Political, social and economic realities of the American countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XX-1992-93</td>
<td>Participation of the American Armies and their reserves in contributing to their governments to guarantee continental security in view of the new world situation. The formation of economic blocks and/or alliances, supported by international organizations, and pressures on the need of the armed forces, their missions and access to technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXII-1996-97</td>
<td>Armies’ participation in country development and in international security and peace cooperation activities within the framework of a democratic society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXIII-1998-99</td>
<td>The CAA we wish for the 21st century.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXIV-2000-01</td>
<td>American Armies within the framework of global relations and international law at the beginning of the 21st century. Impacts on national defence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXV-2002-03</td>
<td>The American Armies and their contribution to the formation of defence policies in the context of new challenges to continental security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXVI-2004-05</td>
<td>The CAA and its contribution to hemispheric security and defence through an increased ability to work together, for Chapter 6 PKO and disaster relief operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXVII-2006-07</td>
<td>The CAA and its contribution to PKOs (developed under UN mandate) and disaster relief operations, through the creation and application of mechanisms and procedures designed to improve the collective capacities and interoperability of their members.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### CAA Cycle

The Conference operates in two-year cycles, and a Permanent Secretariat is established during each cycle, which is under charge of the host country’s Army. Selected subject: Contribution to peacekeeping and disaster relief operations.

**CAA (2009)**

Specialized conferences, ad-hoc meetings and exercises, with the chosen sub-items. Reports are prepared for the general conference. 2010-2011: CAA 50th anniversary, civil-military relations, science and technology, radio communication exercise and meeting on legal issues in peace operations. The 2010-2011 cycle mission includes advancing on studies about the advantage of regionalizing certain response capabilities in case of disaster relief and peacekeeping operations; carrying out planning and execution exercises, both in the classroom and in the field; promoting research initiatives in the scientific and technological areas in relation to the chosen general subject; implementing studies on procedures related to environmental protection in military operations; and implementing studies on procedures aimed at facilitating civil-military relations in peace operations and disaster relief.

**CAA (2011)**

New Conference. A host Army is elected.

Source: Compilation based on information provided in the web site of the Conference of American Armies, XXIX Cycle of the Permanent Executive Secretariat of the American Armies Conference (SEPCEA).
Inter-American Naval Conferences (CNI)

The CNIs began in 1959, when the national navies of the continent were invited to attend the Semi-annual Conference of the Chiefs of Mission of the US Navy. In 1960 a Conference was held in two phases: the first phase was held for the Chiefs of Mission of the US Navy (Key West, Florida), the second was a Multilateral Conference of the Continent’s Navies (San Juan, Puerto Rico).

As a result of the debates and discussions held in the two First Inter-American Naval Conferences, the need and convenience of drafting a document that would serve as the Bases for Agreement for future Naval Conferences became evident. Thus, studying common naval problems and stimulating permanent professional contacts became the CNIs’ objective.

In 1962, the Bases for Agreement were adopted. Among other things, they established the following:
- The Conference agendas shall be prepared six months in advance and the projects that have to be submitted shall be exchanged three months prior to the Conference date.
- The adopted agreements shall have a Recommendation status, and their adoption shall depend on the respective Navies parties to those agreements.
- The intervals from one conference to the next are established to be of no less than one year and no more than two years.

Until 2010, twenty-three Inter-American Naval Conferences have been held. Its members are the Navies of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama (National Aero naval Service), Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. The Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network (IANTN) and the IADB are observer organizations.

Source: Compilation based on the information provided on the website of the XXIV Inter-American Naval Conference’s organization.

Cooperation System of American Air Forces (SICOFAA)

The SICOFAA was created on April 16, 1961, within the framework of the First Conference of the Chiefs of the American Air Forces. Its objective is to be a system of integration and cooperation among the American Air Forces or their equivalent, in order to exchange experiences, means, personnel training and education and everything that facilitates the elaboration of procedures.

Members: Air Forces of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama (National Aero naval Service), Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. Observers: Belize, Costa Rica (Air Surveillance Service), Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica and Mexico.

Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA)

The Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA) was founded on March 15, 1943. It is located in Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, United States.

