



# Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice

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## Acknowledgement

The document was written by Letitia Anderson, Advocacy and Women's Rights Specialist for UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict, with expert input from Maj. Gen. (ret.) Patrick Cammaert and Anne Marie Goetz, UN Women Chief Advisor on Peace and Security.

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\*Any reference to "UNIFEM" in the document must be understood to refer to "former UNIFEM", one of the four entities merged into the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women on 21st July, 2010 by United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/64/289.

\*Any reference to United Nations "resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions or 5 WPS resolutions" in the document must be understood to refer to Security Council resolutions on women and peace and security 1325 (2000); 1820 (2008); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2009); and 1960 (2010).

*On the cover: Members of the Indian battalion of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) on route to Sake from North Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), as two young local boys salute the peacekeepers. 12 September 2007, Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo*

## ADDRESSING CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE AN ANALYTICAL INVENTORY OF PEACEKEEPING PRACTICE



## METHODOLOGY AND PURPOSE

This document began with a 2008 desk review of protection strategies employed by international and regional peacekeepers, namely: the United Nations (UN); the African Union (AU); the European Union (EU); the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Reports of ongoing peacekeeping missions by the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council were cited in addition to reports from think-tanks, academics, media and NGOs. The desk review was a basis for discussion at a high-level Wilton Park conference held in May 2008, entitled “Women Targeted or Affected by Armed Conflict: What Role for Military Peacekeepers?” co-organized by UNIFEM (now UN Women) and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), under UN Action auspices, with support from the Governments of Canada and the United Kingdom. This discussion continued in August 2008 at the annual Heads of Military Components Conference, where UNIFEM/DPKO/UN Action discussed how efforts to address sexual violence can contribute to building trust and confidence amongst the civilian population and improving situational awareness, thereby advancing broader mission objectives.

The findings were then field-tested through missions to UNMIL in Liberia; MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); and Rwanda to speak with members of the Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) who had served as peacekeepers with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The purpose of these validation missions was to cross-reference examples cited in the desk review with operational realities in contexts where sexual violence has been a prominent feature of conflict and its aftermath. Briefings with a range of interlocutors in Kigali, Monrovia, Bong County, Kinshasa and Goma helped to verify these examples and elicit further instructive illustrations. Insights and recommendations also emerged regarding how to take the process forward into doctrine, pre-deployment/mission-specific training, force generation, planning and operational orders. The research team comprised a former Force Commander, UN Division Commander and DPKO Military Adviser, Major General (ret.) Patrick Cammaert, representatives of the DPKO Office of Military Affairs (OMA), Hawaa El-Tayeb and Colonel Koko Essein, and a representative of UN Action, Letitia Anderson.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with multiple stakeholders including mission leadership, women’s groups, UN agencies and host governments (ministries of defense, justice, gender and health). Input was also provided from UN Secretariat staff and academics working on peacekeeping.

The roll-out and distribution of this knowledge product, financed by the Government of Australia, has included the development of training material as part of a package being developed by DPKO Integrated Training Service (ITS) on the protection of civilians. Scenario-based training has been piloted in several major troop contributing countries. There will also be continuing capture of the kinds of tactics identified in this paper to build a ‘bank’ of good practice. Indeed, since this process began, there has been a virtuous cycle of increased attention to sexual violence leading to more concerted efforts on the ground.

## DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

“Gender” refers to the social characteristics or attributes and opportunities associated with being male or female. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed on the basis of different factors, such as age, religion, national, ethnic and social origin and are learned through socialization. They differ both within and between cultures and are context/time-specific and changeable, not static or innate. Gender defines power relations in society and determines what is expected, allowed and valued in a woman or a man in a given context.<sup>1</sup>

“Gender analysis” refers to the methods used to understand the relationships between men and women in the context of society. An example would be when military planning activities assess the different security concerns of women and men in the area of operation or take account of power relations in the community to ensure women have equal access to assistance, where the military is engaged in facilitating humanitarian access. Other examples would include understanding how customary conflict-resolution mechanisms affect women and men differently, and how women’s social status may change as a result of war.

For the purpose of this paper, “peacekeeping operations” are understood broadly as internationally mandated, uniformed presences, either under United Nations auspices or under the authority of a regional organization like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Armed UN peacekeepers, unarmed UN Military Observers (UNMOs), armed and unarmed UN Police (UNPOL) and soldiers serving under their national commands but authorized by the Security Council, like the US-led Multinational Force in Haiti (1994-95) and the Australian-led force in Timor-Leste (1999-2000), all come within the definition of ‘peacekeeper’ for present purposes.

Recalling that women are not merely victims needing assistance but holders of rights to whom duties are owed by both national authorities and the international community, this paper takes a broad approach to the term “protection”. This aligns with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee definition: “The concept of protection encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the

letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. human rights; international humanitarian law; and refugee law).”<sup>2</sup> The practices identified cover all three widely-accepted subcategories of protection, namely: remedial action; responsive action; and environment building. The Independent Study on *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations* (2009), jointly commissioned by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and DPKO to look at steps taken to transform the protection of civilians from UN mandate language into realities on the ground, should be read in conjunction with the present paper.

It is insufficient to understand ‘sexual violence’ solely in terms of rape. Sexual violence also encompasses: sexual slavery; enforced prostitution; forced pregnancy; enforced sterilization; or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, which may include indecent assault; trafficking; inappropriate medical examinations; and strip searches (see 1998 *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*). The “Elements of Crimes” of the ICC defines sexual violence as follows: “The perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or caused such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent”.

Sexual violence can amount to a **tactic of war** when used to “humiliate, dominate, instil fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group” (Security Council resolution 1820 (2008), preamble). Sexual violence “can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide” (Security Council resolution 1820 (2008), operative paragraph 4; cf. 1998 *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* and the statutes and jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone).

<sup>1</sup> Adapted from UNHCR, *Sexual and Gender-Based Violence against Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons: Guidelines for Prevention and Response*, May 2003, and Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI) website (<http://www.womenwatch.org/osagi>)

<sup>2</sup> *Women, girls, boys and men - Different needs, equal opportunities*, Inter-agency Standing Committee, *Gender Handbook in Humanitarian Action*, New York, 2006, 12

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## Part 1: CONTEXT: CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE

1.1	Changing Dynamics of Conflict	8
1.2	The Mandate on Sexual Violence as a Threat to Peace and Security	9
1.3	Why Focus on Sexual Violence?	9
1.4	Responses by Peacekeepers—Taking Stock of Efforts to Address Sexual Violence	13
1.5	“War is not over when it’s over”	13
1.6	Participation and Empowerment	14
1.7	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Allegations tend to Overshadow Efforts to Contribute to Women’s Safety	15
1.8	Summary	16

## Part 2: INVENTORY OF TASKS AND TACTICS

2.1	Preventive Physical Protection: Armed Patrols and Escorts	18
2.2	Joint Protection Teams (JPTs)	21
2.3	Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)	22
2.4	Deterrent Tasks, Including through Visible Presence	23
2.5	Cordon-and-Search Operations	24
2.6	Community Liaison	25
2.7	Securing the Environment for Delivery of Humanitarian Aid	27
2.8	Gender-Sensitive Camp Design and Management	28
2.9	Public Information: Monitoring, Reporting, Behavioral Change Communication	29
2.10	Reviving the Political Process: Electoral Security for Women	30
2.11	Restoring Rule of Law: Fostering Gender Justice	30
2.12	Gender-Sensitive DDR/Demilitarization and Ceasefire Monitoring	31
2.13	Gender-Sensitive Justice and Security Sector Reform	32
2.14	Non-combatant Evacuation Operations/Safe Passage	33
2.15	Counter Human Trafficking Operations	34
2.16	Women in Detention	34

## Part 3: CHECKLIST: EMERGING ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE RESPONSE

3.1	Leadership backed by strong command and control structures	36
3.2	Systematization of ad hoc responses	36
3.3	Understanding the links between sexual violence and the restoration of peace and security	36
3.4	Willingness and wherewithal to patrol and operate in unconventional space	36
3.5	Consultation with all segments of the community	36
3.6	Incentives that recognize and reward successful initiatives to combat sexual violence	37
3.7	Effective coordination between military and other protection stakeholders	37
3.8	Operational scenario-based pre-deployment and in-mission/refresher training	37
3.9	Role-modeling and capacity-building to help leave a legacy of security for women and girls	38
3.10	Gender balance in force generation and deployment	38

## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur  
 African Union Mission in Sudan  
 Civil-Military Coordination  
 Demilitarized Zones  
 Democratic Republic of the Congo  
 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration  
 Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement  
 Displaced Person Operations  
 Economic Community of West African States  
 ECOWAS Monitoring Force in Liberia  
 European Union Security Sector Reform Mission in the DRC  
 Inter-Agency Standing Committee  
 Internally Displaced Persons  
 International Committee of the Red Cross  
 International Humanitarian Law IHL  
 International Force in East Timor  
 International Rescue Committee  
 Kosovo Force  
 Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders)  
 Non-Governmental Organizations  
 Police Contributing Country  
 Quick Impact Projects  
 Rules of Engagement  
 Rwanda Defense Force  
 Security Sector Reform  
 Sexual and Gender-Based Violence  
 Special Representative of the Secretary-General  
 Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO-led  
 Training of Trainers  
 Troop Contributing Country  
 United Nations Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict  
 United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda  
 United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone  
 United Nations Children’s Fund  
 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
 United Nations Development Programme  
 United Nations Development Fund for Women  
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
 United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women  
 United Nations Military Observer  
 United Nations Mine Action Service  
 United Nations Mission in Kosovo  
 United Nations Mission in Liberia  
 United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC  
 United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in DR Congo  
 United Nations Police  
 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  
 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights  
 United Nations Protection Force, former Yugoslavia  
 World Food Programme

UNAMID  
 AMIS  
 CIMIC  
 DMZs  
 DRC  
 DDR  
 DRRR  
 DP Ops  
 ECOWAS  
 ECOMIL  
 EUSEC  
 IASC  
 IDPs  
 ICRC  
 IHL  
 INTERFET  
 IRC  
 KFOR  
 MSF  
 NGOs  
 PCC  
 QIPs  
 ROE  
 RDF  
 SSR  
 SGBV  
 SRSG  
 SFOR  
 TOT  
 TCC  
 UN Action  
 UNAMIR  
 UNAMSIL  
 UNICEF  
 DPKO  
 UNDP  
 UNIFEM  
 UNHCR  
 UN WOMEN  
 UNMO  
 UNMAS  
 UNMIK  
 UNMIL  
 MONUC  
 MONUSCO  
 UNPOL  
 UN OCHA  
 UN OHCHR  
 UNPROFOR  
 WFP

## 1: CONTEXT: CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE

“I don’t know when I began to clearly see the evidence of another crime besides murder among the bodies in the ditches and the mass graves. I know that for a long time I sealed away from my mind all the signs of this crime, instructing myself not to recognize what was there in front of me. The crime was rape, on a scale that deeply affected me... For a long time I completely wiped the death masks of raped and sexually mutilated girls and women from my mind as if what had been done to them was the last thing that would send me over the edge. But if you looked, you could see the evidence, even in the whitened skeletons. The legs bent and apart. A broken bottle, a rough branch, even a knife between them. Where the bodies were fresh, we saw what must have been semen pooled on and near the dead women and girls. There was always a lot of blood. Some male corpses had their genitals cut off, but many women and young girls had their breasts chopped off and their genitals crudely cut apart. They died in a position of total vulnerability, flat on their backs, with their legs bent and knees wide apart. It was the expressions on their dead faces that assaulted me the most, a frieze of shock, pain and humiliation.”

– Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Roméo Dallaire, Former UNAMIR Force Commander  
 Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda  
 (Random House Canada, 2003, p.430).

“The failures of humanity” in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s compelled the United Nations to review its efforts to **protect unarmed civilians under imminent threat of physical violence**. These and other contemporary conflicts brutally demonstrated that “physical violence” includes sexual violence, and that women’s perspectives on peace and security could no longer be sidelined.

Despite increased attention over the past decade to the women, peace and security agenda, major **analytical and implementation gaps** remain. Without detracting from the primary responsibility of national authorities to protect their citizens, an important remaining gap is the potential of uniformed peacekeepers to help fight sexual violence and exert a positive impact on the lives of women and girls and, by extension, civilian communities as a whole. While the focus of this document is on sexual violence, this should be viewed as part of the broader role of peacekeepers in protecting civilian populations, contextualized within the understanding that the restoration of security requires not only **protection from physical violence**, but establishing a **protective environment** and finding a lasting **political solution**.

