


Chapter 8:

Defence and National and International Community



Military Troops from Latin American Countries involved in Peace Operations



Compared Evolution of Latin America involvement in Peace Operations (2001-2010, %)

	2001-2002	2002-2003	2003-2004	2004-2005	2005-2006	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	Total Evolution 2001-2010
Latin America	131.4%	43.6%	7.5%	127.1%	-0.6%	5%	0.9%	1%	-0.2%	763.7%
Rest of the World	29%	-6.2%	8.9%	34.8%	9%	15.5%	2.3%	10.3%	7.1%	169.9%

The percentage represents the growth compared the previous year. Initial data: December 31, 2000 (742 Latin American soldiers). Closing, December 31, 2009 (6,401 Latin American troops).


Source: Compilation based on information provided by the website of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

PKO Training Centres and Courses

Argentina	Ecuador
CAECOPAZ - <i>Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz</i> (Armed Forces) - 27 June 1995	UEMPE - <i>Unidad Escuela Misiones de Paz Ecuador</i> (Armed Forces)- 10 November 2003
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UN operating techniques - UN military observer - Negotiations in peace operations - UN logistics - International law of armed conflict - Human rights for peacekeepers - Disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion of former combatants - Civil-military coordination in peace operations - Humanitarian aid in peace operations scenarios - Train the trainer - "Train the Trainer" (given by the DPKO) - Senior staff of task force in Cyprus - Task force in Cyprus - UNFLIGHT for the air unit - Senior staff of the Argentine joint battalion in Haiti - Argentine joint battalion in Haiti 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Peacekeeper - MINUSTAH - Military observer - Staff - Police procedures in border and community actions - Press correspondents in peace operations
Bolivia	El Salvador
COMPEBOL - <i>Centro de Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz del Ejército de Bolivia</i> (Armed Forces) - 23 January 2007	EOPFA - <i>Escuela de Operaciones de Paz</i> (Armed Forces) - 1 July 2004
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training of the Bolivia Mechanized Infantry Company (<i>Compañía de infantería mecanizada Bolivia, CIMB</i>) "Haiti" - Training of the CIMB "Congo" - Peacekeeping operations for military observers - War correspondents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UN military observer - UN logistics and finance - Peace operation military instructor - FINUL pre-deployment training - Staff Officer in peace operations
Brazil	El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua
CCOPAB - <i>Centro Conjunto de Operaciones de Paz de Brasil</i> (Armed Forces)* - 15 June 2010	CREOMPAZ - <i>Centro Regional de Entrenamiento de Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz</i> (Armed Forces) - 8 June 2005
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Advanced exercise for peace operations - Introductory course for peace missions - Civil-military cooperation symposium - Introductory course for platoon and sub-unit Commanders - Introductory course for Staff officers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UN terminology - UN staff - Military observers (national) - Military observers (international) - Contingent commander - MINUSTAH basic training - MONUC basic training - UN Instructor - Logistics and finance - Basic training of UN CFAC Battalion troops
Chile	Paraguay
CECOPAC - <i>Centro Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz de Chile</i> (Armed Forces and Law-enforcement forces) - 15 July 2002	CECOPAZ - <i>Centro de Entrenamiento Conjunto de Operaciones de Paz</i> (Armed Forces) - 8 October 2001
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Military observers - Peace operations - Police monitors - Correspondents in peacekeeping missions - International humanitarian law in armed conflicts for peace operations - At the service of peace (together with Leaster Pearson Centre of Canada) - Pre-deployment for national contingents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Military decision making process in MINURCAT - UN contingent basic training - MINUSTAH pre-deployment advanced training: Infantry Company - MINUSTAH pre-deployment advanced training: Multi-role Engineering Company - UNFICYP Pre-deployment advanced training - UN military observer - Multi-national logistics
Dominican Republic	Peru
<i>Escuela de Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz</i> - June 29, 2010 (Recently created)	CECOPAZ - <i>Centro de Entrenamiento Conjunto de Operaciones de Paz</i> (Armed Forces) - 11 November 2003
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Military observers - Haiti pre-deployment - Peace correspondents
Uruguay	
ENOPU - <i>Escuela Nacional de Operaciones de Paz de Uruguay</i> (Armed Forces)** - 28 August 2008	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UN military observer - UN multi-national Staff - UN police officers - National contingent in UN missions - National contingent in Sinai 	
CICAME - <i>Centro de Instrucción y Capacitación de Operaciones para el Mantenimiento de la Paz de la Policía</i> (Police)*** - 1 January 1996	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UN police observers 	

* By means of *Guidance (Portaria)* N° 952-MD 2010/06/15, the previously called Peace Operation Training Centre was replaced - CI OP PAZ.
 **The ENOPU preceding organizations include the Peace Operation Training Centre of the Army (CIOPE), which began its operations in 1982, when Uruguay first made the commitment to send Engineers and Transportation Special Group to the Sinai Peninsula. Some years later, in 1998, this was replaced by the Peace Operation School of the Army (*Escuela de Operaciones de Paz del Ejército, EOPE*).
 *** The precise date of the Centre's creation was 1996/03/01 and it operated until the end of February 1999. Afterwards, it began operating on March 1, 2004, when Police Observers were sent, again, both to Haiti and Ivory Coast missions.

