Tuesday
12 October 1999
0800-1000 (IS)
No plan of operations survives the first collision with the main enemy body.
Helmuth von Moltke
Introduction:
At the very time Jomini and Clausewitz were struggling to explain the powerful new form of war that emerged during the French Revolution and was exploited so spectacularly by Napoleon, forces were already at work further reshaping the character and conduct of war. Technical advances such as rifled muskets and cannon, burgeoning industrialization, increasingly vitriolic nationalism, the spread of bourgeois and proletarian revolutions, the rapid growth of modern communications and transportation such as the telegraph and the railroad, and the steady professionalization of armies and their officer corps-epitomized by the development of general staffs that specialized in war planning-all combined to accelerate the rate at which warfare was changing to a dizzying pace. Together, these changes helped spark a nineteenth century revolution in military affairs, but the "revolutionary" aspects of the changes were not obvious to everyone, nor was there widespread agreement that the character and conduct of war had been altered significantly.
As early as the mid-nineteenth century, the Crimean War and the American Civil War posed serious tests for the soundness of the ideas propounded by Jomini and Clausewitz. By the end of the century, the Russo-Japanese War illustrated just how far warfare had advanced from the Napoleonic model that was the touchstone for Jomini and Clausewitz. But again, the nineteenth century changes in warfare were neither universally acknowledged nor understood. New theorists and practitioners emerged to put their own spin on military practice and theory: Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder) in Prussia; Ardant du Picq and Ferdinand Foch in France; and, exercising influence throughout Europe, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Vladimir Lenin. All tried valiantly to capture the essence of the style of warfare they saw emerging, and all made valuable contributions to the evolving body of modern military thought. But the dynamics of war were changing too fast for anyone to pin down its essence. Thus, when the cataclysm of World War I began early in the next century, its character and conduct surprised virtually everyone.
In this lesson, we will examine the principal forces affecting the evolution of war in the nineteenth century, and how those factors affected military thought. As we do, think about possible parallels to--and cautions for--today.
Objectives:
- Comprehend the implications of the principal forces affecting the character and conduct of war in the nineteenth century.
- Understand how the Prussian/German general staff system shaped the conduct of war.
- Become familiar with Marx's and Engels's principal ideas in respect to war and the continued relevance of those ideas today.
Issues for Consideration:
- What were the most important changes taking place during the nineteenth century that affected the evolving character and conduct of war? Do such changes justify the title "revolution in military affairs"?
- Do the ideas of Marx and Engels represent a line of continuity with the previous evolution of military thought or a radical departure? Were Marx and Engels military theorists at all?
- Do you see any similarities between the situation and conditions in nineteenth century Europe and the situation we face today?
- By the end of the nineteenth century, whose theory had best stood the test of time, Jomini's or Clausewitz's? Why?
Required Readings:
* Hajo Halborn, "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff," Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 281-295. (Student Issue)
* Gunther F. Rothenberg, "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment," Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 296-325. (Student Issue)
* Robert L. O'Connell, "Death Machine," "On the High Seas and Out of Sight," and "Prelude," Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, and Aggression, pp. 189-240. (Reprint)
* Sigmund Neumann and Mark von Hagen, "Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society," Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 262-280. (Student Issue)
Supplemental Readings:
* Larry Addington, The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 43-133. (Student Issue)
* Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London, UK: George Allen and Unwin, 1983).
* Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871 (London, UK: Rupert Hart-Davis Ltd., 1961).
* Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1994), pp. 149-193.
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