


Chapter 6:

# Education






### Main colleges with a Defence course offering

Country	Institution
<b>Argentina</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- National Defence School</li> <li>- Superior War School "Teniente General Luis María Campos"</li> <li>- Naval War College</li> <li>- Argentine Centre for Joint Training in Peace Operations</li> <li>- University of La Plata</li> <li>- Torcuato Di Tella University</li> </ul>
<b>Bolivia</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- University for Strategic Research in Bolivia (UPIEB)-Ministry of the Presidency - Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Government</li> <li>- National School of Higher Education Studies "Coronel Eduardo Avaroa"</li> <li>- Centre for Peacekeeping Operations of the Bolivian Army (COMPEBOL)</li> </ul>
<b>Brazil</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Superior War School</li> <li>- Universidad Estadual Paulista, Universidad Estadual of Campinas, Catholic University of São Paulo"</li> <li>- Joint Centre for Peacekeeping Operations in Brazil</li> </ul>
<b>Chile</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Pontifical Catholic University of Chile</li> <li>- National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies</li> <li>- University Andrés Bello</li> <li>- Army War College</li> <li>- Joint Centre for Peacekeeping Operations</li> </ul>
<b>Colombia</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Superior War School</li> <li>- Military University Nueva Granada</li> </ul>
<b>Cuba</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Raul Roa Garía Institute of Higher International Affairs Studies</li> <li>- Defence Information Centre</li> <li>- National Defence College</li> </ul>
<b>Dominican Republic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Graduate School of Higher Security and Defence Studies</li> <li>- Graduate School of Human Rights and Humanitarian International Law</li> </ul>
<b>Ecuador</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Institute of National High Studies</li> <li>- The Peacekeeping Unit School "Ecuador" (UEMPE)</li> </ul>
<b>El Salvador</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- College of High Strategic Studies</li> </ul>
<b>Guatemala</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Minister of Defence (with the guarantee of San Carlos University, University Francisco Marroquín and Panamerican University)</li> <li>- Superior Command of Education of the Army</li> <li>- Security in Democracy</li> <li>- ESTNA Centre (Foundation for the Institutional Development of Guatemala)</li> </ul>
<b>Honduras</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- National Defence College</li> </ul>
<b>Mexico</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Centre for Superior Naval Studies</li> <li>- National Defence College</li> </ul>
<b>Nicaragua</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Nicaraguan Army</li> </ul>
<b>Paraguay</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Institute of High Strategic Studies</li> <li>- Metropolitan University of Asunción</li> </ul>
<b>Peru</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Centre for High National Studies</li> <li>- University Alas Peruanas</li> <li>- Catholic University of Peru</li> <li>- Join Training Centre for Peacekeeping Operations (CECOPAZ)</li> </ul>
<b>Uruguay</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- High National Studies Centre</li> <li>- Military College of Higher Studies</li> </ul>
<b>Venezuela</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Institute for High National Defence Studies</li> </ul>

Source: Information by the above mentioned institutions.

### Number of Applicants to Officers Academies (2008 - 2010)




No callup of candidates was made that year. Not available

**Source:** Ministry of Defence and Military Academy (Colegio Militar) (Argentina). National Army, Military Naval School and Military Aviation College (Bolivia). Military Academy, Navy of Brazil and Air Force (Brazil). Ministry of Defence (Chile). Military School, Naval School and Military Aviation School (Colombia). Military Academy, Naval Academy and Air Academy (Dominican Republic). Ministry of National Defence (Ecuador). Ministry of National Defence (El Salvador). Ministry of National Defence (Guatemala). Army, Naval Force and Air Force (Honduras). National Defence Secretariat and Navy Secretariat (Mexico). Centre of Higher Military Studies (Nicaragua). Ministry of National Defence (Paraguay). Military School, Naval School and Air Force Officers' School (Peru). National Army, National Navy and Uruguayan Air Force (Uruguay). Naval School, Military Aviation School and National Guard Training School (Venezuela).




## Number of Applicants and Admitted Candidates to Officers Academies (year 2010)



\* As of September 2010, the admission process had not finished.