Troop Contribution to Peacekeeping by Region



Source: Website of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO-UN), and information provided by the training centres and Armed Forces of each country.



Cooperation in the Event of Disasters

Country	Civil Defence Agency	Legal Grounds	Immediate Superior Authority*	Institutional Reporting
Argentina	National Direction of Civil Protection	There is no civil defence law, only executive, provincial and municipal rules. <i>Decreto</i> N° 1045/2001, establishing objectives and functions of the national leadership.	Minister of the Interior	Ministry of the Interior**
Bolivia	Deputy Minister of Civil Defence	<i>Ley No 1.405 orgánica de las Fuerzas Armadas de la Nación (1992/30/12)</i> <i>Ley N° 2.446 de organización del Poder Ejecutivo</i> , Regulated by <i>Decreto Supremo N° 27.230 (2003)</i> , ratified by D.S. N° 28.631, <i>Reglamento de la Ley N° 3.351</i> , and recognized by <i>Norma de organización del órgano ejecutivo D.S. N° 29.894</i> .	Vice Minister of Civil Defence and Cooperation for Integral Development	Ministry of Defence
Brazil	National Civil Defence Secretariat	<i>Decreto</i> No 5.376, governing the National System of Civil Defence and the National Council of Civil Defence, as well as other provisions (2005/17/01).	National Secretary	State Ministry of National Integration
Chile	National Emergency Office	<i>Decreto Ley N° 369</i> , which creates the National Emergency Office (1974/16/03)	Director	Ministry of the Interior
Colombia	Disaster Prevention and Response Office	<i>Decreto</i> N° 919, whereby, the National Disaster Prevention and Response System is organized (1989).	Chief of the National Office for Disaster Prevention and Response	Office of the President of the Republic
Cuba	National Civil Defence Staff of the Revolutionary Armed Forces	<i>Ley N° 75 de la defensa nacional (1994/21/12)</i> and <i>Decreto-Ley No 170 del sistema de medidas de defensa civil (1997/08/05)</i>	National Chief of Civil Defence Staff	Office of the President of the State Council through the Revolutionary Armed Forces
Dominican Republic	Civil Defence Office	<i>Ley</i> No 257-66, whereby a civil defence office is created (1966/07/06).	Executive Director	Office of the President of the Republic
Ecuador	National Directorate of Civil Defence	<i>Ley N° 275, de seguridad nacional (1979/09/08)</i> in Title III "de la Defensa Civil".	Director (General o Colonel or equivalent Navy staff officer)	Secretary General of the National Security Council
El Salvador	National Civil Protection, Disaster Prevention and Mitigation system	<i>Decreto</i> No 777, <i>Ley de protección civil, prevención y mitigación de desastres (2005/08/18)</i> y el <i>Decreto</i> No 56 (2006/24/05) <i>Reglamento de organización y funcionamiento de la dirección general de protección civil, prevención y mitigación de desastres</i> .	General Director	Ministry of Government
Guatemala	National Coordinator for the Reduction of Natural or Man-made Disasters	<i>Decreto Legislativo N° 109-96, Ley de la coordinadora nacional para la reducción de desastres de origen natural o provocado (1996/06/11)</i> ; <i>Acuerdo Gubernativo 443-2000</i> , Regulation of <i>Decreto Legislativo N° 109-106 (2000/09/12)</i> .	Minister of National Defence (military)	Ministry of Defence
Honduras	Permanent Commission of Contingencies	<i>Decreto</i> No 9-90-E, <i>Ley de contingencias nacionales (1991/26/07)</i> y <i>Acuerdo</i> No 661.91, (1990/12/12)	National Commissioner	Office of the President of the Republic
Mexico	National Civil Protection System	<i>Ley general de protección civil</i> (DOF 2000/05/12. Last Amendment: DOF 2006/04/24).	Secretary of Government	Office of the Secretary of Government
Nicaragua	National System for Disaster Prevention, Mitigation and Response Nicaraguan Army's Civil Defence Staff	<i>Ley N° 337, de creación del sistema nacional para la prevención, mitigación y atención de desastres (2000/04/07)</i> and its Regulation (2000/06/28), <i>Decreto</i> No 53-2000. <i>Ley N° 181, Código de organización, jurisdicción y previsión social militar (1994/09/02)</i> , y <i>Ley N° 337</i> and its Regulation.	Executive Secretary Chief of Civil Defence Staff (EMDC) (Brigadier General)	President of the Republic Nicaraguan Army
Paraguay	National Emergency Committee	<i>Ley N° 2.615/ 05 que crea la secretaria de emergencia nacional (2005/06/02)</i> .	Executive Director	Ministry of the Interior
Peru	National Civil Defence System	<i>Decreto Ley N° 19.338, Ley del sistema de defensa civil (1972/03/28)</i> , as amended and extended, and its Regulation (<i>Decreto Supremo 005-88</i>).	Director (military officer of a General or Admiral rank)	National Defence Council
Uruguay	National Emergency Directorate	<i>Ley</i> No 18.621, <i>sistema nacional de emergencias</i> , (National Emergency System) created as a permanent public system (200/10/25).	National Director	Office of the President of the Republic
Venezuela	National Civil Protection and Disaster Management Organization	<i>Decreto Presidencial</i> No 1.557, <i>Ley de la organización nacional de protección civil y administración de desastres (2001/11/13)</i> .	National Director of Civil Protection and Disaster Management	Ministry of the Interior and Justice

