Sven Torfinn / Panos Pictures

WHY THE DRAMATIC DECLINE IN ARMED CONFLICT?

There has been a great deal of research on the causes of war, but very little on the causes of peace. Since the end of the colonial era there have been fewer and fewer international wars, while the last 15 years have seen a dramatic decline in civil wars. Why?

WHY THE DRAMATIC DECLINE IN ARMED CONFLICT?

Introduction

Introduction

The post–World War II era witnessed an extraordinary increase in the number of wars—most of them civil wars. This was followed by a steep decline after the end of the Cold War.

Part V of this report reviews some of the findings that will be presented in greater detail in the *Human Security Report 2006.* It focuses on the causes of the recent decline in global conflict, and addresses two key questions:

- How do we explain the decline in the use of force in relations *between* states since the end of the colonial era?
- What brought about the remarkable post–Cold War decline in wars *within* states?

Strangely, neither of these important trends has been the subject of much scholarly investigation. 'For every thousand pages on the causes of war,' historian Geoffrey Blainey has noted, 'there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace.'[1]

Blainey may have overstated his case, but there is no doubt that scholars have generally been more interested in explaining the drivers of war than the determinants of peace. This is particularly true with respect to the remarkable post–Cold War decline in civil wars.

In the past 30 years three remarkable changes in international politics have had a major—and mostly positive—impact on global security.

First, by the early 1980s, wars of liberation from colonial rule, which had made up between 60% and 100% of the international wars occurring in any one year from the beginning of the 1950s to the end of the 1970s, had virtually ceased.[2]

The security import of this change is as profound as it is rarely acknowledged. Between 1816 and 2002 there were some 81 wars of colonial conquest and subsequent struggles for independence from colonial rule.[3] With the demise of colonialism one of the major drivers of international conflict had simply disappeared.

> By the early 1980s, wars of liberation from colonial rule had virtually ceased.

Second, the end of the Cold War removed another major cause of armed conflict from the international

system. Approximately one-third of all wars in the post–World War II period had been driven wholly, or in part, by the geopolitics of the Cold War.[4]

The end of the political confrontation between East and West in the late 1980s not only removed the only real threat of war between the major powers, but also meant that Washington and Moscow stopped supporting 'proxy wars' in the developing world. Denied the external assistance that had long sustained them, many of these conflicts simply petered out, or were ended by negotiated settlements.

Third, the end of the Cold War set off an explosion of international activism directed toward stopping ongoing wars and preventing wars that had ended from starting up again. This little-analysed but critically important development appears to offer the most compelling explanation for the steep decline in warfare that started in 1992.

Part V uses a different dataset from those reviewed earlier in this report. The dataset is based on information going back nearly 200 years and deals only with wars.[5] It does not include data on the less deadly 'minor' armed conflicts that are part of the Uppsala/PRIO dataset featured in Part I of this report. Despite the differences, the post–World War II conflict trends are very similar in both datasets.

The decline of international war

A newly revised dataset tracks the number of wars since the Congress of Vienna ended the Napoleonic era in 1815. The decline of international war that began in the 1980s is associated with the end of wars of liberation from colonial rule and the end of the Cold War.

Between 1816 and 2002 there were 199 international wars (including wars of colonial conquest and liberation)[6] and 251 civil wars—one international war on average for every 1.3 civil wars over the entire period.[7]

International wars accounted for one-fifth to three-quarters of all wars being waged in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. As Figure 5.1 shows, the anti-colonial struggles and then the conflicts related to the Cold War came to an end,[8] the total number of international wars declined both absolutely and relatively.