This paper focuses primarily on **military peacekeepers**, not to ‘militarize’ the sexual violence agenda or to downplay the vital work of police and civilian components, humanitarian actors and development experts, but because military institutions have been belatedly engaged with so-called ‘gender’ or ‘women’s issues’, and provided with little guidance. For instance, national armies do not generally have **doctrine** or **scenario-based training** to deal with sexual violence as a war tactic. Military personnel may therefore lack the requisite level of **preparedness** to address it in theatre. The independent study on **Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations** notes that expectations of peacekeepers in the field have not always been clearly articulated in mandate language. Moreover, military institutions are generally the last branch of government to attain gender balance and integrate women’s perspectives. Globally, women comprise just **3 per cent** of military peacekeeping personnel, though it is clear that they add distinctive skills. As sexual violence has deep political, economic and attitudinal roots, female peacekeepers serve not only to facilitate outreach to women and girls, but also provide striking role models, as do male peacekeepers who listen to women’s voices and take their concerns seriously. This can shape local perceptions of women as valued contributors to the consolidation of peace.

All references to MONUC in this document refer to the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, now called MONUSCO.

Bolstering the capacity of military peacekeepers in this regard reinforces strategic efforts by DPKO and regional security institutions to **make the best possible use of existing resources**. It is evident that peacekeepers have developed enterprising solutions even in the face of limited operational capacity, as well as security and political constraints. This research also affirms that protection requires the military to **connect with civilian staff** and other components of an integrated mission. As MONUC Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Alan Doss stated in May 2009: **“There will never be enough resources...this is why, for example, we are trying to understand the communities better... We need to recognize that protection is more than just having military boots on the ground. It’s about how you use them, and how you can connect with your civilian staff.”** Some of the practices cited here are mission-level tasks that could not be conducted by the military independently, but may require military support. Uniformed peacekeepers have a **distinct contribution** to make to this agenda, for instance, because victims of conflict-related rape are often located in remote areas that can only be reached by well-equipped patrols.

## UNIFORMED PEACEKEEPERS HAVE A DISTINCT CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE TO THIS AGENDA, FOR INSTANCE, BECAUSE VICTIMS OF CONFLICT-RELATED RAPE ARE OFTEN LOCATED IN REMOTE AREAS THAT CAN ONLY BE REACHED BY WELL-EQUIPPED PATROLS.

### 1.1 CHANGING DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT

**“It is perhaps more dangerous to be a woman than a soldier in armed conflict.”**

– Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Patrick Cammaert  
Wilton Park Conference, May 2008.

Contemporary, intra-State conflicts are characterized by an **increased civilian-combatant interface** and have been termed **“wars among the people”** (Gen. Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, 2007). This means that women and children are frequently the focus of armed violence—waged for the control of populations, as much as

territory. Yet the role of uniformed peacekeepers in enhancing women’s security and countering sexual violence has not received due attention. Some contend that sexual violence is nothing new—rather, recent years have seen new attention to this ancient crime of war. However, the dynamics of conflict and the classical boundaries between ‘homefront’ and ‘battlefront’ have changed. One effect of this has been the strategic use of brutal forms of sexualized violence against civilian populations to serve specific purposes. Examples include: forced incest and public rape for maximum humiliation and to shred the social fabric, as in DRC and Timor-Leste, turning victims into outcasts; rape as a deliberate vector of HIV during the Rwandan genocide; forced impregnation of women in camps specifically designed for that purpose in Bosnia and Herzegovina; premeditated rape as a tool of political repression in Guinea-Conakry to punish women for participating in public life; and countless other cases. As part of the **continual process of adapting protection to the changing nature of conflict, the profound insecurity perpetuated by sexual violence must be addressed at the strategic and tactical level**. Peacekeeping and, more generally, national and regional security and defense policy, doctrine and training, need to keep pace with these evolving threats.

While the role of military components in peacekeeping missions is primarily to provide a secure environment as a precondition for advancing other elements of peace agreements, **contemporary conflicts have often necessitated direct interactions between military peacekeepers and local populations**. In some field locations, the first point of contact for the peacekeeping mission may be military personnel. Victims of sexual violence should be able to approach them and request support. The military therefore need to know how to provide a **first response** that ensures respect for the wishes of the victim; provides information about available medical support; and appropriately documents the case, respecting privacy and confidentiality. The way peacekeepers respond to such cases can affect the **image of the mission** and, in turn, the **safety of the force**. Many commanders have realized that working closely with civilians and understanding the gender, ethnic and religious dynamics of the societies in which they serve relates directly to conflict resolution.

While the women’s rights literature highlights the need to protect and empower war-affected women, military peacekeepers are barely mentioned. Yet they are a **vital piece of the overall protection puzzle**. The focus has rather been on the more developed field of police practice in responding to sexual violence. While the present paper primarily examines the role of the military, the issue of **coordination between police and**

**military components of integrated missions** is a relevant consideration, hence some aspects of policing practice are referenced in this inventory. Coordination between military peacekeepers and other mission personnel, including justice, corrections, human rights, child protection and gender, is equally important and touched upon in the inventory and checklist, which do not purport to be comprehensive in this regard. While measures are taken by communities themselves, and the responsibility for maintaining a secure environment rests with government authorities, there remains an important provisional role to be played by uniformed peacekeepers in helping women to protect their lives and livelihoods, often providing a ‘thin blue line’ between security and terror. Although in some locations, effective protection can make the difference between life and death and serve as a deterrent to rape, abduction and forced displacement, the role of the military will always be limited. An effective response requires a well-planned and coordinated effort from an array of actors.

### 1.2 THE MANDATE ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE AS A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY

**“Effective steps to prevent and respond to such acts of sexual violence can significantly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.**

– Security Council resolution 1820 (2008)  
Operative Paragraph 1

The lag in practical and tactical responses has **policy roots**. Conflict-related sexual violence has only recently been elevated to a place on the mainstream peace and security policy agenda. On 19 June 2008, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted **resolution 1820 (2008)**, acknowledging sexual violence as a “tactic of war” linked with the maintenance of international peace and security. Resolution 1820 (2008) demands the “immediate and complete cessation by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence against civilians” (operative paragraph 2). This complements Security Council **resolutions 1325** (2000) and **1889** (2009) on *Women and Peace and Security*; Resolutions **1612** (2005) and **1882** (2009) on *Children and Armed Conflict*; and Resolutions **1674** (2006) and **1894** (2009) on the *Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*.

Resolution 1820 (2008) has been subsequently operationalized by **resolution 1888** (2009) and **resolution 1960** (2010). Together they provide an ambitious platform for confronting a present-day emergency affecting millions of women and children. They require security actors, including UN and regional peacekeepers, to respond to sexual violence with as much determination as they would to any other atrocity. Resolution 1820 (2008) places sexual violence squarely within the security paradigm of the

Council, acknowledging that it can **exacerbate armed conflict and impede the restoration of peace**.

As a result of resolutions 1325 and 1820, **peacekeeping missions are increasingly being specifically mandated to address sexual violence** (six missions currently have addressing sexual and gender-based violence as a mandated task.) A positive example is MONUC, which was mandated through Resolution 1856 (2008) to “strengthen its efforts to prevent and respond to sexual violence, including through training for the Congolese security forces..., and to regularly report..., on actions taken in this regard, including data on instances of sexual violence and trend analyses of the problem” (operative paragraph 13). Subsequent mandate renewals of this mission have only reinforced this emphasis. This new prioritization of sexual violence reflects an understanding that the credibility of peacekeeping operations is at stake if they are unable to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, including sexual violence. The present document is an initial contribution to meeting the call in resolution 1820 (2008) for “effective guidelines and strategies to enhance the ability of relevant UN peacekeeping operations, consistent with their mandates, to protect civilians, including women and girls, from all forms of sexual violence” (operative paragraph 9). It also partly responds to the May 2010 *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations* (C-34), which “welcomes the Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ efforts to update training programs for military, police and civilian peacekeeping personnel to ensure they include operational guidance to protect women and girls from sexual violence. In this regard, the Special Committee encourages the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to work with other United Nations actors in identifying best practices for peacekeeping personnel to protect women and girls from sexual violence” (A/64/19, paragraph 127).

### 1.3 WHY FOCUS ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE?

**“In a number of contemporary conflicts, sexual violence has taken on particularly brutal dimensions, sometimes as a means of pursuing military, political, social and economic objectives.”**

– Report of the Secretary-General  
pursuant to Security Council resolution 1820 (S/2009/362)  
paragraph 6.

Sexual violence warrants specific attention as one of **“history’s greatest silences.”** Its impact is exacerbated by social and religious taboos, including a cultural disinclination to disclose abuse. Shrouded in shame, it is a torture tactic victims are reticent to reveal. It is precisely this stigma and silence, which supports impunity for the perpetrators, that has contributed to its prevalence as a war tactic of choice. In 1994, then-UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women Radhika Coomaraswamy characterized rape as **“the least condemned war crime.”**

Indeed, sexual violence **challenges conventional notions of what constitutes a security threat**. It is often invisible: the world does not witness rape in the same way as landmine injuries. Cheaper than bullets, it requires no weapons system other than physical intimidation, making it low cost, yet high impact. This may also render sexual violence **resistant to disarmament processes and ceasefire monitoring**, aimed to rid communities of conventional weapons and ensure the cessation of shooting and other openly hostile acts. Yet Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) without psychological debrief, rehabilitation or follow-up may exacerbate sexual violence by reinserting ex-combatants into civilian settings in closer proximity to women and children, or by integrating past perpetrators into the national armed forces without a credible vetting process. Limited livelihood options for ex-combatants, combined with militarized notions of masculinity, learned patterns of aggression, and drug and alcohol abuse, may perpetuate violent behavior.

## INDEED, SEXUAL VIOLENCE CHALLENGES CONVENTIONAL NOTIONS OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A SECURITY THREAT. CHEAPER THAN BULLETS, IT REQUIRES NO WEAPONS SYSTEM OTHER THAN PHYSICAL INTIMIDATION, MAKING IT LOW COST, YET HIGH IMPACT.

In the case of Liberia, available data indicates that the perpetrators of sexual violence during the conflict were principally combatants. Post-conflict, the majority of perpetrators are ex-combatants, former child soldiers or young men brutalized by the conflict. However, rather than analyze the continuum between the current prevalence of rape and the 14-year civil war, there is a tendency to call it a 'cultural' phenomenon, as these ex-combatants are now teachers, family members, religious and community leaders. As one Liberian Senator told us: *"the rapists are now in three-piece suits"*—meaning they have changed their image and attire, but not necessarily their attitudes or behavior. An UNMIL (United Nations Mission in Liberia) military observer further informed our research team that *"the nature of rape in this country makes it impossible for UNMIL to organize physical preventive measures like patrols because the perpetrators live with the community and the offences take place from within"*. This

reveals that **peacekeepers trained to respond to the use or show of force may be ill-prepared and configured to combat the use of rape**. Often the chief obstacle is not *culture*, but capacity. UNMIL's approach accordingly centers on training, sensitization and building the government's capacity to protect its citizens.

**A public/private divide in security policy has kept rape off the radar** of international and regional security institutions, thereby reducing the prospects for intervention and redress. Indeed, a recurrent objection has been that including SGBV in peacekeeping would implicate the mission in the 'private', rather than public, affairs of a State. However, gender dynamics are already part of any conflict and hence violence may **predominate in private or semi-private spaces**, such as homes, camps or compounds far from the 'battlefield', **this does not mean it is unconnected to the conflict**. As the Oxfam/Harvard Humanitarian Initiative report on sexual violence in DRC notes, over half of all sexual assaults that took place in the supposed safety of the family home were committed by armed combatants ("Now, The World Is Without Me", April 2010, showing that 56 per cent of assaults were carried out in the home by armed men, while 16 per cent took place in fields, and almost 15 per cent in the forest; the study also found that rape spiked during military activities). In conflict/post-conflict zones, where the perpetrators of sexual violence are affiliated with armed groups, this may fall within the scope of a peacekeeping mandate in a way that ordinary domestic crimes or purely internal matters would not. The relevant issue is the nexus with peace and security, rather than the location in which rape occurs. Mandates that require peacekeepers to "prevent and halt acts of extreme violence", in

## A PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE IN SECURITY POLICY HAS KEPT RAPE OFF THE RADAR OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS, THEREBY REDUCING THE PROSPECTS FOR INTERVENTION AND REDRESS.

particular "violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict", will therefore often include sexual violence.

