RESTRUCTURING COLOMBIA'S DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT TO IMPROVE CIVILIAN CONTROL AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

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Introduction

In the "region of peace" that is contemporary Latin America, Colombia is an exception. The seemingly intractable internal conflict, which has now continued for four decades, is evidenced by high levels of violence, kidnappings, and guerrilla attacks. [1] As Colombia is the major illegal drug producing country supplying the U.S. market, the U.S. Government can not help but be interested and engaged in Colombia. Following a major, and ongoing, debate in the U.S. Government, NGO and think tank community, and the media, from the late 1990s, Colombia currently receives the largest amount of security assistance funding after Israel and Egypt. After September 11, the U.S. identification with Colombia's problems expanded beyond counter – drugs to counter – terrorism, and "expanded authorities" allow U.S. security assistance to be used to counter terrorism as well as narcotics. The U.S. and Colombia are very close allies along a number of dimensions in the current "global war on terror." And, due to Colombia's strategic location with coasts on two oceans, access to both the Amazon and the Darien Straights, and sharing borders with three countries enduring serious domestic political tensions (Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela), the domestic security issues of Colombia are perforce regionalized.   Colombia is a nation at war in which national security and defense are at the forefront of political debate and action.

Colombia is one of only two countries in Latin America that has produced a national security strategy (the other is Chile in its second White Book, of 2002). Entitled "Democratic Security and Defense Policy" the April 2003 document provides a well - crafted analysis of the largely drug – fuelled terrorist threats facing Colombia and what the government must do to successfully confront them. The strategy stipulates that central to its implementation is coordination of state actions and strengthening of state institutions. It is in this context of the recognition of the necessity of reform to counter threats, that the document, in articles 63 – 65, lays tremendous emphasis on the central role of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in coordinating national security and defense in order to implement the government's policies. In doing so, "it [MOD] will undergo structural reform and will issue policy guidelines for the Armed Forces and the National Police to ensure that they meet their Democratic Security objectives. " [2] The Colombian Government, in short, publicly recognizes that in order to implement the national security strategy it requires a reformed, or restructured, ministry of defense. To appreciate the full significance of this recognition, and what follows from it, requires some background.

Background

There is no doubt that by any reasonable definition, Colombia is a democracy, and has been for most of the 20th. century but for the period of military rule, 1953 – 58. After 1953 there was, however, no longer a civilian minister of defense. Further, the terms of the democratic transition, the pact, defined by President Alberto Lleras in his speech in the Patria Theater in 1958, clearly distinguished between the political and military domains. "Se contrapone entonces, la controversia a la disciplina. Al ser contrapuesta, desde la perspective de Lleras, los ambitos no se pueden traslapar, entonces la politica no se puede immiscuir en el manejo de las Fuerzas Armadas y las Fuerzas Armadas no deben ser deliberantes en politica." [3] From that period, until at least 2002, the domain of the military, and thus of national security and defense, was kept separate from the civilian political sector. On the one hand the armed forces did not intervene in politics, and Colombia did not undergo military rule as the overwhelming majority of Latin American republics in the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, the civilian government did not engage in discussion and formulate policies on national security and the armed forces. In fact, it was only in 1991, at the time of the constitutional reform, that a civilian assumed the Minister of Defense position after 38 years. However, the absence of civilian involvement in national security and defense, and its monopolization by the military, did not result in a stable and secure Colombia but instead led to a situation where internal security steadily deteriorated.

Until the late 1990s the largely self – regulated armed forces focused overwhelmingly on external roles, stimulated by notions of professionalism patterned after the United States. If other militaries in the region during the 1960s and 70s were marked by their experience with counterinsurgency to embrace a "new professionalism" based on the Doctrine of National Security, the Colombian Army was shaped by its involvement in the Korean conflict alongside the U.S. which led it to follow a model of professionalism that emphasized external defense and "going through the ranks." The external defense roles were primarily with regard to Venezuela, and the Gulf of Maracaibo. and Sandinista Nicaragua with regard to the San Andres and Providencia Islands. Going through the ranks signifies emphasis on training and education courses in Colombia and abroad, professional development, and essentially social activities. Officers established their standing vis-à-vis civilian society by pursuing MBAs and law degrees; meanwhile, the army was used to acculturate the masses into Colombian society through a system of conscription (a function Thomas Marks has referred to as the "Army of socialization"). [4] The internal conflict was considered a side - show, far from the normal and proper roles and missions of the armed forces. It was a matter of "orden publico" in which the police, once in a while with the support of the Army in its few mobile battalions (BRIMs), would pursue the armed insurgents. But, it must be reemphasized, this was not the main role of the armed forces.

This probably surprising assertion can be proven by examining the structure of the armed forces, its equipment purchases, and its doctrinal and training systems. The table of organization and equipment (TO&E) demonstrates that the structure of the armed forces, with traditional brigades, battalions, and divisions copied from the U.S., was overwhelmingly oriented for external defense roles. The equipment, until the late 1990s, included Brazilian armored cars, but not helicopters, for the Army; Mirage and Kfir jets

for the Air Force, but not close air support gunships; and submarines and frigates, but not patrol boats, for the Navy.   Personal testimony through interviews, and the experience by the author at the Colombian War College, demonstrates that Colombian military doctrine was virtually all oriented towards external defense. And, interviews with young Colombian officers indicate that until very recently the academies were teaching almost exclusively about external defense roles. As one U.S. officer observed, the Colombian military educational and training system "is more mature in the garrison and the classroom than in the field… [and t]here isn't as much unit training out in the field as I would expect given the circumstances." [5]

It is worth noting that the almost total focus on external defense changed in 1998 following FARC successes in overcoming the Colombian National Police and the Army, including Army elite units. (In ft. nt. The situation became so serious that the IISS affirmed in early 1998 that the Colombian Army was losing the war. [6]   In the face of these defeats, fueled in part with drug money, the generals running the Colombian Armed Forces selected two Army officers, General Fernando Tapias Stahelin and general Jorge E Mora Rangel to become head of the armed forces and head of the Army, respectively. They had been among the few that had proven themselves as warfighters while commanders of the BRIM. It should also be noted that while the military took the initiative, President Pastrana (1998 – 2002) was supportive in terms of filling other staff positions, planning to professionalize the armed forces, and purchases of equipment with which to fight the insurgents.