Its stated mission is to train and educate the military forces to build and generate abilities for the support of world stability and security, while generating academic and cultural relations. It offers training courses for Officers (ISOS) and professional training courses for Non-Commissioned Officers (INCOA).

During the period 2010-2011, the System Committees are devoted to the development of a Procedure Manual to respond to natural disasters. In October 2010, the Cooperation Exercise I shall be executed, with Chile acting as the host country (see Chapter 7 of this publication).

SOUTHCOM, headquartered in Miami, Florida, is one of the ten Unified Combatant Commands (UCC) of the Department of Defense. It is charged with the task of providing planning, operations and cooperation in security for 32 countries in the Americas, except for Mexico (which forms part of the Northern Command), and the 12 islands which are States or territories under European sovereignty. It also has jurisdiction in part of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (the waters adjacent to Central American and Caribbean countries, between 30° and 92° West meridians) and the Gulf of Mexico. The Panama Canal is within SOUTHCOM’s jurisdiction.

**Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S)**

The working group has the mission to detect, follow-up and support interdiction to disarticulate illicit trafficking, including drug trafficking in the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico and the Eastern Pacific. It is located in Key West and has representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Mexico, Peru, Spain, The Netherlands, and United Kingdom.

**Mutual Assistance Pacts**

Since the mid 20th century, military assistance agreements, also known as mutual assistance pacts, have been signed between the US and countries of the region. In various cases, these agreements have ceased to be implemented or were superseded by hierarchically higher standards. They form the basis for personnel, training and equipment assistance as well as for the so-called military groups.

**Objectives proposed for 2010**

- Expand humanitarian activities, build friendships and attract allies at local and regional levels.
- Integrate military and civilian efforts, through higher interaction with other government agencies.
- Provide advice to foreign security forces and enhance their combat capacity against narcoterrorism.
- Implement a new development of public-private cooperation and a strategy for corporate commitment.
- Expand exercises, country participation and military—military commitment with allies.
- Focus on community extension and improvement of the US Government and SOUTHCOM profile in local community.
- Work jointly with other government agencies in order to train and equip partner nations and propose initiatives that deal with common security challenges.

(1) It comprises the continental territory of the United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding waters up to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, the Florida Strait and parts of the Caribbean to include Bahamas, Puerto Rico and US Virgin Islands.

(2) Each office is composed of at least one serving military person established in the territory of another country through an agreement, from which command and control can be extended or training and tactical operation support can be provided.

On November 2009, Colombia and the United States entered an agreement allowing the use of Palanquero Air Base facilities, Malambo Air Base, Tolemaida Military Base, Laranjada Military Base, Aplay Air Base, Cartagena Naval Base, and Bahia Malaga Naval Base. In August 2010, Colombia’s Constitutional Court declared that the agreement was invalid. In September 2010, the matter was still pending resolution.

In September 2009, the ten-year agreement for the use of Manta in Ecuador was not renewed by that country. Part of the team working on drug surveillance missions was relocated to Comalapa and Curacao.
Interagency

In September 2007, the Secretary of Defense authorized the reorganization of Southern Command to convert it into an inter-agency structure, which was fully approved in October 2008. In response to the idea of the “whole of government approach”, the Department of Defence implemented that year the Orientation Guidelines for the Use of the Force, aiming at a higher participation of other Departments. Southern Command was designated as the prototype of this comprehensive approach (and, once established, the African Command as well). Thus, the structure is composed of representatives of other agencies occupying key positions.

Represented Agencies*:
- State Department (DOS): 7 (FT)
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID): 2 (FT)
- Department of Homeland Security (DHS): it includes ICE: 3 (FT) 7 (PT)
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence: 3 (FT)
- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF): 1 (PT)
- Defense Department: 1 (FT)
- Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): 2 (FT)
- Department of Energy (DOE): 1 (FT)
- Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA): 1 (FT)
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): 2 (FT) 2 (PT)
- Department of Transportation (DOT): 1 (PT)
- Transportation Security Administration (TSA): 1 (PT)
- Coast Guard: 2 (FT)
- Department of Commerce (DOC): 1 (FT)
- Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): 1 (FT)
- Government Accountability Office (GAO): 1 (PT)
- Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): 1 (FT)
- Total representatives of other Agencies: 40

*Representatives can be full time (FT) or part time (PT) representatives.

