

Chapter 7:


The Armed Forces



Armed Forces Strength in 2010



Army			Navy			Air Force			
Argentina									TOTAL 77,660
45,048			18,561			14,051			
5,748 Officers	21,666 Non-commissioned officers	17,634 Enlisted soldiers	2,474 Officers	14,545 Non-commissioned officers	1,542 Enlisted soldiers	2,403 Officers	10,098 Non-commissioned officers	1,550 Enlisted soldiers	
Bolivia									TOTAL 39,492
28,493			5,334			5,665			
2,883 Officers	4,392 Non-commissioned officers	21,218 Enlisted soldiers	915 Officers	1,549 Non-commissioned officers	2,870 Enlisted soldiers	902 Officers	1,725 Non-commissioned officers	3,038 Enlisted soldiers	
Brazil									TOTAL 333,582
222,212			46,956 ¹			64,414			
26,108 Officers	51,191 Non-commissioned officers	144,913 Enlisted soldiers	7,821 Officers	3,476 Non-commissioned officers	35,659 Enlisted soldiers	9,027 Officers	24,687 Non-commissioned officers	30,700 Enlisted soldiers	
Chile									TOTAL 61,851
35,551			18,365			7,935			
3,825 Officers	16,933 Non-commissioned officers	14,793 Enlisted soldiers	2,211 Officers	15,534 Non-commissioned officers	620 Enlisted soldiers	1,165 Officers	6,182 Non-commissioned officers	588 Enlisted soldiers	
Colombia									TOTAL 268,242
226,544			31,355			10,343			
8,927 Officers	31,544 Non-commissioned officers	186,073 Enlisted soldiers	2,159 Officers	7,888 Non-commissioned officers	21,308 Enlisted soldiers	2,197 Officers	3,338 Non-commissioned officers	4,808 Enlisted soldiers	
Dominican Republic									TOTAL 46,172
25,949			10,082			10,141			
7,781 Officers	18,168 Non-commissioned officers and Troops		2,580 Officers	7,502 Non-commissioned officers and Troops		4,071 Officers	6,070 Non-commissioned officers and Troops		
Ecuador									TOTAL 37,184
23,538			7,576			6,070			
2,844 Officers	20,694 Enlisted soldiers		1,030 Officers	6,546 Enlisted soldiers		835 Officers	5,235 Enlisted soldiers		
El Salvador									TOTAL 14,262
12,661			830			771			
1,444 Officers	820 Non-commissioned officers	10,397 Enlisted soldiers	133 Officers	54 Non-commissioned officers	643 Enlisted soldiers	205 Officers	242 Non-commissioned officers	324 Enlisted soldiers	
Guatemala									TOTAL 14,906
13,078			909			919			
1,652 Officers	3,047 Non-commissioned officers	8,379 Enlisted soldiers	161 Officers	275 Non-commissioned officers	473 Enlisted soldiers	118 Officers	296 Non-commissioned officers	505 Enlisted soldiers	
Honduras ²									TOTAL 8,566
6,467			994			1,105			
526 Officers	109 Non-commissioned officers	5,832 Enlisted soldiers	163 Officers	54 Non-commissioned officers	777 Enlisted soldiers	214 Officers	323 Non-commissioned officers	568 Enlisted soldiers	
Mexico									TOTAL 258,439
198,311			52,426			7,702			
37,448 Officers	168,565 Non-commissioned officers		12,807 Officers	26,233 Non-commissioned officers	13,386 Enlisted soldiers	Desaggregation includes within Army data			




1. The marine corps members (fuzileiros) are not included.

2. Data for 2009.

3. Data for 2009.

4. Includes the National Guard.

Number of regular Force members every 10,000 inhabitants




Source: Agencies and official documents specified in section "The countries" for this publication. Information on population provided by the Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2009, ECLAC (Population Forecast 2010).



