


Chapter 5:

# Hemispheric Relations



## Security and Defence Organizations and Initiatives



\*On July 3, 2009, Resolution 1962 expelling Cuba from the OAS was abolished (Cuba ratified it would not return to the OAS). On July 5, 2009 Honduras was suspended by the OAS as an active member (currently in the process of readmission).

**Source:** Compilation based on information provided by the mentioned organizations in their web sites.

## Organization of American States – Committee on Hemispheric Security (CHS)

In September 2008, the CHS decided to create a working group to unify the measures adopted in the Declarations of Santiago and San Salvador, and the Consensus of Miami. The work of such group resulted in a consolidated list of 36 confidence- and security- building measures to be reported by member countries every year, according to resolutions adopted by the OAS General Assembly (CP/CSH-1043/08). An inventory of such reports is communicated to the Inter-American Defence Board (IADB).

Meetings	
<b>Conventional Weapons</b> Inter-American Convention on Transparency In Conventional Weapons Acquisitions (1999).	Meeting of the States Parties in preparation for the Conference of the States Parties of the Inter-American Convention on Transparency In Conventional Weapons Acquisitions (2006, 2008, 2009).
	First Conference of the States Parties to the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions (2009).
<b>Confidence- and security-building measures</b> Declaration of Santiago (1995), San Salvador (1998), Consensus of Miami (2003).	Regional Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures held in Santiago (1995), Regional Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures held in San Salvador (1998).
	Meeting of Experts on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Region (Miami, 2003).
	Forums on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Region (2005, 2006, 2008).
<b>Hemispheric Security</b> Declaration on Security in the Americas (2003).	Special Conference on Security (2003).
	Meeting to examine the progress attained in the Implementation of the Declaration on Security in the Americas (2007).
	Celebration of the Declaration on Security in the Americas' Fifth Anniversary (2009).
	Follow-up of the Special Conference on Security (2010).

**Source:** Compilation based on documents of the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security.

## Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas (CDMA)

Since 1995, the CDMA has brought together 34 countries of the Hemisphere to meet every two years. In 2010, Cuba was invited to participate in the meeting. The CDMA seeks to advance reciprocal knowledge, analysis, debate and exchange of views and experiences on defence and security, as well as any other interaction mechanism to allow its fulfilment.

### Thematic Agendas

<b>I Williamsburg, 1995 (United States)</b>	Measures on transparency, military confidence and security improvement. Cooperation on defence measures. The Armed Forces in 21st century democracy.
<b>II Bariloche, 1996 (Argentina)</b>	New dimensions of international security. New roles. Institutional framework and relations between defence systems.
<b>III Cartagena, 1998 (Colombia)</b>	The hemispheric security system and its mechanisms for regional development. Complementary duties of the military forces in democratic societies. Hemispheric cooperation on counter-terrorism, counter-drugs, and combat of illegal trafficking in firearms, ammunitions and explosives.
<b>IV Manaus, 2000 (Brazil)</b>	Hemispheric security at the turn of the 21st century. Confidence-building in the American continent, current scenario and prospects for the next decade. Defence and development: regional cooperation possibilities
<b>V Santiago, 2002 (Chile)</b>	Regional security at the turn of the 21st century. Confidence-building in the Americas. Defence and society: regional cooperation possibilities.
<b>VI Quito, 2004 (Ecuador)</b>	The new architecture of hemispheric security. Confidence-building and security in the hemispheric security system. Defence, development and society: cooperation possibility.
<b>VII Managua, 2006 (Nicaragua)</b>	Hemispheric security system, subregional scenarios and regimes: strengthening cooperation and institutionality in the Americas. Confidence- and security-building measures and cooperation in multinational operations in the Americas. Modernization and transformation of defence institutions.
<b>VIII Banff, 2008 (Canada)</b>	Assistance in natural disasters. Assistance in major national or regional events. Peacekeeping operations.
<b>IX Santa Cruz, 2010 (Bolivia)</b>	Consolidation of peace, trust, security and cooperation in the Americas. Democracy, armed forces, security and society. Regional security and natural disasters. Strengthening hemispheric cooperation.

### Topics contained in Final Declarations

	Bariloche	Cartagena	Manaus	Santiago	Quito	Managua	Banff	Santa Cruz*
Condemning outlawed armed groups/terrorism.		↓	•	•	•	•	•	•
Civil society contribution.							↓	•
Inter-American Convention: transparency in conventional weapons.		↓	•	•	•	•	•	•
Cooperation on natural disasters.		↓	•	•		•	•	•
Defence: responsibility of all the society.			↓	•	•			
Humanitarian demining.			↓	•	•	•		•
HHRR/IHL education.		↓	•	•	•		•	•
Military education/training.							↓	•
Promotion of meetings and exchanges.		↓		•	•			
Civilian training/inclusion.			↓	•			•	•
Multiculturalism.								↓
Multidimensionality/new threats according to domestic laws.			↓	•	•	•	•	•
Non-proliferation.			↓	•	•	•	•	
Peace operations.	↓	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Gender perspective.				↓	•		•	•
Institutional modernization processes.					↓	•		•
Small arms and light weapons proliferation.		↓			•	•	•	
Promotion of confidence-building measures.	↓	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Protection of the cultural heritage.					↓			
Subregional realities/flexible architecture.			↓	•	•	•	•	
Democracy-security-economy relation.				↓	•	•		
Budgetary transparency.			↓	•	•		•	•
<b>Williamsburg Principles</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mutual security rests on the preservation of democracy.</li> <li>• Military and security forces play a critical role in supporting and defending the legitimate interests of sovereign democratic States.</li> <li>• Subordination of the Armed Forces to the democratically controlled authority.</li> <li>• Openness in the discussion of defence matters.</li> <li>• Dispute resolution through negotiated settlements.</li> <li>• Greater defence cooperation in support of security needs.</li> </ul>								

\*Draft Declaration as for September 2010

**Source:** Compilation based on the Conferences' Final Declarations. The main subjects addressed in each Declaration have been considered. Santa Cruz 2010: Draft Declaration



## Central America: Central American Armed Forces Conference (CFAC)

The CFAC is a specialized international body of military nature. It was created by the Presidents of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua on November 12, 1997.

**Members:** El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Dominican Republic (joined in 2007).

**Observer countries:** Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Germany, Russia, Spain, Taiwan, United Kingdom and United States.

