Friday
29 October 1999
0900-1100 (L)
Monday
1 November 1999
0900-1100 (IS)
America's fatal error...was to underestimate its foe. U.S. policymakers rather casually assumed that the Vietnamese, rational beings like themselves, would know better than to stand up against the most powerful nation in the world.
George C. Herring
Every quantitative measurement we have shows that we are winning this war.
Robert S. McNamara
Our intention was to break the will of the American government to continue the war.
Vo Nguyen Giap
Introduction:
What kind of war was Vietnam? Was it a civil war, a revolution, a war of liberation, or simply an episode in the containment of the East-West ideological struggle? Clausewitz asserts that "the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." As basic as this principle is, American political and military leaders had trouble agreeing completely (or convincing others) what kind of war they were waging. Most would agree it was an unconventional war with some conventional aspects, particularly during its concluding phases. Many pointed to revolutionary war theory as the key to understanding the character and conduct of the war and thus, as the guide for dealing with the North Vietnamese and their Viet Cong allies in the south.
Most would also agree the war in Southeast Asia was, like that in Korea, a limited war, at least for the U.S. Yet the U.S. proved even less successful in Vietnam than it had been in Korea. Clearly, U.S. political and military leaders, as well as the military forces at their disposal, were having difficulty preparing themselves for the challenges of limited war. Few people would argue that the U.S. did not have the requisite military power; it just did not seem capable of wielding that power in an effective manner in the limited war environment of Vietnam.
In the readings for this lesson, Robert Osgood probes America's limited war mindset on the eve of its Vietnam involvement; Douglas Pike explores the nature of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese enemy; George Herring examines Richard Nixon's conduct of the war, while former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara provides a personal perspective on Vietnam decision-making during the Lyndon Johnson presidency. Herring, Retired Army Colonel Harry Summers, and Russell Weigley all offer thoughts on the war's legacies. Finally, in a selection from his provocative book, Dereliction of Duty, Army Major H. R. McMaster provides a disturbing look at why America's military and civilian leadership failed to wield military power effectively.
Objectives:
- Understand the character and conduct of the war in Vietnam.
- Analyze and critique the application of military power during the Vietnam War in light of the theories studied thus far in the course.
Issues for Consideration:
- Which experiences from the Korean War had the greatest effect on American political and military decision-makers in Vietnam? In which cases were those experiences relevant? In which cases were they not?
- Which theories or theorists provide the best guidance for understanding the war in Vietnam? Were there conditions in Vietnam for which no theory was appropriate?
- Compare United States political objectives in Vietnam in 1963, 1965, 1968, and 1972. Did military objectives change to reflect changes in political objectives? Did military operations change to reflect the changing conditions?
- Reference Issue 3, above, make the same analysis relative to North Vietnam--and the Viet Cong.
- How effective was the coordination between ground and air operations? How joint were operations in general?
- Analyze the relationship among the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, and the President as America actively entered the Vietnam War with military force in 1965. What, if anything, do you think that the Chiefs should have done differently to convey their views?
Required Readings:
* Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 13-27, 234-251. (Reprint)
* George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam: 1950-1975, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1986), pp. 221-256. (Reprint)
* Harry G. Summers, Jr., "Lessons: A Soldier's View," in Vietnam as History, ed. Peter Braestrup (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1984)(a Wilson Center Conference Report), pp. 109-114. (Reprint)
* Russell F. Weigley, "Reflections on 'Lessons' from Vietnam," in Vietnam as History, ed. Peter Braestrup (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1984) (a Wilson Center Conference Report), pp. 115-124. (Reprint)
* Douglas Pike, "The Other Side," in Vietnam as History, ed. Peter Braestrup (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1984)(a Wilson Center Conference Report), pp. 71-77. (Reprint)
* Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect (New York, NY: Random House, 1995), pp. 161-177, 182-192, 200-206. (Reprint)
* George C. Herring, "Preparing NOT to Refight the Last War: The Impact of the Vietnam War on the US Military," 1998 Lecture at Johns Hopkins University. (Reprint)
* H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamera, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), pp. 300-322, 411-415. (Student Issue)
Supplemental Readings:
* Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1981).
* Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
* Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1979).
* Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books, 1984, 1997).
* Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).
* Truong Nhu Tang, A Viet Cong Memoir (New York: Vintage Books, 1987).
* Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1973), pp. 113-222.
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