Military Cooperation

Military cooperation in the region is materialized in the ongoing and regular conduct of combined exercises, both of a bilateral and multilateral nature, where the goal is to enhance greater interoperability among forces while contributing to the strengthening of confidence-building between nations. Such exercises, in many instances include in addition to military training, the conduct of natural disaster response drills, multidimensional scenarios under UN mandate, search and rescue situations, and combat of illicit trafficking, among others.

Bilateral Exercises




























References:

EJ: Army	[Training]: Training	[Force deployment]: Drills	[Natural disasters]: Natural disasters
AR: Navy	[Information and procedure exchange]: Information and procedure exchange	[Illicit trafficking]: Illicit trafficking	[Search and rescue]: Search and rescue
FA: Air Force	[Force deployment]: Force deployment		

Source: Compilation based on information provided on the websites of the legislative bodies, Ministries of Defence and Armed Forces of the participating countries.

Multilateral Exercises

Exercise	Type of Exercise	Force	Participants
ACRUX 2009	  	Navy	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay.
PANAMAX 2009	  	Navy, Army	Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay.
Multinational Alliance Operation	  	Navy	Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, United States.
UNITAS 50 GOLD	  	Navy	Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Germany, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, United States.
Salitre 2009	  	Air Force	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, France, United States.
Team Work South	  	Navy	Brazil, Chile, France, United Kingdom, United States.
SOUTHERN EXCHANGE 2009	  	Navy	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, United States, Uruguay
INTEGRATION	  	Army	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.
VII Multilateral War Exercise	   	Navy	Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, United States.
TRANSOCEANIC XXIV	  	Navy	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, South Africa, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Transamerica VII	  	Navy	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Military Exercise	   	Navy	Colombia, Honduras, United States.
AMERICAS 09	   	Navy, Army, Air Force	Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay.
Southern Star	   	Army, Air Force	Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, United States, Uruguay.
Exercise for assistance in the event of disaster	   	Army	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.
FAHUM	   	Navy	Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, United States.
International Military Patrol Competition		Army	Argentina, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, United Kingdom, United States.
2009 Command Forces		Army	Argentina (Gendarmerie), Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay.


In 2007, during the XLVII CONJEFAMER (Conference of Air Chiefs of the Americas), the conduct of an exercise was agreed for the integrated response to natural disaster events. Thus, "COOPERACIÓN I" Exercise was designed, to be conducted in October 2010, with Chile as the host country. The Air Forces of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama (National Air Naval Service), Paraguay, Peru, United States and Uruguay take part. The Exercise is based on quick and predefined deployment of the aircraft to a disaster area, followed by a short force training and integration period. The goal is to contribute to the standardization of procedures and the definition of a common action methodology for the Air Forces of the Americas to be able to act promptly and effectively in the event of an emergency.

Argentina-Chile "CRUZ DEL SUR" Combined Joint Peace Force
In December 2005, the Ministers of Defence of the Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Chile signed a bilateral agreement for the purpose of setting up the Argentine-Chilean Combined Peace Force "CRUZ DEL SUR." This project comprised the creation of a rapid deployment force under the UNSAS (United Nations Stand By Arrangement System)- with the capability to deploy within a 30/90 day period from the time the UN Security Council Resolution is passed until the deployment of a generic peacekeeping and stabilization mission; and with a self-sustaining capacity in the area for 90 days. In October 2008, the Ministers of Defence of Republic of Peru and the Republic of Argentina agreed on the creation of the Binational "Libertador Don José de San Martín" Company of Engineers intended for the joint construction of infrastructure work needed by the Haitian people within the framework of the MINUSTAH, a mission in which both countries already have military personnel deployed. A similar initiative was the creation of the Combined Chilean - Ecuadorian Company of Horizontal Construction Engineers, a unit that has been operating since 2009.