Source: Ministry of Defence and Military Academy (Colegio Militar) (Argentina). National Army, Military Naval School and Military Aviation College (Bolivia). Military Academy, Navy of Brazil and Air Force (Brazil). Ministry of Defence (Chile). Military School, Naval School and Military Aviation School (Colombia). Military Academy, Naval Academy and Air Academy (Dominican Republic). Ministry of National Defence (Ecuador). Ministry of National Defence (El Salvador). Ministry of National Defence (Guatemala). Army, Naval Force and Air Force (Honduras). National Defence Secretariat and Navy Secretariat (Mexico). Centre of Higher Military Studies (Ni-

**GUATEMALA**






Recruited personnel: 11.1 % over total number of Officers from all Services.

**HONDURAS**




Recruited personnel: 64 % over total number of Officers from all Services.

**MEXICO**




Recruited personnel: 3 % over total number of Officers from all Services.

**NICARAGUA**






Recruited personnel: 7 % over total number of Officers from all Services.

**PARAGUAY**






Recruited personnel: 4 % over total number of Officers from all Services.

**PERU**







Recruited personnel: 7 % over total number of Officers from all Services.

**URUGUAY**



Recruited personnel: 4% over total number of Officers from all Services.

**VENEZUELA**



caragua). Ministry of National Defence (Paraguay). Military School, Naval School and Air Force Officers' School (Peru). National Army, National Navy and Uruguayan Air Force (Uruguay). Naval School, Military Aviation School and National Guard Training School (Venezuela).and Military Aviation Academy (Honduras). Secretary of National Defence and Secretary of the Navy (Mexico). Army of Nicaragua (Nicaragua). Ministry of Defence (Paraguay). Ministry of Defence (Peru). National Army, National Navy and Uruguayan Air Force (Uruguay). Military Academy, Naval School, Military Aviation School and Training School of the National Guard (Venezuela).



## Analysis

# Professional Military Education

**Thomas C. Bruneau**

*Center for Civil – Military Relations, Monterey, California*

I believe there is generally little in the U.S. experience of national security & defence and civil – military relations that is relevant to Latin America. And I have this opinion for at least five reasons: First, the U.S. is a well – established democracy, and has been for most of its history. Second, the U.S. with a defence budget of almost \$700 billion in 2010, and 4% of GDP, commits a sum equal to the next fourteen countries for national security and defence. Third, the U.S. is a global power and is highly bureaucratized, with an enormous Department of Defence that consists of 1,421,731 million active duty members within the four services, 2,646,658 civilian personnel, and 463,084 in the Army and Air Force National Guard.<sup>1</sup> Fourth, given the system of represen-

tation, virtually all members of the U.S. Congress have real and concrete electoral incentives to be involved in or conversant with national security and defence. Fifth, with a defence industrial base, even those members of Congress without military bases in their districts, have electoral interests to be involved in issues of national security and defence. This combination of factors suggests that most of the defence institution structure and process don't have much in common with Latin American countries.

The U.S. experience in reforming professional military education (PME), however, is relevant, and for a number of reasons. First, PME was reformed as an integral part of a larger reform effort, and there are lessons that can be drawn from the experience relevant to other countries. The reform was part of the Goldwater – Nichols Defence Reorganization Act of 1986 (G-N), which was the last successful reform in U.S. national security and defence. Second, the reformers behind the reform explicitly saw PME as a way to change the profession in order to increase the combat effectiveness of the armed forces and to reinforce the authority of civilians in decision – making in national security and defence. Third, the PME reforms, and their impact, prove that the profession in the U.S., in contrast to the assumption in Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, can be changed. Huntington's classic book is not