In October 2007, the State Department developed the Merida Initiative, which (together with other federal government agencies), is charged with providing assistance against drug-trafficking and organized crime in Mexico and Central America. This initiative includes military assistance funds. For financial year 2009, the initiative divided the funds granted in the region. The Merida-Mexico Initiative was maintained and the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) in fiscal year 2010.

It is responsible for US forces and military means operating in Latin America and the Caribbean. It manages all naval units under the responsibility of the Southern Command.

Assigned to COMUSNAVSO. It operates jointly with other Southern Command components. One of the operations conducted is the Continuing Promise Mission. This is an annual humanitarian and civil assistance operation developed in the Caribbean, Central and South America under the naval component charge of Southern Command and the US Naval Forces Southern Command. This mission is conducted in cooperation with partners from other agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations and other international partners.

It conducts humanitarian assistance exercises. As part of the programme, troops specialized in engineering, construction and healthcare provide services and information to the communities. In 2009, the exercise was carried out in Colombia, Jamaica, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.

Beyond the Horizon 2009*

It conducts humanitarian assistance exercises. As part of the programme, troops specialized in engineering, construction and healthcare provide services and information to the communities. In 2009, the exercise was carried out in Colombia, Jamaica, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.

*Other exercises conducted by the Southern Command are specified in the English language Caribbean dossier.


**Funds of the US State Department for Security and Defence (in millions of dollars)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Oct. 07 - Sep. 08 (1)</th>
<th>Oct. 08 - Sep. 09 (2)</th>
<th>Oct. 09 - Sep. 10</th>
<th>Oct. 10 - Sep. 11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>372.0</td>
<td>116.5 FMF (1)</td>
<td>210.3 (3)</td>
<td>310.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>(40.0 FMF)</td>
<td>105.0 (2)</td>
<td>83.0 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Caribbean</td>
<td>5.0 (3)</td>
<td>(17.0 FMF)</td>
<td>5.0 (3)</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) The funds shown represent fiscal year 2008 supplement.
(2) FMF: Foreign Military Funds.
(3) The Dominican Republic and Haiti were the only countries in the Caribbean to receive funds.
(4) The budget advance granted during 2008 was considered for fiscal year 2009, as well as the budget allocation and supplement for fiscal year 2009.
(5) The “Central America-Merida” fund became the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CBSI) in fiscal year 2009.
(7) The funds taken into account for fiscal year 2010 correspond to the budget submitted to Congress by the Executive.
(8) Haiti’s budget request for fiscal year 2010 was made outside the CBSI due to the earthquake suffered in 2010.

**Bilateral and Sub-Regional Defence Agreements**

**Central America and Mexico**
- Defence Sub-Committee - Security Commission of Central America – SICA
- Agreement for the creation of the Central America Armed Forces Conference-CFAC (1997).
- Central America permanent program for confidence building and security measures (SICA) (2008).
- Central America and Mexico security strategy (SICA) (2007).

**Andean Region**
- Bolivia – Peru: Consultation Mechanism (2010).

**Southern Cone**
- Argentina – Brazil: Memorandum of Understanding for Consultation and Coordination (1997).
- Argentina – Chile: Memodandum of Understanding for Consultation and Coordination (1997).
- Argentina – Paraguay: Memorandum of Understanding for Consultation and Coordination (1997).
- Brazil – Chile: Bilateral Work Team (2000).
- Brazil – Chile: Bilateral Work Team (2000).

**Sources:** Information provided by the Ministries of Defence of Argentina, Chile, Colombia and El Salvador. Gaceta Oficial and Libro Amarillo (from 2006 to 2009) of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Nicaragua, 2005. Web pages of Peru and Uruguay’s Ministries of Defence; Ministries of Foreign Relations of Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela; Uruguay’s Parliament; Brazil’s Federal Senate.
Agreements and treaties between Latin American countries and other countries in the world