**Mission:** to promote a permanent and systematic effort of cooperation, coordination and mutual support among the Armed Forces for the professional study of shared issues and provide a high level of defence against threats to democracy, peace and freedom. To contribute to security, as well as to the military development and integration in the region, in order to conduct humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

### Organization

- Higher Council: decision-making body of the CFAC, integrated by the military officer of highest rank and hierarchy from each member country.
- Executive Committee: body in charge of providing advice, control and follow-up of decisions taken by the Higher Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Joint Staff, or their equivalents, from member countries, and presided over by the host country.
- Pro-tempore General Secretariat: Conference administrative body; it serves on a two-year rotating basis. The Secretary General is a senior officer in the rank of Colonel, and Deputy Secretary General and representatives of the Armed Forces are members. The establishment and fulfillment of the Secretariat's tasks are the responsibility of the military institution from the host country. Each country sends a delegate to the host country, generally of the rank of Colonel.

**Pro-tempore Secretariat** for 2008-2009: El Salvador (the period was extended to November 2010).

### Main Programs developed by CAFC

- Education exchange for cadets, instructors and officers.
- Training exercises (virtual and practical).
- Confidence-building measures' annual programme.
- Peacekeeping Operations Unit.
- Humanitarian and Rescue Unit.
- Cooperation plan to prevent and combat terrorism and organized crime.
- Cooperation agreements with international institutions.
- Communication with SICA's Secretary General.
- Military health.
- Logistics.
- Human rights.
- Intelligence and operations.
- Civilian affairs.

### Humanitarian and Rescue Unit (UHR-CFAC)

It was created by the end of 1999 and started operating in 2000. It conducts humanitarian and rescue operations in any Central American country wherever a natural or anthropogenic disaster occurs, upon request of the President of the country afflicted by the disaster.

The Unit is made up of elements from each member country, which -once an operation is launched- operate under the operational command of the UHR-CFAC Commander of the host country. Operation costs are borne by each one of the countries that provide their assistance unit to the site.

Since its creation, it has provided assistance in:

- Fumigation, dengue outbreak. El Salvador, March, 2000.
- Laguna de Apoyo and Masaya earthquakes. Nicaragua, July, 2000.
- Earthquakes. El Salvador, January – February, 2001.
- "KEITH" hurricane, "MICHELLE" tropical storm. Nicaragua, September, 2000 and November, 2001.
- Fumigation, dengue outbreak. Honduras and Nicaragua, April, 2002.
- Tropical waves: 8, 13, 14 and 15. Nicaragua, 2002-2004.
- Beta hurricane. Nicaragua, 2005.
- "STAN" tropical storm. Guatemala and El Salvador, October, 2005.
- Llamatepec volcanic eruption. El Salvador, October, 2005.
- "FELIX" hurricane. Nicaragua, September – October, 2007.
- Rescue of a low pressure system. El Salvador, November, 2009.
- Earthquake. Haiti, January, 2010.

1991	Establishment of the SICA.
1992	
1993	
1994	
1995	Execution of the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America.
1996	
1997	Creation of CFAC.
1998	
1999	Creation of UHR – CFAC.
2000	Activation of UHR – CFAC.
2001	
2002	Integral cooperation plan to prevent and combat terrorism, organized crime and related activities.
2003	
2004	Activation of UOMP – CFAC.
2005	
2006	Creation of the Regional Peacekeeping Operations Command.

## Central American Integration System (SICA) – Defence Sub-Committee

The Defence Sub-Committee includes representatives of the Ministries of Defence of SICA countries that have their own armed forces and representatives of the SICA's General Secretariat. Panama and Costa Rica participate as observers. Although the Defence Sub-Committee and CFAC have not established any formal mechanism, bilateral meetings are often held.

The Sub-Committee is mainly responsible for regional security matters, including: demining, reasonable balance of forces, confidence-building measures annual programme, models for promotion of weapon/armament inventories, Central American information mechanism and security communication, studies on peaceful settlement of disputes, and crisis and peacekeeping.

The main working areas as of 2010 are:

- Natural disasters.
- Peace missions.
- Confidence-building measures.

It meets every six months at the location selected by the Pro-Tempore President.

**Sources:** Acuerdo de Creación de la Conferencia de las Fuerzas Armadas Centroamericanas (1997/11/12). Manual de Políticas y Procedimientos de la Unidad Humanitaria y de Rescate UHR-CFAC (XVI ROCs – 2005/12/16). Memoria de Labores (1998-2007). Reglamento de la Conferencia de Fuerzas Armadas Centroamericanas (Office of the President of the Republic of El Salvador, Executive Decree N° 79 – 2008/07/15). Web sites of the afore mentioned institutions. Defence Sub-Committee of SICA's Security Commission.

## UNASUR's South American Council

### Creation

December 2008. A Forum for Cooperation, Consultation and Coordination. It is attended by the Ministers of Defence of UNASUR member countries.

### Miembros

Argentina\*, Bolivia\*, Brazil, Colombia, Chile\*, Ecuador\*, Guyana\*, Paraguay, Peru\*, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela\*.

### Objectives

- Consolidate South America as a "peace zone".
- Build a South American identity in the area of defence, based on sub regional and national characteristics while contributing to the strengthening of Latin America and the Caribbean unity.
- Generate consensus to reinforce regional cooperation in the area of defence.

\*Countries that have ratified the UNASUR Treaty.

### Centre for Strategic Defence Studies (CDS)

Its Statute was approved at the II CDS Ordinary Meeting held on May 2010 and its permanent office is located in Buenos Aires, Argentina.


### Confidence- and Security-building Measures

The document was approved at the CDS II General Meeting in May 2010\*.

- Its main guidelines are:
- Information exchange and transparency (systems and defence spending).
  - Intra- and extra-territorial activities.
  - Security measures.
  - Assurances.
  - Compliance and verification.

(\*) Pending approval by the Council on Foreign Relations of UNASUR.