Sources: Compilation based on websites of the Ministry of Defence of Argentina, National Defence Staff of Chile, and the Joint PKO Center of Chile (CECOPAZ). *Memorandum de Entendimiento Fuerza de Paz Combinada Argentino-Chilena "Cruz del Sur"*, 2006. *Memorandum de Entendimiento Fuerza de Paz Combinada Argentino-Peruana "Libertador Don José de San Martín"*, 2008. Website of the legislative bodies, Ministries of Defence and Armed Forces of the participating countries. More information on Chapter 9.



Women's Admission to the Armed Forces (year)



Note: The Command corps includes officers who have been educated at military academies from the beginning of their professional careers. The Professional corps refers to those who develop a career in the civilian sphere and are then incorporated to the armed forces. In Venezuela the admission of women into the National Guard was 1970 for the Staff corps and 2001 for the Command corps.

Women Officers who have reached the Highest Rank in the Command Corps (2010)

ARMY

Company-grade Officers

Argentina: First Lieutenant
Chile: Lieutenant
Colombia: Second Lieutenant
El Salvador: Lieutenant
Honduras: Captain
Paraguay: Lieutenant
Peru: Lieutenant
Uruguay: First Lieutenant
Venezuela: Captain

Staff-grade Officers

Bolivia: Colonel*
Ecuador: Major
Guatemala: Colonel**
Nicaragua: Lieutenant Colonel

* Current Colonels graduated from the first promotion of the Officers Academy (1979-1985).

** Colonels are health specialist officers from the service branch. There are no active women in the command corps.

*** Generals belong to the professional corps.

Senior-grade Officers

Cuba: Brigadier General
Dominican Republic: Brigadier General
Mexico: Brigadier General***

NAVY

Company-grade Officers

Argentina: Lieutenant JG
Colombia: Lieutenant
El Salvador: Lieutenant
Guatemala: Second Lieutenant
Honduras: Lieutenant
Peru: Second Lieutenant
Paraguay: Lieutenant JG
Uruguay: Navy Second Lieutenant

Staff-grade Officers

Dominican Republic: Commander
Ecuador: Captain
Mexico: Commander*
Peru: Lieutenant-commander

Senior-grade Officers

Venezuela: Vice-Admiral

Note: In Chile women are currently in their 4th year of training. In El Salvador as for 2010 they are in their 3rd year of training. In Mexico commanders are women officers from the professional corps.

AIR FORCE

Company-grade Officers

Argentina: Lieutenant
Chile: Lieutenant
Colombia: Captain
Ecuador: Captain
El Salvador: Lieutenant
Honduras: Captain
Guatemala: Lieutenant
Paraguay: Lieutenant
Peru: Lieutenant
Uruguay: Captain

Staff-grade Officers

Brazil: Lieutenant-Colonel
Dominican Republic: Captain*

Senior-grade Officers

Mexico: Brigadier General**
Venezuela: Major General

* According to the officers classification they belong to Intermediate Officers category.

**Generals are women officers from the professional corps.

Note: In the case of Bolivia, women officers are in the 4th year of instruction.

Information about Cuba is not available.

Admission of Women into Military Training Specialties (Officers, command corps)

Country	Admission level sorted by corps and specialty		
	Army	Navy	Air Force
1. Argentina	Partial	Total	Total
2. Bolivia	Total	No access	Total
3. Brazil	No access	No access	Partial
4. Chile	Partial	Partial	Total
5. Colombia	Total	Total	Total
6. Cuba	n/a	n/a	n/a
7. Dominican Republic	Partial	Partial	Partial
8. Ecuador	Partial	Partial	Partial
9. El Salvador	Partial	Partial	Partial
10. Guatemala	Partial	Total	Total
11. Honduras	Partial	Total	Total
12. Mexico	Partial	Partial	Partial
13. Nicaragua	Total	Total	Total
14. Paraguay	Partial	Partial	Partial
15. Peru	Partial	Partial	Partial
16. Uruguay	Total	Total	Total
17. Venezuela	Total	Total	Total

1. No access to infantry or cavalry in the land force.

3. No access to infantry or first class technician.

4. No access to infantry, armoured cavalry in the land force; to marine corps and its specialties on material, submarines, tactical diving, rescue diving and lighthouses in the naval force.

