Tuesday
28 March 2000
0830-1130 (LS)
Air, space and outer space are a strategically inseparable medium above the earth's surface, where military operations will be key to armed combat. Outer space is a unique theater of military operations in which the same fierce combat will develop as in the air.
General Colonel N. A. Lomov, 1973
May the shoreless cosmic ocean be pure and free of weapons of any kind. We must preclude the militarization of outer space.
President Leonid Brezhnev, 1981
We will endeavor to maintain our current technological lead in space as more users develop their commercial and military capabilities. It is becoming increasingly important to guarantee access to and use of space as a part of joint operations, and to protect US interests. Space control will ensure freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries.
National Military Strategy, 1997
The control of air and space is a critical enabler for the Joint Force because it allows all U.S. forces freedom from attack and freedom to attack.
Global Engagement, 1997
Purpose
The purpose of this lesson is to comprehend the emerging concept of "space power;" analyze the national security strategy with regard to space for military implications; evaluate US military strategy and joint doctrine for space; and evaluate future military requirements and capabilities in space.
Learning Objectives
1. Analyze space as a strategically significant region and a unique operating environment.
2. Comprehend the contribution of US space-based assets to US military strategy and operations on earth.
3. Evaluate the military advantages, disadvantages and vulnerabilities of US space operations.
4. Evaluate US military strategy and joint doctrine for space.
5. Create and devise alternative national strategies for protecting US interests with regard to space.
Discussion
It is a military axiom to seize the high ground. Space represents the ultimate high ground, a unique operating medium and, potentially, a theater of war-as suggested by the Soviets 25 years ago. Furthermore, the United States relies on space systems to enhance mission effectiveness across the board, from the tactical through the strategic levels. It is crucial, therefore, for all commanders to understand and be able to capitalize on the synergies available through the integration of this dimension into our overall strategic design.
Space superiority is commonly perceived as the ability to launch satellites on demand and operate them effectively once in orbit. Maintaining reliable access to space and the ability to exploit it in order to ensure information dominance and robust communications are critical capabilities. However, the protection of space systems from hostile interference is no less important
DESERT STORM has been described by some as the "first space war." If so, it was a decidedly one-sided affair, in the sense that the Coalition's ability to marshal space assets in support of its victorious campaign went completely unchallenged. Moreover, whether because of security classification, insufficient familiarity, or lack of doctrine, the Gulf War demonstrated only a fraction of the enormous potential embedded in this medium of warfare.
At the same time, the war showcased not only America's impressive capabilities, but also its growing dependence on space to support virtually every facet of terrestrial operations. This, in turn, exposed a vulnerability that could be exploited by future opponents or peer competitors. Given that any relative military advantage is likely to be challenged, U.S. dominance in space is by no means assured for the long term. In tomorrow's conflicts, we might need to both defend our access to space and deny its use to adversaries. How might we go about it-without alienating nations and commercial concerns whose satellites provide our opponents with critical, militarily-relevant communications, navigation and weather data-is a major dilemma facing the United States and the international community at large.
These imperatives notwithstanding, space remains an unassigned area of responsibility (AOR) and a war fighting doctrine is yet to be adopted in the joint arena. Similarly, there is no policy framework for addressing-let alone solving-the problems involved in selective denial of commercial and third-party systems to an adversary. Meanwhile, resource limitations and competing priorities might be calling into question our continued ability to translate technological promise into actual, fielded capabilities. As you prepare for this lesson, ask yourself: are we taking our current lead for granted? Are we short-changing the future in the name of today's requirements?
Issues for Consideration
1. What is it that makes space a unique operating medium? What is its relative importance and, thus, priority in our overall strategic design?
2. How critical is space superiority to the conduct of U.S. military operations? Was DESERT STORM the last time we got a "free ride" in terms of uncontested access to and exploitation of space assets? What, if anything, should we do now to hedge against the threat that our current advantage might be challenged by future adversaries or peer competitors?
3. Should space remain "a weapons-free environment" as stipulated in current international conventions? Given that space is already used to support nearly every form of military operation, is the prohibition meaningful and practical? What are the potential implications of further "militarizing" this theater? Who has the most to gain or lose from keeping things as they are?
4. Is there a meaningful distinction between civilian and military space systems, or are nearly all dual-use? What are the potential implications in terms of control, accessibility, defense, and vulnerability to attack in time of crisis? Does the growing internationalization of space operations pose special problems?
5. Do the growing demands to provide space support to the war fighters detract from other USSPACECOM missions? Which missions should receive top priority? Who should deconflict the requirements? Do we need a joint force space component commander to act as a JFACC-equivalent at the theater level? Should space be an assigned AOR?
6. Scenario - Iraq has established an on-going relationship with a Chinese firm which provides satellite images of the Gulf region. The images are excellent quality, one meter resolution, certainly targeting quality. Although there is an approximate 12-hour image cycle, CINCCENT is concerned about the threat to his forces. Discussions in Beijing have not been rewarding; the US ambassador does not believe China will stop selling the images to Baghdad.
China's rather neutral position on the fighting in Korea has been helpful. Three divisions from the military region north of the DPRK have been moved forward, but these are dealing with the refugee problem.
Two options have surfaced. The first is to do nothing and accept that US movements will be known 12 hours after they have taken place. The second option, favored by the CINC, is to use a laser dazzler to obscure the Chinese satellites during critical operations. The second option has some potential policy problems. First, the Chinese response is unknown. They may see it as an "attack" on a sovereign spacecraft. Second, there could be a broad and negative broad political reaction among those nations (including Iraq) in the global movement to declare space an arena of non-competition.
How do you think the JCS ought to recommend at this point in the crisis? What do you think the President should decide?
Required Readings
1. Joint Pub 3-14, Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Space Operations. (Student Issue)
2. Colin S. Gray, "The Influence of Space Power on History," Comparative Strategy (October/December, 1996), pp. 293-308. (Reprint)
3. Kerry Kimble and Rudy Veit, "Space as an AOR," Joint Force Quarterly, (Issue 23) Autumn/Winter 99-00, Gallery Proof without page numbers (Reprint)
4. Robert L. Butterworth, "The Case Against Centralizing Military Space," Strategic Review, vol XXIV, no 3 (Summer 1996), pp. 41-49. (Reprint)
5. Katherine McIntire Peters, "Space Wars," Government Executive (April,1998), pp. 12-20. (Reprint)
6. Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler (eds), Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World, Institute for National Security Studies, 1999, Chapter XX, "Space and Oceans: Can They Be Controlled?" pp. 301-308. (Student Issue)
7. Richard J. Newman, "The New Space Race - The Pentagon envisions a war in the heavens, but can it defend the ultimate high ground?" US News & World Report (November 8, 1999) (Reprint)
Recommended Readings
Jeffrey R. Cooper, "Strategy," Air and Space Power in the New Millenium, 1997.
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