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Agreements or treaties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1 out of 1 country has signed an agreement or treaty with the US.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7 out of 8 countries have signed an agreement or treaty with Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1 out of 2 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1 out of 2 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with China.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2 out of 5 countries have signed an agreement or treaty with Canada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2 out of 5 countries have signed an agreement or treaty with France.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2 out of 7 countries have signed an agreement or treaty with Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2 out of 7 countries have signed an agreement or treaty with Italy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 out of 4 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with the UK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 out of 6 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with India.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 out of 6 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with South Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 out of 6 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with Poland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 out of 6 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with South Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 out of 9 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with the Netherlands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 out of 9 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 out of 9 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 out of 9 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with Ukraine.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In July 2010, the Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica approved the request for the docking, staying at port and disembarking of the crews of 46 vessels of the US Navy (maximum authorized crew 13,291 troops). Said authorization was granted until December 2010 in the framework of the agreement signed by Costa Rica and the US in 1999 the object of which is antinarcotics operations in support to the US Coast Guard.

Source: Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica.

US Southern Command Relations with the Region

George Withers

WOLA – Washington Office for Latin America

The potential for military conflict in the U.S. Southern Command’s “area of focus” – Latin America and the Caribbean – is considered among the lowest of all the regional combatant commands. Lately, Southcom has chosen to emphasize its partnership initiatives – with the countries of the region, and domestically with other agencies of the U.S. Government.

All has not gone well in these two endeavours, however. While the Command engages with other countries in several joint naval exercises each year, the region was taken by surprise when, in April 2008, the Navy announced that it was, after several decades, re-establishing the Fourth Fleet in the region. Many viewed this as an unnecessary and provocative escalation of U.S. military presence in the waters of Latin America’s waters.

Then, almost exactly one year later, the Department of State announced the details of a new “Defence Cooperation Agreement” between the United States and Colombia. This would significantly expand the U.S. military’s access to several bases in that country. Internal Department of Defence documents alluded to the potential to conduct “full spectrum operations” throughout the hemisphere. Again, several countries expressed their alarm and demanded to know the Southern Command’s intentions in the region.

While the partnership programs intend to build bridges, these confusing signals work against the improved relations that the Southern Command claims to seek in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Domestically, the Southern Command is the first combatant command to explore the concept of broadening its mission beyond a traditional military focus. In 2006, the Command announced its intention to become an “inter-agency” command, modifying its structure to include representatives of several civilian agencies. Today, the Combatant Commander retains his position at the top, and is served by two deputies – one for the military components and one for the civilian agencies. Officials explain that this will allow the military to better coordinate with these agencies in the delivery of U.S. assistance throughout the region. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the Government Accountability Office have expressed concerns over this new structure.

Now, the Command views the region more broadly. While many problems are transnational in nature and are the result of economic, social and political dynamics, increasingly, these are increasingly seen as “security threats” to the United States. This is true whether it be economic instability, street gangs, narcotics trafficking, or other problems. Many view Southern Command’s involvement in these issues as interagency overreaching. It presents the very real possibility that the U.S. military will be seen as the “go-to organization” for all U.S. assistance, not just military aid. But perhaps most important, it accelerates an ongoing tendency to militarize U.S. foreign policy.

There should be no doubt that the U.S. Southern Command can, and often does, act as a force for good in the region. The military’s tireless efforts in the immediate aftermath of natural disasters, for instance, should not be overlooked. However, because of apparent Southern Command expansions – both structurally and in its presence – the region remains concerned about the continuing spectre of unwanted U.S. military activity.
Analysis

Brazil’s Role in the Hemisphere

Maria Celina D’Araujo  
PhD in Political Science and Master from PUC-Rio

Over the past few years, Brazil's role in the context of hemispheric relations dominated a large part of the defence and international relations literature and has given rise to intellectual and ideological debates. In this paper we argue that Brazil will not become a leader in the traditional sense of appearing as the representative of other countries and that it would encounter many challenges if it tried to become a local power with imperialist ambitions. The diplomatic history of the country, its economic development and its focus on avoiding direct confrontation with the United States discourage this kind of inferences. Witness to this is the fact that since the 1970s Brazil has been working, especially with Chile and Argentina, to create sub-regional institutions and discussion and consulting forums, and never presented itself as an alternative to block the United States.