Conflict-related sexual violence is comparable in its *intent, extent and impact* to any classical method of warfare. It often has an **aggravated character**, such as gang-rapes; rapes accompanied with torture, mutilation or branding; rapes with objects; rapes

in the presence of family members; or rapes of particularly taboo categories of victim such as men, boys and the elderly. Dr. Mukwege, who has been treating sexual violence survivors in DRC for a decade, describes this as "Rape with Extreme Violence (REV)", stating that "[o]n any given night in eastern DRC, armed groups of men will overrun a village and divide into bands of three to five, forcing themselves into houses where they seize and serially rape women and young girls. Some mutilate female genitals with guns, pieces of glass, wood, or heated plastic. Some take their victims to the forest and torture them as sex slaves for days, months, or years" (Dr. Denis Mukwege, Cathy Nangini, "Rape with Extreme Violence: The New Pathology in South Kivu, DRC", *PLoS Med* 6(12), Dec. 2009). **Far from being cultural or inevitable, this is a method of warfare that has a sexual character**. The lack of repercussions for such acts can fuel a culture of sexual predation. In some armed groups, refusing to rape may be more likely to have negative consequences than actually committing the crime. For instance, gang-rape was used as a bonding mechanism for forcibly recruited rebels during the civil war in Sierra Leone, and constructed as the action of a "successful soldier" during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

NGOs such as *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) have noted the **persistence of sexual violence during and in the wake of armed conflicts, despite conventional protection strategies**. MSF further reports that with every fresh outbreak of armed conflict in the DRC, sexual violence against women and girls escalates. Other commentators have observed that the large peacekeeping presence in the DRC has corresponded with an apparent acceleration, rather than decline, in sexual violence (noting this does *not* refer

to sexual abuse by peacekeepers, but rather sexual violence by armed groups in peacekeeping areas). This apparent acceleration could be explained by the fact that improved security makes women less afraid to report; the security umbrella enables the work of humanitarian organizations that collect this information; and it would be difficult to access the information at all if peacekeepers were not present. Nonetheless, data suggests that the presence of MONUC has measurably lowered the incidence of overall violence in their areas of responsibility, but has not had a comparable impact on the prevalence of rape. For example, in November 2007, MONUC reported its success in South Kivu, including a *"sharp reduction in violent incidents"*, yet simultaneously mentioned that incidents of rape across the country *"remain prevalent"*.

MONUC, as well as several human rights organizations, have noted an escalation of sexual assaults in eastern DRC, leaving some villages virtual ghost towns. The UN registered 7,703 new cases of sexual violence in the Kivus in 2008; and between January and June 2009, 5,387 rapes were reported in South Kivu alone—a 30 per cent increase compared to the same period the previous year. In total, 15,275 rape cases were registered in DRC over the course of 2009. Very few cases are investigated or prosecuted. For instance, according to a representative of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in DRC, of some 14,200 rape cases registered in South Kivu between 2005-2007, just 2 per cent of perpetrators were ever pursued. In March 2009, the International Crisis Group (ICG) noted critically that even as State authority in DRC is extended and the political environment becomes more conducive to conflict resolution, women who



UN observers speak with Syrian women in the aftermath of violence – Credit: UN Photo/Neeraj Singh

are raped everyday remain voiceless: *“There’s no longer fighting, just women being raped, so everyone is happy”*. This reflects a prevailing opinion that a security situation has improved when inter-group fighting has ceased or become sporadic, even though large numbers of women continue to be raped.

In **Darfur**, women have been living under the shadow of conflict-related sexual violence for several years. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reported to the Security Council on 13 July 2009, that *“large-scale violence stretching over a wide territory and for lengthy periods is now infrequent”*, and yet *“banditry and sexual violence continue to plague civilians throughout Darfur”*, particularly the 2.6 million forcibly displaced. Even though the overall level of violence has declined significantly since the joint UN-African Union (AU) hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was formed, **sexual violence remains a hallmark of the crisis**.

In **Haiti**, prior to the January 2010 earthquake, data collected by NGOs revealed an alarming spike in sexual violence despite the presence of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The number of reported cases of raped women and girls increased by 40 per cent from 1,100 cases in 2007 to 1,600 cases in 2008. Some have attributed this to safer reporting conditions, but incidents nonetheless remain sufficiently widespread to threaten overall security, as well as the ability of women and girls to benefit from the peace dividend. Among the aftershocks of the January earthquake was a **spike in sexual and gender-based violence, correlated with increased instability**.

In **Timor-Leste** during the crisis in 1999, 27 per cent of women reported physical violence by members of militias/ military, whereas post-conflict rates of violence against women were one-quarter of those reported during the crisis period. More specifically, one in four women reported sexual violence during the crisis, as opposed to one in eight post-crisis (according to a report by Hynes, Ward et al., “A Determination of the Prevalence of Gender-based Violence among Conflict-affected Populations in East Timor”, 2004). This demonstrates a correlation between instability and increased sexual violence that cannot be explained by a straightforward “continuum of gender-based violence” from times of peace to times of war.

In a 2005 report to the Security Council, Former UN Under Secretary-General Jan Egeland stated: *“The recurrent use of sexual violence is arguably one of the worst global protection challenges due to its scale, prevalence and profound impact... Far from making general progress, we have in too many places regressed. We have information of more and more women being attacked; younger and younger children are victims of these atrocities”*. At a high-level UN colloquium on conflict-related sexual violence and peace negotiations, held in June 2009, Mr. Egeland lamented the **striking lack of progress in this area**, noting a lingering *“conspiracy of*

*silence”* and tendency to *“leave conflict-related sexual violence to humanitarian agencies, and all they do is offer a rape survivor a blanket and some food. They can document it and provide for victims, but cannot stop it”*. Similarly, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon observed during his mission to the DRC in March 2009 that the scale and severity of sexual violence continues in a way that *“violates everything the United Nations stands for”*. He further observed that while *“the situation on the ground is improving”*, **rape remains “commonplace”**. Indeed, sexual violence can become **socially normalized** during and after conflict, which undercuts confidence in nascent government institutions and makes a mockery of efforts to reinstate the rule of law.

In addition, sexual violence has sweeping socio-economic implications: inhibiting women’s workforce participation and girls’ school attendance. It is particularly devastating in traditional societies where women’s status is often linked to marriage and motherhood, as the consequences of rape (including irreparable fistula and infertility) **may permanently exclude victims from community life**. Being raped or labeled a ‘rebel wife’ or ‘child of the enemy’ can result in lifelong social ostracism and neglect. The physical and psychological trauma and disease inflicted by rape renders it a form of ‘biological warfare’, with ripple effects extending from the victim to their family and community. This can spark vicious cycles of attack and retribution that hinder reconciliation. Rape perpetrated publicly and in front of loved ones may prevent community recovery through a forced repudiation of family ties. Action to address sexual violence by peacekeepers, as well as official punitive action, is important as it signifies to the community that rape is not the victims’ fault, but a crime to be taken seriously. This also serves as a warning and deterrent to would-be perpetrators.

Sexual violence is directed mainly, though by no means exclusively, against women and girls. **Men and boys** are also exposed to rape and other forms of sexual violence during and in the aftermath of armed conflict, as an instrument of terror and collective punishment, during detention and interrogation, as an expression of ethnic hatred and humiliation, and to emasculate and shatter leadership structures. Though data is limited, UNFPA reports that 80% of the 5,000 male inmates held at a concentration camp in Sarajevo Canton reported being raped. Sexual violence is not specific to any group, culture or continent. In varying forms and degrees, it **spans all of history and all geography**. Accordingly, the present inventory covers conflicts in the Balkans, Africa, Asia, the Pacific and the Middle East—though recent years have seen the African continent disproportionately affected by a wave of internal conflicts in which sexual violence has been a feature of the fighting.

#### 1.4 RESPONSES BY PEACEKEEPERS—TAKING STOCK OF EFFORTS TO ADDRESS SEXUAL VIOLENCE

*“One might wonder why the Rwanda Defense Force is at the forefront of combating gender-based violence... But our experience during the genocide of 1994 opened our eyes and is inevitably related to our intolerant attitude to this crime. Who cannot combat this heinous crime if it impacted on him or her directly? Rwandese women were victims of this evil during the genocide. The same spirit drives us in peacekeeping missions. Whether we are in Khartoum or Darfur or the Comoros, it is as if we are in another province of Rwanda. We see the women as our own mothers, sisters and aunties. And we do for them as we would do for our mothers and sisters back home.”*

– Rwanda Defense Force (Rdf) Army Chief of Staff, Lt. General Charles Kayonga, UNIFEM (now UN Women) Conference, Kigali, March 2008.

In the face of intensifying, strategic attacks of a sexual character, peacekeepers have endeavored to provide, or support efforts to provide, an effective response. This has proved challenging in the absence of clear mandates, tailored training, dedicated resources and incentive structures that encourage proactive protection and preparedness. The inventory of tactical responses employed to date [see Part 2], which aims to provide a basis for designing future interventions, was hence demand-driven. ‘Business as usual’ has not adequately equipped uniformed peacekeepers to combat this form of conflict-related crime. ‘Best practice’ is admittedly a vexed description of the strategies cited, as women have not consistently experienced them as such. ‘Lessons learned’ is equally inapplicable, as cross-mission learning and information-sharing on actions to address sexual violence is yet to occur. The challenges and trade-offs associated with various responses to sexual violence, as well as their direct or indirect protection dividend for women and girls, were therefore analyzed prior to their inclusion in this inventory.

The inventory of tasks and tactics is illustrative rather than prescriptive or comprehensive. It is evidence of promising practice that could be scaled-up, rather than a formal position of the UN system or its constituent entities. It originally served as a springboard for discussion by actors with operational experience and Security Council members during a high-level conference at Wilton Park in May 2008, whose report is included in this collection. By providing precedents for practitioners to nuance, supplement and contest, the aim was to stimulate reflection on creative, practical solutions that can advance women’s protection, and overall mission success. Since this process began, there has been a virtuous cycle of increased attention generating more effective practice on the ground. The Wilton Park Conference engaged Generals alongside gender experts, to broaden the constituency for sexual violence prevention and response, by viewing it through a security as well as a gender lens. The present

document continues in this direction, by bringing gender analysis and the practice of military and police peacekeepers into closer contact. The proposal in Security Council resolution 1888 (2009) that Women Protection Advisers (WPAs) be appointed in peacekeeping missions, on a case-by-case basis, provides a further bridge between operational protection and gender-sensitivity skill sets.

In keeping with the pragmatic character of peacekeeping operations, the focus is on solutions that warrant deeper discussion, dissemination and potential replication, taking into account circumstances prevailing on the ground and the strategies in which specific tasks are embedded. The inventory is structured around issues that present distinct security risks for women and deserve specific consideration in training and planning, but may be overlooked. For instance, it is not enough to plan for and conduct patrols. If information suggests that women are at risk of sexual violence when carrying out culturally-assigned tasks like firewood or water collection, peacekeepers must first understand that this has security dimensions that require a specific response. This response may include the presence of female peacekeepers on patrols and female language assistants to coordinate the patrol calendar with local women. Consultation with women about their needs, concerns and experiences has been crucial to ensuring the success of protection strategies.

#### 1.5 “WAR IS NOT OVER WHEN IT’S OVER”

*“Sexual violence was our big weapon...we did it as a way of provoking the Congolese Government. Sexual violence has led to the Government wanting to negotiate with us.”*

– Commander Taylor CNDP (National Congress for the Defense of the People), In 2009 Documentary “Weapon of War: Confessions of Rape In Congo”.

Where rape has been employed as a method of warfare, it can become a habit carried seamlessly into the post-conflict context. Women become convenient targets of frustration in a fractured, brutalized society, where law and order is held in abeyance. In some cases, rebel commanders or “spoilers” who seek to disrupt implementation of a mission mandate, use exactions against civilians to earn them attention as a force to be reckoned with. The more shocking the violence, the more effective it is. This can mean that mass rape is more likely to lead warlords to the negotiating table or the corridors of power, than to the cells of a prison. As many war correspondents and reporters from the frontlines have observed, for women “war is not over when it’s over”. However, sexual violence is rarely mentioned in ceasefire agreements. The UN Women paper on peace negotiations (‘Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence’) included in this collection,

notes that since the end of the Cold War, out of approximately 300 peace agreements only 18 have mentioned sexual or gender-based violence, and that in 24 peace processes over the past two decades, women formed less than 10 per cent of negotiating teams. When wars end, violence against women continues and often escalates.

This is relevant for peacekeepers who may find themselves operating in a “nation of widows”—a term used to describe the post-conflict demographics of Rwanda, Afghanistan and Sierra Leone—or in contexts where every armed group, and even male civilians, profit from the cover of war to rape, abduct, extort and coerce women into forced marriage, labor or prostitution. Moreover, the persistence of sexual violence can delay the return of refugees and IDPs to their original domiciles, and thus reduce a society’s ability to reconstitute. This is relevant for peacekeepers whose mandates may require them to facilitate the voluntary and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs.