<sup>1</sup> Specifically, there are 552,425 personnel in the Army; 330,703 in the Navy; 204,261 in the Marines; and 334,342 in the Air Force. Department of Defense, Military Personnel Statistics, "Active Duty Military Personnel by Rank/Grade, August 31, 2009", <http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/rg0908.pdf>. For the data on civilians: Department of Defense, Dod Personnel and Military Casualty Statistics, "Civilian Personnel", <http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CIVILIAN/CIVTOP.HTM>. And for the National Guard see Michael Waterhouse and JoAnne O'Bryant "National Guard Personnel and Deployments: Fact Sheet," *CRS Report for Congress*, (Washington D.C.: The Library of Congress, 2008). For further data on the armed services see Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, "Population Representation in the Military Services", <http://prhome.defense.gov/MPP/ACCESSION%20POLICY/poprep2005/contents/contents.html>

only based on a tautology, but is clearly wrong regarding the unchanging nature of military professionalism in the U.S.<sup>2</sup> If, through PME, the culture of the military profession can be changed in the U.S., there is little reason why it cannot be changed elsewhere, given political will. I would go further and state that if countries in Latin America want to reform their national defence and security structures, they, as the US, will discover that they also must reform PME.

While the G-N Act's primary method to strengthen the joint elements of the military was to change organizations and their responsibilities, PME, however, was expected to play a central role. "Education is important both for learning facts and for affecting attitudes and values. Specifically, joint education can broaden an officer's knowledge beyond his own military service to joint, multi-service matters and can help the officer develop a joint perspective. The Act would enhance joint education both to meet the increased responsibilities of the joint elements and provide officers with joint perspectives. Education on joint matters is a basic link between a service competent officer and a joint competent officer. Further, joint education is a major way to change the professional military culture so that officers accept and support the strengthened joint elements."<sup>3</sup>

Or, as Arch Barrett, who along with James Locher was the main staff in the U.S. Congress behind G-N communicated to me- the staff of the Panel saw changes in education as the means to change the culture of the organization of the U.S. armed forces.<sup>4</sup> However,

2 In *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Huntington traces the development of U.S. military professionalism up to the Cold War. He then allows no possibility for future evolution. Rather, he focused on how American culture might change to match the military professionalism. His most famous student, Peter Feaver, recognizes the tautology of Huntington's central argument: "The heart of his concept is the putative link between professionalism and voluntary subordination. For Huntington, this was not so much a relationship of cause and effect as it was a definition: 'A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state'. A professional military obeyed civilian authority. A military that did not obey was not professional." Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 18.

3 United States. Congress House, Committee on Armed Services, Panel on Military Education, *Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress of the Committee on Armed Services*, House of Representatives: One Hundred First Congress, first session, (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1989), 11-12.

4 Arch Barrett, e-mail communication to the author, November 28, 2001.

as Barrett also pointed out, legislation is not self-implementing. Despite the item on "establishes a joint officer personnel system" in the G-N law, it became obvious that the services were not seriously establishing a joint officer personnel system nor providing the education to support it. Thus, two years after G-N was enacted, the House Armed Services Committee created the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress to investigate PME and to make recommendations. Congressman Ike Skelton became the PME Panel Chairman.

The Skelton Panel was the first systematic study of PME in 200 years. Through extensive hearings and visits to the main higher - level military educational institutions, the Panel arrived at a number of conclusions that resulted in nine recommendations. All of these led in the direction of a higher quality, more intensive and robust, system of PME, including Joint PME.<sup>5</sup>

Subsequent high - level studies have generally found that the PME goals of Goldwater-Nichols are being achieved. The Cheney report notes a 1991 General Accounting Office study indicating that 90% of Skelton Panel's recommendations had been achieved.<sup>6</sup> The reformers of the institutions of U.S. national security and defence realized that the institutions would not work as intended without educational change. They thus invested a huge amount of political energy and time in reforming the U.S. military educational system. It should be noted that the U.S. Department of Defence "(...) presides over the largest and most expensive educational system in the world."<sup>7</sup> The reformers, in later studies, including the 1997 Cheney study and the 2010 Oversight & Investigations Subcommittee<sup>8</sup>, realized that educational was key to all aspects of control and effectiveness in national security and defence. It must also be noted, however, that it has been difficult to reform PME. It was for this reason that the Congress assigned specific responsibility to the Secretary of Defence, and there is a requirement for an annual report

5 United States. Report of the Panel on Military Education..., 2-7.

6 Richard B. Cheney, *Professional Military Education: An Asset for Peace and Progress. A report of the CSIS Study Group on Professional Military Education*, ed. Bill Taylor, (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1997), 64. For more information see Greta E. Marlatt, *A Bibliography of Professional Military Education (PME)*, (Monterrey CA, Dudley Knox Library, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), [http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/biblio/Oct07-PME\\_biblio.pdf](http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/biblio/Oct07-PME_biblio.pdf).