A recent example of this effort is the creation, in 2008, of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and other organizations derived from it, including the South American Defence Council (CDS). These new institutions are a prerequisite for the region to speak by consensus without resigning bilateral and multilateral channels. Historically, no country in Latin America has accepted the leadership of a third party entitled to speak on their behalf. Brazilian diplomacy has always been aware of that and it has never encouraged the country to assume any leadership role, even though some political parties may have appreciated that kind of project.

The expectations of leadership in Brazil, however, are not recent and have acquired new life after economist Jim O’Neill in 2001 coined the term BRIC. The acronym represents the initial letter of the four main emerging countries of this century (Brazil, Russia, India and China) giving Brazil greater international projection and generating a wave of speculation on Brazil's role in the world. The “group” was also expected to become a political bloc, which never actually happened. Strictly speaking, what these four states have in common is the fact that they are continental countries and that they are in the top ten regarding surface area and population and among the top twelve in terms of wealth production.

Their macro-structural data also show worrying realities from the social and political standpoints. The per capita income ranges from US$11,000 per year in Russia to US$1,000 in India. Brazil, with a per capita income of US$7,000 per year is, however, the one with the highest disparity in the group and one of those with the highest inequality in the world. Overall, these are countries with many problems in the social and transparency areas, and with huge differences in their political systems, not to mention their cultural differences. In all of them, however, growth rates are expected to be equal to or exceed those in other emerging countries. This means they may expand their economies and gain new markets. In this sense, the term BRIC does not refer to important and fundamental issues such as democracy, the fight against corruption, social inequality, environment protection or defence.

In any case, the term BRIC gave Brazil greater visibility abroad even though it did not give it more decision power nor did it make it a global player with more weight in the world or even in the Americas. Brazil's economic and territorial weight in Latin America contributed to generating, along the history, expectations over a potential Brazilian leadership, but asymmetries in relation to its neighbours have prevented and continue to prevent that leadership to be legitimated. Quite to the contrary, the perception has grown that Brazil could, in the 21st century, become a regional imperialist power which, in turn, might hinder the strengthening of cooperation and confidence building measures. However, together with such debate, it became evident that in the region, the creation of institutions based on clear and shared principles is more important than the emergence...
of or the boycotts to any leadership.

At this point, it should be noted that hemispheric leadership is not in question. The United States are a military, economic and cultural super power; the largest empire that history has known, with a leadership based on its strength and economy, but also on cultural and behavioural influences. On the other hand, Brazilian diplomacy has received with great caution the demands to assume a more marked leadership role among Latin countries in the Hemisphere. This trend started to change slowly since the 1990s with the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, when the region’s geopolitics seemed to have changed. While Mexico reinforced its bonds with the United States through the North American Free Trade Agreement, South America appeared as a more integrated space, more independent from North American influence. Central America, in turn, continues to develop a direct line with the United States, for different structural reasons that will not be discussed here.

Therefore, when speaking of Brazil’s potential leadership nowadays it should be made clear that if such potential should exist, it would be limited to South America. And, in any case, it would not be a leadership concurrent with that of the US, nor would it be of a personal but of an institutional character.

Historically, Brazil has shown little interest in regional defence affairs, whether because it defended the principle of non-intervention or because the region has never been an area with large and frequent armed conflicts. Whenever regional security has been at stake, Brazil chose to support negotiated and multilateral solutions.1

In the same manner, with the only exception of the war against Paraguay, Brazil has never felt threatened and this has led the country to never take an active role in the regional debate on defence. As time went by, the security of the continent was a subject more cared about by Brazilian diplomacy than by its armed forces. This started to change also in the 1990s, placing the focus in South America, but always with the concern of not generating tension with the United States.

The end of the Cold War opened the possibility of holding conversations with Argentina and starting conversations on the reduction of nuclear weapons, the signing of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and the search for new roles for the military. In the absence of communism as an internal enemy and being in good terms with past enemies in the region, the defence matters in Brazil were limited to the Amazonia, where border policies are more actively implemented and modern technologies for air traffic control and services shared with neighbouring countries are deployed. Therefore, Brazil’s entry in the regional defence debate was gradual and limited: it is now about South America, understood as a security unit, but also as a possibility of joint infrastructure and defence industry projects in political democratic environments. Brazil has been, since then, more of a protagonist in South America, and from Lula da Silva’s administration (2002-2010) on it has shown greater interest in defence matters. This was made clear in 2008 with the publication of the National Defence Strategy, a document that reveals the political ambitions of the country to develop its defence industry and make it a driver of the country’s industry and technology development.