### Structure and Organization



### Action Plan for 2010-2011

Defence Policy	R	JR	Military Cooperation, Humanitarian Actions	R	JR	Defence Industry and Technology	R	JR	Training and Education	R	JR
Network for information exchange on defence policies.	Ec.	Sec. P-Te.	Seminar on crisis management challenges in peace operations.	Ec.		Consolidation of industry and technology's diagnosis.	Ec.		Database containing information on military institutions and education centres for civilian defence specialists.	Ec.	Ven.
Methodology for measuring defence spending.	Chi.	Arg. Per. Ven. Ec.	Regional combined exercise on peacekeeping operations, modelling.	Arg.	Chi.	Panel on metrology, normalization and assessment of conformity, focusing on the defence sector.	Bra.	Ven.	Proposal of a South American defence education programme for the civilian representatives of CDS member states.	Arg.	Chi.
Seminar to advance in the identification of risk factors and threats, and the definition of conceptual approaches.	Ven.	Ec. Sur.	Exercise on natural disasters modelling.	Per.		Integrated system of information on industry and technology.	Ec.		Course on Defence (March, 2011) at the Brazilian War College for civilian and military personnel.	Bra.	
Mechanism to contribute to the coordination of joint positions in multilateral forums.	Per.	Chi.	Inventory of defence capabilities to support humanitarian action and proposals on employment mechanisms.	Bra.	Chile. Col. Per. Ven.	Annual agenda of fairs, seminars and other events.	Arg.				
Establishment of a consultation, information and immediate assessment mechanism in the event of situations where peace is at risk.	Ec.	Arg.				Identification of common areas for strategic partnership.	Arg.				
						Promotion of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.	Ven.				
						Possibility of creating a CDS Center for Technological Research and Development and Industrial Cooperation.	Arg.	Ec.			

R: responsible. JR: jointly responsible.

### Thematic Meetings

2009	First South-American Meeting of Strategic Studies (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)	November 11 - 13
	Seminar "Modernization of Defence Ministries" (Quito, Ecuador)	November 19 - 20
	Seminar "A Vision of Defence Conceptual Approaches, Risks and Threats to the Region" (Caracas, Venezuela)	May 26 - 28
2010	"Participation of the Ministries of Defence and the Armed Forces in case of Natural Disasters" Seminar (Ica, Peru)	June 8 - 11
	Defence Industry and Technology Workshop (Quito, Ecuador)	June 29 - 30
	Seminar on Lessons Learnt in Peace Operations (Montevideo, Uruguay)	August 31 - September 3

Source: Compilation based on information provided by the Pro-Tempore Secretariat of the South American Defence Council (Ecuador 2009-2010).





## Conference of American Armies (CAA)

The Conference of American Armies (CAA) was created in 1960, with the aim of becoming a debate forum for the exchange of experiences among the Armies of the American continent. This Conference has twenty Member Armies (Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela); and 5 Observer Armies (Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica y Suriname). The Central America Armed Forces Conference (CFAC) and the IADB are observer organizations.

Since 2004, the Conference cycles have been working on the development of manuals related to peace operations. Thus, products have been developed on lessons learned, procedures, terminology, education and training.

### Thematic Evolution in the CAA (1960-2010)

Nbr. - Year	Subjects
I-1960	Operations, information, logistics, control, research and development.
II-1961	Personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil action and military policy.
III-1962	Logistics.
IV-1963	Establishment of communication networks in order to disseminate and exchange information on subversive movements.
V-1964	Administration of training and intensifying preparations of armies in revolutionary wars.
VI-1965	Cooperation between the army and government organizations for better interaction with the social order of the people and organization and training of the army for internal security.
VII-1966	Military system improvement and its incorporation to the Charter of the OAS.
VIII-1968	Hemispheric security.
IX-1969	Communist subversion in the Americas. Education on democracy and training on fighting a revolutionary battle.
X-1973	Strategies against subversion in the Americas for the security of the Hemisphere.
XI-1975	CAA regulations: Security of the Americas, integral educating system in the American Armies (contribute to eradicate subversion).
XII-1977	Integration of the Inter-American system. The fight against communist subversion.
XIII-1979	Improvement of professional education of soldiers. Administrative training. Approval of CAA's Regulations.
XIV-1981	Psychological war. Member Armies guarantee they will not allow other countries' subversive organizations into their territories.
XV-1983	Cooperative action to identify, isolate and neutralize external support to communist subversion in the Americas. Communist threat to hemispheric security.
XVI-1984-85	The Army in a democratic society. Subversion in Latin America? Perspectives and delimitations. Defence coalition in the Americas.
XVII-1986-87	Combating international terrorism: threats, policies and responses.
XVIII-1988-89	Central American conflict. Analysis and assessment of the 78 / 89 period from the political-military viewpoint.
XIX-1990-91	Democracy maintenance in the continent faced with the ideological opening of the communist world. Political, social and economic realities of the American countries.
XX-1992-93	Participation of the American Armies and their reserves in contributing to their governments to guarantee continental security in view of the new world situation. The formation of economic blocks and/or alliances, supported by international organizations, and pressures on the need of the armed forces, their missions and access to technology.
XXI-1994-95	Challenges to the Nation-State. Consequences for continental security and their impacts on the American Armies.
XXII-1996-97	Armies' participation in country development and in international security and peace cooperation activities within the framework of a democratic society.
XXIII-1998-99	The CAA we wish for the 21st century..
XXIV-2000-01	American Armies within the framework of global relations and international law at the beginning of the 21st century. Impacts on national defence.
XXV-2002-03	The American Armies and their contribution to the formation of defence policies in the context of new challenges to continental security.
XXVI-2004-05	The CAA and its contribution to hemispheric security and defence through an increased ability to work together, for Chapter 6 PKO and disaster relief operations.
XXVII-2006-07 XXVIII-2008-09 XXIX-2010-11	The CAA and its contribution to PKOs (developed under UN mandate) and disaster relief operations, through the creation and application of mechanisms and procedures designed to improve the collective capacities and interoperability of their members.

### CAA Cycle

The Conference operates in two-year cycles, and a Permanent Secretariat is established during each cycle, which is under charge of the host country's Army.

Selected subject:

Contribution to peacekeeping and disaster relief operations

**2 years**

**CAA  
(2009)**

**Countries offer themselves as next hosts for the following event, and for the sub-items.**

Specialized conferences, ad-hoc meetings and exercises, with the chosen sub-items. Reports are prepared for the general conference. 2010-2011: CAA 50th anniversary, civil-military relations, science and technology, radio communication exercise and meeting on legal issues in peace operations.

