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Queries
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Security Sector Reform in Haiti

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This study examines the experience of the United Nations interventions to reform Haiti’s security sector as part of a larger effort to rebuild the Haitian state. Despite multilateral attempts in the 1990s to demobilize the army, create a police force and implement reforms, the lack of elite support, insufficient judicial sector capacity and persistence of corruption led to the current resurgence of violence. The study concludes that a legitimate national dialogue with local elites and long-term donor involvement, specifically of the United Nations, are necessary to ensure that justice, security, development and the governance sector are developed simultaneously to prevent Haiti from becoming a failed state.

Key words: Haiti, security sector reform, international intervention, United Nations, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, post conflict reconstruction

The significance of good governance and social development within developing countries has become intertwined with ‘human security’ in the decade since the term was first coined in 1994. This contribution focuses on the case of Haiti, which, in its 201 years of independence, has been plagued by poverty, violence, instability and dictatorship. In 1986, a military coup ended 29 years of authoritarian rule by the Duvalier family, and a military government ruled for nearly the next eight years. The prevalence of military or authoritarian governments has been a common factor in creating barely functioning political institutions and limited accountability of government. To this day, Haiti remains the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Eighty per cent of Haitians live in abject poverty. The literacy rate is a mere 53 per cent. Haitians face an average life expectancy of 53 years due to miserable living conditions, high levels of violence, AIDS and chronic malnourishment. Combining measures of income, life expectancy, school enrolment and literacy, of 177 countries worldwide ranked by the 2004 UNDP Human Development Report, Haiti ranked 153. The combination of a legacy of weak government institutions, a strong military and the poverty and violence suffered by Haitian citizens created a dire need for effective reforms, security and development.

Security sector reform in Haiti since 1994 presents an interesting case for exploring how a weak state, shattered by a legacy of authoritarianism, has been affected by attempts to reform various parts of the state that comprise this sector. From the Haitian Armed Forces (FAHD), the police, the judiciary and the legislature, various attempts imposed by external actors have aimed to change the security dynamic with varying degrees of success. The most dramatic of those acts, the demobilization of the Haitian Army and the creation of a new
civilian police force, were important steps that could have been successful had it not been for the short time frame allowed for success.

What has not happened, however, is an internal process of reconciliation by the Haitian political class. In spite of efforts from 1994 to the present to achieve a lasting political solution to the crisis of governance, Haiti remains a country dependent on external donors for assistance, with national institutions in disarray. A national dialogue meant to continue the creation of a vision of a modern Haitian state gathered stakeholders together to begin such a process only in April 2005. The absence of political closure or power sharing has further compromised attempts to reform the state security sector. For the second time in less than a decade Haiti’s security is once again under control of a UN Chapter VII peace operation.5

While security and development are now linked conceptually in the development literature, the 1994 interventions were framed outside of development programming. This study explores how security sector reform was applied after the first post-conflict experience in 1994. The period began when the UN and a US-led multinational force restored the elected government of Jean Bertrand Aristide to office after he had been deposed by a military coup in 1991. If we define reform of the security sector as a restructuring of those institutions of governance that have control over the use of force, then Haiti in 1994 was ripe for such reform. Investments were made to create a new police force, abolish the armed forces and establish an independent judiciary and correctional system. Yet despite attempts to implement changes in governance of the security sector, these efforts were for the most part short-lived. While the focus of the analysis here will be primarily on the reforms that occurred after 1994, the study will also reflect on the situation in 2005.

Ongoing violence and the continued presence of former military personnel in Haiti demonstrate the difficulties of applying a tool like security sector reform to a weak or shadow state.6 The Haitian case reinforces the lesson that undertaking security sector reform must be tempered by a vision of long-term investment by both international donors and also by the citizens of the state subject to the reform. The Haitian experience shows how without a holistic approach to security sector reform that envisages a long-term process, coupled with other economic and social development interventions and support for a transparent political process, the medium to long-term success of security reform is compromised. Countries such as Haiti require other alternative remedies to protect its citizens in the absence of state capacity, or interim measures that will allow a political and economic transition to occur. Whether Haiti will require a transitional administration is a question for the international community to ponder, but such a decision will ultimately require the Haitian people to accept a solution that tears at the very heart of national interest.7