From the early 1980s to the early 1990s the number of international wars declined. For the rest of the 1990s and the early years of the 21st century there have been almost no international wars. The one exception was 1999, when there were three wars—two of which, Kosovo and India-Pakistan, had relatively small death tolls.[9]

How do we explain this drop in the number of international wars? Much of the research on the causes of international peace over the past 20 years has used large datasets and statistical inference models to examine the 'correlates of war'—the economic, political and sociological factors associated with interstate war—and peace. This research points to a number of long-term global trends that are associated with reduced risks of international conflict:

- **A dramatic increase in the number of democracies.** In 1946, there were 20 democracies in the world; in 2005, there were 88.[10] Many scholars argue that

Figure 5.1 International wars, 1816–2002

Source: Human Security Centre, 2005[11]

There is no obvious trend in the number of international wars until the end of the 1970s. But following the end of colonialism and then the Cold War, the number declined dramatically.

(The graph shows the annual number of wars expressed as a five-year moving average.)[12]

this trend has reduced the likelihood of international war because democratic states almost never fight each other.

- **An increase in economic interdependence.** Greater global economic interdependence has increased the costs of cross-border aggression while significantly reducing its benefits.[13]

- **A decline in the economic utility of war.** The most effective path to prosperity in modern economies is through increasing productivity and international trade, not through seizing land and raw materials. In addition, the existence of an open global trading regime means it is nearly always cheaper to buy resources from overseas than to use force to acquire them.

- **Growth in international institutions.** The greatly increased involvement by governments in international institutions can help reduce the incidence of conflict. Such institutions play an important direct role in building global norms that encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes. They can also benefit security indirectly by helping promote democratisation and interdependence.

> Greater global economic interdependence has increased the costs of cross-border aggression while reducing its benefits.

These interrelated and mutually reinforcing trends have given rise to what is often referred to as the 'liberal peace'—a transnational security system that is credited with having created an unprecedented 60 years of peace within Western Europe, indeed between all the liberal democracies.[14]

The liberal peace thesis is challenged by many traditional strategic analysts who believe that security is achieved through credible deterrence, effective war-fighting capabilities and—especially for smaller powers—membership of alliances.[15] From this perspective the unprecedented period without war between the European powers that followed the end of World War II had more to do with mutual solidarity against a common communist threat than with democracy or economic interdependence.

> Anti-violence norms are often transgressed and they are more entrenched in some regions than in others, but they play an important role in constraining behaviour.

In fact, the long period without war between the major powers since World War II is likely a function of *both* the growth of the institutions and processes stressed by the liberal peace theorists, *and* the impact of traditional 'peace through strength' deterrence policies—in particular the caution-inducing effect that nuclear weapons had on relations between East and West.

The power of ideas: A war-averse world

A quite different explanation for the decline in interstate war stresses neither the role of liberal economic and political institutions, nor military deterrence, but a gradual normative shift against the use of violence in human relationships.[16]

Among the key indicators of this general shift in attitudes, one that has been underway for several centuries, are the outlawing of human sacrifice, witch-burning, lynching, slavery, vigilantism, duelling, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

These anti-violence norms are often transgressed, of course, and they are more entrenched in some regions than others, but they play an important role in constraining behaviour. They also inform the creation of laws and institutions—which in turn can provide the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to help encourage compliance.

Nowhere is this normative shift more evident than in changing public attitudes toward war. Prior to the

20th century, warfare was a normal part of human existence. For governments, war was simply an instrument of statecraft.

Today the forcible acquisition of territory is universally perceived as a blatant transgression of international law, and resort to force against another country is only permissible in self-defence, or with the sanction of the UN Security Council.

There has been a similar change in attitudes to colonialism. While colonial subjugation is now universally abhorred, such conquests were once accepted as a normal part of empire and were often depicted as morally justified, in that they brought the benefits of civilisation to the colonised.

Ideologies that glorify violence and see war as a noble and virtuous endeavour are today notable mostly by their absence. Insofar as similar ideologies still exist they are mainly found not in governments but in small, fanatical, terrorist organisations, such as those associated with al-Qaeda. In addition, the sort of hyper-nationalism that drove Nazi German and Imperial Japanese aggression in the 1930s and 1940s is now extremely rare.

Some scholars argue that the rise of war-averse sentiment in the industrialised countries has been the critical factor in the worldwide decline in international war.[17]

The reason that liberal democracies live in peace, according to this view, is not because they have democratic modes of government, but because their leaders and peoples have become more averse to war.