7. No access to combat related specialties.

8. No access to infantry, armoured cavalry or aviation in the land force, to submariners and naval aviation in the naval force, or to paratrooper corps, helicopter pilot, special operation, air combat control or liaison officer positions in the air force.

9. No access to combat-related specialties.

10. No access to artillery, engineering or cavalry in the Army.

11. No access to artillery, infantry or cavalry in the Army.


12. No access to combat-related specialties.

14. No access to infantry, cavalry or artillery in the Army; submarines, infantry, special operations, diving or rescue in the Navy; or combat pilot, air defence or special operations positions in the Air Force.

15. No access to artillery, cavalry or religious services in the Army; to submarine crew, intelligence or special operation forces in the Navy, nor to combat pilot or intelligence in the Air Force.

n/a: not available.

Percentage of women in the Armed Forces



Note: it includes officers, NCO's and enlisted troops. The graph does not include Brazil, Dominican Republic and Nicaragua.

Source: Data gathered through interviews with Army Officers and the Ministry of Defence (Argentina). Directorate of Human Rights and Interculturality of the Ministry of Defence (Bolivia). websites of the Armed Forces (Brazil). Personnel Directorates of the Army, Navy and Air Force (Chile). Ministry of Defence and National Navy (Colombia). Directorate of Human Rights of the Ministry of Defence (Ecuador). Ministry of Defence and Peacekeeping Operations Training Institute of the Armed Forces (El Salvador). Ministry of National Defence (Guatemala). General Command of the Air Force, General Command of the Naval Force and Joint Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (Honduras). Memoria 1979-2009 (Army of Nicaragua). Secretary of the National Defence and Secretary of the Navy (Mexico). Ministry of National Defence (Paraguay). Human Resources Directorate of the Ministry of Defence (Peru). Third Department of the Army General Staff, National Army and Uruguayan Air Force Public Relations Directorate, National Peacekeeping Operations Training Centre and Navy General Staff (Uruguay). Ministry of the Popular Power for the Defence (Venezuela). Project 07-184 Global Peace and Security Fund - RESDAL.



Military Service

Reserve

Mexico and Cuba are the only cases with a reserve corps system in place. In Mexico, recruitment in the Army and Air Forces is done in two ways: **voluntarily** or through **conscription** (NMS).

NMS Personnel Non-commissioned officers in 2009.	NMS Personnel recruited in 2009.	
	Enlisted	Reserve
511,999	63,980	363,262

The number of candidates who entered the ground and air forces voluntary military service in 2009 was 13,359.

Professional soldiers

In Chile, the professional enlisted soldiers reached the number of 3,703 members of staff in 2009. In 2010, the system was also made available to the Air Force. The number of professional soldiers is estimated to reach 5,000.



Voluntary – conscription system relationship

According to the Guatemalan Civil Service Act, all the citizens of Guatemala have the right and the responsibility to provide service to their country. During the first stage, participation shall be voluntary. If the numbers expected are not reached, the general practice is to conduct a draw. The summon prior to the mandatory call can equal or exceed the available vacant places. For instance, in 2009 the total amount of conscripts in Chile joined the military service on a voluntary basis.

The following data belongs to Guatemala:

Guatemala (2009)	
Entered	Discharged
6,438 (Enlisted soldiers)	6,180 (Enlisted soldiers)
107 (experts)	80 (experts)

In countries where military service is mandatory, men always have to serve while women may do so voluntarily in times of peace or be drafted in the event of war or emergency.

	Mandatory			
	1 year	2 years	3 years	4 years
	Voluntary			
	1 year	2 years	3 years	4 years
Brazil: 1 year. El Salvador: 1 year. Mexico: 1 year. Paraguay: 1 year. Venezuela: 1 year.	Ecuador: 1 year. Nicaragua: 1 year.	Bolivia: 2 years. Chile: up to 2 years. Colombia: 1 to 2 years. Cuba: 2 years. Guatemala: up to 18 months.		Dominican Republic: 4 years.
		Argentina: 2 years. Honduras: 2 years. Peru: Up 2 years. Uruguay: 2 years..		