The Legacy

Haiti’s repressive army has a long history. Between independence from France in 1804 and the US occupation (1915–34), every president of Haiti was either
nominally a general or actually serving in the army. The Haitian military’s predatory behaviour was rooted in nineteenth-century practices of bestowing privileges on members of the armed services. Both president and Senate provided military officers with promotions and land, ensuring their loyalty to the executive. The only exception was the government of Michel Oreste (1913–14), Haiti’s first civilian president, who was overthrown in less than a year and replaced by a military regime. If nineteenth-century Haiti was the era of the generals, coup d’états and an inchoate military, the twentieth-century has seen constant struggles in civil–military relations, political instability and repression. The first US occupation had transformed the local warriors into a new, professional army. This modern institution became the basis of support for civilian government, as the capacity to govern Haiti was reinforced by the military. After occupation, the Haitian armed forces also served as the nation’s police, with navy and air force integral parts of the army rather than separate branches of the service. In the principal cities of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitian, the police departments functioned as army units. Even though the police and soldiers of Port-au-Prince wore different uniforms, and had separate barracks, they were still under the command of a military officer. There was no police force in Haiti independent of the army. Most sources indicate that there were over 7,000 men enlisted, including police and firefighters in Port-au-Prince, as well as soldiers stationed outside the capital.

Haiti’s first democratic elections in 1990, which brought Aristide to power, created new political space for free expression and assembly. During his seven-month tenure as president (prior to his deposition on 30 September 1991), the Haitian armed forces remained outside the civilian political dialogue. What the election did not change was the nature of Haiti’s military and police structure. The military’s distrust of ‘Fanmi Lavalas’, a new civilian movement that supported Aristide, incited the officers’ corps to revolt and drive out Aristide. An estimated 4,000 civilians were subsequently killed by the security forces during his exile.

The coup of September 1991 was the first test of the Organization of American States (OAS) that had recently promulgated Resolution 1080, the Declaration of Santiago. This agreement stipulated that if a democratically elected government in the hemisphere were overthrown, the Council of Ministers would be authorized to adopt ‘all additional measures which may be necessary and appropriate’ to restore constitutional order. Based on a strategy of economic and diplomatic isolation, the OAS believed that sanctions would weaken the resolve of the coup leaders and lead to Aristide’s restoration. The UN, while issuing similar warnings through the Security Council and the General Assembly, deferred to the OAS’s efforts to resolve the crisis.

These diplomatic efforts and economic pressure yielded very little except immense suffering for the majority of Haitians and further diminution of the underdeveloped economy. By August 1992 the military junta had placed Marc Bazin as titular head of a de facto government who vowed that Aristide would not be permitted to return. This action was also complicated by a further deterioration of human rights conditions and intensified abuse and intimidation of
citizens by the military. OAS human rights monitors arrived in Haiti in the autumn of 1992, though the mission lacked the capacity to address the abuse they observed.

With the election of Bill Clinton as US president in November 1992, the United States turned to the UN for stronger international action, leading its Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali to appoint former Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo as his special envoy to Haiti. To avoid jurisdictional conflicts, the OAS agreed to make Caputo a jointly sponsored envoy. Throughout 1993 there were several attempts to resolve the crisis. Notably, in July the Governors Island Agreement between the parties called for Aristide’s restoration and the intervention of a UN and OAS mission. The coup leaders initially agreed to this in order to end Haiti’s economic and political isolation, but when the USS *Harlan County* arrived in Port-au-Prince in October, carrying police and military trainers, hoards of Haitian thugs tried to attack the external forces and they forced the ship to turn back. This victory for the repressive military led to more abuses, but it was not until May 1994 that the US government began the process of planning what would ultimately be an operation, under cover of UN Security Council authority, that would facilitate Aristide’s restoration. During the summer of 1994, US military and diplomatic planners laid foundations for what would become Operation *Restore Democracy* in September 1994. A last-minute mission led by ex-President Carter and retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, failed to persuade coup-leader, Raoul Cedras, to leave before military operations began, and on 14 September the multinational force (MNF) of over US 20,000 men and women, plus 5,000 others from 24 countries, was permitted to land.13