The 2010-2011 cycle mission includes advancing on studies about the advantage of regionalizing certain response capabilities in case of disaster relief and peacekeeping operations; carrying out planning and execution exercises, both in the classroom and in the field; promoting research initiatives in the scientific and technological areas in relation to the chosen general subject; implementing studies on procedures related to environmental protection in military operations; and implementing studies on procedures aimed at facilitating civil-military relations in peace operations and disaster relief.

**CAA  
(2011)**

**New Conference. A host Army is elected.**

**Source:** Compilation based on information provided in the web site of the Conference of American Armies, XXIX Cycle of the Permanent Executive Secretariat of the American Armies Conference (SEPCEA).

## Inter-American Naval Conferences (CNI)

The CNIs began in 1959, when the national navies of the continent were invited to attend the Semi-annual Conference of the Chiefs of Mission of the US Navy. In 1960 a Conference was held in two phases: the first phase was held for the Chiefs of Mission of the US Navy (Key West, Florida); the second was a Multilateral Conference of the Continent's Navies (San Juan, Puerto Rico).

As a result of the debates and discussions held in the two First Inter-American Naval Conferences, the need and convenience of drafting a document that would serve as the Bases for Agreement for future Naval Conferences became evident. Thus, studying common naval problems and stimulating permanent professional contacts became the CNIs' objective.

In 1962, the Bases for Agreement were adopted. Among other things, they established the following:

- The Conference agendas shall be prepared six months in advance and the projects that have to be submitted shall be exchanged three months prior to the Conference date.
- The adopted agreements shall have a Recommendation status, and their adoption shall depend on the respective Navies parties to those agreements.
- The intervals from one conference to the next are established to be of no less than one year and no more than two years.

Until 2010, twenty-three Inter-American Naval Conferences have been held. Its members are the Navies of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama (National Aero naval Service), Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. The Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network (IANTN) and the IADB are observer organizations.

**Source:** Compilation based on the information provided on the website of the XXIV Inter-American Naval Conference's organization.


### Conference of the Leaders of the Marine Corps of the Americas

The Conference is held every two years. Participating countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, United States and Uruguay. The Netherlands and France are observers.

## Cooperation System of American Air Forces (SICOFAA)

The SICOFAA was created on April 16, 1961, within the framework of the First Conference of the Chiefs of the American Air Forces. Its objective is to be a system of integration and cooperation among the American Air Forces or their equivalent, in order to exchange experiences, means, personnel training and education and everything that facilitates the elaboration of procedures.

**Members:** Air Forces of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama (National Aero naval Service), Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. Observers: Belize, Costa Rica (Air Surveillance Service), Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica and Mexico.



## Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA)

The Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA) was founded on March 15, 1943. It is located in Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, United States.

Its stated mission is to train and educate the military forces to build and generate abilities for the support of world stability and security, while generating academic and cultural relations. It offers training courses for Officers (ISOS) and professional training courses for Non-Commissioned Officers (INCOA).

During the period 2010-2011, the System Committees are devoted to the development of a Procedure Manual to respond to natural disasters. In October 2010, the Cooperation Exercise I shall be executed, with Chile acting as the host country (see Chapter 7 of this publication).

Country	2008 Graduates*	2009 Graduates*
Argentina	68	40
Bolivia	5	6
Brazil	0	5
Chile	14	18
Colombia	165	278
Dominican Republic	23	13
Ecuador	64	42
El Salvador	7	13
Guatemala	19	9
Honduras	8	11
Mexico	71	89
Nicaragua	7	5
Paraguay	8	14
Peru	74	90
Uruguay	5	12
Venezuela	0	0

\* Mobile equipment and expert exchange are included.

**Source:** SICOFAA Permanent Secretariat, website of the Chilean Air Forces, and Charter of the System (July 2007).



## US Southern Command

SOUTHCOM, headquartered in Miami, Florida, is one of the ten Unified Combatant Commands (UCC) of the Department of Defense. It is charged with the task of providing planning, operations and cooperation in security for 32 countries in the Americas, except for Mexico (which forms part of the Northern Command (1)), and the 12 islands which are States or territories under European sovereignty (the territories forming part of the US administration are also excluded). It also has jurisdiction in part of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (the waters adjacent to Central American and Caribbean countries, between 30° and 92° West meridians) and the Gulf of Mexico. The Panama Canal is within SOUTHCOM's jurisdiction.

### Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATFS)

The working group has the mission to detect, follow-up and support interdiction to disarticulate illicit trafficking, including drug trafficking in the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico and the Eastern Pacific. It is located in Key West and has representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Mexico, Peru, Spain, The Netherlands, and United Kingdom.

### SOUTHCOM Security Assistance Offices in the Americas (2)

Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

### Mutual Assistance Pacts


Since the mid 20th century, military assistance agreements, also known as mutual assistance pacts, have been signed between the US and countries of the region. In various cases, these agreements have ceased to be implemented or were superseded by hierarchically higher standards. They form the basis for personnel, training and equipment assistance as well as for the so-called military groups.

### Objectives proposed for 2010

- Expand humanitarian activities, build friendships and attract allies at local and regional levels.
- Integrate military and civilian efforts, through higher interaction with other government agencies.
- Provide advice to foreign security forces and enhance their combat capacity against narcoterrorism/terrorism.
- Implement a new development of public-private cooperation and a strategy for corporate commitment.
- Expand exercises, country participation and military –to – military commitment with allies.
- Focus on community extension and improvement of the US Government and SOUTHCOM profile in local community.
- Work jointly with other government agencies in order to train and equip partner nations and propose initiatives that deal with common security challenges.

(1) It comprises the continental territory of the United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding waters up to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, the Florida Strait and parts of the Caribbean to include Bahamas, Puerto Rico and US Virgin Islands.

(2) Each office is composed of at least one serving military person established in the US embassy. Its missions include providing financial and technical assistance, transfer of resources, and training and services to host countries, as well as promoting military-military contacts.





## Interagency


In September 2007, the Secretary of Defence authorized the reorganization of Southern Command to convert it into an inter-agency structure, which was fully approved in October 2008. In response to the idea of the “whole of government approach”, the Department of Defence implemented that year the Orientation Guidelines for the Use of the Force, aiming at a higher participation of other Departments. Southern Command was designated as the prototype of this comprehensive approach (and, once established, the African Command as well). Thus, the structure is composed of representatives of other agencies occupying key positions.