From this perspective, interdependence and the rapid growth of membership in international institutions are a *consequence* of the peace achieved by increased war-aversion, not its causes.[18]

While the rival merits of the different explanations of the decline in international conflict are subject to intense debate within the scholarly community, they are not necessarily contradictory. The problem with them all is that while they surely point to changes that are likely to enhance security in the long run, none can account for the steep decline in international wars between 1980 and 2002.

Countries didn't become dramatically more interdependent in this period; war didn't suddenly become more costly; nor was there a huge increase in membership in international institutions. And a global increase in anti-war sentiment around the world can't explain the decline, for while *international* wars declined from 1980 to the beginning of the 1990s, *civil* wars increased dramatically during this period (Figure 5.2).

The evidence suggests that the end of colonialism triggered the decline in international wars that started in the early 1980s, and that the end of the Cold War ensured that it continued.

The rise and decline of civil war

Civil wars were rare in the immediate aftermath of World War II, but over the next four decades they increased in number at an unprecedented rate. This increase was followed by a more rapid decline. The Cold War—and its ending—was a critical determinant of the changes.

The most dramatic changes in the incidence of warfare in the past two centuries have taken place in the last 60 years and relate to changes in civil war (also known as intrastate war).

The number of civil wars taking place around the world increased from two in 1946 to 25 in 1991.[19] Prior to World War II the maximum number of civil wars in the world in any one year had never exceeded 10. (Note that because Figure 5.2 shows five-year moving averages the highest totals for particular years will not be shown.)

As Figure 5.2 shows, the escalation in the number of civil wars from 1946 to 1991 was by far the largest in the entire 1816 to 2002 period. This remarkable increase was due mainly to the rise in Cold War–related conflicts and to struggles for control over the new states created by the end of colonialism.

The *decline* in civil war numbers that began after 1992 was steeper than the considerable increase from

1946 to 1992. In just 10 years, the number of civil wars fell by 80%.[20]

Figure 5.2 Civil wars, 1816–2002

Source: Human Security Centre, 2005[21]

Driven by Cold War politics and struggles for control of the post-colonial state, civil wars soared after World War II, then declined even more rapidly after the end of the Cold War.

(The graph shows the annual number of wars expressed as a five-year moving average.)

The decline in civil wars is due in large part to changes wrought by the end of the Cold War. But before discussing these changes in detail, four other potential explanations are considered.

> The end of colonialism contributed to an increase in civil wars.

The end of colonialism

The often violent demise of colonial rule around the world removed a major driver of war from the international system. However, this change did not reduce the number of *civil* wars. These continued to rise rapidly in number throughout the 1980s. Part of the reason for this was that in many newly independent countries the stuggle against colonialism was replaced by wars over who should control the post-colonial state.

The end of colonialism contributed to an increase rather than a decrease in the number of civil wars. But not only were new post-colonial stuggles being waged, throughout the 1980s many civil wars were being prolonged by continued support from the superpowers and their allies.

Democratisation

Established democratic states almost never go to war against each other; they also have a very low risk of succumbing to civil war.

The number of democracies increased by nearly half between 1990 and 2003 (Figure 5.3),[22] while the number of civil conflicts declined sharply over the same period. Can the surge in democratisation explain the decline? The evidence suggests that this is unlikely.

The risk of civil war is indeed low in stable and inclusive democracies, but countries with governments that are partly democratic and partly authoritarian—dubbed 'anocracies' by political scientists—are *more* prone to civil war than either democracies or autocracies.[23]

Figure 5.3 The rising tide of democratisation


Source: Marshall and Gurr, 2005 [24]

The number of democratic regimes increased consistently in the 1990s. But any security benefits from this change were likely offset by the increase in the number of 'anocracies'—regimes that are neither democratic nor autocratic, and which are associated with a higher risk of civil war.