**Demobilization and Public Security**

Central to the planning of Operation *Restore Democracy* was demobilization of the Haitian armed forces and maintenance of public security. US military planners were well aware of the need to neutralize the 7,000-strong army as a first step in restoring public security, and the exit strategy of US forces was closely tied to the demobilization operation. But military planners were concerned about demobilizing the FADH without a replacement security force. The need to demobilize the predatory FADH weighed against the need to have some form of interim police in place until a new force could be trained, or in military jargon, ‘stood up’. Because they led to a permissive entry, negotiations by the Carter delegation had the net effect of altering the demobilization programme. An outright invasion would have meant rounding up the FADH, holding them in their barracks and demobilizing them on the spot, providing a monetary pay-off and a chance to voluntarily enter a reintegration programme at a later date. Instead, those FADH soldiers deemed suitable became part of an interim police force.

The decision to have an Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) became a component of the security framework that the newly-installed Aristide government accepted as part of a wider package. It included support for a new police academy and the training of specially recruited civilians to serve in the police force.
Under this plan, 3,300 FADH soldiers out of 7,000 would be selected for the IPSF and the remainder demobilized. Ultimately, out of the 3,300 interim police, 1,500 would be chosen to remain part of the armed forces once the new police force was fully deployed. This last component of the plan, to retain an army of 1,500, was rendered null and void on 23 December 1994, when Aristide abolished the army and dissolved the officer corps and incorporated the remaining army members into the IPSF. Haiti now had a civilian defence minister and 15 people working in the defence ministry without an army.14

In theory, the army was to have been vetted into two groups: some would be retained for service in the interim police, while the others would be dismissed and become candidates for a demobilization and reintegration programme supported by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). This notion was short-lived. US military planners quickly realized that in order to develop an interim police force rapidly, Haitian military leaders would have to select in those soldiers they deemed fit for police work rather than selecting out those soldiers who were considered to be human rights abusers. The US embassy vetted the finalists, reviewing records to determine whether they had any history of human rights violations or criminal activity. Ultimately, these men formed the core of the IPSF.15

The Demobilization Programme

The demobilization of the Haitian armed forces was planned in three phases. Phase I began in October 1994, one month after the first multinational troops landed in Port-au-Prince. From October to the end of December, the demobilization programme was completely voluntary, and only 187 soldiers entered the reintegration programme during that period.16 Phase II began after the December announcement by Aristide that the army would be officially abolished. A nationwide demobilization scheme was put into effect on 25 January 1995. No longer a voluntary operation, soldiers were required to report to their posts for processing. After this first round was completed in March 1994, 3,042 soldiers had registered as demobilized. Two years later, 5,482 soldiers had been removed from the army.

Phase III of the demobilization process began in June 1995. Former FADH personnel who had served in the Interim Police Force were now being dismissed. April 1996 marked the last opportunity for any soldier who had not yet done so to register for a vocational training programme. This gradual reduction in force of the interim police was tied to replacement by newly trained police at the Haitian Police Academy. By November 1996, all former FADH who were not retained in the new Haitian National Police (Police Nationale d’Haiti – HNP) would have to be demobilized and retrained. By that time, Haiti was scheduled to have over 5,000 new police officers, fresh out of the academy.

Organization of the process represented a new collaboration between multinational military officials and civilian agencies. By taking those soldiers who voluntarily left the army, the USAID/IOM demobilization programme relieved the military of a population that was viewed as a potential security risk. In reality, however, during the first phase of the demobilization, those soldiers who joined
the demobilization programme were self-selected and, therefore, more responsive to any initiative that could afford them a better life than the army. After Aristide dissolved the army in early 1995 the type of soldier entering the demobilized programme was one less willing to accept his fate.

Motivation to attend the vocational training programmes was based on a simple incentive: in return for successfully completing a six-month training programme, a former soldier would receive a stipend and tuition for the period enrolled. The tuition for the courses and daily transportation costs were paid for through a grant from USAID to IOM. A stipend to support the demobilized soldier over the course of the training was to come from the Haitian government. It was this last item, the stipend, which became a source of endless problems until the government finally agreed to live up to this part of the bargain in June.

