Wednesday
3 November 1999
0830-1130 (LS)
We must remember that this war, like every other, was unique.
Dick Cheney
Introduction:
The Gulf War was the United States' third major limited conflict since the end of World War II. In contrast with its experiences in Korea and Vietnam, however, the United States enjoyed phenomenal military success in the Gulf War. Open hostilities lasted only six weeks, with the bulk of that devoted to the air campaign; the ground campaign lasted a mere 100 hours. The air campaign battered Iraq's air defense system, its strategic strike capability, and its industrial, logistical, and command and control infrastructure. In the ground action, U.S. and coalition forces inflicted serious losses on Iraqi forces, quickly ejecting them from Kuwait. It was an impressive display of overwhelming military superiority expertly applied. A vital part of that superiority derived from capabilities based on quantum advances in information gathering, processing, and communication. America's victory in the Gulf exploited the emergence of many of these capabilities. Still, eight and a half years after the war ended, Saddam Hussein has not complied with UN demands, and American aircraft continue to patrol the skies over Iraq and frequently engage in combat with Iraqi forces. Nagging questions thus remain over the war's political outcome. Did the U.S. and its coalition partners achieve their objectives in 1991? Were the military objectives chosen the proper ones to achieve the political objectives? That these questions remain highlights the most devilishly difficult aspect of waging limited war: how to devise limited strategies and campaigns that achieve desired political outcomes and enduring strategic effects.
Objectives:
- Understand the character and conduct of the Persian Gulf War.
- Analyze and critique the application of military power in the Gulf War in light of the theories studied thus far in the course.
Issues for Consideration:
- What were the most important ways in which the war in the Gulf differed from that in Vietnam? Korea? How did these differences affect the course and outcome of the Gulf War?
- What were Iraq's centers of gravity? What should have been the strategic military objective(s) of the coalition forces? Why? Critique U.S. and coalition conflict termination objectives. What influenced those objectives? Were there significant differences between U.S. objectives and those of the other members of the coalition? What, if any, were the effects of the differences?
- Critique the strategic concepts for employment of the U.S. and coalition forces in the Gulf War in light of the theories studied thus far in the course.
- What, if any, ethical considerations (necessity, proportionality, and discrimination) were or should have been made with regard to actions taken against Iraq (e.g., economic sanctions, strategic bombing, etc.)?
- Were there aspects of a "revolution in military affairs" revealed in the Gulf War? If so, what were its elements and implications?
Required Readings:
* Ilana Kass and Bard O'Neill, "The Persian Gulf War: A Political--Military Assessment," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 11, April-June 1992, pp. 213-240. (Reprint)
* Richard M. Swain, "Lucky War:" Third Army in Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994), pp. 71-101. (Reprint)
* Mark Clodfelter, "Of Demons, Storms, and Thunder: A Preliminary Look at Vietnam's Impact on the Persian Gulf Air Campaign," Airpower Journal, Winter 1991, pp. 17-32. (Reprint)
* Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 235-251. (Reprint)
* John Warden, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-First Century," in Richard H. Shultz, Jr., and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds, The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1992), pp. 70-82. (Reprint)
Supplemental Readings:
* Bob Woodward, The Commanders, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1991).
* Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Generals War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York, NY: Little, Brown and Co., 1995).
* Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
* Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994).
 |
 |
 |