This finding is important. While the number of inclusive democracies increased dramatically as the Cold War wound down, so too did the number of anocracies. So it is likely that the positive impact on global security of more democracies was offset by the negative impact of the increase in risk-prone anocracies.

State capacity

Levels of economic development and the risk of war are strongly related (Figure 5.4). Indeed, one of the most striking findings to emerge from conflict research is that most wars take place in poor countries, and that as per capita income increases, the risk of war declines.

Figure 5.4 The association between war and poverty

Source: Humphreys and Varshney, 2003[25]

Poverty is associated with weak state capacity. The greater the poverty and the lower the state capacity, the higher the risk of war.

This doesn't, of course, mean that the poor are inherently more violent than the rich. Indeed, the key factor here does not appear to be per capita income as much as state capacity. Other things being equal, the higher the per capita income a country has, the stronger and more capable its government. This in turn means more state resources to crush rebels and to redress grievances.

The pursuit of equitable economic growth would thus appear to be an effective long-term strategy for enhancing security, in addition to being a necessary condition for sustainable human development.

But while there is no doubt that growth in state income and capacity is associated with a reduced risk of armed conflict *in the long term,* neither factor can explain the major decline in civil wars since the early 1990s. The rate of economic growth in this period is simply too slow to account for such a rapid drop in conflict numbers.

Ethnic discrimination and conflict

Ethnic conflict has been the subject of intense scholarly scrutiny in recent years. A new analysis by the Minorities at Risk project at the University of Maryland argues that 'high levels of political discrimination are a key cause of violent ethnic conflict' and that there has been a steady decline in political discrimination by governments around the world since 1950.[26]

In 1950, some 45% of governments around the world actively discriminated against ethnic groups; by 2003, that share had shrunk to 25%. Economic discrimination by governments followed a similar trend.[27]

The decline in official discrimination has also been paralleled by a long-term rise in government-sponsored *positive* discrimination/affirmative action programs for ethnic minorities around the world. This appears to be part of a broader normative shift toward greater recognition of minority rights and away from seeking to resolve political conflicts by force.

> Other things being equal, the higher the per capita income a country has, the stronger and more capable its government. This in turn means more state resources to crush rebels and to redress grievances.

But while this is clearly a trend that enhances security in the long term, it cannot explain the sharp

decline in armed conflicts—including ethnic conflicts—in the 1990s.[28]

The security-enhancing effect of the steady reduction of political and economic discrimination was not strong enough to offset the rapid increase in civil wars from the 1950s to the early 1990s. And there is no evidence to suggest that after the end of the Cold War the reduction in discrimination suddenly became a powerful enough force to account for the decline in conflict numbers.[29]

The explanation for the dramatic drop in political violence in the 1990s has to be related to other changes that took place during, or immediately preceding, this period.

The end of the Cold War

The most persuasive explanation for the decline in civil conflict is found in the far-reaching political changes wrought by the end of the Cold War.

What were the forces that drove the decline?

First, as already noted, the end of the Cold War removed a major driver of ideological hostility from the international system. This affected civil wars as well as international wars.

Second, the end of the Cold War meant that the two superpowers largely stopped supporting their clients in proxy wars in the developing world. Denied this support, many of these conflicts died out, or the parties sued for peace. But less than 20% of the post–Cold War decline in conflict numbers appears to be attributable to this factor.[30]

Third, and most important, the end of the Cold War liberated the UN, allowing it for the first time to play an effective global security role—and indeed to do far more than its founders had originally envisaged.[31] The impact of this wave of post–Cold War activism on the global security front—which went well beyond the UN—has been both profound and the subject of extraordinarily little study.

## The upsurge of international activism

Since the end of the 1980s, the UN has spearheaded a remarkable, if often inchoate, upsurge in conflict management, conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding activities by the international community. The World Bank, donor states and a number of regional security organisa-

tions, as well as literally thousands of NGOs, have both complemented UN activities and played independent prevention and peacebuilding roles of their own.