The profile of the demobilized soldier that emerged from the records is an interesting one. The majority of those participating in the programme had served between five and ten years in the army, with the second largest group being those with 10–15 years of service. By far the largest group for training were soldiers between 30 and 34 years old, with the second largest consisting of those aged between 25 and 29. Another feature of the demobilized FADH was that the vast majority had attended some form of secondary school, though it is not clear how many of the 94 per cent (4,203) who responded to this question completed their high school programme. By and large, however, the demobilized were neither illiterate nor very young.

The Military Pay Issue

One of the thorniest issues of the demobilization programme was who would pay the former soldiers. Even before the arrival of the MNF, the pay issue was a continuous point of debate between Aristide’s negotiators in Washington and the US government. While the United States agreed to foot the bill for the technical components of demobilization and retraining, it never agreed to pay the salaries of the former army members who enrolled in the training programme. US and Haitian government officials could not agree on this point. A similar issue arose regarding the pension rights of the demobilized. While the decree of 25 April 1995 further disbanded the FADH and established a one-time pension payout scheme for the cashiered officers, it did not resolve the pension problems of the enlisted.

The unresolved salary issue risked undermining the dual goals of demobilization – to reduce security risks by keeping former FADH in training, while providing soldiers with a new start in life. The government of Haiti insisted that it would not pay the demobilized soldiers, as there was no money for them in the budget. In truth, the funds once designated to pay the FADH were transferred to provide salaries for the new Haitian National Police, who were about to be trained by US officials. The issue grew more significant on a political level. The longer the Aristide government refused to make good on the salaries of former soldiers, the more likely a confrontation would occur between former FADH and the MNF. It was this last factor that the US government feared,
since any uprising would be viewed as a breakdown of control, sending negative
signals to the international media and to Congress.

Support for Civilian Policing

Haiti was one of the first post-Cold War missions that clarified the importance
of policing in transitional peacekeeping missions. The UN provided civilian
police (CIVPOL), to replace the 800 international police monitors recruited
from 20 countries after the MNF pulled out of Haiti in 1995. The greater reliance
on civilian police monitors over military police marked another essential com-
ponent of transitional peacekeeping in post-conflict environments. Both under
the MNF and CIVPOL, these international policemen were armed and had
arrest authority, a novelty in international peacekeeping at that time.17

It was precisely the questions of restoring public order and determining
what would happen to the Haitian army that opened up a tremendous policy
debate about the role of development assistance in these tasks. The MNF was
ill at ease with the policing and development-related tasks that were being
thrust upon them as the situation in Haiti unfolded.18 Yet the events of 1995
laid a foundation for the security-development nexus to unfold as a central
component of post-conflict operations. It is ironic that one of the central
lessons learned from the Haiti operation, and subsequent post-conflict settings,
was lost on US military planners almost a decade later in the invasion and
occupation of Iraq.

The need for policing was evident from the outset, and the US began to retrain
military personnel and recruits from the refugees at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba for
the HNP. At the same time, the US with the UN and the government of Haiti
began a national campaign to recruit and train new police. This force would
receive 16 weeks of training from international trainers, with the bulk of the
work being carried out by the US Department of Justice, the French gendarmerie
and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The goal was to ‘stand-up’ 3,000 new
police in two years. But delays and the US desire to exit Haiti led to a fast-track
training of 2,000 recruits at the US Army’s Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri.

The police training had many shortcomings, as documented in a series of
reports that followed. One such example was insufficient training for HNP in
arrest and detention procedures.19 Moreover, at its formation the HNP consisted
of very young and inexperienced troops. They were under-equipped and lacked
training, particularly in human rights. Over a period of four months, they
received only nine hours of training in human rights and a 16-hour human
dignity course. The focus of what training they were given was predominantly
in crowd control and firearms. Once trained, fewer than 2,000 troops actually
showed up for work, even though 6,000 were on the payroll.20