### Represented Agencies\*:

State Department (DOS): 7 (FT)  
 United States Agency for International Development (USAID): 2 (FT)  
 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (it includes ICE): 3 (FT) 7 (PT)  
 Office of the Director of National Intelligence: 3 (FT)  
 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF): 1 (PT)  
 Defense Criminal Investigative Service: 1 (FT)  
 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): 2 (FT)  
 Department of Energy (DOE): 1 (FT)  
 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA): 1 (FT)  
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): 2 (FT) 2 (PT)  
 Department of Transportation (DOT): 1 (PT)  
 Transportation Security Administration (TSA): 1 (PT)  
 Coast Guard: 2 (FT)  
 Department of Commerce (DOC): 1 (FT)  
 Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): 1 (FT)  
 Government Accountability Office (GAO): 1 (PT)  
 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): 1 (PT)

Total representatives of other Agencies: 40

\*Representatives can be full time (FT) or part time (PT) representatives.



**U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO)**

It is responsible for US forces and military means operating in Latin America and the Caribbean. It manages all naval units under the responsibility of the Southern Command.



Fourth Fleet

Assigned to COMUSNAVSO. It operates jointly with other Southern Command components. One of the operations conducted is the Continuing Promise Mission.

This is an annual humanitarian and civil assistance operation developed in the Caribbean, Central and South America under the naval component charge of Southern Command and the US Naval Forces Southern Command. This mission is conducted in cooperation with partners from other agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations and other international partners.

### Deployment of the Continuing Promise Mission

Ships	Date of development	Route
USNS Comfort	June – October 2007	Belize, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago.
USS Boxer and USS Kearsarge	April - November 2008	Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago.
USNS Comfort	April - July 2009	Antigua and Barbuda, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama.
USS Iwo Jima	July –November 2010	Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Suriname.

### Beyond the Horizon 2009\*

It conducts humanitarian assistance exercises. As part of the programme, troops specialized in engineering; construction and healthcare provide services and information to the communities. In 2009, the exercise was carried out in Colombia, Jamaica, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.


\*Other exercises conducted by the Southern Command are specified in the English language Caribbean dossier.

**Source:** Southern Command Public Affairs Office. U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation, Report of the United States Government Accountability Office (July 2010).

**Merida.** In October 2007, the State Department developed the Merida Initiative, which (together with other federal government agencies), is charged with providing assistance against drug-trafficking and organized crime in Mexico and Central America. This initiative includes military assistance funds. For financial year 2010, the Initiative divided the funds granted in the region. The Merida-Mexico Initiative was maintained and the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)\* were created.\*

\*For more information on the CBSI, see the English language Caribbean dossier.

### Funds of the US State Department for Security and Defence (in millions of dollars)



**Source:** MERIDA INITIATIVE: The United States Has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures, United States Government Accountability Office. Merida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues, Congressional Research Service, and laws P.L. 110-252 (2008), P.L. 111-8 (2009), P.L. 111-117 (2010), of the United States.



## Bilateral and Sub-Regional Defence Agreements

Colombia – El Salvador: Memorandum of Understanding (2006).  
 Colombia – Guatemala: Memorandum of Understanding on Military Technical Cooperation (2005).  
 Colombia – Honduras: Inter-Institutional Agreement on Maritime Cooperation (2005). Framework Agreement on Technical Cooperation (2010).  
 Colombia – Dominican Republic: Agreement and Addendum on Military Cooperation and Defence (2005 – 2007).  
 El Salvador – Peru: Cooperation Agreement in the Defence sphere and New Threats to Security (2008).  
 Nicaragua – Peru: Agreement on Technical Assistance for Maritime Security and Water Environment Protection (2004).  
 Mexico- Colombia: Agreement on Maritime Cooperation (2005).

### Andean Region

- Bolivia – Chile: Memorandum of Understanding.
- Bolivia – Ecuador: Agreement for military cooperation (2008).
- Bolivia – Peru: Consultation Mechanism (2010).
- Bolivia – Venezuela: Basic Agreement and Supplementary Agreement on Technical Cooperation (1973 - 2006). Memorandum of Understanding (2008).
- Colombia – Ecuador: Binational Border Commission (1996).
- Colombia – Peru: Agreement on Conversations among Air Forces High Commands (1994). Agreement to Fight Illicit Activities in Common Border Rivers (2002). Mechanisms for Political Consultation and Coordination (2007).
- Colombia – Venezuela: Declaration of Principles and Cooperation Mechanism (2010).
- Colombia – Bolivia: Memorandum of Understanding on Military Technical Cooperation (2004).
- Ecuador – Peru: Binational Commission on confidence building and security measures (1998). Permanent Mixed Commission on borders (2000). Mechanism for Political Consultation and Coordination (2007). Memorandum on Mutual Support in case of Natural Disasters and Binational Civil Action (2010).
- Andean Charter for Peace and Security, and Limitation and Control of Expenses Assigned to External Defence (Lima Commitment, CAN) (2002)
- Guidelines for the Common External Security Policy of the Andean Community (Decision 587, CAN) (2004).

### Ilo Maritime Pact between Peru and Bolivia (10/19/2010)

Peru has ceded, renewed and expanded for Bolivia a special industrial and economic free trade zone (ZOFIE, acronym in Spanish) and a tourist free zone (Mar Bolivia) for 99 years, which gives land-locked Bolivia a permanent access to the Pacific Ocean.

### Central America and Mexico

- Defence Sub-Committee - Security Commission of Central America – SICA
- Agreement for the creation of the Central America Armed Forces Conference- CFAC (1997).
- Central America permanent program for confidence building and security measures (SICA) (2006).
- Central America and Mexico security strategy (SICA) (2007).
- El Salvador – Guatemala – Honduras: Joint Agreement to Fight against Illicit Drug-Trafficking (2010).
- Mexico- Guatemala: Agreement on Cooperation for the Prevention of and Assistance in Case of Natural Disaster (1987).
- Mexico – Panamá: Information Exchange on Intelligence (2005)

Framework Treaty on Democratic Security (1995)

- Mexico - Chile: Cooperation Agreement (2003).
- Mexico - Uruguay: Cooperation Agreement (2004).
- Argentina – El Salvador: Cooperation Agreement (2009).
- Argentina – Honduras: Cooperation Agreement (2006).
- Brazil – El Salvador: Cooperation Agreement (2007).
- Brazil – Guatemala: Cooperation Agreement (2006).
- Brazil – Honduras: Cooperation Agreement (2007).
- Brazil – Dominican Republic: Bilateral Cooperation Agreement (2010).
- Chile – Guatemala: Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation (2003).
- Chile – El Salvador: Statement of Intent for Bilateral Cooperation (2001).