Conscription

El Salvador (2009)		
	Candidates	Admitted Candidates
Ground Force	1,613	224
Air Force	74	0
Naval Force	92	67

Brazil (2009)	
	Admitted Candidates
Ground Force	61,610
Air Force	6,553
Naval Force	3,131

Paraguay (2009)	
Total	3,927

Geographical Distribution of the Recruited Persons

Bolivia (2009)	
La Paz	11,261
Potosí	1,101
Oruro	2,040
Tarija	714
Santa Cruz	3,840
Beni	1,287
Cochabamba	6,950
Chuquisaca	682
Pando	58
TOTAL	27,933

Women in the Military Service

All the countries of the region with a voluntary military service regime allow both men and women to be candidates. Some examples are:

Argentina (Ground Force - 2009).			
Men		Women	
Candidates	Admitted Candidates	Candidates	Admitted Candidates
9,038	5,276	2,711	748

Chile (Ground Force - 2009)			
Candidates		Admitted candidates	
Women	7,531	Women	1,200
TOTAL	32,297	TOTAL	13,608

Argentina (Admitted Candidates – Ground Force 2009)	
Buenos Aires: Azul / Tandil / Mar del Plata / City Bell / Bahía Blanca	459
Región Metropolitana: Campo de Mayo / CABA	1,111
Entre Ríos	484
Salta / Jujuy / La Rioja / Tucumán	354
Neuquén / Río Negro	442
Mendoza / San Luis / San Juan	445
Chubut	271
La Pampa	357
Santa Cruz	720
Formosa / Chaco / Corrientes / Misiones	278
Santa Fe / Corrientes	404
Córdoba / Santiago del Estero	717

Source: Legislation regulating the military service in the different countries. Data: Ministries of Defence of the corresponding countries.

Analysis

Military Organization and Force Design

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The concept of military “transformation” emerged in the United States in the 1970s, when Generals Starry and Morelli, with Alvin Toffler’s prospective advice, started to think about the type of war that would be waged by the end of industrial society, in an age dominated by cybernetics with a strong technological component. Their conclusion was clear: the new type of war required a military force with sophisticated armament, more qualitatively than quantitatively equipped, with personnel with higher intellectual preparation. However, the word “transformation” was not formally adopted at that time.

It would be the Bush administration that placed emphasis on the project. Soon after the inauguration of the Republican government a Force Transformation Office was created within the Department of Defence. The process began in 2001, but it was also hit by the impact of international contingencies. Indeed, after the attack on the Twin Towers, it focused on the fight against terrorism and the lessons learnt in the Iraq War. In this new scenario, it became clear that excessive technology and qualitative forces did not necessarily guarantee success. Discordant voices were heard from high-ranking military officers, both in active service and retired. Later on, after the Rumsfeld resignation, the Force Transformation Office (based in Norfolk) was dissolved and all its activities distributed to differ-

ent structures within the Department of Defence.

Without attempting, for reasons of space, a complete analysis of the subject, it is worth underscoring the so-called *Network Centric Warfare*. This element was defined as a new “war theory” and constitutes a platform of command, control and employment based on the integration of strategic systems, techniques, emerging tactics, procedures and organizations which give a decisive advantage in war fighting.

The other significant measure was the implementation of inter-agency coordination and the joint employment of State and Defence Departments in operations. The core idea was integrating political and military aspects from the beginning of any conflict. So, while military operations evolve, activities prior to the stabilization and reconstruction phases are conducted in parallel.