In Burundi in 2006, despite the war being mostly at an end, and the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) being in place, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and MSF reported a steady stream of mothers bringing daughters for post-rape care in areas where rebel groups had settled. In Northern Uganda in 2007, even as the political situation stabilized, rape remained rampant in the camps. In Liberia, rape is currently the number one crime reported to the Liberian National Police (LNP) according to the monthly crime statistics. Despite the prevalence of sexual violence and women’s pivotal role in peacebuilding, the issue was not addressed in the 2003 Liberian Peace Agreement. Rather, the arrival of ECOWAS at the end of the civil war marked a “frenzy of rape” as a form of “scorched earth policy” by both rebel and government fighters, who saw the female population “as booty to be taken before the peacekeepers took over” (according to a 2004 study by the African Women and Peace Support Group, “Liberian Women Peacemakers: Fighting for the Right to be Seen, Heard and Counted”).

Ceasefire monitors should be mandated to ensure that when the guns fall silent, raping does not continue unchecked. Otherwise, ex-belligerents can claim to adhere to the formal terms of a peace accord while waging a proxy war on one another’s women. Peacekeepers cannot be omnipresent, but when they deploy between opposing factions to keep them at bay and to ensure the ceasefire on the ground, what they monitor should include the cessation of sexual violence. Otherwise, license to loot and rape at gunpoint (be it implicit or explicit) can prolong conflict, providing incentive for irregularly-paid rebels to continue or resume the fight.

## 1.6 PARTICIPATION AND EMPOWERMENT

**“Women are seen to be much less threatening and much more accessible to the local population than men, particularly when you go into a community of mostly women and children.”**

– Michelle Lee Former UN Peacekeeper,  
“Women Peacekeepers Making a Difference”, Jane Lloyd, UN Chronicle, 2006.

Gender balance in peacekeeping can help the UN to “lead by example” in relation to women’s empowerment as both security providers and beneficiaries. Women may have a comparative operational advantage in sexual violence prevention, having greater proximity to groups at risk. The sending a message that women are credible interlocutors regard, ‘empowerment’ advances mandate implementation by broadening the base of participation for peacebuilding, so a nation is not deprived of half its human resources. The preamble of resolution 1888 (2009) mentions the role of peacekeepers in “helping to build a security sector that is accessible and responsive to all, especially women”. Increasing the number of women peacekeepers specifically trained on sexual violence is an important challenge for troop and police contributing countries.

Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), awareness that “an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls...can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security” has grown, yet this insight has rarely been operationalized, let alone systematized. Efforts are being made to protect women from conflict-related violence, but they generally occur in the absence of explicit mandates, tested tactics and analytical tools. As a result, they have generally been reactive, short-term and ad hoc. For instance, if firewood patrols to protect women from attacks outside of camps are being conducted in different ways, by different battalions, in different missions, the most effective techniques should be identified for information-sharing purposes. Women’s physical security is a right in itself and a prerequisite to the realization of all other rights, such as freedom of movement and equal participation in social, economic and political life.

## 1.7 SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE ALLEGATIONS TEND TO OVERSHADOW EFFORTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO WOMEN’S SAFETY

**“We initially thought ‘gender issues’ were only about the behavior of troops...not realizing the operational interest, the added value to the effectiveness of the mission of integrating gender perspectives.”**

– BRIG. General Jean-Philippe Ganascia  
Former Force Commander of EUFOR/CHAD, EU Seminar  
“Strengthening ESDP Missions and Operations Through Training on UNSCR 1325 and 1820”, Brussels, 9 July 2009.

Many women’s rights advocates and humanitarian actors agree that peacekeepers make a crucial contribution to women’s safety. Yet this discussion has largely been eclipsed by the media spotlight on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA). SEA figures prominently in the press, while successful peacekeeping initiatives are often overlooked. Indeed, discussions of peacekeepers and sexual violence have disproportionately portrayed them as perpetrators rather than protectors. Field research suggests that this has had the effect of distancing personnel from the host population, thereby limiting situational awareness of women’s needs and risks. While it is important to avoid conflating the two, SEA can have a complex relationship with SGBV prevention. Fear of SEA allegations may deter uniformed personnel from

operating in proximity to women or undertaking, for example, much-needed night foot patrols. It may also compound efforts to engage local women as language assistants and community liaisons. This could diminish innovation and de-motivate the mission from taking proactive steps to protect.

Peacekeeping regulations generally prohibit military peacekeepers from ‘fraternizing’ with local populations. However, peacekeepers interviewed agreed that the force could occasionally support forums for the military and local populations to exchange experiences and knowledge, and could also perform more humanitarian tasks like supporting recreational/sporting activities or imparting farming skills. Certainly, full implementation of the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13) is critical to preserving the credibility required for the military to perform its functions, but opportunities to improve relations with the host population should not be inhibited by fear of SEA allegations.

The present paper does not cover conduct and discipline issues such as SEA, but rather aims to provide a platform for assessing, improving and up-scaling emerging good practice to curb sexual violence employed by armed groups.



Mission engineers test a new water pump as part of quick impact project to assist a village in North Darfur –  
Credit: UN Photo/Albert González Farran

## 1.8 SUMMARY

In sum, sexual violence is one of the most challenging issues to address in peace and security work. Often called ‘the war within the war’, it occurs in places not routinely patrolled by peacekeepers. It occurs in contexts where gender-based violence may be prevalent, making it difficult for peacekeepers and ceasefire monitors to discern when and why sexual violence falls within their purview, as articulated by Security Council resolution 1820 (2008). Reliable information on trends, common contexts of attack and the profile of perpetrators remains elusive, in part because victims—not attackers—are shamed and stigmatized. Some communities are more concerned about the honor and repute of the family, than the harm done to the woman or child. This seems to be magnified on a national scale, where the priority is rarely providing reparations to victims, but rather collectively ‘erasing’ sexual violence from the historical record to expedite reconciliation. When it becomes generalized as a chronic social

problem, perpetrators are all the more difficult to identify and apprehend. Yet peacekeepers are mandated to create the security conditions that enable efforts to consolidate peace.

This must mean peace and peace of mind for all members of the population—men and women; boys and girls. Unlike burnt buildings or ransacked fields, sexual violence can take generations to heal—destabilizing communities even as security actors strive to build peace.

This inquiry marks a modest first step towards replacing improvisation with systematization, to catch the women and girls who may otherwise fall through the safety net of peacekeeping practice. It should serve as a catalyst for the cross-fertilization of ideas on what is working and needs to be expanded; what is not working and needs a more strategic response; and what critical gaps remain.



UN peacekeepers provide security at food distribution point in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, as women arrive to receive bags of rice – Credit: UN Photo/Sophia Paris

*“In no other area is our collective failure to ensure effective protection for civilians more apparent...than in terms of the masses of women and girls, but also boys and men, whose lives are destroyed each year by sexual violence perpetrated in conflict.”*

*United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, 2007*

## 2: INVENTORY OF TASKS AND TACTICS

The following compilation of practice to directly or derivatively combat sexual violence, provides a knowledge base for military peacekeepers and planners in their respective task areas. It is also intended as a tool for national and regional military institutions to discuss practical approaches to sexual violence in theatre. The tasks are numbered for ease of reference, including for the purpose of cross-referencing the examples with operational training scenarios to be distilled from this research and provided to Troop/Police Contributing Countries as a pre-deployment training resource. It also aims to inform the development of doctrine and mission-wide strategies being developed pursuant to the DPKO/Department of Field Support (DFS) Protection of Civilians Operational Concept. It is one of a number of tools being developed by DPKO and partners to enhance the impact of peacekeeping. Effective prevention of sexual and other forms of physical violence should be carried out in a comprehensive way that helps restore social structures disrupted by armed conflict and avoids creating dependency on an international security presence. In that context, the military dimension is a valuable but very limited component. The examples listed will not apply to all mission contexts or correspond to all mandates. It is hence critical to retain flexibility, while learning from past practice. The following practices have been compiled in order to distil emerging elements of an effective response [see Part 3] and to aid systematization and dissemination.

TASK/TACTIC	ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
<b>2.1 PREVENTIVE PHYSICAL PROTECTION: ARMED PATROLS AND ESCORTS</b>	
<b>A. FIREWOOD PATROLS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Armed escorts accompany women/girls when collecting firewood beyond camp perimeters to anticipate and avert predictable risks such as ‘firewood rape’.</li> <li>&gt; Mobility/speed of patrols is critical for a rapid response to sexual assault and can also have a deterrent effect.</li> <li>&gt; Patrols have been particularly well-received when they are close enough on the ground to discern potential threats, but not so close as to impede women’s normal routines, and when communities have been given reminders in advance as well as on the day of patrols.</li> <li>&gt; AU civilian police and military observers in Darfur drove deep into the bush to patrol a remote area where thousands of women/girls ventured several times per week to collect firewood, which had resulted in numerous rapes.</li> <li>&gt; Twice per week on designated days, UN police cars, pickups and UNAMID APCs (Armored Personnel Carriers) escorted women from Darfur’s Kalma refugee camp into the surrounding hills and waited while groups of women chopped branches and raked grass for animal fodder.</li> <li>&gt; Noting that when women arrive in the bush they generally disperse to maximize coverage, UNAMID initiated some aerial patrols, in addition to vehicular patrols, when fuel and air-time could be made available</li> <li>&gt; Managing community expectations is important as patrols can be cancelled due to low troop density or gaps between the time one contingent leaves their duty station and their replacements become operational. Patrols may also displace, rather than prevent or neutralize, armed violence.</li> <li>&gt; Firewood patrols are particularly effective when trust is built between participants and patrollers through ‘firewood patrol committees’ that discuss timing, frequency, route selection, distance and how the patrol will be carried out; a translator accompanies patrols; and patrols are conducted on a regular and predictable basis.</li> <li>&gt; There is a difference between patrols and mere transportation: in some cases, women have been dropped off at firewood collection sites, leaving them vulnerable on their return to camp. It must also be taken into account that women bearing wood, water or other provisions are slow-moving targets at risk of being robbed, raped and forced to surrender their supplies to armed elements.</li> </ul>

TASK/TACTIC	ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
<b>B. WATER ROUTE PATROLS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; In Darfur, armed patrols accompany women/girls (the primary water-collectors) along water supply routes, as armed groups often camp near rivers to secure their own supply</li> <li>&gt; Escort teams move out ahead of women/girls to secure water-collection points and forestall or warn of risks.</li> <li>&gt; At the request of humanitarian actors in Ethiopia, proactive assistance was provided to women in transporting water jugs, supplying bulk water to communities, and in constructing water bladders or wells to reduce the burden on women and earn the trust of the community.</li> <li>&gt; In Goma, DRC, combatants entered an IDP camp in violation of its civilian character due to a need for water supplies. In response, MONUC supported the construction of a water bladder outside the camp.</li> </ul>
<b>C. MARKET AREA/TRADE ROUTE PATROLS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; AMIS patrols accompanied women to and from market.</li> <li>&gt; In DRC, few women initially followed the market patrols, but as confidence increased more and more women began to benefit from the enhanced sense of safety to access markets. This has improved trade and contributed to economic development.</li> <li>&gt; Rehabilitating transportation permits women to travel with children, rather than leaving them unattended.</li> <li>&gt; Dismantling roadblocks or adding a peacekeeping presence and oversight role at checkpoints en route to market can reduce the risk of harassment and extortion.</li> <li>&gt; In DRC, market entrances were sealed before sunrise and a patrol kept in the area for the duration of trade, to help ensure a “weapons-free zone” to facilitate women’s economic activity, which often has a powerful multiplier effect for recovery and development.</li> <li>&gt; Patrols have been deployed around (militarized) mining areas and trade arteries where sexual violence is prevalent.</li> </ul>
<b>D. NIGHT PATROLS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; In Darfur, regular night patrols have been deployed around camp perimeters in response to rape, live fire incidents and sleep disturbance.</li> <li>&gt; Joint crime-prevention night patrols (foot and vehicular) have been undertaken with local police in Liberia. By mentoring the unarmed local police, UNMIL’s all-female FPU (Formed Police Unit) have helped them deal with lingering suspicions of citizens whose trust in the uniform was eroded by civil war.</li> <li>&gt; An UNMO (Unarmed Military Observers) night presence was placed in communities at risk in Rwanda during the genocide.</li> <li>&gt; “Owning the night” is an important military task that contributes to building a safe and secure environment. Night patrols have a considerable element of surprise, which keeps potential perpetrators of crimes off balance</li> </ul>