Andean Peace Zone (2004)

### Southern Cone

- Argentina – Brazil: Memorandum of Understanding for Consultation and Coordination (1997). Collaboration Protocol for Military Manufacturing (1997). Agreements on Technological Cooperation (1999, 2002, 2003, 2005). Master Agreement and Protocol on Cooperation (2005 – 2008).
- Argentina – Chile: Memorandum of Understanding for Strengthening Security Cooperation (1995). Agreement of Cooperation in Case of Disaster (1997). Memorandum of Understanding for Technical, Scientific and Logistic Development Cooperation (2001). Combined Peace Force (2005).
- Argentina – Paraguay: Agreement for Paraguay's Army Participation in the Argentine Task Force deployed in Cyprus (2003). Agreement and Protocol for Strengthening Cooperation (2007). Cooperation Agreement (2008).
- Argentina – Uruguay: Agreement for Strengthening Cooperation (2010).
- Brazil – Chile: Bilateral Work Team (2000). Cooperation Agreement (2007).
- Brazil – Paraguay: Military Cooperation Agreement (1995). Framework Agreement on Cooperation (2007). Binational Mechanism for Strategic Consultation (2007).
- Brazil – Uruguay: Cooperation Agreement (2010).
- Chile – Uruguay: Cooperation Agreement (2007). Agreement for Strategic Partnership (2008).

Peace Zone (1998)

- Argentina – Bolivia: Agreement for Strengthening Cooperation (1996). Organic Agreement for the creation of the Binational Commission. White Helmets (1996). Memorandum of Understanding on a Permanent Committee on Security (2004). Academic, Scientific, Technological, Industrial and Commercial Cooperation (2006).
- Argentina – Ecuador: Cooperation Agreement (2007). Bilateral Work Team (2008).
- Argentina – Peru: Cooperation Agreement on Antarctic Matters (2001). Cooperation Agreement in case of Disaster (2004). Memorandum of Understanding on a Permanent Cooperation Committee (2006). Combined Peace Force (2008).
- Argentina – Venezuela: Creation of the High Level National Commission (2009).
- Bolivia – Brazil: Cooperation Agreement (2007).
- Bolivia – Paraguay: Consultation Mechanism (2007).
- Brazil – Colombia: Cooperation Agreement (2003 - 2008).
- Brazil – Ecuador: Cooperation Agreement (2007).
- Brazil – Peru: Surveillance and Cooperation in Amazonia (2003). Master Agreement on Cooperation (2006). Mechanisms for Consultation and Coordination among Ministries (2006). Cooperation in terms of Surveillance of the Amazon Area (2006). Establishment of Integrated Border Control Systems (2009).
- Brazil – Colombia – Peru: Tripartite Commission (2004).
- Chile – Ecuador: Cooperation Protocol (1999). Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation (2002). Declaration of Intentions on Cooperation (2006).
- Chile – Peru: Memorandum of Understanding for Strengthening Security Cooperation and creating COSEDE (2001).\* Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation in Case of Catastrophe (2002). Memorandum of Understanding (2006).
- Uruguay – Venezuela: for Cooperation and Exchange of Experiences (2010).
- MERCOSUR – Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Regional Security Matters (MERCOSUR States, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela).
- I Meeting of Defence Ministers of the Amazon Treaty Cooperation Organization on the Security and Integral Defence of Amazonia (2006)

\*Suspended

**Sources:** Information provided by the Ministries of Defence of Argentina, Chile, Colombia and El Salvador. Gaceta Oficial and Libro Amarillo (from 2006 to 2009) of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Nicaragua, 2005. Web pages of Peru and Uruguay's Ministries of Defence; Ministries of Foreign Relations of Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela; Uruguay's Parliament; Brazil's Federal Senate.

**Agreements and treaties between Latin American countries and other countries in the world**

United States	17	1 out of 1 country has signed an agreement or treaty with the US.
Spain	15	7 out of 8 countries have signed an agreement or treaty with Spain.
Russia	9	1 out of 2 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with Russia.
China	8	1 out of 2 countries have signed an agreement or treaty with China.
Canada	7	2 out of 5 countries have signed an agreement or treaty with Canada.
France	7	2 out of 5 countries have signed an agreement or treaty with France.
Germany	5	2 out of 7 countries have signed an agreement or treaty with Germany.
Italy	5	2 out of 7 countries have signed an agreement or treaty with Italy.
United Kingdom	4	1 out of 4 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with the UK.
India	3	1 out of 6 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with India.
South Korea	3	1 out of 6 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with South Korea.
Poland	3	1 out of 6 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with Poland.
South Africa	3	1 out of 6 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with South Africa.
Netherlands	2	1 out of 9 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with the Netherlands.
Israel	2	1 out of 9 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with Israel.
Turkey	2	1 out of 9 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with Turkey.
Ukraine	2	1 out of 9 countries has signed an agreement or treaty with Ukraine.

**Note:** In July 2010, the Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica approved the request for the docking, staying at port and disembarking of the crews of 46 vessels of the US Navy (maximum authorized crew 13,291 troops). Said authorization was granted until December 2010 in the framework of the agreement signed by Costa Rica and the US in 1999 the object of which is antinarcotics operations in support to the US Coast Guard.

**Source:** Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica.

**Note:** Spain (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela). Russia (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela). Canada (Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Peru). China (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela). France (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela). Germany (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Peru). Italy (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru). United Kingdom (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Chile). India (Brazil, Chile and Colombia). South Korea (Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador). Poland (Chile, Colombia and Peru). South Africa (Brazil, Chile and Uruguay). The Netherlands (Chile and Colombia). Israel (Colombia and Peru). Turkey (Brazil and Chile). Ukraine (Argentina and Brazil).