In sum, from a description of the background of civil – military relations in Colombia, what comes out clearly is a heavy formalism and lack of content in institutions for exerting civilian control. Colombia has been a democracy since at least 1958. There are no suggestions of military blackmail or coups. But, there were also few indications of civilian interest or engagement in that which involves the military and security. In some countries this might not matter. It obviously did in Colombia, however, since the country has been wracked by internal conflicts since the 1960s, and the situation of governance and violence has become increasingly more serious. It was in this context that Alvaro Uribe mounted his presidential campaign in late 2001 and early 2002 based on a platform of fighting the armed insurgents - the FARC, ELN, and AUC - and regaining control of the country from them, drug lords, and common criminals. That he, a dissident Liberal, won overwhelmingly and on the first round, indicates that the country was ready for another approach to dealing with domestic violence following four years of the aborted peace process promoted by President Pastrana. Most observers believe that President Pastrana's peace effort was necessary before a harder line with candidate Alvaro Uribe would prevail in 2002.

President Uribe immediately on taking office on 7 August 2002 encountered three major problems in implementing his campaign platform of "democratic security," all of which center to a greater or lesser degree on the Ministry of Defense. The first two arise directly from the pact of the transition back in 1958. The first was captured in a phrase the last minister of defense, Marta Lucia Ramirez, used with me in a meeting in mid - 2003: "There is a civilian minister of defense but not a civilian ministry of defense." This is evidenced by the near total absence of civilians with expertise in national security and defense and the salary structure in the MOD that was designed for employing military professionals but not civilians. That is, the salaries for civilians are about three –

fourths what they are in the other, civilian, ministries. This fact has obvious implications for recruiting and retaining civilians who might become interested in a career in national security and defense. It should be noted that in Colombia, a nation at conflict for four decades, until 2003 there was no think tank, NGO, or university program that dealt with these issues. It was a total monopoly of the armed forces in their extensive and robust system of training and education institutions culminating in the Colombian War College. Second, once President Uribe took office on August 7, 2002 and appointed Marta Lucia Ramirez as Minister of Defense, the resistance of the military to her and other civilians actually attempting to exercise control emerged and would increase until her departure in late 2003. Departing with her was her by then nemesis, the commander of the military forces, General Jorge Mora. Third, due to the scope and nature of the internal conflict, the PNC, the Colombian National Police, were included within the MOD, but not integrated. Further, the armed forces have resisted cooperating with each other and even more so with the PNC. Therefore, the challenges outlines in the national security strategy to coordinate and implement President Uribe Government's national security policies would require restructuring the MOD to achieve real (vs formal) civilian control and military effectiveness. Before turning to the case study of how this is being done in Colombia it is necessary to more broadly discuss possible roles and relationships of ministries of defense.

Conceptual Approach

        To avoid the all too common error in studies of civil – military relations of formalism, of confusing form with content, we must at least briefly define the conceptual approach to this topic. An analysis of a bureaucracy such as a MOD must begin with Max Weber. In his classic "Bureaucracy" Weber explains, "The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non – mechanical modes of production." [7] While this statement is formally correct, and Weber elaborates on the conditions under which bureaucracies emerged, much hinges on the term "fully developed bureaucratic mechanism."   The more recent literature in the theory of organizations, and particularly the sub-field of social science known as the "New Institutionalism," takes us further and highlights a number of necessary considerations for the topic under study. The more important of these considerations center on the often forgotten fact that bureaucracies, here referred to as institutions, are crafted by humans at particular times and with particular agendas or purposes in mind. The scholars using this approach also look to the conditions under which these institutions develop or wither. And, they analyze the "stickiness" of institutions. Created at one time, they do not easily change. [8] All of this is by way of caution: that one MOD does not equal another. It depends; we must be skeptical and analyze in some detail to grasp whether a MOD does or does not have power, and the real extent of its roles and reach. In sum, the approach to analysis here looks at MODs as institutions that may be either formal and without power and content, or are alive and dynamic with potential to continue to develop.

Ministries of Defense Have Been Created to Achieve Four Main Purposes

Based on a review of the literature, but fundamentally on what I have observed in the new democracies attempting to deal with issues in civil – military relations, it appears that MODs have been created for four main purposes. This is not to say that these purposes, singly or jointly were the beginning point or justification for their creation, but rather that they figured in at some point, often being discovered, after – the –fact, as purposes for the new or recreated institutions. These four purposes are conceptually distinct, but like any social or political phenomena they are intertwined in reality.

The first, and most obvious purpose for democratic civil – military relations, is for a MOD to structure the power relationships between the democratically elected civilians and the armed forces. A MOD is the fundamental vehicle whereby relationships are institutionalized between those who hold the democratic right to rule, through the electoral process, and those who hold a monopoly on the means of violence. How civilians in different countries attain this right, and whether they are in fact able to exercise it, varies tremendously, and the scholarly literature is as ambiguous on this point as it is broad. But once the civilians have this right a if not the key issue in democratic consolidation is how to bring the armed forces under control. [9] A MOD is the favored institutional mechanism in the contemporary era for this control. Based on my research and especially on my direct observations in different parts of the world, I would go so far as to say that today without a MOD there can be no civilian control. It is necessary but not sufficient for democratic civilian control.