* Only in the cases explicitly expressed in the corresponding Law; this chart indicates if the Higher Authority is a civilian or a military member.

** Until July 1996, it reported to the Ministry of Defence. Decree 660-96 reassigns the National Direction of Civil Protection (DNPC) to the Ministry of the Interior (1996).

Armed Forces Missions – Operational and Reporting Relationships

<p>The National Civil Protection Directorate is in charge of the elaboration of civil protection doctrine, policy and planning and the coordination of support of law-enforcement and security forces, the Argentine Federal Police and the Armed Forces, with the purpose of mitigating the effects of disasters at a national level. Likewise, the decentralized characteristic of civil defence in Argentina allows provincial and municipal governments to coordinate the necessary means to respond in the event of an imminent situation.</p>
<p>The civil defence planning, conduct and supervision in the territory is under the responsibility of the Deputy Minister for Civil Defence, and the Commander-in-Chief coordinates with the former the participation of the Armed Forces in civil defence planning and execution.</p>
<p>The Ministry of Defence is part of the National Civil Defence Council and coordinates Special Forces' combined operations for civil defence actions.</p>
<p>There exist regional, provincial and community Emergency Committees presided over by the Regional Mayor, the Province Governor or the respective local Mayor, as applicable. In each one of these instances, each branch of the Armed Forces is represented, but there is no reference as to whether they would perform operative roles for the compliance of specific civil defence missions, nor is the type of relation they hold with civilian authorities specified.</p>
<p>The Ministry of National Defence is part of the National Disaster Prevention and Response System and of the National Committee for Disaster Prevention and Assistance, although it may delegate its responsibilities to the General Commander of the Military Forces. The latter are in charge of the disaster area isolation and security, air control, identification and control of ports and heliports in an emergency situation. A delegate from the Ministry of Defence is member of the National Technical Committee.</p>
<p>The Civil Defence System encompasses all levels of military hierarchy ranks: Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, National Civil Defence Staff, armies and Provincial and Municipal Staffs. The presidents of the Provincial and Municipal Assemblies of People's Power are the heads of civil defence in the pertinent territory and their work is supported by the civil defence bodies of provincial and municipal Staffs.</p>
<p>The Ministry of the Armed Forces has permanent representation at the Emergency Operations Centre, an integral part of the National System for Disaster Prevention, Mitigation and Response, which is conducted by the Civil Defence sector. In turn, it is part of the National Council for Disaster Prevention, Mitigation and Response, chaired by the President of the Republic (or his delegate), as well as of the National Technical Committee on Risk Prevention and Mitigation. The Armed Forces also have a representation at the regional, provincial and municipal committees for disaster prevention, mitigation and response. The Organic Law establishes that whenever the President of the Republic so resolves, they will provide cooperation in public emergencies or disasters.</p>
<p>The National Directorate reports to the General Secretariat of the National Security Council and its National Director is an officer of the Armed Forces (Joint Staff General or Colonel or equivalent Navy rank). The Provincial Boards are presided over by the respective governors and their vice president is the highest-ranking officer of one of the services. In times of peace, the Armed Forces support civil defence. The National Civil Defence System, in coordination with the National Directorate for Armed Forces Mobilization and private and public bodies, plan the activities provided for during the period prior to the adverse event. The Armed Forces, as a National System support organization, take part in the prevention, mitigation and reconstruction, and train the various military units for their involvement in those missions.</p>
<p>In a disaster, upon the requirement of the President of the Republic, of the National Commission or the General Directorate, the Armed Force shall provide quick and timely assistance to evacuate and aid the people, as well as to help them safeguard their life and property. The police may be helped by the Armed Force to secure public order, upon approval of the President of the Republic.</p>
<p>The Minister of Defence is the Coordinator of the National Council, the highest body of the National Coordinator, which he legally represents. Neither the Law nor its Regulation makes any reference to the Army in disaster situations.</p>
<p>The Secretary of Defence is part of the Permanent Commission. The Permanent Commission of Contingencies Creation Law establishes that the Armed Forces contribute personnel and means to assist in natural disasters and emergency situations affecting people and their property. However, neither this nor the National Contingency Law gives details of the conduct levels or operating relations with the National Commission.</p>
<p>The Secretaries of National Defence and the Navy are part of the National Civil Projection Council, a consulting body on civil protection planning matters. The Armed Forces participate in the response to extraordinary situations requiring immediate civil protection actions at any level of the institutional structure (federal, state or municipal). They coordinate with these instances' authorities and conduct the actions under their charge even though a disaster state may have not been declared. The General Civil Protection Law makes no reference to the type of relation established between the civil agency and the Armed Forces, or to any supervision procedures to control the armed forces in the performance of these missions.</p>
<p>The Army Commander-in-Chief accompanies the Minister of Defence in the integration of the National Committee for Disaster Prevention, Mitigation and Response. The Special Operations Commission (one of eight sector-led work commissions in the system) is presided over by a permanent delegate of the Army. The Civil Defence Staff guarantees the effective participation of the various Army units and their coordination with State institutions and the population in protection plans for natural disasters, catastrophes and similar events.</p>
<p>The Nicaraguan Army's Civil Defence Staff established the Disaster Operation Centre included within the National System. The System's Executive Secretariat, in coordination with the Civil Defence Staff declares the pertinent alert levels.</p>
<p>A general officer representing the Armed Forces is part of the National Emergency Committee presided over by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Armed Forces provide the National Emergency Committee any required cooperation.</p>
<p>The National Civil Defence Committee, one of the five levels the System is comprised of, is chaired by the Minister of Internal Affairs. The Armed Force Joint Staff is one of its members. The Committee has jurisdiction over the whole territory of the Republic and the Regional Committees within the geographic space covered by each Military Region. Each Regional Committee is presided over by the Commander of the pertinent military region. The National Institute for Civil Defence, a public body decentralized from the defence sector, governs and conducts the National Civil Defence System and its Chief is a General or Admiral, appointed by the President of the Republic upon proposal by the Minister of Defence.</p>
<p>The Minister of Defence is a member of the National Emergency System and Committee (chaired by the President of the Republic) and the National Emergency Council (chaired by the Secretary of the Presidency). Other participants are the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, the National Navy and the Air Force, and the Director of the Permanent Technical Operating Directorate.</p>
<p>The National Civil Protection and Disaster Management Coordination Committee is part of the National Risk Management System and the National Citizen security Coordination; it is presided over by the Minister of Internal Affairs and Justice and a high-level representative of the Ministry of Defence has a seat in it. The law makes no reference to the Armed Forces.</p>