TASK/TACTIC	ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
<b>E. BORDER PATROLS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› Security at border crossing-points, such as the Sudan-Chad border, helps to protect uprooted populations (the majority of whom are women and children) and monitor the movement of arms, troops and resources, including cross-border human trafficking in women/girls for sexual slavery and enforced prostitution.</li> <li>› Capacity-building in this area has begun to ensure that it is not only arms and contraband that is checked by border security, but also signs of human trafficking, in line with new understandings of sexual violence as a security issue.</li> </ul>
<b>F. FOOT PATROLS TO PROTECT HARVESTERS ACCESSING FIELDS; CHILDREN EN ROUTE TO SCHOOLS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› Areas have been cordoned off to permit farming/foraging, mostly undertaken by women.</li> <li>› Foot patrols escort women leaving camp to pursue sustenance activities and ensure their freedom of movement. Women are the backbone of agricultural economies, making their ability to safely access fields critical to the fight against poverty.</li> <li>› In Darfur, contingents have assisted women to harvest crops in volatile areas and increased women's freedom of movement to access fields.</li> <li>› Targeted mine risk awareness for women/girls helps to ensure physical security in connection with accessing fields.</li> <li>› The presence of military peacekeepers has helped facilitate safe access to schools for girls/boys in insecure settings. This is especially important in settings like Goma, DRC, where monthly crime statistics show that the rape of minors is most common at times corresponding to the commute to and from school.</li> </ul>
<b>G. UNARMED PATROLS TO TACKLE SGBV IN CAMP SETTINGS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› In Darfur, efforts to curb SGBV and other criminal activity in/around refugee and displacement settings have included regular unarmed patrols to secure the camp vicinity.</li> <li>› Capacity-building/support has been provided to community policing initiatives in DRC and Liberia.</li> </ul>
<b>H. RANDOM PATROLS/CHECKPOINTS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› In Kosovo, it was observed that unannounced, random foot patrols and checkpoints kept perpetrators off balance. In some settings, this has been linked with an emergency "hot-line" service (or locally-adapted equivalent) for at-risk communities and lone women.</li> <li>› Efforts to contact government authorities to request the removal of illegal checkpoints where women are harassed have been followed-up by military spot checks.</li> <li>› Political efforts to ensure the payment of army salaries have an indirect effect in reducing extortion and illegal taxation of vulnerable/unarmed individuals at roadblocks.</li> </ul>



Peacekeepers conduct night patrols to respond to an increase in robbery and rapes in an IDP camp in North Darfur – Credit: UN Photo/Albert González Farran

TASK/TACTIC	ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
<b>2.2 JOINT PROTECTION TEAMS (JPTs)</b>	
<b>A. JPTs/JOINT TEAM SITES</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› The practice of military observers and civilian liaison personnel patrolling from a joint team site helps ensure that information from humanitarian partners (who have greatest access to and dealings with the population) can support trend/ pattern analysis undertaken by the military and enhance planning.</li> <li>› The aim of JPTs is to facilitate humanitarian access; support community protection; and improve coordination and information-sharing between troops, the host population and its representatives, including women.</li> <li>› In MONUC, this practice helped to coordinate the activities of the force with the activities and priorities of the substantive civilian sections and UNPOL.</li> <li>› UNMIS has begun to incorporate the best practices of MONUC, such as setting up a JPT of military and civilian personnel, as well as temporary bases near the local population.</li> <li>› Combined UNAMID military and police patrols have been established within and outside IDP camps.</li> <li>› In Feb. 2008, MONUC deployed JPTs to seven locations in North Kivu and two in South Kivu. The JPTs, supported by civilian components of MONUC, have cooperated with local authorities and communities, and implemented measures such as voluntary curfews and night patrols in high-risk areas.</li> </ul>

TASK/TACTIC	ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
<b>2.3 QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS (QIPs)</b>	
<b>A. PROVISION OF FUEL/FIREWOOD</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; To reduce the risk and time women spend in fuel collection, uniformed peacekeepers have engaged in the provision of fuel.</li> <li>&gt; Physical protection has been provided during collection, coupled with the promotion of fuel-efficient locally-adapted technology and assistance in developing alternative fuel sources, with support from appropriate partners.</li> </ul>
<b>B. PROVISION OF FUEL-EFFICIENT STOVES/PROMOTION OF FUEL-EFFICIENT ALTERNATIVES</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Providing stoves in contexts like Somalia or Darfur, in cooperation with national women's associations and other appropriate partners, can be a proactive prevention measure to reduce the need for firewood and thus for women to leave the camp. This is especially effective when accompanied by alternative income-generating options for women reliant on selling wood as a form of livelihood/for commercial purposes.</li> <li>&gt; This can be done as a Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) activity, capitalizing on military capacity, including engineering capability to show communities new cooking techniques (bearing in mind the need to avoid confusion among the humanitarian actors).</li> <li>&gt; Slow-combustion stove construction can help cultivate positive relationships with local women, and reduce the need to disperse the force through regular firewood patrols, which can result in being too thinly-spread on the ground. This was the case when the Rwanda Defense Force contingent of AMIS worked with local women in Darfur to build "Ronderezas" (fuel-efficient clay stoves traditionally used in Rwanda), which reduced the need for firewood by up to 80 per cent. The original aim of the stoves was to minimize environmental degradation/desertification, however they doubled as a protection mechanism, which the RDF found to be <i>"well-appreciated by the population, especially the women"</i>.</li> <li>&gt; Complementary humanitarian strategies, like distributing pre-cooked beans and food that requires less cooking-time and hence less firewood, can mean it then becomes feasible to provide escorts without becoming overstretched.</li> <li>&gt; During the Bougainville Peace Monitoring Group deployment, some Fijian soldiers noticed that being regularly forced to flee insecurity had compelled the community to limit its diet. They worked with women to identify alternative food sources and cooking solutions. This dialogue also gave them a more complete picture of the security situation.</li> </ul>

TASK/TACTIC	ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
<b>C. CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Quick Impact Projects (QIP) funding has supported the construction of Women's Shelters for survivors of SGBV, as in South Kivu, DRC, where a dedicated shelter provides counseling/ psychosocial support.</li> <li>&gt; CIMIC/QIPs projects have helped rehabilitate shower and latrine facilities in camps, providing lighting, improved privacy and separate entrances for men and women, which can help reduce the risk of rape.</li> <li>&gt; When conflict/crisis weakens penitentiary systems, efforts to rehabilitate prisons can be critical to the fight against impunity, including for sexual violence. UNMIL military engineers reinforced the perimeter walls of Monrovia Central Prison and posted guards outside the facility to deter jail breaks (particularly significant in a country where rape is the most frequently-reported crime).</li> <li>&gt; A women's prison wing was constructed (in consultation with appropriate partners) using MONUC QIPs resources following reports that women co-housed with male inmates were becoming pregnant and/or HIV-positive.</li> </ul>
<b>2.4 DETERRENT TASKS, INCLUDING THROUGH VISIBLE PRESENCE</b>	
<b>A. "OPERATION NIGHT FLASH"</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; In one instance in eastern DRC, truckloads of MONUC peacekeepers drove into the bush and kept their headlights on all night to signal presence in the area. In the morning, numerous women/girls were found sleeping in the safe area beneath the headlights.</li> <li>&gt; A visible presence can provide an anchor/congregation point for at-risk civilians.</li> <li>&gt; Use of flares/illumination mortars ('night flashes') is a form of 'deterrence through presence' in areas where women/girls are being abducted and raped.</li> </ul>
<b>B. VILLAGE VIGILANCE/DEFENSE COMMITTEES</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Community alarm schemes have been established by MONUC using designated villagers to bang pots or blow whistles to alert nearby forces to the arrival of intruders. This functions as a force multiplier in early warning where a Rapid Reaction Force is on stand-by to respond to disturbances.</li> <li>&gt; Peacekeepers have coordinated with 'Community Watch Teams' (trained by UNHCR) in IDP camps. This involves IDP volunteers patrolling the camp intervening, mediating and reporting as needed.</li> <li>&gt; Efforts have been made to support self-protection initiatives such as IDPs moving in groups to reduce incidents of SGBV, following a "shared responsibility concept" developed in coordination with chieftains/village elders and IDP representatives.</li> <li>&gt; A policy of 'safety-in-numbers'/communal labor groups has been encouraged, while not assumed to be a protection panacea.</li> </ul>

TASK/TACTIC	ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
C. ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMILITARIZED ZONES (DMZs)/SAFE HAVENS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› Including women-specific safe havens/shelters as part of the protection strategy was a recommendation voiced by Platoon Commanders and other peacekeepers interviewed in the field. Demilitarized Zones (DMZ)/safe areas have been used in contexts such as Iraq, Bosnia, Rwanda and Sri Lanka.</li> <li>› Establishing safe areas/DMZs could respond to situations where insecurity has triggered “pendulum displacement”, that is when civilians hasten to temporary safety around peacekeeping bases as a proxy “safe haven”.</li> <li>› In cases of “pendulum displacement” in DRC, the MONUC base was equated with a safe haven or anchoring point for civilians.</li> </ul>
D. TEMPORARY/MOBILE OPERATING BASES (TOBs/ MOBs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› Long-range mobile patrols expand the perimeters of protection and increase geographic coverage, projecting a greater sense of security for civilians at risk.</li> <li>› Some displaced persons have reported feeling sufficiently reassured to return to their village of origin after MONUC mobile patrols established a visible presence in the area.</li> <li>› The deployment of TOBs in places like Jonglei state and Abyei, Sudan, as well as the more consistent and prolonged use of long-range foot patrols and helicopter patrols, have shown positive preventive results. UNMIS engaged in a contingency planning exercise which identified concrete, localized protection strategies to provide safe spaces for civilians in case of an eruption of violence.</li> <li>› In accordance with robust mandates, preventive tactical redeployments can interposition peacekeepers between armed groups in times of rising tension. This is relevant when the <i>modus operandi</i> of such groups includes SGBV.</li> </ul>
<b>2.5 CORDON-AND-SEARCH OPERATIONS</b>	
A. CORDON-AND-SEARCH OPERATIONS TO DISARM MILITIAS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› In Kosovo, NGOs reported that women who had experienced sexual violence during the war manifested symptoms of re-traumatisation after house-searching for arms by peacekeepers. The presence of women among the force was found to reduce intimidation.</li> <li>› Cordon-and-search/knock operations have limited the capacity and movement of armed groups in places like DRC and Afghanistan, but may also trigger reprisals against civilians who are seen to be supporting one side of a conflict. As reprisals have included sexual violence, this risk has begun to be included in contingency plans.</li> <li>› There is emerging evidence (including from UNMIL’s all-female FPU) that when women conduct cordon-and-search operations it is less threatening to women civilians and may help to build constructive community relationships, resulting in increased operational intelligence/situational awareness, including knowledge about movements in the community of arms, contraband or weapons caches.</li> </ul>

TASK/TACTIC	ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
<b>2.6 COMMUNITY LIAISON</b>	
A. TRUST AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES/ LIAISON DUTIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› ‘Building communities around safety’ initiatives (led by UNPOL officers in Darfur) include: creating ‘Women’s Desks’ in camps; helping to establish cells in camps to respond to SGBV and collect data; and cultivating strong relations with civil society to bolster trust and hence the capacity to protect, including through the mission’s gender unit or equivalent.</li> <li>› Liaison with potential SGBV perpetrators (demobilized combatants, urban gangs, unemployed youth, etc) has included “Agro Farm Projects” to keep young men engaged in productive activities, away from crime and less susceptible to recruitment by militias/nascent criminal networks that tend to prey on vulnerable members of the community (as supported by an UNMIL battalion in 2008).</li> <li>› UNMIL has engaged in sporting activities with young men, which, in the words of one peacekeeper interviewed, “helps to take all the steam out of them”.</li> <li>› UNMIL military has begun to work with Liberian communities in rural areas to impart farming skills to the local population, in a setting where high male unemployment is a factor that exacerbates SGBV. Such vocational training initiatives (also including carpentry, masonry, etc) impart life-long skills and boost self-sufficiency. This can help restore self-esteem and expedite a return to normalcy.</li> <li>› An UNMIL battalion in Bong County, Liberia, initiated a “Free Fridays” medical clinic for the community. Many women/girls who have suffered sexual and other abuse seek assistance. Though few will openly mention rape to foreigners, they nonetheless benefit from the medical outreach programme.</li> <li>› Alarming rates of rape and domestic violence are reported within displaced communities—often the product of frustration at being hemmed in by insecurity, without freedom of movement, employment opportunities or recreational outlets. MINURCAT has helped to establish cells within camps for responding to SGBV and for collecting data to help the UN better target its activities.</li> <li>› Providing economic alternatives for ex-combatants is important in contexts where fighters are considered an elite. Without economic standing, there is a high-propensity to again take up arms to secure a living. Such conduct (looting/pillage) often goes hand-in-hand with rape.</li> <li>› The EU’s <i>Operation Artemis</i> in Ituri, DRC, in 2003 was a response to the withdrawal of foreign armed forces and to militias and ex-militias, reportedly frustrated at being “members of the public like everyone else”, laying waste to towns, looting, killing and raping. The EU Rapid Protection Force swiftly stabilized Bunia by launching the “Bunia weapons-free operation” to make it a town with ‘no visible arms’.</li> </ul>