The second purpose is to sort out, or define and allocate, responsibilities between and among civilians and military officers. It is less about civilian control and more about division of tasks and responsibilities. This purpose may seem straightforward or simple, but it most definitely is not. As proof of this one need only review the ongoing efforts by the two North American highly institutionalized democracies in sorting out these relationships. The U.S. efforts in creating the Department of Defense, and defining its responsibilities with regard to the armed services, including the newly – created Air Force in 1947 were extremely complicated and highly political, and the national security system was modified or reformed at least twice in the following four decades. (Note book on topic by Amy.) The most recent reform, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, or Goldwater – Nichols as it is generally known, was equally complicated and political. Indeed, it was virtually imposed by Congress over the resistance of the Department of Defense and some of the armed services. [10] One might anticipate the difficulty and drama in U.S. civil – military relations due to its superpower status and global involvement. In contrast, with Canada one might anticipate that relations between civilians and military officers will be more tranquil and simple. Yet, the most respected Canadian student of defense issues concludes the following: "In Canada, civil – military relations are floundering and uncertain. Recent events have exposed the problem, but they are only the current manifestation of weaknesses long resident in the structure of the defense establishment….The relationship between the government and the defence establishment is troubled because political leaders have failed in their basic responsibility to supervise the armed forces of Canada." [11]

A third purpose in creating a MOD is to maximize the effectiveness in employment of the armed forces. By effectiveness I mean the capacity to actually implement policies; in the case of the armed forces, to provide for the security and defense of the nation. It is not only armed forces that, as bureaucracies, are slow to

change, but they must surely be among the slowest due to their mission in national defense, career promotion structures, and huge investment in and lead time in developing new equipment. This issue of effectiveness may have been of marginal importance in the past in many countries where there was either no real threat on the borders and where the main function was to control and intimidate their own defenseless populations. Currently, with the end of the Cold War and its superpower alliance relations, and with the Third Wave of democratization and a general lessening of interstate wars, the utility of the armed forces with regard to other government functions is an open question. With the built - in inertia of any established bureaucracy the effectiveness of redefining and implementing new roles and missions, or a new mix of them, cannot take place without another, higher level institution, playing the central role. [12] This issue of effectiveness is particularly acute today, in the current environment of low interstate but considerable intrastate conflict as many countries are increasingly discovering peacekeeping or peacemaking roles as central to the justification of their armed forces. These missions, combining prominent roles for civilians, particularly in foreign ministries, are hard to imagine without a central role being played by a MOD. This is obvious if we survey those countries that are most active in peacekeeping; they not only have had to resolve their inter – service rivalries but also clarify the central roles for civilian leadership. In sum, the effectiveness of the armed forces in the current environment of international peacekeeping puts a premium on a MOD. The MOD is the vehicle or basis for this wide-ranging and extremely dynamic coordination that is required for effectiveness. Since September 11, 2001 a new mission is fighting terrorism. The role of a MOD in this global and local fight is unclear since virtually all levels of government must be integrated thereby probably requiring the highest level of executive coordination.

The fourth and last major purpose in creating a MOD is to maximize the efficiency in the use of resources – funds, personnel, and equipment – in these different and changing roles and missions. By efficiency I mean the ability to achieve a goal at the lowest possible cost. In the previous, pre – democratic phase, in many countries the different branches of the armed forces enjoyed complete independence. Their missions often overlapped and they maintained separate supply and training programs. If they cooperated at all it was to insure the greatest amount of resources for the separate services. Most often their budgets were secret and even if they weren't the population would have no influence over the allocations in any case. Today, with democratization and globalization, both demanding transparency, the previous privileges or prerogatives are long gone. With popularly elected governments that have to respond to the demands of sectors of the population, the armed forces can no longer enjoy the luxury of abundant resources. With globalization, organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, NATO, and EU, individual states, and even individual investors demand convincing justification for any investment at all in national defense. In the case of the European Union, this pressure is codified in the strict fiscal requirements of belonging to the European Monetary Union. Consequently, with defense budgets dropping just about everywhere, the armed forces are pressured to be as efficient as possible. [13] The vehicle whereby this is done, or at least where it is centered, is a MOD. In the MOD the civilian politicians can implement programs to ensure budget transparency, act as arbiter, minimize duplication among the services, sell off unnecessary facilities, and negotiate with those seeking to sell equipment and services. The MOD is the institution that employs lawyers,

accountants, and planners to initiate and implement all of these programs. That is, the MOD is the place to concentrate a wide variety of expertise in order to manage effectively and efficiently the defense and security of a nation.

These four purposes are the most important that I have been able to identify as justifying, implicitly or explicitly, sooner or later, the creation of MODs. I have never seen anything written that elaborates them together in this manner, but when the researcher stands back and reviews what is being said and done, normally over a period of at least a decade, these four purposes emerge as the most critical reasons or purposes to create a MOD. Taken together they can be summarized as follows: armed forces that are capable of providing for the nation's security and defense and under civilian control.

The Primary Competencies of a MOD and Its Relations with Other Institutions

If a MOD is to fulfill one or more of these four main purposes it must be endowed, or empowered, with a number of primary tasks, functions, or competencies. Further, its relations with other agencies must place it in a position of relative power. This section is divided into two main subdivisions. They review first the key competencies and then the most important relations to be specified. The following is based on the experiences in established democracies and the lessons being learned in the newer democracies, both positive and negative.

1. Key Competencies

There are at a minimum four key competencies for a MOD. These four are necessary if a MOD is to be able to fulfill the above purposes. The competencies are in the areas of budgets, personnel, acquisitions, and definition of roles and missions. If a MOD does not have power or authority in these areas, it is but a facade without much significance.

a. Budgets. It is trite, but true, that the "power of the purse" is the basis of civilian control of the armed forces. In authoritarian regimes the defense budgets (and probably other budgets as well) were secret, and the funds went directly to the armed forces with virtually total autonomy to allocate within the services and other departments. [14] In many countries the system was especially pernicious as funds for the troops would be allocated to a local commander with no oversight on how the money was in fact used. One hears of many cases where the commander would minimize the funds for the troops' food, clothing, equipment, and training, and simply pocket it.

The challenge is, how to move from this situation to one where a civilian – controlled MOD assumes responsibility for allocation and oversight? Based on my observations, it is a very gradual process in which a MOD and Ministry of Finance, or equivalent, absorb the budget functions from a general staff and divide them between these two ministries. The Ministry of Finance provides the general allocations among the ministries, and the MOD provides the allocations within the defense sectors. This immediately brings up the issue of how to do it, and while there are no panaceas, some kind of system is necessary. At a minimum the adopted system must guarantee transparency, provide justification for funding categories and funding at a certain level, and accountability. All of this requires an active civil society and a free and energetic media. In Portugal, Spain, South Africa, and Argentina, among others, their MODs have in fact assumed control of the budgets within the defense sector, thereby allowing the civilians to in fact control the armed forces. [15]

b. Definition of Roles and Missions. Roles and missions, theoretically embedded in a strategy, are the bases for what the armed forces are all about. Roles and missions define why the military exists at all. This is particularly obvious today at the end of the Cold War, in the midst of the Third Wave, and the global war on terrorism. What are the forces to be used for and under what conditions? It is clearly not what they were supposed to be used for during the Cold War or during the authoritarian regimes. These are issues that are debated everywhere there is an openness and sufficient knowledge for a debate. In the end, in a democracy, it should be the democratically elected civilians who determine the strategy and the purposes of the forces. [16] This responsibility becomes particularly crucial today with the ambiguous, heavily civilian oriented, missions in peacekeeping and with the huge demands for coordination in the fight against terrorism.