Source: Compilation based on the above-mentioned laws.



Major Earthquakes and Hurricanes in Latin America and the Caribbean (1960-2010)

Event	Date	Intensity/Category*	Estimated Damage
Earthquake	Chile February 27, 2010	8.8	800 killed and missing; 2 million people affected; 1,5 million houses damaged; U\$S 30 billion in material damages.
Earthquake	Haiti January 12, 2010	7.2	More than 200 thousand killed; 250.000 injured; and one million homeless people.
Earthquake	Costa Rica January 8, 2009	6.2	34 killed.
Hurricane Félix	Central America, Caribbean and Yucatan Peninsula August 2008	5	133 killed, 130 of them in Nicaragua; 40.000 homeless; and U\$S 720 million in material damages.
Earthquake	Peru (Chincha Alta) August 15, 2007	7.9	519 killed; and 300.000 homeless.
Hurricane Wilma	Yucatan, Cuba October 2005	5	23 killed; and U\$S 29 billion in material damages.
Hurricane Stan	Central America, South of Mexico and Haiti October 2005	1	Heavy rains, floods and landslides; 1,600 killed; missing people in Guatemala and El Salvador.
Hurricane Katrina	Bahamas, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi August 2005	5	Near 2,000 killed; and U\$S 75 billion in material damages.
Hurricane Iván	Caribbean, Venezuela and United States of America September 2004	4	64 killed; U\$S 13 billion in material damages in the United States and U\$S 3 billion in the Caribbean.
Earthquake	El Salvador January 13, 2001	7.6	200 houses buried due to landslides.
Hurricane Mitch	Central America October 1998	5	9,000 killed; 12,000 missing people; floods; 80% of crops destroyed; and U\$S 5 billion in material losses.
Hurricane Paulina	South of Mexico October 1997	4	400 killed; 300,000 homeless people; and U\$S 9 billion in material damages.
Hurricane Gilberto	Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico September 1988	5	318 killed; and U\$S 5 billion in material damages.
Earthquake	Mexico September 19, 1985	8.1	9,500 killed.
Earthquake	Guatemala February 4, 1976	7.6	Approximately 25,000 killed.
Hurricane Fifi	Central America September 1974	3	10,000 killed; and 600 thousand Honduran homeless.
Earthquake	Nicaragua December 24, 1972	6.5	10,000 killed.
Earthquake	Peruvian Andes May 31, 1970	7.9	66,000 killed
Hurricane Flora	Caribbean October 1963	3	Heavy rains: floods; more than 7,000 killed; and U\$S 528.6 million in material damages.
Valdivia Earthquake	Chile May 22, 1960	9.5**	2,000 killed; tsunami which devastated coastal areas and caused deaths in Hawaii, Japan and Philippines.