**Source:** For further details, see references in table "Bilateral and Sub-Regional Defence Agreements" of this Chapter. China: Ministry of National Defence. Spain: Ministry of Defence. United States: State Department.

## US Southern Command Relations with the Region

**George Withers**

WOLA – Washington Office for Latin America

The potential for military conflict in the U.S. Southern Command's "area of focus" – Latin America and the Caribbean – is considered among the lowest of all the regional combatant commands. Lately, Southcom has chosen to emphasize its partnership initiatives – with the countries of the region, and domestically with other agencies of the U.S. Government.

All has not gone well in these two endeavours, however. While the Command engages with other countries in several joint naval exercises each year, the region was taken by surprise when, in April 2008, the Navy announced that it was, after several decades, re-establishing the Fourth Fleet in the region. Many viewed this as an unnecessary and provocative escalation of U.S. military presence in the waters of Latin America's waters.

Then, almost exactly one year later, the Department of State announced the details of a new "Defence Cooperation Agreement" between the United States and Colombia. This would significantly expand the U.S. military's access to several bases in that country. Internal Department of Defence documents alluded to the potential to conduct "full spectrum operations" throughout the hemisphere. Again, several countries expressed their alarm and demanded to know the Southern Command's intentions in the region. While the partnership programs intend to build bridges, these confusing signals work against the improved relations that the Southern Command claims to seek in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Domestically, the Southern Command is the first combatant command to explore the concept of broadening its mission beyond a traditional military focus. In 2006, the

Command announced its intention to become an "inter-agency" command, modifying its structure to include representatives of several civilian agencies. Today, the Combatant Commander retains his position at the top, and is served by two deputies – one for the military components and one for the civilian agencies. Officials explain that this will allow the military to better coordinate with these agencies in the delivery of U.S. assistance throughout the region. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the Government Accountability Office have expressed concerns over this new structure.

Now, the Command views the region more broadly. While many problems are transnational in nature and are the result of economic, social and political dynamics, increasingly, these are increasingly seen as "security threats" to the United States. This is true whether it be economic instability, street gangs, narcotics trafficking, or other problems. Many view Southern Command's involvement in these issues as interagency overreaching. It presents the very real possibility that the U.S. military will be seen as the "go-to organization" for all U.S. assistance, not just military aid. But perhaps most important, it accelerates an ongoing tendency to militarize U.S. foreign policy.

There should be no doubt that the U.S. Southern Command can, and often does, act as a force for good in the region. The military's tireless efforts in the immediate aftermath of natural disasters, for instance, should not be overlooked. However, because of apparent Southern Command expansions – both structurally and in its presence – the region remains concerned about the continuing spectre of unwanted U.S. military activity.



## Analysis

# Brazil's Role in the Hemisphere

**María Celina D'Araujo**

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Over the past few years, Brazil's role in the context of hemispheric relations dominated a large part of the defence and international relations literature and has given rise to intellectual and ideological debates. In this paper we argue that Brazil will not become a leader in the traditional sense of appearing as the representative of other countries and that it would encounter many challenges if it tried to become a local power with imperialist ambitions. The diplomatic history of the country, its economic development and its focus on avoiding direct confrontation with the United States discourage this kind of inferences. Witness to this is the fact that since the 1970s Brazil has been working, especially with Chile and Argentina, to create sub-regional institutions and discussion and consulting forums, and never presented itself as an alternative to block the United States.

A recent example of this effort is the creation, in 2008, of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and other organizations derived from it, including the South American Defence Council (CDS). These new institutions are a prerequisite for the region to speak by consensus without resigning bilateral and multilateral channels. Historically, no country in Latin America has accepted the leadership of a third party entitled to speak on their behalf. Brazilian diplomacy has always been aware of that and it has never encouraged the country to assume any leadership role, even though some political parties may have appreciated that kind of project.

The expectations of leadership in Brazil, however, are not recent and have acquired new life after economist Jim O'Neill in 2001 coined the term BRIC. The acronym represents the initial letter of the four main emerging countries of this century (Brazil, Russia, India and China) giving Brazil greater international projection and generating a wave of speculation on Brazil's role in the world. The "group" was also expected to become a political bloc, which never actually happened. Strictly speaking,

what these four states have in common is the fact that they are continental countries and that they are in the top ten regarding surface area and population and among the top twelve in terms of wealth production.

Their macro-structural data also show worrying realities from the social and political standpoints. The per capita income ranges from US\$11,000 per year in Russia to US\$1,000 in India. Brazil, with a per capita income of US\$7,000 per year is, however, the one with the highest disparity in the group and one of those with the highest inequality in the world. Overall, these are countries with many problems in the social and transparency areas, and with huge differences in their political systems, not to mention their cultural differences. In all of them, however, growth rates are expected to be equal to or exceed those in other emerging countries. This means they may expand their economies and gain new markets. In this sense, the term BRIC does not refer to important and fundamental issues such as democracy, the fight against corruption, social inequality, environment protection or defence.

In any case, the term BRIC gave Brazil greater visibility abroad even though it did not give it more decision power nor did it make it a global player with more weight in the world or even in the Americas. Brazil's economic and territorial weight in Latin America contributed to generating, along the history, expectations over a potential Brazilian leadership, but asymmetries in relation to its neighbours have prevented and continue to prevent that leadership to be legitimated. Quite to the contrary, the perception has grown that Brazil could, in the 21st century, become a regional imperialist power which, in turn, might hinder the strengthening of co-operation and confidence building measures. However, together with such debate, it became evident that in the region, the creation of institutions based on clear and shared principles is more important than the emergence



of or the boycotts to any leadership.

At this point, it should be noted that hemispheric leadership is not in question. The United States are a military, economic and cultural super power; the largest empire that history has known, with a leadership based on its strength and economy, but also on cultural and behavioural influences. On the other hand, Brazilian diplomacy has received with great caution the demands to assume a more marked leadership role among Latin countries in the Hemisphere. This trend started to change slowly since the 1990s with the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, when the region's geopolitics seemed to have changed. While Mexico reinforced its bonds with the United States through the North American Free Trade Agreement, South America appeared as a more integrated space, more independent from North American influence. Central America, in turn, continues to develop a direct line with the United States, for different structural reasons that will not be discussed here.