Generally the same point can be made regarding what are loosely termed 'military missions in support of civilian authorities'. These missions range from disaster relief – volcanoes, floods, earthquakes, etc., riot control, counter-drugs, and internal insurrection. For obvious reasons, the latter examples on this list are extremely sensitive and may be perceived as a return to the "bad old days." These missions thus require very clear guidance, based on law and exercised through robust structures and processes, to ensure that the military execute the tasks without usurping power. Again, the MOD should have responsibilities in determining when and how to use the armed forces for these domestic missions.

c. Personnel. The issue of armed forces personnel is more complicated than it might appear initially. Here the reference is to both officers and enlisted personnel in the forces. If the armed forces were sized in the context of the Cold War and authoritarianism, then the sizing and training in the current context will of necessity be very different. The problem is, it is impossible to know a priori how they will be different unless roles and missions are first defined. Also, there are political and career structure considerations that impinge on these decisions. The main point is, however, that there are decisions to be made, that the past is not the future, that inertia should not be allowed to rule, and the decisions on personnel and training should be made in the MOD. It is difficult to know about the sizing and training for the forces unless it is known what they will be used for. The political concerns include, on the one hand, pressure in a democratizing society to abolish conscription and allocate fewer funds to defense and more funds to social areas; and on the other hand, concern to not alienate the armed forces by cutting them too far and too quickly. There was awareness of the latter in Spain, but apparently not in Russia. The career structure considerations relate to both political concerns and morale. The number of senior officers, generally colonel and above, optimally depends on the number of troops, thus to cut down the size of the force should, logically, result in fewer senior officers. However, for political and morale reasons, the upper ranks may not be reduced, at least not quickly and proportionally, thereby causing problems of morale in the lower ranks, having "hollow forces", using up more resources than necessary for salaries for the higher ranks.

d. Acquisitions and Facilities. There are at least two generalizations that can be made regarding acquisitions in defense: they are very expensive and the lead - time between when they are purchased or borrowed and finally put into use is long. It is thus all the more important that a system be put in place to most efficiently determine and

acquire the most appropriate equipment. Again, the appropriateness must be determined by the missions for which the equipment, and the forces, will be committed, and this requires attention to making decisions. Acquisitions often lead to graft and corruption, so the system must be especially rigorous. Again, it is difficult to see how the armed forces alone can achieve these levels of systems and robustness. Management of facilities is an emerging issue both because of the different requirements that vary by different uses for the forces and the fact that armed forces often accumulate installations over the years. The issue becomes how to most effectively sell off, or give away, no longer useful, or utilizable, facilities and acquire new ones or convert old ones to meet new needs. This issue obviously requires attention at a level above the services in order to make the best use of the existing facilities, convert them, or sell them and use the resources for other purposes. It is obviously easy to imagine the opportunities for graft and corruption in selling off real estate in areas that have appreciated tremendously. And, there are also huge implications for local politics if facilities are closed and employees lose their jobs. Apparently good progress has been made in Argentina and Portugal in this area.

These four key competencies are obviously not monopolies of a MOD. Indeed, they are initially not even competencies of the MOD as either there is no MOD or it has not yet acquired them. Initially there is a lack of an institutional basis and expertise to exercise the hypothetical competencies. But, they must be acquired if the MOD is to fulfill the purposes defined the section above. But, while acquiring them and continuing to build them, another series of issues must be dealt with which are to define relationships with key elements of the domestic political system, the armed forces, and international actors.

2. Relations to be Defined and Clarified

It is obvious that a MOD does not emerge fully - formed out of any political system, let alone a new democracy. Rather, there is a tremendous amount of institutional engineering required to build the MOD and endow it with the four competencies listed above. This same point clearly pertains to other democratic institutions such as the legislature, courts, political parties, regional and local governments, and organizational components of civil society. The institutional engineering is not limited to structures and processes within the MOD, but also to its relations with other key components or actors, which are also developing. At a minimum, these must include the executive, of which it is a part, the legislature, the armed forces, and relevant international actors.

a. The Executive. The MOD is part of the executive. Obviously there are critical differences in the structures of relations in presidential versus parliamentary systems. The generalizations here are meant to apply to both types of democratic political systems, and are thus even more generic. The fundamental issue is one of power, as it is indeed in all aspects of civil – military relations. The question that must be asked is: does the MOD, as an institution and the MOD as individual, have a central position in the power structure of a country, or is the MOD only a façade and the minister a political nobody? If the MOD is not integrated into the cabinet with clear lines of authority radiating from the president or prime minister, and if the minister of defense is not politically powerful, then the MOD by definition is not a player in the political system.   This is particularly important because building a MOD is clearly a case of institution building, when there was nothing previously. If the MOD as institution, and MOD as individual, are not

closely linked to power, then either the armed forces continue to enjoy a great deal of autonomy or there is some other institution in the executive branch that holds the power. Based on my observations and readings, this other institution is the ministry of finance, treasury, or its equivalent. While this "power of the purse" may indeed control the military, most likely by starving it for resources, it does nothing for the two other goals or purposes of effectiveness and efficiency. The ideal situation, at least in a new democracy, is one in which the MOD as institution and minister as individual is integrated into the structure of power in the government and holds the personal confidence of the executive. In this way the armed forces know they are taken seriously on the one hand, and know on the other hand that they must deal with the MOD and not attempt to avoid its control. This was the situation in both Portugal and Spain in the critical period of the early 1980s. In Greece Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou also held the position of minister of defense. In Nicaragua in contrast, ever since President Violeta Chamorro gave up the minister of defense position in November 1996, it was occupied by weak political figures until about 2002 when Minister Adan Guerra took over and is trying to assert his authority.