*Earthquake intensity is measured according to the Richter scale. Hurricane category is determined according to Saffir- Simpson scale.

**The most powerful earthquake ever recorded

Source: Compilation based on the information supplied by different related agencies.

Regular Internal Order Programs


Country	Program or Facultative Rule	Activities of the Armed Forces
Bolivia	Supreme Decree N° 27.977	- Demonstration and riot control
	Security City Plan	- Patrolling
	Joint Task Force	- Eradication of surplus coca crops.
Brazil	Supplementary Law N° 97	- Patrolling. - Inspection of people, road vehicles, ships and airplanes. - Arrest of people caught in flagrant crime.
Colombia	Consolidation Policy of Democratic Security / Illegal Armed Groups	- Offensive military incursions and containment of illegal armed groups - Law-enforcement and civil-military inter-agency coordination.
	Policy of Democratic Security Consolidation /Drug Trafficking	- Illegal crop eradication. - Interdiction operations by land, sea, rivers and air. - Neutralization of illegal armed groups involved in any business stage, and of drug trafficking and armed organizations. - Control of the territory.
	Policy of Democratic Security Consolidation/ Public Security	- Intelligence - Strengthening law-enforcement presence, increase in number of strength.
Dominican Republic	Presidential Decree N° 310-06 Joint Doctrine Handbook of the Armed Forces	- Support to the National Police in the prevention of crime and to guarantee citizen peace. - Jointly with the National Police: regular patrols and surveillance checkpoints, involvement in operations, criminal activity interdiction, stabilization activities. - Anti-drug support activities using military means.
El Salvador	Joint Community Support Groups	- Patrolling, seizure or arms and drugs, arrests, inspection of people and vehicles.
	"Nuevo Amanecer" (New Sunrise) Campaign	- Patrolling, arms and drugs seizure; arrests and people and vehicle inspections; joint operations and police coordination; security at schools and detention centres, reception of crime reports.
	Support plan for detention centres management Cuscatlán Plan	- Patrolling, arms and drugs seizure; arrests; people and vehicle inspections. - Support in the fight against drug trafficking from the branches of the Armed Forces.
Guatemala	Master Law of the national security system	- Military Police Brigade. Patrolling to support the National Police in citizen security and fighting against drug trafficking.
Honduras	Bases of the National Defence Policy	- Joint operations with the National Police for anti-gang control, patrolling, surveillance, inspection, arrests. - Support to organized crime control. - Support to drug trafficking control.
Mexico	Guidance for integral fight against drug trafficking 2007-2012 "Inflexible Operation"	- Fight against organized crime and drug trafficking: surveillance, offensive actions, inter-agency coordination, inspection, seizure.
Nicaragua	Permanent Security Plan in the Countryside	- To counteract illegal activities of regular and organized crime. - Particular and combined operating services with the National Police: patrolling to combat the trafficking of drugs, arms and ammunitions, smuggling and trafficking of fauna and flora, illegal fishing and hunting.
	Integral Plan of the Army – National Police	- To fight crime in the countryside, jointly with the National Police.
	Integral Plan to Fight Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime	- Operations carried out by the Naval Force of the Nicaraguan Army to fight drug trafficking and organized crime.
Venezuela	Organic Law of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces N° 6.239	- Bolivarian National Guard. to cooperate in the investigation and prevention of crimes relating to drugs and psychotropic substances, kidnapping and extortion, border and rural security road security, surveillance of strategic industries, ports and airports, immigration control, public order, public security, criminal investigation; support, custody and surveillance of facilities and the property of the Legislative and Judicial Branches, the Citizen Power and Voting Power and support to Civil Protection and Disaster Management agencies.
	ZeroContraband Plan	- Bolivarian National Guard. Seizure, detention and inspection for smuggling activities.
	"Secure Caracas" (Caracas Segura) Plan	- Bolivarian National Guard. Protection, patrolling and intelligence in each parish of Caracas.
	Anti-drug Officers of the Armed Forces Guard	-Seizure, operations, inspection.
Argentina Chile Ecuador Paraguay	The Armed Forces' involvement in law and order functions is admitted only under a state of exception. In Chile, the state of exception was declared after the 2010 earthquake to maintain public order. In Ecuador, the state of exception was declared at the end of September 2010, in order to re-establish public order after a Police mutiny. At the beginning of 2010, in Paraguay this status was required in 5 departments for a 30-day period with the purpose of dismantling a guerrilla group. In such period, a joint police-military operation was carried out.	
Cuba	The President of the State Council is entitled to use the Revolutionary Armed Forces to keep internal peace, even if the state of emergency has not been declared.	
Peru	The recent approval of Decree Law N° 1.095 provides for the Armed Forces involvement in different areas relating to internal peacekeeping, whenever police capacity is overwhelmed upon the instruction of competent authorities.	
Uruguay	Even though the Armed Forces do not develop regular law-enforcement activities, the National Defence Act establishes that, under expressed authorization given by the Minister of National Defence, the Armed Forces shall be entitled to render services in different activities, when called upon. To date, the President has announced that between 1.500 and 2.000 soldiers will be transferred to activities of the police force.	