Simultaneously, in 2001, the notion of military transformation spread to Latin America, and in 2003 Chile adopted it, when its Modernisation Plan started to focus on transformation. Around that time, something similar was announced in Uruguay, but the initiative did not prosper. In turn, Colombia applied a scheduled renewal process to its armed forces by adopting the joint system but without speaking of transformation with the meaning that was attributed to the term in the US. The rest of the countries did not adhere to



this notion but started to watch closely what was going on in the north. Obviously, certain countries ruled out the model from the outset owing to its high technological demands and its inapplicability in countries ranking low among national powers. This means that there was no regional consensus on the matter which did not elicit more than initial curiosity. The expression “military transformation” disturbed and perhaps even confused the natural intentions in military renewal and reform processes already underway in some countries. This happened because the United States concept was adopted but its content was not incorporated.¹

It is worth noting then, that if in the United States the initiative responded to change in the nature of war, in our region undertaking as radical a process as transformation ended up as unnecessary.

Adopting a notion like military transformation necessarily demands adopting as well a new theory. When faced with the need to define a new theory it should be clear that the original factors in the analysis will be the so-called *military control elements*: objective, scenario, military forces, time and the principles of war.

Owing to the existing confusion and the interest in reforming the region's armed forces, a number of years ago I proposed two triangles to analyze the reformation process, modernization, military change or whatever name we would like to give it. These triangles make available a methodology for the study of all three basic elements of the armed forces in their relation to society and all three elements intrinsic or endogenous to the force. The triangle analyzed in this work is the one I mentioned first. On the upper vertex is the *nature* of the armed forces, because they were born to perform a task that the social group entrusted them with since their inception. On the right vertex, the *legal standard*, then the Rule of Law gave them a legal framework. On the left vertex, the State delivers certain *capabilities* for them to perform their natural work according to the legal framework. These components or basic axes interact with each other and any change in one of them will impact on all others. Therefore, the options to reform, modernize or “transform” –if you like– are associated with the depth and scope of what needs to be changed.

It is important to understand and accept the reasons why the armed forces in the region have the characteristics they have. Constitutions, standing at the top

of the legal obligations pyramid, are, in those cases where the armed forces are referred to therein, their primary reference. Structuring armed forces in terms of threats does not seem to have any strategic sense. Threats are more volatile than Constitutions and may come and go; for this reason, threats may have an impact on operational or tactical changes in the short and medium term, but the strategic reason for armed forces design is a constitutional mandate, or, in certain cases a legal mandate, and must be commensurate with the country's strategic challenge. When a country finds such a mission excessive, it has the political (certainly not the military) task of changing the role for those forces.

In this scenario, the study of reformulating the military apparatus must be undertaken based on serious, well-supported and technical diagnosis, and end up with the elaboration of a project with a realistic future consistent with the strategic horizon of the country, the region and ultimately, the world.

In the case of Latin America, an integration scenario is offered to work on, although in my opinion, underlying issues will delay progress until they are addressed. The first of them lies in diplomatic tensions over border issues that remain an obstacle to deep integration. And this is because they appear in a somewhat sensationalist communications environment that is more harmful than beneficial. This situation, in addition, encourages ultra-nationalist movements in each country to stir up discontent.²

The second issue is the ideological division in the region. Ideological instability persists in the region and this makes it difficult to predict whether different-sign government changes will occur without disruptions. The third issue is the dispute for regional leadership, in which Brazil is a natural protagonist.

Finally, and by way of conclusion, every country has to follow its own path. Perhaps, given the circumstances in the region, fortunately at this time not involving armed conflicts between countries, using the notion of “transformation” could be premature since there are no lessons learnt that may recommend something similar. In my judgement, what is most applicable to the majority of these countries is the design of forces based on capabilities, since this allows reconciling strategic uncertainty with the budgetary realities of the region.

1 Jaime García Covarrubias, “New Threats and Defence Transformation: The case of Latin America,” *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*, Vol 12, Num 3, (Autumn 2004).

2 What I am pointing out could be seen between Chile and Peru since they are going through an arbitration procedure at The Hague. Every now and then there is an incident which, small as it may be, ends up with the recalling of ambassadors.