      b. The Legislature. There are obviously important differences between a presidential and parliamentary system in regard to the role of the legislature. [17] And, again, the general points here apply despite the different forms of political systems. The most important point, or consideration, is to broaden the interest in or concern with the armed forces, and national security and defense, beyond a relatively small group in the executive. We must recall the background was one in which few civilians had any interest in or opportunity to deal with the armed forces. There was no advantage to such an interest, and it could be very dangerous. By broadening the possibility of control to the legislature not only are there more structural means for involving another body but personal ones as well to interest a broader group of politicians. The former point speaks to the issue of effectiveness; to have another institution interested and involved, and the latter speaks to preparing a cadre of politicians who can specialize in the armed forces, security, and defense. How this may be done is illustrated by Portugal, Spain, and Argentina where defense committees were created with some powers of policy and oversight, which encouraged the members to become interested and involved. This is currently happening as well in Brazil. Later, at least in Portugal, a member of the defense committees became the minister of defense. This of course is common in the U.S. where the three most recent administrations, those of President George Bush, 1989 - 92 ,William Clinton, 1992 – 2001, and George W. Bush nominated former members of the Congress as their Secretaries of Defense.

      c. The Armed Forces. Obviously the relations between the MOD and the armed forces will have to be defined, with democratically elected civilians clearly in charge. Specifically what is meant here is the relationship between the MOD and the top ranks of the armed forces, generally constituted as a joint or general staff, or even as a joint general staff. There are a variety of relations to be clarified at this level since, in most cases, the MOD is taking over roles from the joint staff, and the central issue is what the MOD takes on and what is left with the joint staff. From my observations, the two main relations that must be clarified concern nominations for the highest military positions (assuming the executive nominates and the legislature approves) and operational roles. How are nominations for senior officers handled? Does the MOD play a central role in

handling the candidates and making the nominations, or are nominations done strictly by the general staff? If the MOD plays a central role then it will influence not only the character of the higher officer ranks but also influence the behavior of those who aspire to higher ranks. I became aware of this role in Spain, and it was pointed out to me in the context of asserting civilian control over the armed forces. Spanish officers are very much aware that their career possibilities are related to their (non) political behavior. These are the new rules of the game that must be asserted, likely tested, and subsequently reaffirmed and institutionalized. The issue here is not the power of the executive, the president or prime minister, to promote or retire, which is a first sign of civilian control, but rather the proper management of personnel, including promotion of the best qualified officers to the highest positions.

The second issue, that of operational roles, concerns the division between the MOD and the general staff for command responsibility in peace, but also in war. Has the MOD assumed the "support" roles of budgets, equipping, personnel management, training, and the like, and the joint staff taken on operational roles? I have found that this issue is clarified in the more advanced new democracies, such as Portugal and Spain, but is much less clear in the newer new democracies such as Russia, Brazil, and Nicaragua.

d. International Actors. There are an incredible number and variety of international actors involved in international defense and security, including civil – military relations. The issue here is – who deals with them? Do the armed forces, as services or the joint staff at the peak of the services, deal directly with them? Does the executive, or maybe even the legislature, deal with them? Or, does the MOD have at least initial responsibility to interact with these international actors? I would argue that if the MOD can monopolize the role as initial contact then it can increase its roles by mobilizing all types of resources: financial, personnel, training, and grants of equipment. These international actors include other countries' MODs, visiting flag rank officers and officials, United States regional commander in chiefs, organizations such as NATO and Partnership for Peace, the Foreign Military Finance & International Military Education and Training and other programs from the US, and so forth. The myriad of international donors, the coordination of which is minimal even for one country let alone among several countries, offer real resources, providing the MOD can create structures and processes for dealing with them. From my experience, very few MODs are in this position. Indeed, in most cases the services are still in the lead and there is little coordination.

Unless and until at least these four sets of relationships are clarified, the MOD will be unable to fulfill one or more of the purposes for which they are created. Clearly, defining and finally managing these four relationships takes knowledge and qualified personnel, two resources that a new MOD is unlikely to possess. If, however, an initial commitment is made, then the MOD can develop as it reworks these relationships to its institutional advantage. This has been done in Portugal and Spain, has gone fairly far in Argentina, is just beginning, but on the right track in South Africa and Brazil, has begun in Nicaragua, and is regressing in Venezuela.

3. Interview data on MOD Restructuring in Colombia

In early 2003 CCMR was asked by Minister of Defense Marta Lucia Ramirez to assist her in a restructuring effort of the ministry in order to facilitate the implementation

of President Uribe's national security strategy goals. In order to respond to the request for recommendations, research was first necessary to better understand how the MOD was structured and functioned. With the assistance of an internal working group, the CCMR team interviewed both military and civilian personnel within the MOD the military forces, and the national police. The CCMR team focused on organizational and functional offices within the ministry at the level of service commander and above. We did not delve into organizations and functions in the military forces or the national police.

The first series of interviews were conducted in early February 2003, with the assistance of a member of Vice Minister of Defense Andres Soto's office. These interviews were based on a list of 12 questions developed by the CCMR team. The questions were inspired by the conceptualization of the functions, competencies, and relationships of a MOD presented above.

We conducted interviews were with:
   MG Gil--Jefe Oficina de Planeación
   Capitan de Navío Eduardo Posada--Jefe Oficina Finanzas
   Dra. Viviana Pérez--Asesor Sector descentralizados
   Consuelo Mejía--Jefe Dirección Administrativa
   Colonel Raul Castro Ante---Jefe Oficina Control Interno
   Dra. Ana María Romero--Jefe Oficina Comunicación Corporativa
   Almirante Cubillos --Jefe del Gabinete Militar
   Maria Alejandra Ojeda--Coordinadora Think Tank
   German Espejo y Luis Lordouy--Oficina de Asuntos Internacionales
   Colonel Carlos Castillo--Oficina de Derechos Humanos
   Mayor Pedro León Acosta--Jefe Oficina de Informática
   Colonel Ernesto Maldonado--Coordinador Grupo Potencial Humano.
In addition there were informal interviews with a number of Colombian military and civilian personnel known to the CCMR team from previous visits. A number of military and civilian personnel within the U.S. Embassy, Bogotá also offered their thoughts on these issues.