Therefore, when speaking of Brazil's potential leadership nowadays it should be made clear that if such potential should exist, it would be limited to South America. And, in any case, it would not be a leadership concurrent with that of the US, nor would it be of a personal but of an institutional character.

Historically, Brazil has shown little interest in regional defence affairs, whether because it defended the principle of non-intervention or because the region has never been an area with large and frequent armed conflicts. Whenever regional security has been at stake, Brazil chose to support negotiated and multilateral solutions.<sup>1</sup> In the same manner, with the only exception of the war against Paraguay, Brazil has never felt threatened and this has led the country to never take an active role in the regional debate on defence. As time went by, the security of the continent was a subject more cared about by Brazilian diplomacy than by its armed forces. This started to change also in the 1990s, placing the focus in South America, but always with the concern of not generating tension with the United States.

The end of the Cold War opened the possibility of holding conversations with Argentina and starting conversations on the reduction of nuclear weapons, the signing of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and the search for new roles for the military. In the absence of communism as an internal enemy and being in good terms with past enemies in the region, the defence matters in Brazil were limited to the Amazonia, where border policies are

more actively implemented and modern technologies for air traffic control and services shared with neighbouring countries are deployed. Therefore, Brazil's entry in the regional defence debate was gradual and limited: it is now about South America, understood as a security unit, but also as a possibility of joint infrastructure and defence industry projects in political democratic environments. Brazil has been, since then, more of a protagonist in South America, and from Lula da Silva's administration (2002-2010) on it has shown greater interest in defence matters. This was made clear in 2008 with the publication of the National Defence Strategy, a document that reveals the political ambitions of the country to develop its defence industry and make it a driver of the country's industry and technology development.

At the same time, the CDS was created under Brazilian initiative, which gave rise to several interpretations. Two of them ultimately show concern or disbelief about its creation. On the one hand, some see it as a statement of Brazil intended to strengthen its regional and world leadership, rising as an asymmetrical power in South America, always in concert with United States' interests. This would be part of a Brazilian strategy to gain a seat at the United Nations Security Council and become a stronger international leader, an intermediate state at world level, representing the interests of the region. Thus it would be part of Brazil's global ambitions after having surpassed Argentina as the region's leader. Given this context, the country would be giving continuity to its nuclear submarine construction project and re-equipping its land and air forces. Within this formulation, the Council could also be thought of as part of Brazil's plans to strengthen its defence industry and turn it into the main supplier in the region.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, other analysts see this move as more of a formal intention with little, if any, effective power vis-à-vis US military and political hegemony. In this sense, according to Alsina Junior<sup>3</sup>, South America "does not have sufficient weight to alter the world's strategic balance," especially in light of the fact that its main power, Brazil, is an actor with "little significance from the military viewpoint." Thus, the fact that Brazil is indeed the strongest country in South America has little meaning in the context of international security in light of the weakness of its defence apparatus.

Both interpretations are made on the basis of the paradigm of disputes for regional leadership and reveal the

<sup>1</sup> See on this matter, Luiz Bitencourt, "Seguridad en el nuevo mundo: Brasil y el dilema del liderazgo mundial", in *La Seguridad desde las dos Orillas*, ed. Rafael Martínez and Joseph S. Tulchin, (Barcelona: CIDOB, 2006).

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Raúl Benítez Manaut, Pablo Celi and Rut Diamint, "Los desafíos de la Seguridad y la Defensa en Latinoamérica: entre las nuevas amenazas, la nueva geopolítica y los viejos conflictos", in *Seguridad regional en América Latina y el Caribe - Anuario 2009*, ed. Hans Mathieu and Paula Rodríguez Arredondo, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

<sup>3</sup> João Paulo Soares Alsina Júnior, *Política externa e poder militar no Brasil, universos paralelos*, (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2009), 57.





recurring suspicion around Brazil and the United States. However, going beyond the conspiracy-simulation dichotomy, it is important to consider the Council as part of a process to redefine regional security policy and, as further proof of the concern for the institutionalization of the defence cooperation and debate forum for the countries of the region based on the principle of military subordination to civil power. Beyond the idea of reactive defence alliances, like the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the South American Defence Council (CSD) -with all twelve countries involved- they tend, like the Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas (CDMA), to invest in conflict prevention, a position backed by the “empire” from the beginning, which frustrated the Venezuelan proposal to create a “Southern” NATO with a defence and operational character.<sup>4</sup>

The proposed South American Defence Council was clearly inspired by the European integration model, with less ambitious objectives, mainly geared to create a mutual confidence and transparency climate in the relation among States. On joining the CDS, then Colombian President Alvaro Uribe asked other countries to get involved in the fight against terrorism and conditioned their adherence to the Council to the approval of three requirements: Council decisions must be adopted by consensus; the Council should make clear that there would be explicit acknowledgement of the institutional forces established in each country's Constitution; and all violent and/or irregular armed forces

should be rejected, regardless of their origin. Finally, in December 2008, at the special UNASUR meeting in Brazil, the Council was ratified as a “defence matters consultation, cooperation and coordination” body. Its explicit objectives are consolidating South America as a peace area, building a regional identity in defence matters, and attaining consensus to strengthen regional cooperation.

As a matter of fact, the National Defence Strategy, by emphasizing the defence industry, seems a measure supplementary to CDS objectives and it is this precisely what has generated such distrustful reactions. The Strategy seems to have been motivated by two concurring principles reflecting the government's comfort and enthusiasm as regards the country's potential: economic and political stability on the one hand, and prominence in the international context on the other. In this new scenario, Brazil would need to consolidate “its position in the world”.

It should be noted, however, that a large part of the issues posed for the National Defence Strategy might never become anything but good intentions. Except for the mandatory military service, what the document calls for involves large amounts of funds that need to be approved in a number of Legislative and Executive instances in a context of resource scarcity. Thus, the document formally responds to military and leftist groups' demands of more weapons and projection, but does not seem to have the strength to redirect the balance position that Brazil has maintained over its history in relation to its neighbours. Nothing seems to indicate that Brazil, despite its growing protagonist role in South America, will alter its traditional stance for balance, moderation, negotiation and dialogue.

<sup>4</sup> A brief history of the CDS is available at: Consejo Sudamericano de Defensa, “Publicaciones”, UNASUR, <http://www.cdsunasur.org/es/prensa/publicaciones>.