TASK/TACTIC	ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; The EU military operation in DRC (Operation EUFOR RD Congo) collaborated with local women's organizations to improve its response to sexual violence. Local groups provided information on who to contact whenever EUFOR came across cases of sexual violence in order to arrange for psychosocial, medical and legal support.</li> <li>&gt; Mission-specific pre-deployment/refreshers training on cultural awareness includes gender roles and relations in the host society, so peacekeepers are sensitive to local gender dynamics. For example, lessons have been learnt from Somalia, where male soldiers caused antagonism when they had to frisk women for weapons upon entering civilian camps.</li> <li>&gt; Women police officers accompany patrols where possible to make them less intimidating for local women. The confidence-building effect is multiplied where they speak the local language and can explain the purpose of the patrols to women in the host community.</li> <li>&gt; In Afghanistan, NATO Female Engagement Teams have built relations with women, an often overlooked sector of the population, and delivered humanitarian assistance. It has proven easier for female troops to access the population, as both Afghan men and women generally feel more at ease interacting with them.</li> </ul>

UNPROFOR peacekeepers speak with local women in Croatia during the war in the early 1990s – Credit: UN Photo/John Isaac



TASK/TACTIC	ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
<b>B. TRAINING/ KNOWLEDGE-BUILDING</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Uniformed peacekeepers have worked with humanitarian agencies to establish grassroots referral networks for sexual violence victims to facilitate access to medical/psychosocial support.</li> <li>&gt; Peacekeepers have helped to train communities on how to respond in cases of emergency, including attacks on women/girls.</li> </ul>
<b>C. SUPPORTING WOMEN'S ROLE IN COMMUNITY SAFETY</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Female UNPOL Officers have hosted “Women’s Forums” in camps—gatherings at which they exchanged views on how to improve community safety with IDP women. Where tribal leadership has been reluctant to allow officers to meet exclusively with women, officers entered into a sustained dialogue with them to obtain consent. In 2006, it was reported that the ‘Women’s Forum’ in Otash camp, Darfur, regularly attracted up to 200 women.</li> <li>&gt; UNMIL’s all-female FPU has proactively promoted women’s security, including by initiating self-defense (‘unarmed combat’) training for women/girls in schools and community centres. Their example has encouraged more women to join the Liberian National Police (LNP), contributing to a three-fold increase in the number of applications from women. This has a powerful effect on communities not accustomed to seeing women in uniform or performing official, public functions. They have also been credited by the local police with encouraging increased reporting of sexual abuse.</li> </ul>

An all-female formed police unit patrols an urban area in the outskirts of the Haitian capital – Credit: UN Photo/Marco Domino



TASK/TACTIC	ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
<b>2.7 SECURING THE ENVIRONMENT FOR DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN AID</b>	
<b>A. CREATING A “SECURITY BUBBLE”; PROVIDING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT; ASSET-SHARING; ESCORTING CONVOYS (AS REQUESTED)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Peacekeepers have facilitated the free flow of humanitarian assistance/medical supplies by lending assets and engineering capacities to help improve humanitarian access to remote populations, and by helping to establish the necessary security conditions.</li> <li>Peacekeepers have helped humanitarian actors to reach IDPs by providing escorts through dangerous areas. Military escort activities have also been extended to humanitarian agencies providing services to rape victims. (Where the use of escorts is considered an inappropriate/unsustainable way of securing humanitarian access by NGOs, it may be preferable to instead open regular ‘windows of access’ along specific routes at specific times, as needed.)</li> <li>A security presence has been provided at distribution points where women, often with children, line up for supplies.</li> <li>‘Blue corridors’ were established in Bosnia to protect aid convoys. This could also be used for convoys transporting rape kits/PEP (Post Exposure Prophylaxis) kits (where available) that must reach survivors within 72 hours of a rape, including through HIV/AIDS Advisors.</li> <li>Military escorts have accompanied mobile health clinics to reach women who have been attacked in remote, insecure areas.</li> <li>Some organizations have relied on mission flights to reach civilians in countries with a poor record of airplane safety.</li> <li>Aid shortfalls affect women in specific ways, being traditionally the caretakers of families and communities. Efforts by peacekeepers to secure airports to ensure the arrival of aid flights and to provide logistical support for unfettered aid distribution can amount to an indirect protection strategy, reducing the risk of women/girls being forced into so-called ‘survival sex’.</li> <li>Efforts to ensure that relief reaches populations in situ can help prevent and off-set repeated cycles of displacement, which heightens the risk of sexual violence.</li> <li>The military has provided additional security to facilitate the safe transport of humanitarian assistance by women from delivery points to their homes.</li> </ul>
<b>B. REHABILITATION/ PROTECTION OF CRITICAL CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UN military engineers repaired generators after an electricity failure led to increased rape and criminal activity at night in Haiti.</li> <li>Military components contributed to repairing the town soccer field in Haiti to provide young men with a recreational outlet.</li> <li>Dilapidated or non-existent roads are obstacles to humanitarian access. Road building by peacekeepers can help to protect women. According to UNHCR, when there was no road between Goma and Kitchanga in North Kivu, DRC, women traveling from one village to another passed through a forest filled with roaming militias. Once the road was built, they had a safer route.</li> <li>NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), comprised of civilian and military personnel, have been useful in providing area security and supporting reconstruction and development activities in Afghanistan. They have rebuilt schools, repaired critical infrastructure and met with women to give them an opportunity to express their concerns. PRTs include Gender Advisers as a pragmatic approach to operationalizing gender.</li> </ul>

TASK/TACTIC	ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
<b>2.8 GENDER-SENSITIVE CAMP DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT</b>	
<b>A. SECURITY PRESENCE; LIGHTING, FENCING, SANITATION</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Uniformed peacekeepers have guarded aid-distribution points, hospitals and other static positions in camps.</li> <li>Male and female latrines and showers situated side-by-side virtually invites sexual violence. Due diligence and coordination with humanitarians can reduce the likelihood of assault. Where the military is engaged in the establishment of shelters/ camps for displaced populations, the specific security risks facing women/ girls need to inform the lay-out of facilities.</li> <li>Support has been provided to improve the conditions of temporary shelter and camps for IDPs and refugees.</li> <li>In Kenya, live thorn bushes were planted around camp perimeters to deter night attackers and sexual predators. This served a defensive purpose without militarizing camp appearance through the use of defensive stores like barbed wire and corrugated iron.</li> <li>Joint UN/national police walking patrols in and around camps has helped improve security in settings such as Haiti.</li> <li>MINURCAT military have facilitated access of humanitarians and police to populations most in need in eastern Chad. In one case, UNHCR found alcohol to confiscate and destroy 200 litres of locally-produced alcohol, working through abuse to be a major cause of SGBV in a camp. MINURCAT supported an operation the Chadian community police force, the <i>Détachement Intégré de Sécurité</i> (DIS).</li> </ul>
<b>B. DISTRESS CALL SYSTEMS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Where the reality in the field permits, a distress call system (‘911 Helpline Concept’) can be established to activate a Quick Reaction Force to dispatch to the scene, as attempted in eastern DRC where phone numbers were given to camp leaders/IDP representatives (as part of ‘Operation Night Flash’). Civilians under threat of physical violence, including sexual violence, can access this number and call for help. Efforts are underway to add evacuation of victims in critical condition to this concept and transfer responsibility to government authorities.</li> <li>Distress call systems have also helped to ensure that women in camps are insulated from civilian-on-civilian attacks.</li> <li>Without compromising the civilian character of camps, military have contributed to the safety of populations through coordination with police and humanitarian counterparts, by patrolling camp perimeters and intervening in emergency situations.</li> </ul>

TASK/TACTIC	ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
<b>2.9 PUBLIC INFORMATION: MONITORING, REPORTING, BEHAVIORAL CHANGE COMMUNICATION</b>	
<b>A. PROVIDING SECURITY AT AWARENESS-RAISING EVENTS; COMMUNITY INTERFACE</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› Security/crowd control has been provided at cultural events such as open-air theatre productions depicting the social effects of rape, and public concerts on the theme of Stop Rape Now, as in Liberia.</li> <li>› Peacekeepers have collaborated with prominent national figures on anti-rape campaigns and provided logistical and security support for high-profile missions that cast a spotlight on issues such as sexual violence.</li> <li>› Mission-run radio programmes have been used to amplify anti-rape messages, e.g. women's programming on Radio Okapi in DRC, which also follows sexual violence trials on air for a deterrent effect.</li> <li>› Direct cell phone communication between MONUC area commanders and community leaders/IDP representatives has been initiated so patrols better correspond to the times and places civilians feel most at risk.</li> <li>› A gender mix on patrolling and verification teams has helped improve operational situational awareness, especially in relation to sexual violence, which victims are more comfortable discussing with female peacekeepers.</li> <li>› Contingency planning needs to ensure that the security of women who provide information to the mission is not compromised.</li> <li>› Customary communicators have been engaged to convey key messages about ending violence against women (e.g. <i>les griots</i>).</li> </ul>
<b>B. MONITORING</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› A peacekeeping presence reminds parties/former parties to conflict that their actions are being watched and creates a sense of accountability.</li> <li>› Peacekeepers can serve as the 'eyes and ears' of the international community in relation to human rights abuses in remote, otherwise inaccessible locations. They can also monitor propaganda and hate speech that may be an early-warning indicator of violence, including sexual violence, as occurred in Rwanda where radio communications provided incitement to rape Tutsi women to 'end their pride'.</li> <li>› UNMIL military observers patrol daily the most remote areas of Liberia, observing and collecting information and passing it on to the command, including about sexual violence.</li> <li>› Military peacekeepers have also helped to provide security for representatives of the media—the world's witness to atrocity.</li> </ul>

TASK/TACTIC	ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
<b>2.10 REVIVING THE POLITICAL PROCESS: ELECTORAL SECURITY FOR WOMEN</b>	
<b>A. COMBATING SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED ELECTORAL VIOLENCE; SUPPORTING WOMEN'S SAFE PARTICIPATION</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› Uniformed peacekeepers often assist in the establishment of a secure and peaceful environment for the holding of free, transparent and inclusive elections. In response to the security risks women in remote areas encounter in accessing registration or polling stations during elections, military personnel have been deployed along routes that pose protection risks for women.</li> <li>› Female guards present at polls encourage women to participate in the democratic process.</li> <li>› Outreach has provided women in remote areas with information about elections.</li> <li>› Protecting women as voters and candidates has included security awareness training to combat gender-based electoral violence and intimidation, especially in settings where women have not traditionally played an active role in political life.</li> <li>› Fast-track lines for pregnant women and nursing mothers lining up to vote in Burundi were established by ONUB and overseen by uniformed peacekeepers. Facilitating specific queues ensured that pregnant women and women with babies were given priority attention at polling booths.</li> </ul>
<b>2.11 RESTORING RULE OF LAW: FOSTERING GENDER JUSTICE</b>	
<b>A. SUPPORTING TRANSITIONAL/ GENDER JUSTICE</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› In cooperation with UNPOL/Rule of Law section, uniformed peacekeepers have assisted in the apprehension and hand-over of sexual violence suspects (in line with mandate).</li> <li>› The military may provide security for transitional justice processes, which can help provide redress for sexual violence. They may locate and safeguard key witnesses and evidence related to investigations and prosecutions, and provide security for women's rights defenders and participants in truth and reconciliation processes.</li> <li>› In Equateur Province, DRC, 119 women were raped in the village of Songo Mboyo in 2003. In response to a special investigative mission conducted by MONUC, a military tribunal found seven FARDC officers guilty of crimes against humanity. The military can play a role in identifying, securing and preserving evidence of such crimes.</li> </ul>
<b>B. CAPACITY-BUILDING</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› Efforts have been made to build the national military justice capacity through training and the creation of Prosecution Support Cells.</li> <li>› Missions have helped to put in place measures to assist governments and national institutions to protect their own citizenry and address sexual violence.</li> </ul>