The extent of the changes that have taken place over the last 15 years[32] is as remarkable as it is under-reported:

- **A dramatic increase in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking activities.** UN preventive diplomacy missions (those that seek to prevent wars from breaking out in the first place) increased from one in 1990 to six in 2002.[33]

UN peacemaking activities (those that seek to stop ongoing conflicts) also increased nearly fourfold—from four in 1990 to 15 in 2002 (Figure 5.5).

Figure 5.5 UN peacemaking activities, 1989–2002

Source: UN Department of Political Affairs, 2003[35]

A dramatic increase in UN peacemaking activities followed the end of the Cold War.

The increase in preventive diplomacy helped prevent a number of latent conflicts from crossing the threshold into warfare, while the rise in peacemaking activities has been associated with a major increase in negotiated peace settlements. Approximately half of all the peace settlements negotiated between 1946 and 2003 have been signed since the end of the Cold War.[34] The average number of conflicts terminated per year in the 1990s was more than twice the average of all previous decades from 1946 onwards.

- **An increase in international support for UN peacemaking.** The number of 'Friends of the Secretary-

General', 'Contact Groups' and other mechanisms created by governments to support UN peacemaking activities and peace operations in countries in—or emerging from—conflict increased from 4 in 1990 to more than 28 in 2003, a sevenfold increase.[36]

■ **An increase in post-conflict peace operations.** There has been a major increase in complex peace operations, not just UN missions, but those of regional organisations as well. These have involved an ever-growing range of peacebuilding activities that are designed in part to prevent the recurrence of conflict. Since 40% of post-conflict countries relapse into political violence within five years,[37] any policy initiatives that can minimise this risk will in turn reduce the risk of future wars.

The number of UN peacekeeping operations more than doubled between 1988 and 2004—from 7 to 16 (Figure 5.6).

Figure 5.6 UN peacekeeping operations, 1948–2004

Source: Human Security Centre, 2005[38]

The end of the Cold War led to a steep increase in UN peacekeeping operations. Peace operations now play a critical role in rebuilding war-shattered societies and in preventing peace agreements from breaking down.

The peace operations of the post–Cold War era are not merely larger and more numerous than Cold War peacekeeping missions, they are also far more ambitious. Whereas the Cold War missions typically involved little more than monitoring ceasefires, many of today's operations are more akin to nation building.

A recent RAND Corporation study found that despite the much-publicised failures, two-thirds of UN nation-building missions examined were successful. This compared with a 50% success rate for comparable US missions.[39]

■ **A much greater willingness to use force.** The Security Council has been increasingly willing to authorise the use of force to deter 'spoilers' from undermining peace agreements and in so doing to restart old conflicts. UN peace operations are now routinely mandated to use force to protect the peace, not just their own personnel.[40]

■ **An increased resort to economic coercion.** Since the end of the Cold War the Security Council has been increasingly willing to impose economic sanctions—the other coercive instrument in the council's armoury. The number of UN sanctions on regimes increased more than fivefold between 1990 and 2000.[41] Sanctions can help deny warring parties access to arms and can pressure recalcitrant regimes—and rebel groups—to enter peace negotiations.

■ **An assault on the culture of impunity.** In addition to the establishment of the International Criminal Court and the various UN and ad hoc tribunals, the number

Figure 5.7 Numbers of international tribunals and countries prosecuting grave human rights abuses, 1970–2004

Countries prosecuting agents of previous regimes for grave human rights abuses

Hybrid and international criminal tribunals

Source: Human Security Centre, 2005[42]

The ending of the Cold War was associated with an increase in national and international prosecutions of perpetrators of grave human rights abuses.

of governments prosecuting agents of former regimes for grave human rights abuses increased from 1 to 11 between 1990 and 2004 (Figure 5.7). If would-be perpetrators of gross human rights abuses believe there is a real prospect that they will be brought to justice they may be deterred from acting in the first place.[43]

- **A greater emphasis on reconciliation.** The number of truth and reconciliation commissions in operation in any one year has more than doubled since the end of the Cold War—from one in 1989 to seven in 2003.[44] Pursuing reconciliation rather than revenge in post-conflict societies reduces the risk of renewed violence. Reconciliation is also a major aim of most peacebuilding programs.