For a second series of interviews conducted in late March 2003 the CCMR team developed a second set of more general questions and made appointments with:
   Secretaria General
   Comandante General de las Fuerzas Armadas
   Commandante de cada Fuerza Armada
   Jefe de la Dirección National de la Policía
   Jefe del Estado Mayor Conjunto
As a result of other commitments, the Comandante General de las Fuerzas Armadas, the Comandate de la Fuerza Aérea, and the Comandate de la Armada cancelled their interview appointments. General Ospina, Comandante del Ejército, had only limited time available, so he offered to provide written responses to the CCMR questions. General Campo, Jefe de la Dirección Nacional de Policia discussed the general questions with the CCMR team, and provided a written response to the team's initial list of 12 questions. It should be noted that we later did meet with General Mora, Commander of the Armed Forces and with the Minister herself and her Vice Ministers (VMODs) on several occasions.

To complete our background research, we requested and received a number of laws (including the National Budget for 2003), decretos, and media material.

Interview results

All the interviews were characterized by a very open and frank attitude on the part of the CCMR team and the persons being interviewed. The interviews revealed a number of common themes, with very divergent answers, that are outlined below. To give a flavor of what we found the statements are listed below pretty much as we received them.

Functions that a ministry of defense should perform

The functions a MOD should perform are coordination, administration, political issues, and budget

- Functions of a Ministry of Defense should be:
  - leadership of action in support of national defense
  - integrate actions for citizen security
  - be involved in policy development
  - stay out of military operations
  - lead, but not command
  - have the ability to question the security forces on strategy, operations and budget
- The principal functions of a Ministry are
  - policy and politics
  - strategy
  - budget

- Civilians should stay out of military operations because they do not understand them
  - civilian participation in high-level strategy is appropriate
  - the MOD provides a political level of strategic direction
  - it is important to have a civilian, rather than military MOD
  - police have had better access to civilian Minister than they had to military Minister
  - military often treated police as second rate military
  - in effect, the MOD is really four ministries: each service and the police
  - the civilians in the MoD should help and assist the military perform their functions.
  - the civilians should not command
  - the civilians should not be involved in operations
  - the national police should be part of the Ministry of Defense during times of internal conflict, but in times of peace and internal order, the national police should be part of the Ministry of Interior
  - the National Police should and do have a separate budget and budgeting process
  - coordination with Police at national level is done informally in ad hoc meetings

The interviews with these key actors within the MOD made it clear that there is fundamental disagreement over the functions of the Ministry.

<u>Basic ministry structure is viable, but needs major adjustment</u>
This is the sense we received when asking about the current structure. This is illustrated in the responses that follow:

- the current MoD structure is adequate and appropriate
- don't need to change structure; need to change people
- there is no reason the Ministry of Defense should be managed differently than any other public function
- Secretary General function is "common" to all ministries
- there should be three sub-sectors of the MoD: two VMoDs and the Secretary General
- the secretary general function is an administrative position and should be run by a civilian with public administration background
- Secretary General function within the ideal Ministry of Defense would have the following responsibilities
  - information technology
  - administration
  - civilian personnel and discipline
  - legal and contracts
- there are disparate levels of offices and functions within the MOD
- there are gray areas where functions are duplicated or not covered
- there needs to be a review and reorganization of functions
- reorganization of administrative aspects of MOD to make it more like other ministries.
- there is little role definition within the MOD
- there is a need for the two VMODs that exist in the current administration
  - there is a need to differentiate and define the roles of each of the VMODs
  - VMODs should have a coordination role, not command or operational role
- need to have civilians and military jointly determine their respective and individual roles
- the VMODs are administrative only
- have no line authority
- people do not understand what each of the VMODs do
  - appears there is not a clear definition of roles
- administrative culture is antiquated
- information technology/architecture is antiquated
- lack of administrative structure and discipline
- extremely inefficient on paperwork: paper goes in; never comes out
- there needs to be a change in technology within the MOD
  would reduce the manpower requirements
- the ideal MOD would have a mixture of military and civilians
- need to have more military within the civilian leadership structure to act as advisors
- the budgeting and finance functions should be performed by both military and civilians

- lack of qualified and experienced civilian personnel is a significant issue within the MOD
- MOD needs expertise in contracting and the legal issues of contracts
- issues that need to be addressed
  - civilian manpower (numbers and skills)
  - tooth to tail ratio within the ministry is out of balance
  - too many performing duties that are not mission-related
  - no one in MOD in charge of communications or C2
  - there are 20,000 civilians in the services themselves
- can't make all the needed changes now, or within the Uribe tenure
- need a roadmap for the next ten years

<u>Clash of Leadership styles is an impediment to efficiency and effectiveness</u>

It was obvious from interviews, and then even in the media, that there was an ongoing battle between Minister Ramirez and at least General Mora. This was made obvious in the responses that follow.

- tension between high level civilians and military is visible in media
- military say
  - civilian leadership is moving/changing too fast (shared by some civilians)
  - civilians should be assisting/supporting military, not trying to command or direct them
- civilians say that the military, once traditional processes are challenged, withdraw into their institution and ignore civilian leadership
- problem with civil-military relations now is that civilian leadership does not know or understand military culture or operations
- it is natural for there to be some tension between civilian and military leadership at first, until they get to know, understand, and respect each other
- the perception is that period of tensions is beginning to diminish
- the civilian leadership came into their jobs and began functioning without receiving orientation on military culture and priorities
- there is no standard orientation for new people
- MOD and VMODs have not provided coherent direction and leadership
- MOD and VMODs are adhocing and overtasking
- everyone putting out fires
- not performing basic functions
- dysfunctional
  - working and management level are very frustrated
  - there is little incentive to do things right
  - everything is last minute and disjointed
- VMOD is reported to have said that MOD restructuring will be only at the Ministry level, will not go into the service staffs
- there is too much tension between the military culture and the civilian culture
- La Ministra needs to change her style

- needs to get out to units
- needs to visit the staff
- needs to take and give time to think

<u>Other important issue brought up during interviews</u>

In addition to the responses to the prepared questions, there were also information provided on other relevant issues such as the following:

- pay for civilians within the MOD is lower than in other ministries
- civilians in MOD should be paid the same as in other ministries
- pay system is perverse
  - based on married status, number of children, financial need
  - when military occupied the Secretary General position, they received military pay, plus a technical/expertise stipend
- this combination could sum to more than the MoD was being paid
- military accused of human rights or other issue must pay for their own lawyer. (1) military penal system, (2) civil penal system, (3) procuraduría
- military lawyers cannot provide legal defense for military accused of any crime
  - considered a conflict of interest because would be working against the state or the command
  - military member must pay for legal defense from personal funds
  - some NGOs and terrorists use this as a weapon against effective commanders
  - once civil or military judicial process begins, the military person may be taken out of command or position (out of promotion potential)
- there is some support for establishment of a defense counsel corps and process

The high level of dedication and professionalism evident throughout our interviews was accompanied by a high level of frustration and low level of morale caused by lack of clear mission, direction, and processes. While at the lower levels of the Ministry we found uniformed and civilian personnel work effectively as a team, the obvious and public actions, attitudes, and tensions at the highest level of the Ministry were having a very negative impact. Both uniformed and civilian personnel at the second and third organizational levels were unanimous in their observations that they do not perform, or perform poorly, their normal functions because they are constantly responding to last minute, ad hoc, tasks with very short deadlines.

The combination of public tension and infighting among the most senior leadership of the Ministry, the lack of clearly defined roles, and the antiquated and routinely bypassed administrative processes, were dysfunctional and destructive. While the basic structure of the Ministry appeared sound and appropriate, some significant short term and long term changes were clearly necessary. We found it telling that intelligence as a function or a product was not mentioned during any of the interviews. Most experts agree that intelligence is a fundamental requirement to fight terrorism.

4. Proposed Process Changes

Based on the four purposes of a ministry of defense we defined earlier:

(1) structure political - military relationships; (2) define and allocate responsibilities; (3) maximize effective employment or armed force; and, (4) efficient use of resources, we developed a set of recommended changes in processes The four processes, in national security terms, are as follows: strategic planning, operational planning, requirements generation, and acquisition.

We recommended that these four processes be formalized, their civilian and uniformed participants be established by *decreto*, and they be integrated as a system of processes. An important part of this formalization and integration process would be to harmonize the system of four processes with the appropriate legislative and executive calendars. Acquisition is dependent on legislative approval of a national budget. The purpose of acquisition (equipment, personnel, or facilities) is to support the requirements generated through operational planning. Operational planning is meaningless if not directly linked to strategic planning and the national security strategy.

Strategic planning expresses how the armed forces can be used as an element of national power to support the national interests and the national security strategy. The strategic planning process within a ministry of defense must be the responsibility of the Minister and the most senior uniformed leader. The Minister of Defense must interpret the national security strategy and political objectives of the President and transform them into general guidance on the tasks and functions to be performed by the military. The military, at the highest levels within the service and joint staffs, must transform this guidance into a strategic vision and national military strategy. The product of the strategic planning process should be written documents which are sufficiently general that they can be provided to the interested public and the legislature. Oversight of this process should be performed by a committee Chaired by the Minister, with the senior uniformed officer as Vice Chair, and the Vice Ministers and the heads of the uniformed services (army, air force, navy, national police) as members.   Effective strategic planning within the Ministry of Defense, or any other ministry, is dependent on the President's articulated national security strategy.

Operational planning should be the domain of the armed forces, with civilian oversight to insure that operational plans support the national security strategy and national military strategies, and remain within the constraints of available resources. The operational planning process must address the threats and opportunities developed through net assessment techniques. This process should be performed by military unit commanders who have the responsibility to transform strategy into specific operational and tactical activities. Through this process senior uniformed leadership provides three key assessment to the civilian political leadership: (1) what tasks and functions can be provided with the resources already available; (2) what level of risk is associated with the mismatch between current capabilities and tasks and functions assigned; and (3) what requirements in equipment, personnel, and facilities are needed to reduce the level of risk. The operational planning process should be performed within the armed forces institutions to include both the national police and the joint staff. Oversight of this process should be performed by a committee chaired by the Commanding General of the Armed Forces, with the Chief of the Joint Staff as Vice Chairman. The service and police commanders, and the two Vice Ministers should be participants.

Requirements generation should be a joint military and civilian function. Requirements will flow from the strategic and operational planning processes, but must

recognize the political and fiscal constraints on resource allocations provided by political leadership. In this process the joint staff should have a significant role. Service generated requirements need to be integrated and rationalized. Are the army mobility requirements compatible with the air force and/or navy capabilities? Are the air force's requirements for transport aircraft in harmony with the army's requirement for close air support.   If all the armed forces need boots, or pistols, or rifles, or uniforms these requirements should be aggregated to provide economies of scale. This process is designed to generate requirements; it is also designed to generate tensions between the stated requirements and the practical limits of resource allocations. Oversight of this process should be performed by a committee Chaired by the Chief of the Joint Staff, with the Vice Minister for Resources as the Vice Chairman and the service and national police Deputy Commanders as members.

Acquisition is the process of transforming requirements into useable equipment, personnel, or facilities. This should be a principally civilian function, with military expertise imbedded within specific acquisition programs. The civilian participants in this process should be educated in contract competition, award, management, and enforcement. Military personnel should participate throughout the acquisition process to ensure that the specific programs being developed and/or acquired meet the specifications developed in the requirements generation process. Of the four processes, the acquisition process has the greatest potential for corruption and abuse. Oversight of this process should be performed by a committee Chaired by the Vice Minister for Resources, with the Joint Staff Director of Logistics as Vice Chair, and the armed forces and police directors of logistics or acquisition as members. The Director of Internal Control should also sit on the acquisition oversight committee.

These four processes should be continual and interactive. Although they might be perceived as operating in sequence, in fact they should be iterative and operate in parallel. Each feeds into the other, and provides feedback into the other. Planning the military strategy feeds into operational planning and requirements generation, but at the same time, planning is dependent on the resources actually available, and those planned for the future.

The above provide a sense of the recommendations we made in the report for the Minister of Defense. They were based upon our interviews with key elements in the MOD, and beyond, framed by the orientation in our paper on an ideal MOD.