A major lesson of the US efforts to train a police force de novo was the need to
coordinate the link between policing, the penal system and the judicial sector
reforms. In spite of the shortcomings of the training and creation of the new
force, the HNP ‘became for a time the most honest and effective component of
the Haitian bureaucracy, only to find itself slowly sucked back into the culture
of corruption, incompetence and politicization in which it was embedded’.21
Consequently, accused criminals were more plentiful than courts to try them or prisons to hold them.\textsuperscript{22} The training pointed to three additional conclusions. First, international police armed with weapons and the power to arrest can usefully supplement military peacekeepers. Second ‘broad justice-sector reform is necessary to bolster policing efforts’.\textsuperscript{23} Third, the number of police that were trained, 5,000, fell far short of the 15,000 that the country actually needed. The reason was a simple matter of economics: Haiti would get the police that it could afford, not what it actually required. Economic sustainability drove the reform process, and the reduced number proved insufficient in the long run.

\textit{Reforming the Justice System}

Although a central goal of the post-1994 multinational intervention was the creation of a functioning legal system, the so-called ‘judicial package’ – policing, court system and penal system, were projects undertaken in isolation of each other.\textsuperscript{24} The result was a situation where new police were arresting people and putting them in jail while a functioning court system was still unavailable to render justice. Donors had high expectations for legal reforms and training of judges. Yet in spite of large investments made by the US government and the UN, rule of law remained nascent, and a functional legal system an illusive goal. Part of this disappointment was a consequence of the UN and the US interest in ‘quick fixes’ to the judicial morass they encountered in Haiti.

Respect for the rule of law and the creation of laws through transparent and participatory means should always be a keystone of democratic governance. Judicial independence is guaranteed in the Haitian Constitution under Article 60.\textsuperscript{25} Judges were named for fixed terms by the president from a list prepared by the Senate, or by departmental or communal assemblies. Continued employment, however, was based on a political reappointment process. Additionally, public prosecutors were empowered to be agents of the executive branch and had oversight functions for the police.\textsuperscript{26} Yet their role was open to influence by the executive, resulting in a breakdown of constitutional mandates.

Even though a new college for magistrates was opened in 1995, the judicial system had outdated legal texts, and actual training of judges was still limited. Over the course of the UN presence, more than 200 judges and prosecutors received an intensive training course, but that was all they received. Moreover, judges remained underpaid (they were paid less than police officers) and were vulnerable to corruption in their respective communities. There was a total lack of legislative oversight of the Justice Ministry.\textsuperscript{27} All appointments, training, evaluation and removal of judges were done at the whim of the executive. In addition, the Inspector General’s office, whose role it was to carry out internal investigations of police, hardly functioned. The justice and security tracks were never integrated, resulting in a judicial system that was isolated from the security sector both in policy and in practice. Furthermore, the funding dedicated to the judicial ‘package’ was never adequate to meet the ever-growing need for a more open democratic state.
Democratic Governance

At the time the international community intervened in 1994, security sector reform was a relatively novel concept. Many of the lessons from the Haiti intervention were later used to formulate security sector reform doctrine. Although widely accepted in the international community that security sector reform must be undertaken in a manner consistent with ‘democratic norms and sound principles, of governance, transparency and the rule of law’, the concept has been open to interpretation. Nevertheless, central to security sector reform is a ‘unifying factor of democratic governance’. To ensure this, there are basic principles that should be adhered to. First, it should be ‘people-centred’ and ‘locally-owned’. Second, it should also be carried out to take account of all the security needs of the people and state. Finally, security sector reform should also be implemented ‘through clear process and policies that aim to enhance the institutional and human capacity needed for security policy to function effectively’.

Several attempts to enable a democratic state to take root in Haiti were marred by the inability of state institutions to function, and by the failure of elections to be rendered free and fair. Sadly, the international community has not moved beyond elections as the solution to Haiti’s governance ills. The continued investment in electoral machinery, the costly registration process and the lack of public enthusiasm for change through the ballot box reflect a desperate situation that persists.

Corruption

Transparency International ranked Haiti fourth worst of 133 countries in its 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index. Many police officers were complicit in drug trafficking, kidnappings and extra-judicial killings, and impunity was rampant. Between 1995 and 1998 the HNP was responsible for 143 deaths. In May 1999, police killed 11 people in Carrefour Feuilles. Although, for the first time in the judicial sector, the police involved in this incident were tried and convicted of killings, this response remained exceptional and short-lived.