- **Addressing the root causes of conflict.** The UN, the World Bank along with other international agencies and donor governments are increasingly designing development and aid policies that address what are perceived to be the root causes of political violence.

Individually, none of these policies has had a great impact on global security. Most have achieved only modest success in terms of their own goals. But taken together, their impact has been highly significant.

Overall, this surge of international activism provides the single best explanation for the extraordinary decrease in civil wars around the world since the 1990s.

Conclusion

The evidence and analysis briefly reviewed here support the following conclusions:

- International wars are extremely rare today and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The reasons for this include the factors identified by proponents of the liberal peace, the caution-inducing existence of nuclear weapons, the spread of the norm of war-aversion and the growing acceptance of norms prohibiting the use of force except in self-defence or when authorised by the Security Council.

- The sharp decline in international wars since the end of the 1970s is best explained not by institutions, structures and processes, which change slowly, but by the two dramatic shifts in global politics during this period—namely the demise of colonialism and the end of the Cold War.

- The civil war story is quite different. Over the long term, the evidence suggests that the risk of civil conflict is reduced by equitable economic growth, good governance and inclusive democracy. Development, in other words, appears to be a necessary condition for security, just as security is a necessary condition for development.

The 80% decline in the most deadly civil conflicts numbers that has taken place since the early 1990s owes little to any of the above factors, however.[45] Here the evidence suggests the main driver of change has been the extraordinary upsurge of activism by the international community that has been directed toward conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding.

This last point is both the most surprising and the least examined.[46] The evidence that international activism has been the main cause of the post–Cold War decline in armed conflict is persuasive, but thus far it is mostly circumstantial. A lot more research is required to determine which specific activities and mechanisms have been most effective in bringing about the recent improvement in global security—and under what conditions.

The *Human Security Report 2006* will provide a more detailed analysis of these trends and the data that support them. It will also examine the counter-trends that, if not addressed, may pose a major threat to global security in the long term.

ENDNOTES

1. Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War*, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988).

2. Because colonial wars are not between states, but between an external state and an indigenous liberation army, they are referred to by many scholars as 'extra-systemic' conflicts.

3. This estimate is drawn from tables in Kristian Gleditsch, 'A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816–2002', *International Interactions* 30 (2004): 231–262. The Gleditsch dataset is a revised version of the Correlates of War dataset.

4. Ibid.

5. Wars are defined in this dataset as conflicts that result in 1000 or more battle-deaths and in which at least one of the warring parties is a government.

6. Kristian Gleditsch, 'A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816–2002'. The term 'international war' as opposed to 'interstate war' is used because the dataset includes anti-colonial struggles which do not, strictly speaking, involve two or more governments.

7. Ibid.

8. Some anti-colonial conflicts were, of course, related to the Cold War.

9. The third war in 1999 was that between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

10. Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2005*, Center for International Development and Conflict Management (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, May 2005), http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/PC05print.pdf (accessed 20 July 2005).

11. Based on data in Kristian Gleditsch, 'A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816–2002'.

12. Note that while five-year moving average graphs show trends more clearly than single-year graphs, they tend to obscure some annual changes.

13. Bruce Russett and John O'Neal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations* (New York: WW Norton, 2001). Some critics object to this argument noting (correctly) that pre-war relationships between Germany and the countries it attacked were characterised by a high degree of economic interdependence, but that this did not prevent German aggression. This sort of criticism misses the point. The fact that *some* incentives for going to war have been reduced does not mean other drivers may not, on occasion, impel countries into war. Reducing the risk of war is not the same as eliminating it.

14. Ibid.

15. John Mearsheimer and Christopher Layne in Michael E. Brown et al., eds., *Theories of War and Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).