Source: Laws in force and official security, defence and development plans of the countries under consideration. Websites of the Ministries of Defence and Armed Forces.



Protection of Natural Resources

All Latin American countries introduce in their defence policies the recognition and protection of national resources, as well as their environmental riches. The following map indicates some examples of actual activities presently carried out by the Armed Forces for the defence and protection of both natural resources and the environment as a whole.



Source: Defence White Books, institutional reports, websites of the Armed Forces, energy ministries and natural resource ministries from the various countries. Data provided by the pertinent countries. British Petroleum's "Statistical Review of World Energy 2009" Report. UNESCO's "Water in a Changing World" Report. Website of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Community Support Areas

The Armed Forces of Latin America are aimed to progressively adopt more roles in terms of community outreach and support programs. All countries in the region undertake actions and campaigns that reflect the greater participation of the Armed Forces in society's development. The following are some examples of each case:

Campaign Type	
Food Distribution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Argentina: National Community Support Plan by the Army in Argentina for food distribution, among other objectives. • Colombia: delivery of food to communities in the Amazon. • Mexico: Aquarium Plan for water distribution.
Infrastructure / housing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brazil: Calha Norte Program in support of the community, divided in 194 municipalities. • Cuba: people protection with works of infrastructure. • Ecuador: Road Emergency Plan. • Guatemala: well drilling for 6,200 beneficiaries. • Paraguay: UNMISA Program, Stage 2 of construction.
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bolivia: Juancito Pinto Bonus. Annual school grant. The Bolivarian Armed Forces participate in its allocation. • Chile: awareness action regarding military reality. • Dominican Republic: Program to promote patriotic values. • Nicaragua: coordination with the Ministry of Education, particularly in remote areas. • Peru: literacy campaigns. • Uruguay: literacy and primary education program for adults.
Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Salvador: media campaigns, with 16,539 beneficiaries in 2009. • Honduras: Civil-Military Action Program and Humanitarian Assistance: recovery works, medication delivery, among other things. • Venezuela: Air Ambulance Program to the Service of the People (since 1999).

Sources: Legislation in force, White Books and official security, defence and development plans of countries under review. Websites of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces.

Antarctica



Antarctic Treaty – Washington, December 1st, 1959

Member States: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Chile, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Russia Federation, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay.

Art. I – “1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, to conduct any measure of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapon. 2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose.”

Art. IV – “2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.”

Countries with declared claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica: Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Norway, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

In March 2009, 111 scientific bases existed in Antarctica, with a maximum of 4,460 personnel members in total.

Bases in Antarctica		
Country	Bases	Personnel
America		
Argentina	14	667
Brazil	1	40
Chile	21	359
Ecuador	2	26
Peru	1	28
United States	6	1.293
Uruguay	2	60
Africa		
South Africa	1	80
Asia		
China	3	90
India	2	65
Japan	5	125
South Korea	1	70
Oceania		
Australia	5	200
New Zealand	1	85
Europa		
Belgium	1	-
Bulgaria	1	18
Czech Republic	1	20
Finland	1	20
France	4	125
Germany	4	90
Italy	7	102
Norway	2	44
Poland	1	40
Russia	12	429
Spain	2	50
Sweden	1	20
Ukraine	1	24
United Kingdom	6	217
Join Bases		
France and Italy	1	60
Australia and Romania	1	13

Note: Maximum number of bases and personnel as of March 2009.