Drug trafficking remained the main source of corruption among security forces and continued to be the case in the police. In 1998, 54 metric tons of cocaine passed through Haiti. The police, if not also high government officials, were widely believed to be involved. The suspected motive for an attack by police and former army members on the presidential palace in 2001 was to obtain the share of contraband that was held in there. In spite of domestic laws against drug trafficking, they are rendered useless without enforcement by a judicial body. Moreover, the Haitian legal code does not have a provision for the crime of conspiracy in drug cases.

The Downward Spiral

In February 2004 President Aristide was forced to flee Haiti after several years of instability, in part brought on by what many considered a flawed election in 2000.
But the violence that ultimately forced the end of his government had been brewing in the security sector as gang violence. Inadequate police responses resulted in parts of the country being overrun by armed gangs, many comprised of former soldiers, who terrorized citizens and were able to take over many secondary cities. This lawlessness exceeded the capacity of the police force to cope. Political stalemate ensued from the late 1990s, and the security sector fell prey to the whims of politicians and local elites. The Presidential Guard became the only force standing between order and chaos.

Resurgence of Violence

Although the bulk of the Haitian armed forces had been demobilized and retrained, the absence of job opportunities, coupled with the presence of many ‘spoilers’, made for potential trouble after 1996. Starting in 2001, former members of the FAHD began to mobilize around the border of the Dominican Republic. In November 2002, a group of former military officers began organizing a force in the town of Pernal. Over the next year they proceeded to launch operations that resulted in civilian murders and harassment of police. They also recruited to their cause from other border towns, and on 25 July 2003 this renegade group of former military personnel and two rebel organizations killed four members of the Ministry of Interior.36 The membership of these forces included ex-military leaders Guy Phillippe, Louis Jodel Chamblain, Antoine Izmery, Jean Pierre Baptiste (Jean Tatoune) and ex-Army Colonel Remissainthe Ravix.37 Chimeres, or gangs illegally using force, were also active in destabilizing Haiti, many of them founded and financed by Aristide loyalists to intimidate political opponents.38 Gang members included many who had escaped from prison and were eager to earn money.

By 2004 the situation in Haiti was out of control. The police, always inadequate for the job they were given, were now easily overpowered by the rebels. The HNP had to relinquish control of police stations and precincts in large cities to various rebel groups – especially in Gonaives.39 By September 2005, armed groups still controlled Northern Haiti and parts of Central Haiti.40

Conclusion: Lessons for International Security Sector Intervention

Although Haiti remains a precedent-setting case for early UN and donor attempts to implement reform in the security sector, reversing a 200-year trend of impunity and lawlessness over the course of two years was an impossible mission. Even though police received good training, they soon took on the habits of the old military. Particularly symbolic was their occupation of the old ‘cirque militaire’, the old officers club of the FAHD, as their new headquarters. Additionally, the recurrent cost of security in a country that could barely meet any of its financial obligations has posed a major challenge to donors: security is essential, but the stakeholders cannot afford to pay for even the most basic of policing needs.

The temptations of the drug trade also poisoned the environment. The ever-expanding presence of the Colombian drug cartel in Haiti made it too easy for police to succumb to the lucrative proceeds that could be made in a
trans-shipment haven. With a weak government and no resources except income derived from illegal activities, it is no wonder that corruption remains the central problem for the police and national and local government.

In 1994, the arrival of a US-led multi-national force signalled the beginning of a new era of hope for the people of Haiti. It returned a popular and freely elected leader to his rightful position. Wide public support for security sector reform was evident from the majority of Haitians who welcomed the demise of the military. But the new police that were trained to replace the old military were seen as inadequate for the job of keeping people secure. Rural areas never had enough police, and by the late 1990s reverted to old self-policing behaviour. Although Aristide had only promised to take Haitians ‘from misery to poverty’, this remains an elusive goal. Reform of the security sector in Haiti must be judged as a squandered opportunity to help lay a foundation for even modest development in the region’s poorest nation.