16. John Mueller, *The Remnants of War* (Ithaca: Cornell Univeristy Press, September 2004).

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Kristian Gleditsch, 'A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816–2002'. Note that while these figures refer only to civil (or intrastate) *wars*, the patterns are very similar to the intrastate conflict trends seen in the Uppsala/PRIO dataset discussed in Part I.

20. Ibid. If *all* civil conflicts involving a state are considered—that is, all civil conflicts resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year as opposed to only those resulting in at least 1000 battle-deaths—there is nearly a 40% decline over the same period.

21. Based on data in Kristian Gleditsch, 'A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816–2002'.

22. Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2005*.

23. See Håvard Hegre, Scott Gates, Nils Petter Gleditsch, et al., 'Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992', *American Political Science Review* 95, 1 (March 2001): 16–33, http://www.prio.no/page/Publication_details/CSCW_Staff_alpha_ALL/9429/38020.html (accessed 27 July 2005).

24. Monty G. Marshall and Teb Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2005*.

25. Macartan Humphreys and Ashutosh Varshney, 'Violent Conflict and the Millennium Development Goals: Diagnosis and Recommendations', 1st draft, background paper prepared for the meeting of the Millennium Development Goals Poverty Task Force Workshop, Bangkok, June 2004, http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/HV.pdf (accessed 27 July 2005).

26. Victor Asal and Amy Pate, 'The Decline of Ethnic Political Discrimination, 1950–2003' in Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2005*.

27. Ibid.

28. For data on the increase and subsequent decline in ethnic conflicts see Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr and Deepa Khosla, *Peace and Conflict 2001*, Center for International Development and Conflict Management (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 2000), 10–11, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/peaceconflict.pdf (accessed 27 July 2005).

29. Clearly, not all conflicts are ethnic conflicts.

30. This approximate percentage was established by a review conducted by the Human Security Centre of all the conflicts that have ended since 1989. About half these conflict terminations started *after* the Cold War was over.

31. The UN was established in an era when civil conflict was extremely rare. This is reflected in the language of the Charter which assigns to the Security Council the primary responsibility for maintaining *international* peace and security but contains no provisions for dealing with civil war. Indeed, Article 2.7 of the UN Charter precludes UN intervention in 'matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state'. The Charter also contains no reference to peacekeeping, let alone peacebuilding. However, since 1989 the UN has become increasingly involved in activities that address conflicts *within* states.

32. References for these figures will be presented in the *Human Security Report 2006*.

33. Data provided by the UN Department of Political Affairs.

34. This finding comes from a new dataset on conflict termination created by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program that was commissioned by the Human Security Centre and will be reviewed in detail in the *Human Security Report 2006*.

35. Data provided by the UN Department of Political Affairs.

36. Calculations based on data in Teresa Whitfield, 'A Crowded Field: Groups of Friends, the United Nations and the Resolution of Conflict', a paper reflecting work in progress for an upcoming book, New York, April 2005.

37. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War', Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper, March 2004, www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Files/Filer/CC/Papers/Conflicts_230404.pdf (accessed 27 July 2004).

38. Based on data from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp (accessed 22 July 2005).

39. Rand Corporation, 'Rand Study Says UN Nation Building Record Compares Favourably with the US in Some Respects', press release, 18 February 2005, http://www.rand.org/news/press.05/02.18.html (accessed 26 July 2005).

40. Data provided by Peter Wallensteen and Patrik Johansson, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2003.

41. United Nations, 'Use of sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter', Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General website January 2005, http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sanction.htm (Accessed 23 August 2005).

42. Data compiled by the Human Security Centre, from a wide variety of print and online sources.

43. However, some argue that threats of prosecution mean that those responsible for the crimes in question will be less likely to give up power.

44. Data compiled by the Human Security Centre, from a wide variety of print and online sources. Note that some commissions are truth commissions while others are both truth *and* reconciliation commissions.

45. Kristian Gleditsch, 'A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816–2002'.

46. Notable exceptions are found in the work of Ted Robert Gurr and Monty G. Marshall of the University of Maryland and Peter Wallensteen of Uppsala University.