At the same time, the CDS was created under Brazilian initiative, which gave rise to several interpretations. Two of them ultimately show concern or disbelief about its creation. On the one hand, some see it as a statement of Brazil intended to strengthen its regional and world leadership, rising as an asymmetrical power in South America, always in concert with United States’ interests. This would be part of a Brazilian strategy to gain a seat at the United Nations Security Council and become a stronger international leader, an intermediate state at world level, representing the interests of the region. Thus it would be part of Brazil’s global ambitions after having surpassed Argentina as the region’s leader. Given this context, the country would be giving continuity to its nuclear submarine construction project and re-equipping its land and air forces. Within this formulation, the Council could also be thought of as part of Brazil’s plans to strengthen its defence industry and turn it into the main supplier in the region.2 On the other hand, other analysts see this move as more of a formal intention with little, if any, effective power vis-à-vis US military and political hegemony. In this sense, according to Alsina Junior, South America “does not have sufficient weight to alter the world’s strategic balance,” especially in light of the fact that its main power, Brazil, is an actor with “little significance from the military viewpoint.” Thus, the fact that Brazil is indeed the strongest country in South America has little meaning in the context of international security in light of the weakness of its defence apparatus.

Both interpretations are made on the basis of the paradigm of disputes for regional leadership and reveal the

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1 See on this matter, Luiz Bitencourt, “Seguridad en el nuevo mundo: Brasil y el dilema del liderazgo mundial”, in La Seguridad desde las dos Orillas, ed. Rafael Martínez and Joseph S. Tulchin, (Barcelona: CIDOB, 2006).


recurring suspicion around Brazil and the United States. However, going beyond the conspiracy-simulation dichotomy, it is important to consider the Council as part of a process to redefine regional security policy and, as further proof of the concern for the institutionalization of the defence cooperation and debate forum for the countries of the region based on the principle of military subordination to civil power. Beyond the idea of reactive defence alliances, like the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the South American Defence Council (CDS) - with all twelve countries involved - they tend, like the Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas (CDMA), to invest in conflict prevention, a position backed by the “empire” from the beginning, which frustrated the Venezuelan proposal to create a “Southern” NATO with a defence and operational character.4

The proposed South American Defence Council was clearly inspired by the European integration model, with less ambitious objectives, mainly geared to create a mutual confidence and transparency climate in the relation among States. On joining the CDS, then Colombian President Álvaro Uribe asked other countries to get involved in the fight against terrorism and conditioned their adherence to the Council to the approval of three requirements: Council decisions must be adopted by consensus; the Council should make clear that there would be explicit acknowledgement of the institutional forces established in each country’s Constitution; and all violent and/or irregular armed forces should be rejected, regardless of their origin. Finally, in December 2008, at the special UNASUR meeting in Brazil, the Council was ratified as a “defence matters consultation, cooperation and coordination” body. Its explicit objectives are consolidating South America as a peace area, building a regional identity in defence matters, and attaining consensus to strengthen regional cooperation.

As a matter of fact, the National Defence Strategy, by emphasizing the defence industry, seems a measure supplementary to CDS objectives and it is this precisely what has generated such distrustful reactions. The Strategy seems to have been motivated by two concurring principles reflecting the government’s comfort and enthusiasm as regards the country’s potential: economic and political stability on the one hand, and prominence in the international context on the other. In this new scenario, Brazil would need to consolidate “its position in the world”.

It should be noted, however, that a large part of the issues posed for the National Defence Strategy might never become anything but good intentions. Except for the mandatory military service, what the document calls for involves large amounts of funds that need to be approved in a number of Legislative and Executive instances in a context of resource scarcity. Thus, the document formally responds to military and leftist groups’ demands of more weapons and projection, but does not seem to have the strength to redirect the balance position that Brazil has maintained over its history in relation to its neighbours. Nothing seems to indicate that Brazil, despite its growing protagonist role in South America, will alter its traditional stance for balance, moderation, negotiation and dialogue.