TASK/TACTIC	ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
<b>2.12 GENDER-SENSITIVE DDR/DEMILITARIZATION AND CEASEFIRE MONITORING</b>	
<b>A. MONITORING IMPACT OF DDR/DDRR ON WOMEN (PURSUANT TO EXISTING GUIDELINES)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Efforts have been made to take into account the needs of women associated with armed groups in DDR processes and to ensure proper handling of female ex-combatants.</li> <li>➤ DDR programmes are increasingly taking into account the need to facilitate socio-economic reintegration of female ex-combatants, often stigmatized for their “counter-cultural” behavior.</li> <li>➤ Having female UNMOs to screen women at demobilization sites makes the process more accessible and acceptable to women. DDR teams are increasingly configured to provide adequate support to both male and female ex-combatants, including opportunities for integration into the national military or other vocational training.</li> <li>➤ Monitoring the impact of large numbers of ex-combatants descending upon communities can help to raise the alarm about spikes in sexual violence.</li> <li>➤ Measures to confiscate/reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in communities helps to curb sexual violence.</li> <li>➤ Monitoring and reporting on the number of women engaged in combat provides a basis for the Security Council to mandate that DPKO include women associated with fighting forces in DDR programmes. It also enables plans to be made for the required number of UNMOs to support women’s effective disarmament.</li> <li>➤ The design and lay-out of cantonment sites can minimize the risk of sexual violence when provision is made for separate living quarters for men and women ex-combatants.</li> </ul>
<b>B. INSTILLING DISCIPLINE PROFESSIONALIZATION/ RESTRUCTURING</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Human rights/women’s rights elements have been integrated into training at brassage centres.</li> <li>➤ Training/sensitization of newly-integrated battalions has included messages about sexual violence, disseminated to new members of national armed forces on the parade ground. The role of military peacekeepers in providing mentoring, advisory and training support to military forces of the host country provides an opportunity to impart and underscore international standards for the protection of women’s rights, including the role of national security forces in preventing violations of human rights.</li> <li>➤ Working with authorities to improve payroll and establish a reliable payment chain can reduce looting, pillage and sexual violence used to intimidate populations into surrendering supplies. Reports suggest that exactions against civilians peak when soldiers are cantoned without provisions.</li> <li>➤ Helping to establish garrisons/barracks can reduce commingling of combatants with the civilian population. Confining fighters to military camps/quarters limits what is referred to in DRC as “<i>vagabondage militaire</i>”.</li> <li>➤ Professionalization can include ensuring military units are identifiable through uniforms/insignia, and therefore feel accountable for their actions. (Human Rights Watch reports that a battalion of the FARDC would remove their distinctive purple epaulettes prior to attacking civilians, meaning rape survivors were unable to identify them.)</li> </ul>

TASK/TACTIC	ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
<b>C. CEASEFIRE MONITORING</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ As part of supervising and enforcing ceasefires, efforts have been initiated (especially by women UNMOs) to monitor sexual violence by ex-belligerents, along with other hostile movements and acts that may violate the terms of a ceasefire agreement.</li> </ul>
<b>2.13 GENDER-SENSITIVE JUSTICE AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM</b>	
<b>A. SUPPORT TO NATIONAL ARMED AND SECURITY FORCES</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Peacekeepers have supported the establishment of Family Support/Women and Child Protection/Gender Desks in police stations to permit the registration and investigation of cases of sexual violence in contexts such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, DRC and Kosovo.</li> <li>➤ Dedicated recruitment days were held in Liberia and Haiti for women applying to join the national security sector.</li> <li>➤ Women peacekeepers have mentored female cadets at police academies.</li> <li>➤ Police have been trained to address SGBV and collect sex-disaggregated data. The first specialist police unit dealing with gender-based crimes in a peacekeeping mission was established in Timor-Leste.</li> <li>➤ Efforts to screen/vet the armed and security forces of perpetrators of sexual violence and other abuses of human rights/IHL have been supported.</li> <li>➤ Training/Training of Trainers (TOT) on women’s rights, International Humanitarian Law and the categorical prohibition on sexual violence, help to build a security sector that is equally accessible and responsive to women.</li> </ul>
<b>2.14 NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS/SAFE PASSAGE</b>	
<b>A. EVACUATING RAPE VICTIMS (RESPECTING PRIVACY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND CHOICE)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Mission helicopters and vehicles have been used to transport rape victims to the nearest hospital for treatment.</li> <li>➤ Logistical support from the military component of peacekeeping missions has, in some cases, given rape victims and pregnant women facilitated access to health services.</li> <li>➤ Where women lack freedom of movement, mobile health clinics have been supported, for instance by a battalion of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, to assist women and children. This generated considerable goodwill amongst the host community.</li> <li>➤ Tactical level military personnel who are directly approached by victims of sexual violence must ensure their physical safety, respect the privacy and confidentiality of victims, and refer them to the police or appropriate NGO (according to the wishes of the victim) for follow-up.</li> </ul>

TASK/TACTIC	ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
<b>B. TRANSPORTING THREATENED WOMEN TO SAFETY</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; In Kenya, steps were taken to identify women at risk and transfer them out of camps to a more secure environment.</li> <li>&gt; ‘Blue routes’ (i.e., defended by UN blue helmets) have provided civilians with safe passage out of high-risk areas.</li> <li>&gt; Provision has been made in military planning to support the voluntary relocation of vulnerable groups outside areas of heightened insecurity.</li> <li>&gt; Temporary accommodation has been provided in mission stations to civilians in danger.</li> <li>&gt; In situations of displacement/return, when humanitarian agencies establish emergency rest areas, uniformed peacekeepers can coordinate with them to ensure these sites are secure for women/girls.</li> <li>&gt; If the standard operating procedure is to simply return women to camp following a sexual assault, this may have the effect of identifying them as rape victims in the eyes of their community. Such women are often branded as “sympathizers” of rebel groups and/or abandoned by husbands. Discretion in such activities is paramount.</li> </ul>
<b>2.15 COUNTER HUMAN TRAFFICKING OPERATIONS</b>	
<b>A. RAIDS TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF TRAFFICKED OR SEXUALLY ENSLAVED WOMEN AND CHILDREN</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Peacekeepers have negotiated with armed groups for the release of abducted or sexually enslaved women/girls.</li> <li>&gt; Investigations and raids of premises such as nightclubs, where trafficked persons are thought to be held, have occurred in conjunction with anti-trafficking/search and rescue (SAR) operations, and as part of joint security operations against organized crime syndicates. Given the potential consequences of such raids for women and children, it is critical to link with human rights actors who can monitor the situation.</li> <li>&gt; Military-led interventions to free women held as sex slaves by armed/rebel groups have occurred during and in the wake of operations. MONUC soldiers have secured the release of such women and simultaneously confiscated large amounts of munitions.</li> </ul>
<b>2.16 WOMEN IN DETENTION</b>	
<b>A. IMPROVING WOMEN'S CONDITIONS OF DETENTION (ACCORDING TO GUIDELINES ON CORRECTIONS)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Working with Rule of Law partners, MONUC QIPs resources have been used to construct a separate women’s prison wing in a DRC detention facility</li> <li>&gt; Corrections officers from peacekeeping missions have monitored for cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or torture, including of a sexual character, and supported penal reform following incidents of rape in detention. This has included working with host authorities to improve prison conditions and security for detainees.</li> </ul>



### 3: CHECKLIST: EMERGING ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE RESPONSE

10 elements that may support an effective response by uniformed peacekeepers to conflict-related sexual violence emerge from this research. When we consider why one strategy appears more successful than another, it is generally due to the factors described in the following checklist, such as exemplary leadership, consultation, coordination with civilian counterparts, training and preparedness. The absence of any of these elements can hamper or prevent the effective implementation of mandates on women, peace and security.

The critical question remains how these elements fit together as integral parts of an overarching and comprehensive strategy that leads to the desired end state. This needs to be determined on a situation-specific basis, when mission-wide plans on the

protection of civilians are being developed. It is hoped that these elements can **inform future interventions**, based on a vision of what a peacebuilding environment that protects women and girls would entail.

Peacekeepers conduct night patrols to respond to an increase in robbery and rapes in an IDP camp in North Darfur – Credit: UN Photo/González Farran

## 1 Leadership backed by strong command and control structures.

Commitment and capacity at the level of the SRSG, the Force Commander, as well as the Deputy Force Commander (DFC) and sub-unit officers, can ensure that mandate interpretation covers the responsibility of peacekeepers to address sexual violence as part of the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. Resolution 1820 (2008) should be incorporated into the annual DPKO Heads of Military Components briefings, briefings to UN Police Commissioners/Senior Police Advisers, as well as briefings to the Military Advisers (MILADs) of troop and police contributing countries via the Military and Police Advisers' Community (MPAC), the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), and other relevant channels.

## 2 Systematization of ad hoc responses.

Research revealed a broad recognition that there is more the military component could do to contribute to the overall goal of protecting women civilians. Translating this task into the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) and subsequently into Mission Operational Orders that change approaches on the ground will require training, adequate resources and exemplary leadership. Sexual violence has distinct characteristics that make it resistant to conventional military tactics—even as other violence declines, rape continues or escalates—yet there are rarely specific measures in place to anticipate and avert predictable risks, such as ‘firewood rape’ or rape as part of reprisal attacks. Despite long-standing awareness of rape during firewood collection, response measures have not been standardized. The general practice has been to react when information is received and send a patrol, which may arrive too late. A standard schedule of patrols can more easily be verified and can help manage community expectations. Systematic capture and after-action assessment of good practice and the development of doctrine for staff colleges and peacekeeping training centers could help to turn *best practice* into *standard practice*. Military commanders at all levels should review efforts to address sexual violence and enhance women’s security in their end-of-tour reports.

## 3 Understanding the links between sexual violence and the restoration of peace and security, supported by clear, achievable and sufficiently robust mandates.

Research revealed a general lack of understanding of the link between sexual violence and the restoration of peace and security, as articulated in resolution 1820 (2008). Many members

of the military and police who were interviewed attributed sexual violence to “culture” or the “private” conduct of civilians. It is essential that lower-level commanders receive unambiguous directives that there are no “rape cultures”, only cultures of impunity, and that there can be no security without women’s security. Where mandates are comprehensive, feasible and clear, potential for oversight by missions is reduced. As peacekeepers interviewed consistently stated: “*the military cannot operate in an environment of ambiguity*”. Where sexual violence is among the protection of civilians issues to be addressed, it should be *explicitly*, rather than *implicitly*, mentioned in mandates. This will help avoid variation due to individual commanders interpreting their mandates differently.

## 4 Willingness and wherewithal to patrol and operate in unconventional space (in proximity to villages, compounds, camps, forests and fields) in response to an unconventional and often “invisible” threat.

If SITREPS (Situation Reports) include incidents of sexual violence, there should be a feedback loop to ensure this informs operations. In some cases, the military component could be more creatively configured for ‘soft soldiering’ (besides their core functions, they could provide medical, engineering, supply and transportation support in the mission area). This could better prepare troops to implement their protection of civilians mandate, for instance, by including more engineers within battalions, increasing the focus on assisting local populations to rebuild, including more level hospitals (with female doctors) to provide clinics for the local population, and better supply/transportation capacity to help meet civilian protection and assistance needs. As the majority of rapes occur at night, in unlit areas, units need appropriate equipment such as night-vision goggles/infrared sensors and a rapid reaction capacity. In the words of one former peacekeeper who had participated in AMIS firewood patrols in Darfur: “*If you want me to fly, first give me wings, then you can say whether I flew well*”. This means that for operations to be effective, mandates must be matched with commensurate human and materiel resources, as well as political support.

## 5 Consultation with all segments of the community, including women, for intelligence-gathering, confidence-building and to inform protection activities.

Gender analysis and community liaison not only ensures that peacekeepers are able to ‘see’ why women/girls may be at risk in certain situations, it also enhances overall situational awareness

## GIVEN THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCURATE BOOK-KEEPING ON THE BATTLEFIELD, A LACK OF COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE EFFORTS TO PREVENT AND ADDRESS SEXUAL VIOLENCE. LOW-LEVELS OF REPORTING DO NOT EQUATE TO LOW-LEVELS OF INCIDENTS.

and enables commanders to make better-founded decisions, based on sex-disaggregated security assessments. This can aid efforts to coordinate the calendar of patrols with women when they go to fetch water or access fields, in order to maximize the use of military resources. When vulnerabilities are understood and mapped, it is possible to direct resources to areas of high-incidence where they can have a high-impact. Monitoring and verification tasks should draw on the perspectives of both men and women in the host country. In addition, data collected should be disaggregated by sex. For example, if abductions are rife in an area of operation, reporting on whether abductees are men, women or both can influence the nature of tactical level interventions that may be required to address the problem.

Given the impossibility of accurate book-keeping on the battlefield, a lack of comprehensive information should not preclude efforts to prevent and address sexual violence. Low-levels of reporting do not equate to low-levels of incidents. More often, gross under-reporting is due to chaotic circumstances, shame, safety concerns and the collapse of systems and services. It is therefore imperative to empower local organizations, hospitals and police to better address sexual violence. These contacts facilitate the establishment of referral networks for victims in situations where military personnel may be the first point of contact. Providing the security conditions that support a vibrant civil society is likely to have a lasting benefit for human rights. In order to prevent, not just react, to violence it is important to work with traditional chiefs, non-partisan community groups, faith-based organizations and NGOs to promote reconciliation and broad-based ownership of the peace process. This may include efforts to reinvigorate social restraining standards disrupted by conflict, and to strengthen traditional centers of power that exert a positive influence on behavior. Religious organizations, for example, often have the moral authority to act as a conduit for information and social mobilization. Working with and through

the host community ensures that efforts are sustainable and avoids creating dependence on an external presence.