<u>Progress on Implementation of Recommendations Since April 2004</u>

Amazingly enough, after a hiatus of a few months leading into and following upon the departure of Minister Mart Lucia Ramirez and General Mora and coming into office of Minister Jorge Alberto Uribe and General Ospina, there has been great progress in reform of the MOD. By May 2004 the two Vice Ministers of Defense, and their staffs, had developed recommendations for serious reform of the MOD. The main themes of the recommended changes are the following:

Clearly establish that the MOD has command authority. That is, clarify the fact of civilian control of the military which until now has been ambiguous thereby allowing the military to conclude that there was no intervening control, read MOD, between the President and Commander of the Military Forces.   The Colombian military do not recognize the command authority of the MOD. In addition, the tradition has been that

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when the MOD is out of country, authority is not assumed by one of the VMODs but by the Commander of the Military Forces.

Establish an organization, or organizations, within the MOD to do policy planning and development as well as resource program planning. Clarify the roles and responsibilities of the two VMODs in policy and programming.

Better integrate intelligence, strategic planning, operational planning, requirements generation, and acquisitions by establishing standing committees plus a staff group for intelligence and command, control, and communications.

Develop the mechanisms to better conduct combined and cooperative operations including not only the military forces but also the PNC.

By the end of June the leadership of the MOD - Minister, two VMODS, and Secretary General - were finalizing plans for a *Decreto* to implement all of the above points. With the implementation Colombia will have strengthened civilian control over the armed forces, and the police since they are included in the MOD, and reorganized the structures of intelligence, strategic & operational planning, and acquisition processes.

<u>Conclusion</u>

In the context of an ongoing war, which he campaigned to pursue forcefully, President Uribe and the top level civilians in the MOD recognized that they would have to develop a national security strategy and restructure the MOD and its relations with the armed forces.   Otherwise, civilian control would likely weaken as the military was expanded and strengthened with increased domestic and U.S. resources directed to the military. Whether the military would be effective in combat without strong civilian guidance was also an issue. There was considerable resistance by the military to these efforts, and a great deal of friction between his first Minister, Marta Lucia Ramirez and the military headed by General Mora. Their departure both cleared the air and removed a tense personal element from the equation, thereby allowing reforms to progress. The CCMR team furnished concepts and comparative information whereby the Colombians could determine what institutional framework might best suit their requirements. The interview data allowed the CCMR team to develop recommendations for change based on the reality we discovered. It is hard to imagine how Colombia could at the same time reassert civilian control while increasing military effectiveness without the serious restructuring embodied in the draft decree now being considered for implementation. One key element that is missing in the above discussion is the role of the Congress. It would appear that the Congress plays a small role in national security and defense in Colombia. That, however, is another issue to be dealt with in another paper.

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[1] Most recent data to be provided from Fundacion Seguridad & Democracia, "Coyuntura de Seguridad," Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Colombia, "Logros y Retos de la Politica de Defensa y Seguirdad Democratica," and U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL).

[2] Republic of Colombia, "Democratic Security and Defence Policy," April 2003, Articles 63-65, "Ministry of Defence"

[3] Joaquin Romero, "Hacia la Construccion de una Politica Nacional de Seguridad y Defensa" Bogota: Escuela Superior de Guerra, Agosto, 2003, p. 5.

[4] Thomas Marks, "Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency," Strategic Studies Institute, January 2002. (Check page number.)

[5] Check quote. For this topic, and leading into the next paragraph, see Fundacion Seguridad & Democracia, <u>Fuerzas Militares para la Guerra: La agenda pendiente de la reforma militar</u>
(Bogota: Fundacion Seguirdad & Democracia, 2003).

[6] Ibid, p. 26.

[7] H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, <u>From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 214.

[8] For an introduction to this literature see Sven Steinmo, et. al, eds. <u>Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis</u> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.) See in particular Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical institutionalism in comparative politics," pp. 1 – 32. See also Peter A Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," <u>Political Studies</u> , 1996, pXLIV,

[9] One of the most highly respected scholars writing on democratic transitions & consolidations states the following: "Obviously, the institutional framework of civilian control over the military constitutes the neuralgic point of democratic consolidation." Adam Przeworski, <u>Democracy and the Market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America</u> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 29. Unfortunately, Przeworksi does not develop the argument in this book, or to the best of my knowledge, in his many other books and articles.

[10] On Goldwater-Nichols Dr. Archie Barrett, who as a congressional staffer had a hand in drafting the legislation, has assembled the key elements of the process in his "Goldwater-Nichols Act Readings: Legislative activities and documents leading to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of defense Reorganization Act of 1986" Naval Postgraduate School, May 2001. See for a excellent study on this topic James R. Locher, III, <u>Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwager – Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon</u> (College Station: Texas A & M Press, 2002.)

[11] Douglas L. Bland, <u>National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision a study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia</u> (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1997.), pp. 47-8.

[12] In my interviews in Portugal and Spain in the early 1990s the military and civilian officials in the MOD, other ministries, and the parliaments were clear on the need for a strong MOD in redefining the roles and missions of the armed forces.

[13] For example, between 1990 and 2000 defense spending as a percentage of GDP dropped from 5.5% in the U.S. to 3.0% and for the other NATO allies it declined from 3.0% to 2.0%. Source is National Responses to 2000 NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire.

[14] For example, in Angola the greatest part of defense expenditures are secret, but it is calculated that they are 20% of GDP. These calculations are based on IMF sources as reported in USAID/Angola, "Avaliacao Estrategica do Programa de Democracia e Governacao" April, 2000, pp. 60-1.

[15] Everywhere, including in Argentina, there is an ongoing struggle between different agencies and individuals for control of resources. This topic has been dealt with by David Pion-Berlin, <u>Through Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina</u> (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), Chapter 5

"Trimming the Fat: Military Budget-Cutting Successes Under Democratic Rule", pp. 107-40. In my most recent trip, May 2001, however, it is obvious that the MOD is very much involved in seeking and managing its own resources.

[16] It was pointed out to me by Professor Arch Barrett in several conversations in May 2001 that it was Goldwater-Nichols that directed the U.S. Executive Branch to produce an annual statement on the nation's security strategy. For the last of the Clinton Administration see A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Washington,D.C.: The White House, December, 2000), pp. i – 67.

[17] For a excellent overview on these differences with regional cases see Kurt Von Mettenheim, ed., Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and National Contexts (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997.)