By 2005, public mistrust of security organizations had resulted in people arming themselves, not only for protection but to form brigades that carry out ‘popular justice’ including lynching. There is mistrust of the judicial system, access to which is severely limited. Among the most troubling responses to the increased insecurity has been a call by various political leaders since Aristide’s removal to restore the armed forces to their pre-1994 status.

In March 2004 Kofi Annan had asked the central question about cases such as Haiti:

Should we have learned by now that outsiders cannot solve Haiti’s problems? For a time in the early 20th century it was a US protectorate. Should it not now be left alone to sort itself out? The proposition is attractive only in the abstract. Haiti is clearly unable to sort itself out, and the effect of leaving it alone would be continued or worsening chaos. Our globalized world cannot afford a political vacuum, whether in the mountains of Afghanistan or on the very doorstep of the remaining superpower.

While an ideal solution for such cases may be the creation of a transitional administration under UN authority to help rebuild institutions of governance and security, the likelihood of this seems illusory given the geopolitical concerns of the United States and other permanent members of the Security Council. Over the last decade there have been repeated suggestions that Chapter XI of the UN Charter, the old Trusteeship section, be revised to reflect the post-Cold War need for transitional authorities to help rescue ‘failing states’. This has yet to become an accepted principle, though the notion of a Peacebuilding Commission, proposed in the April 2005 recommendations of the Secretary-General’s report, In Larger Freedom, would provide some medium-term support for Haiti. It would not, however, be a substitute for some form of interim governing arrangement.

In the absence of UN reform on this matter, what options does the international community have for Haiti? Security sector reform, though crucial, is only part of the solution to the social, economic and political morass that
characterizes the situation. Any reform effort must meet the expectations of three actors: the United States, the Haitian business elite and the citizens. While there is some demand to rebuild the police force, starting with a vetting of the current force and the replacement of ‘corrupt cops’, this would only partially address the short-term insecurity. Rebuilding a police force will not solve the problem of insufficient resources to pay for the recurring costs of security, nor will there be any reduction of this gap in the short run. The US, Haitians in the private sector and its citizens might welcome a multinational peacebuilding force for a prolonged period of time. But even in the months after the UN issued its call for troops in February 2004, the contributions to this operation were far lower than those promised by Security Council Resolution 1529.44

The future of Haiti will be determined not by the elections scheduled for the end of 2005, but by the ability of the political leadership to engage in a meaningful dialogue about future needs. Donor neglect and especially the inattention paid to Haiti by the US government could only result in a situation that makes it ripe for a transitional administration. As the bottled-up frustrations of the Haitian people are released, so will violence and hostilities continue. A bleak future lies in store if Haiti moves from a shadow state to a failed one requiring another international engagement.

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NOTES

7. Because security sector reform is as much about the political development of the state as it is about economic growth, engaging the donor community in such programmes requires a clear understanding of the implications such interventions have on local beneficiaries. Analysts of security sector reform have defined specific tasks that must be undertaken to ensure that those who control the use of force (government institutions), are legitimate, selected in a transparent fashion, and subscribe to a social contract in actual operation. But this normative concept of security sector reform insulates it from the practice, which in post-conflict states is made even more challenging and long-term, than in a country where transition is a response to global economic changes, or to political openings that result from a change in the nature of governance (such as in the former Soviet Union).
9. Ibid., p.125.
10. He was exiled for 1,111 days. ‘Haitians Observe Day of Mourning on Coup Anniversary’, *Reuters*, Port-au-Prince, 2 Oct. 1995.
14. The decree of 6 January 1995, reduced the FADH to 1,500 members and incorporated them into the IPSF (published in the *Official Journal* on 13 Mar. 1995). This also put an end to the FADH by officially ending the contracts of all other members of the army, thus setting the stage for a demobilization.
18. Ibid., p.75.
21. Ibid., p.77.
22. Ibid., p.85.
23. Ibid., p.84.
26. Ibid., p.21.
27. Ibid., p.22.
30. OECD (n.28 above), p.2.
34. Ibid., p.10.
35. Ibid.
36. The two groups are the Cannibal Army (or Artibonite Resistance Front) and the Revolutionary Front for Haitian Advancement and Progress.
40. Ibid., p.3.
42. Ibid., p.23.