Source: Website of the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research and Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs. *Antarctic Treaty, 1959, Book of National Defense of Chile, 2010.*



Analisis:

National Defence and Disasters: A Preliminary Approach

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■ The tragedy in Haiti in January 2010 once again brought to the table of hemispheric and international debate the issue of disasters and international humanitarian assistance. One and a half month later, the disaster in Chile added the issue of the relation between national defence and disasters, a new line to be explored around political-military relations.

Latin American and Caribbean countries, the Gulf of Mexico and the US East Coast have always been under the threat of devastating disasters, whether natural -- earthquakes, hurricanes, depressions, tropical storms and other phenomena including floods, landslides and tornadoes-- or anthropogenic, like the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Usually material losses and human fatalities, including dead and missing people, cannot be calculated and official data barely offer estimations and approximate figures. This makes it impossible to have a clear idea of the actual magnitude of these events and their economic, political, and social impacts and their dangerous effects on the democratic stability and governance of the countries affected.

Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Chile, are located on the *Pacific Ring of*

Fire and, therefore, under the permanent threat of earthquakes of varying intensities and magnitudes. The origin of these seismic movements is twofold: volcanism and the collision of tectonic plates. In addition, the countries around the Caribbean Basin --Mexico, Central America, small insular Caribbean states, Venezuela and Colombia-- are located on the road of hurricanes and tropical storms and depressions occurring between June 1 and November 31 every year. Also the Minor Antilles are shaken by seisms, not very frequent but at times, devastating, as the earthquake in Haiti. Hispaniola is crossed by two geological faults; the one that destroyed Port-au-Prince (the *Enriquillo – Plantain Garden*) had been dormant for almost two centuries, silently accumulating colossal amounts of energy. When it was released, the discharge was equivalent to the explosion of 200 thousand kilograms of TNT and caused a catastrophic tragedy.

Haiti and International Humanitarian Assistance

The Haitian tragedy was magnified by a complex set of economic, social, political and cultural factors. At the time of the disaster the country was just escaping

from being a classic example of failed state thanks to the presence of the MINUSTAH, which neither had the mandate nor the capacity to immediately respond to and mitigate the effects of the seism, and much less so the Haitian authorities. The whole world was under commotion, but the United Nations was not prepared to confront a disaster of this magnitude.

With its main port destroyed and the airport control tower demolished, the operative priority was to take control of the only landing strip available; the number of aircraft bringing humanitarian assistance exceeded the capacity of land controllers and many of them had to be rerouted to the Dominican Republic. Criticism to the presence of United States military was fast to come although they took care of air traffic and proceeded to patrol Port-au-Prince, upon the request of President Rene Preval. Clearly, mistakes were made because chaos dominated the reception and distribution of help, which revealed the absence of a national higher authority to control and coordinate all operations and, at the same time, conduct military and police forces to put under rein the excesses of a desperate population of wounded, starved and homeless people. But it is also clear that there is a lack of protocols and coordination mechanisms for an ordered and efficient administration of international humanitarian assistance.

Chile: Weaknesses of the Political Power

Chile's case is paradoxical: in a country with enviable levels of political and economic stability and governance standards, there was ample and generalized criticism to the government's response to the disaster. Many wondered how many deaths, missing people and material damage could have been avoided if the government's response and search, salvage and rescue efforts had had the necessary speed and effectiveness and why public order could not be controlled from the beginning.

Chile has a long tradition of and conducts permanent and systematic drills for preparedness to face earthquakes and tsunamis; there were, however, grave mistakes in the central Government's immediate response to the crisis. The first one of them (the most dramatic on account of the number of victims, higher even to those resulting from the earthquake itself) was an inadequate handling of the seaquake alert. But even if that had been identified in time, it is unlikely that the information would have been transmitted to local coast authorities, as the alarm system operates on the telephone and the Internet, which were not running on account of power failure.

The second one, the slow reaction of the govern-

ment in the distribution of food, medicine and essential items to the southern cities which had been hit the most by the seism, partly because without power and without communications there was no manner of transmitting local needs and thus, respond accordingly. Finally, central authorities had to face the dilemma of mobilizing the armed forces to assist in attention and mitigation tasks and in preserving or reinstating public order. The government hesitated, delaying the decision, partly because of political calculations and a particular reluctance to use the armed forces, given the negative experience during the military regime.

These mistakes, though serious, must be seen in perspective, based on a universally accepted principle: it is impossible to reach perfection in a disaster situation of such magnitude and complexity, where critical decisions have to be made in a simultaneous and coordinated manner, at short notice, with a large number of officials separated by large distances and, even worse, without communications and maybe damaged themselves.

