Wednesday
13 October 1999
0800-1100 (LS)
The military mind always imagines that the next war will be on the same lines as the last. That has never been the case and never will be.
Ferdinand Foch
Introduction:
World War I was as influential in the evolution of modern warfare and military theory as the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. One of the legacies of the French Revolution was the cultivation of intense, militaristic nationalism throughout Europe that held up the nation as the embodiment of all that was good and whose highest destiny was war to defend that good. By the end of the nineteenth century this militaristic nationalism was embodied in an enormously more powerful state. The Industrial Revolution had provided the mass armies of Europe with far greater capacity to equip themselves, supply themselves, transport themselves, and communicate within themselves. It also had provided them with weapons of immensely greater power. In short, the nations of Europe had developed the capacity to mobilize all the resources of their societies and to keep those societies locked in mortal combat for years.
World War I also was the testing ground for the theories of Clausewitz, Jomini, and others, as well as for the military doctrine their theories had spawned. The scale, power, and intensity of the warfare that erupted in August 1914 was beyond the experience and comprehension of those responsible for directing and conducting it. The result was intellectual confusion. The sheer power of the opposing armies seemed to overwhelm enlightened thought about how to employ that power. No one could discern either the methods or the strategies that would allow one side to gain the advantage over the other. Given their relative parity, the two sides simply faced off in a stalemate and slugged it out until one or the other exhausted its resources or will. The guideposts of theory and doctrine did not lead to successful strategies. The prewar theory and doctrine had either been wrong, poorly understood, or misapplied by those in charge.
The bulk of the reading for this lesson provides a strategic analysis of "The Great War." Addington offers a solid overview of the course of the war, while Michael Howard and Michael Geyer examine the factors that influenced strategy and the conduct of military operations. For those interested in how the United States approached the conflict, Supplemental Reading #5 by Russell Weigley provides insights.
Objective:
- In light of military theory studied thus far, analyze and critique the military strategies developed by the major belligerents in World War I.
Issues for Consideration:
- What were the principal military objectives of the combatants in 1914? How well did these objectives correlate with the objectives of other members of each coalition? What was the effect of these objectives on the kind of conflict envisioned (general or regional war)?
- What did the major belligerents do to try to overcome the deadlock of trench warfare? (do not neglect considering instruments of power other than simply the military component)? How successful were their efforts?
- Does World War I validate Clausewitz's theory of war or, as Liddell Hart maintains, prove its bankruptcy? How do the ideas of Jomini hold up in light of the experience of the First World War? If these theories remained valid, why were they ignored or misapplied?
- In World War I, did firepower displace human factors in order of importance? Is Michael Howard correct in arguing that the worst losses were due not to faulty doctrine but to inexperience and inefficiency?
Required Readings:
* Larry Addington, The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 134-171. (Student Issue)
* Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914," Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 510-526. (Student Issue)
* Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945," Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 527-554. (Student Issue)
Supplemental Readings:
* James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of World War I (New York, NY: William Morrow and Co., 1981).
* Edward M. Coffman, The War to End all Wars: The American Experience in World War I (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1969).
* Cyril Falls, The Great War, 1914-1918 (New York, NY: Capricorn Books, 1959).
* Norman Stone, The Eastern Front 1914-1917 (New York, NY: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1975).
* Russell F. Weigley, "Strategy and the Great War of 1914-1918," The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), pp. 192-222. (Student Issue).
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