Gender is not just a ‘women’s issue’—by enhancing situational awareness, it can enhance force protection and mission success. Mass rape, like mass murder, does not happen in one day: there needs to be greater sensitivity to early-warning indicators, including through a resilient relationship with the population that encourages them to come forward and report emerging threats. Early warning analysis needs to include consultations with women to seek out information about any increases in sexual violence as a key protection indicator. For instance, it is foreseeable that when rations are running low, soldiers may engage in predatory practices like looting and rape. Open channels of communication also enable the mission to seek regular feedback from the community about whether it is meeting its objectives.

## 6 Incentives that recognize and reward successful initiatives to combat sexual violence and acknowledge their contribution to overall mission success.

Attention should be paid to the *quality*, not just the *quantity*, of operations like patrols and escorts. Going from point A to point B on patrol may not be an adequate response if there is no interpreter, if patrols do not allow for civilian interface, or if they do not take place in rural areas or at night when women are most at risk. Women interviewed in DRC noted that military peacekeepers generally remained in their vehicle/APC on main roads, saying “*they are not in the places where we women are not safe*”. Equally, inaction in the face of conflict-related sexual violence should carry consequences. There is a need to encourage peacekeepers to act in accordance with the *spirit* of the mandate and not hide behind its *letter*, when conscience and common sense dictate otherwise. Accountability mechanisms should be established and included as part of the performance monitoring framework.

The occasion of the International Day of Peacekeepers, May 29, could be used to urge States to contribute more women peacekeepers (as was done in 2009), and to recognize and reward innovative, gender-sensitive protection practice.

## 7 Effective coordination between military and other protection stakeholders.

Coordination should include all members of the UN Country Team in order to ensure that efforts to combat sexual and gender-based violence are multi-dimensional and harness the full capacity of the UN system, rather than working in silos. Indeed, the present document is driven, in part, by the need to provide military and humanitarian personnel with a common frame of

## RESPONDING TO SEXUALIZED ATTACKS SHOULD BE PART OF MISSION REHEARSAL EXERCISES AND SCENARIO-BASED TRAINING. THIS COULD MITIGATE THE CURRENT LACK OF CLARITY ON THE PART OF MILITARY PEACEKEEPERS REGARDING HOW, AND INDEED, WHETHER TO RESPOND TO INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION CASES.

reference for deeper dialogue. A good initiative in this regard is the piloting of joint observer teams consisting of both military and civilian observers (human rights, civil affairs, child protection, medical, etc) to patrol from a joint team-site, along the lines of the JPTs initiated by MONUC. CIMIC officers can also act as an effective link between the force, humanitarian agencies and human rights monitors for liaison and information management to keep commanders apprised of protection activities, including on sexual violence.

### 8 Operational scenario-based pre-deployment and in-mission/refresher training.

Enhanced training and readiness standards are needed to prepare the force to confront brutal sexual violence used as part of the arsenal of armed groups in contemporary conflict settings. Training should start with the practical then move to the conceptual, rather than the reverse. Instead of imparting normative or theoretical content about sex and gender, it should actually equip uniformed peacekeepers to meet these challenges in theatre. Rather than explaining “1325/1820”, troops should be trained on the “how-to” of implementation. Training must help peacekeepers to respond appropriately to gender-based security threats, rather than being limited to cultivating awareness on the prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) and the *UN Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets*, which are necessary but not oriented to prepare troops to address patterns of widespread or systematic sexual violence in theatre. Responding to sexualized attacks should be part of Mission Rehearsal Exercises and scenario-based training. This could mitigate the current lack

of clarity on the part of military peacekeepers regarding *how*, and indeed, *whether* to respond to individual protection cases. Platoon/Section Commanders are trained to react to the show or use of force, which does not necessarily equip them to respond to under-the-radar rape, even when it is an act of war and a destabilizing factor (see Annex 1 for an example of UN scenario-based training).

### 9 Role-modeling and capacity-building to help leave a legacy of security for women and girls.

As activities undertaken by peacekeeping personnel will only ever be temporary, it is imperative to bolster the technical expertise of national armed and security forces to address sexual violence. This is part of building a justice and security sector that is equally accessible and responsive to women and girls. Professionalization includes not only tangible measures, such as regular and timely payment of salaries to minimize extortion/exactions against civilians, which often go hand-in-hand with sexual violence, but also changing the culture of these institutions. The example set by peacekeepers in how they view and treat women is likely to be emulated, as is the inclusion of women among their ranks. Women FPU officers, for example, should patrol visibly and be on the frontline in crowd control situations. This allows the UN to serve as a model of the principles for which it stands. Interlocutors indicated that more humanitarian tasks could be performed by the military on strategic days (like “UN Day”) and that gender-sensitive security sector reform is an important part of the overall “UN footprint”.

### 10 Gender balance in force generation and deployment.

Women in uniform broaden the range of available skills and perspectives, and can contribute to bolstering women’s credibility as security actors in the eyes of the host community, ensuring women have ‘the power to empower’. As demonstrated by the Indian all-female FPU, the presence of women peacekeepers can galvanize local women’s aspirations to participate in the security sector. Women soldiers and paramilitary have a comparative operational advantage in sensitive situations like house searches, body searches, working in women’s prisons, interviewing victims of SGBV, providing escorts for victims/witnesses, and screening of women combatants at DDR sites. Yet it is easy for commanding officers to assume that women are there to play a subsidiary role. Gender stereotypes are not only demoralizing for female military personnel, they also limit opportunities for women to demonstrate their professional

competence. More female UNMOs and UN experts could be particularly effective in monitoring/reporting threats to the security of women and girls. Supporting women’s active participation and leadership in civilian, military and policing functions helps to ensure that women are equal security beneficiaries, as well as security-providers. Troop and Police Contributing Countries have a critical role to play in augmenting the number of female personnel deployed to peacekeeping operations.

Yet *gender balance* is not synonymous with *gender capacity*. Enhancing a mission’s capacity to better serve the entire population requires not only the presence of female personnel, but

gender training and capacity-building for all peacekeepers. In 2009, the UNMIL Office of the Gender Advisor and the Office of the Force Commander agreed on concrete areas of collaboration, which led to the appointment of a (male) Military Gender Officer under the direct supervision of the Force Commander. This is an instructive precedent for missions with low numbers of women among the force. Through a combination of improved gender balance and capacity, the once all-male domain of peacekeeping is today poised to promote the global goal of gender equality.

**Contact:** Comments, observations and additional examples of promising/innovative practice would be welcome. Contact: letitia.anderson@unwomen.org. Ongoing input will enable this document to be constantly updated online by UN Action [available at: [www.stoprapenow.org](http://www.stoprapenow.org)]

**Copyediting support:** Lisa Collste

# PREVENTION & RESPONSE TO CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE

## SCENARIO-BASED TRAINING FOR MILITARY PEACEKEEPERS

### Scenario I - Democratic Republic of the Congo

#### AIM

Evaluate and address hypothetical situations in which the local population is at risk or the victim of sexual violence, and formulate courses of action in the context of a particular mission's mandate and rules of engagement.

#### OBJECTIVES

- » Provide the participants with an understanding of the nature of sexual violence in armed conflict, as well as the challenges and dilemmas facing military and civilian decision-makers in the field;
- » Enable them to consider and implement protection tasks at the tactical level, including best practices aimed at preventing or responding to sexual violence;
- » Ensure that they understand the roles that various mission components play in addressing human rights violations, including crimes related to sexual violence.

#### BACKGROUND

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is one of the largest countries in Africa – roughly the size of Western Europe – and has been plagued by civil war and insecurity for more than a decade. The long conflict has been characterized by the fight over natural resources, the meddling by neighbouring countries, and, not least, its toll on the civilian population, including the prevalence of sexual violence.

Since 2000, a multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operation (now called MONUSCO) has been deployed to DRC, focusing on the eastern and most unstable part of the country. In addition to its civilian leadership and civilian and police components, MONUSCO consists of a close to 20,000-strong military component organized in brigade-size formations, with weaponry ranging from small personal arms to attack helicopters. A large number of utility helicopters are also available. The brigades are deployed in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, Province Orientale and Katanga, including to a number of permanent bases (approximately 150 soldiers) as well as mobile operating bases (MOB) of approximately 50 soldiers each.

Eastern DRC is rich in minerals and covered with jungle and patches of grazing land. Foreign armed groups and local rebels are preying on the local population. State authorities are weak or non-existent, and police are poorly trained, equipped and hardly paid. The Congolese

Army, FARDC, consists in large part of ex-combatants from various rebel groups, and lacks training, equipment, discipline and leadership. Several commanders have economic ties to external groups, and members of the FARDC are frequently found to be the perpetrators of atrocities committed against the civilian population.

In this context, the rates of rape, killing, and property destruction endured by civilians are far higher than the number of military casualties since the beginning of the two wars and unrest since the nineties. In particular, sexual violence directly or indirectly caused by the conflict has become one of the greatest threats to the security of civilians and a clear impediment to peace building and the success of peace operations. This is manifest in the use of sexual violence as a tactic of war against the population, the majority of whom are women and girls in contested territory; as part of widespread or systematic attacks against civilians; as part of patterns of predatory attacks against civilians in and around refugee and internally displaced persons camps; in connection with the illicit exploitation of natural resources; as an incentive for irregularly paid combatants; at checkpoints manned by abusive elements of the national army FARDC; perpetrated by former combatants reinserted into communities through the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process; and by the 'normalization' of brutal forms of violence described as virtually unknown before the conflict, such as gang rapes, public rapes, forced incest and the rape of victims of all ages, from infants to elderly people. Sexual violence is also used as a form of punishment against populations and includes the rape of men and boys. Apart from the physical and mental consequences, a sexual survivor often faces a future of indigence and social exclusion for herself and her children. Most lose their health, livelihoods, husbands, families, and support networks, which in turn shatters the structures that anchor community values.

MONUSCO has a mandate to assist the DRC government in strengthening its military capacity, not least through the training of and jointly planned operations with the FARDC. At the same time, the Mission's primary task is to ensure the effective protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence and the empowerment of women. Since members of the FARDC are responsible for acts of violence against civilians, MONUSCO often finds itself in a sensitive and politically challenging position, which requires a consistent response and strong leadership.

#### SITUATION 1

*Twice a week, there is market in the village of Muta in North Kivu. The market is regularly threatened by armed groups who are looting, killing, abducting women and girls, and raping women on their way from their homes in the hills to the market. Police are scared and incapable of taking action. The local FARDC commander is openly doing business with FDLR. In the past he has refused to take action when called upon by MONUSCO.*

**Two young girls were raped in the village, abducted and taken to the forest. On the same day, a group of four women were raped on their way to the market, while another managed to escape. She knows where the perpetrators live and reports the incident to the village elder, who passes the information on to UN forces deployed in the area and asks the company commander to help rescue the two girls from their kidnappers.**

#### Questions

On the basis of the situation described above, participants, working in assigned break-out groups, are required to discuss and analyse the following questions. When referring to organizations or authorities the break-out groups should indicate who exactly they want to address. The groups have 1 hour to discuss and prepare a presentation of the answers.

1. How should the company commander react to the request to rescue the girls from their kidnappers and what action should he take?
2. Which documents could be used as basis for possible action?
3. How can the victims be assisted?
4. What action should be taken by the UN at the sector and Mission level to prevent similar situations in the future?

#### SITUATION 2

*The Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) is the primary remnant Rwandan Hutu Power rebel group in eastern DRC. It has been involved in fighting in DRC since its formation in 2000, and is composed almost entirely of ethnic Hutus opposed to Tutsi rule and influence in the region. Since December 2008, when DRC and Rwanda agreed to attempt to disband the FDLR, the armies of the two countries have been pursuing FDLR fighters in eastern DRC. FDLR continues to be responsible for atrocities committed against the civilian population, including larger-scale attacks against villages in the Kivus.*

**A group of approximately 50 FDLR fighters enter a village in the evening. While most of the men manage to flee, 47 women and girls are held and brutally raped. Following the mass rape, the FDLR lock the women/girls inside their huts and burn them alive. The FDLR leave and disappear into the bush. When the men return to the burned-down village, they alert the local police and the closest MONUSCO company location. They claim to know where the FDLR camp is located. FARDC units in the area are unreliable, badly lead and equipped and in the process of reorganizing.**

#### Questions

On the basis of the situation described above, participants, working in assigned break-out groups, are required to discuss and analyse the following questions. When referring to organizations or authorities the break-out groups should indicate who exactly they want to address. The groups have 2 hours to discuss and prepare a presentation of the answers.

1. What should the MONUSCO company commander decide and what are the subsequent actions the mission should undertake?
2. Why must MONUSCO take decisive action in cases such as this one?
3. What should be done with perpetrators if captured?
4. Which mission components might be involved in this situation?
5. What can be done to prevent similar atrocities from occurring in the future?
6. How can remote villages alert the UN Mission in case of attacks?



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