Without seeking to justify these mistakes on the argument that others have done worse, it is worth noting that more serious mistakes were made in the US for the prevention and response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. Close to two thousand people were killed and dozens of thousand individuals stayed trapped for days in their flooded homes, stadiums and convention centres. Looting, violence and vandalism were rampant and did not cease but upon the belated arrival, almost one week later, of 40,000 troops of the National Guard to impose order and guarantee security.

Civil Defence and Armed Forces

All the countries in the region have in place a civil defence system for disaster prevention, response and mitigation. However, for their compliance with these tasks, they are almost absolutely dependent on the capabilities, human and material resources of their respective armed forces. These systems have many elements in common and their relations with their military are considered in their constitutional order and/or in the ordinary legislation of each country. But this is no easy interaction, which reveals a particular aspect of the relations between the political power and the armed forces, a very significant component of politico-military relations and hence, of the civilian conduct of the armed forces. Until now, the relation on disaster situations has not been addressed in depth by social or political sciences. It also involves the armed forces' non-military missions or subsidiary missions, the debate of which is still to be addressed in some countries



in the region.

One of the most interesting aspects is that the relation between civil defence and armed forces does not respond to a common pattern in the region. And that, overall, each country defines the model that best fits its risks, vulnerabilities and threats, and its available capabilities and resources, in order to attain higher efficiency and effectiveness in disaster prevention, response and mitigation. In the case of those relatively foreseeable (e.g. hurricanes) emergency committees are activated with due notice. But in the case of earthquakes, which are almost impossible to predict, they act only after disaster has occurred, launching a complex decision-making process, including the mobilization of the armed forces for a variety of missions not related to the classic notion of national defence, which gives rise to the so-called overlapping of functions.

Some Provisional Conclusions

Reality shows that there is no single model in the interrelation between national defence and disaster assistance and that the most advisable course of action is for each country to adopt the one that best matches its needs and resources to efficiently face its identified risks, vulnerabilities and threats. The Special Declaration on Security in the Americas (Mexico 2003) included natural and anthropogenic disasters in the list of new threats, concerns, and other challenges of diverse nature in relation to the security of the States of the Hemisphere.

The relations between disaster response and armed forces are complex and difficult and are conditioned by legal and political issues. The former refers to what the constitution and the legal system of each country establish, especially as regards states of exception (emergency), armed forces roles and missions, higher command and conduct, entry and exit of national and foreign troops. If strictly applied, the last of these aspects represents a severe limitation to the speed and effectiveness of international humanitarian assistance.

The political factors refer to a complex decision-making process, especially in what moment the political authority orders the armed forces to intervene in the response to and mitigation of disaster, what is their role in public order preservation or restoration, what limits there are to the authority vested upon them and what supervision and control protocols are in place.

The analysis of armed forces' participation in disaster situations is included in the classical context of political-military relations and, within this framework, it has its own pros and cons.

It is unanimously recognized that such participation is fundamental owing to the attributes inherent to the forces: discipline, command and control capabilities, verticality of command, fast response and fast and ordered deployment capability; availability of means and techniques; sea, land and air mass transportation capacity, and self-sustaining capacity for relatively long periods on the field. All of the above, in contrast with civil agencies' marked proneness to bureaucracy in their operations.

On the other hand, the militarization of the affected areas (which is of lesser importance when human lives are at stake) is also subject to criticism along with a limitation to the political capabilities, referred to the decision-making process in the operating front, particularly affecting local and regional civil authorities and, to a lesser extent, the central government. And, finally, the media impact, i.e. the manner in which communication means overrate and criticize military involvement and authority. This is particularly relevant in societies with political hypersensitivity derived from former experiences. Chile is, in this case, an emblematic example that greatly differs from what happens in Central America, for instance, where after a disaster, the victims demand and receive with relief the presence of the men in uniform.

Disaster prevention, response and mitigation is a responsibility that must be fully shared by civil and military authorities and the population at large, and this calls for prior preparation and a process of ongoing education, both formal and informal, of territorial organization of the population and the performance of planned exercises and drills, all essential components of a prevention culture.

A correct coordination between agencies is as critical as international coordination. Haiti is an emblematic example of what must not be done in this respect or, to put it in positive terms, how the international community needs to act in disaster situations and the necessity to have a single national authority directing and coordinating the response and mitigation efforts. To this end, international cooperation protocols have to be agreed upon to standardize procedures, streamline them and make them more efficient, in such manner that their contribution may be effective to alleviate the dramatic effects of any disaster.

Much remains to be done. Beyond and above what the general rules of constitutional order and ordinary legislation prescribe, little has been attained in the pursuit to optimize international humanitarian assistance and find the best interrelation of civil defence and armed forces. Coherence is the key.