7 Richard B. Cheney, *Professional Military Education...*, vii.

8 United States. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, *Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel*, (Washington D.C.: Committee Print 111-14, 24), note 22 for GAO reports.



to Congress on implementation.

With this background one has to wonder if other countries, lacking a powerful and concerned congress as in the US, can take the initiative in passing a law similar to Goldwater–Nichols, creating a Panel, or requiring annual reports to Congress on implementation. I think that generally the model, or lessons, of the U.S. are not applicable. However, we find that there are ongoing reforms in PME in Canada, Romania, and Spain, which are all members of NATO with fairly specific and standard requirements in defence. There are also some recent innovations in several countries in South America that I wish to highlight here. I have not been able to identify a larger, or more general, movement towards PME reform in Latin America, but rather specific responses to particular national challenges and opportunities. Each PME reform initiative is specific, and thus unique, but worthy of further study and possible expansion to other countries.

As the only country in South America engaged in armed conflict, the government and armed forces in Colombia have increasingly been concerned with PME in terms of the educational background of their officers in order to increase combat effectiveness. As early 2002 they sought support from the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) and the Center for Civil – Military Relations. More recently, through the U.S. Department of Defence’s Defence Institutions Reform Initiative (DIRI), the Colombian Armed Forces are heavily engaged in a major assessment, and possible reform, of the whole PME system.

Chile undertook major reform in their Military Academy in 2006. The author participated in the first ever accreditation assessment, involving a foreigner, for the Chilean Ministry of Education. During the process of the accreditation visit in October 2006 it became obvious that there were two main motivations for the accreditation. First, Chileans, including the armed forces, are well aware of the challenges of globalization. Therefore, the armed forces need to respond with education, including training in English and other languages, which will prepare the young officers to deal with the challenges, and opportunities, of globalization. Second, due to initiatives in the Ministry of Education, accreditation is required if the cadets want to receive grants and loans for their education. It must be noted that education at the Chilean Military Academy is not free. The cadets have to pay a certain percentage, and the accreditation makes them eligible for these funds. Accreditation of the Military Academy involves

it with other, public and private, universities. While the accreditation of the Military Academy has probably spread to the other, Navy and Air Force, academies, it is slower to spread to the higher level, war colleges, of the services.

In Brazil the armed forces are very much aware of the overall modernization of society and seeking reforms in all areas. For my purposes here the most innovative program is the Pro-Defesa that seeks to break down the barriers between the war colleges and civilian universities through providing funds if civilians and military officers develop joint research and publishing proposals. This initiative responds to the continuing separation in Brazil between most of society and the armed forces, which was certainly aggravated during the military regime of 1964 – 1985. Part of that legacy is a certain stigma among civilian academics and students regarding the armed forces. Through Pro – Defesa civilians are much more involved with military officers and institutions and the officers are studying for advanced degrees.<sup>9</sup>

In Argentina there is a major reform currently underway to reform the whole PME system. The Ministry of Defence created the office of *Subsecretaría de Formación* in 2009 with authority over PME. They have sent assessment teams to seven military academies and entry – level educational institutions, which would then presumably result in recommendations for reform. In addition, they created a totally new Joint Superior War School with a new, one–year, joint curriculum. Sooner or later this new School will have an impact on the current war colleges of the three services.

In short, there are indications of the awareness of civilians regarding the importance of changing PME to achieve fairly country – specific goals in military education. I suspect that once the practical implications of the reforms in Argentina, Brazil, Chile or Colombia are recognized they will spread further within each society, and quite possibly to other countries.

<sup>9</sup> See Brazil. Ministerio da Defesa, “Pro-defesa”, [https://www.defesa.gov.br/pro\\_defesa/](https://www.defesa.gov.br/pro_defesa/)