The military's reluctance to intervene in political developments, even those it strongly opposed, was demonstrated again in the months that followed the coup. Although the Defense Ministry emerged surprisingly unscathed by the coup, the slow-motion demise of the old center set the military adrift.(Note 48)
Still clinging desperately to the hope that the unified Soviet Armed Forces could somehow be preserved, military leaders returned to their pre-coup tactic of lobbying.(Note 49)
The high command's hopes that the union could be preserved were in vain. The renewed union treaty talks quickly deadlocked. Gorbachev's last-ditch efforts to save the union were futile in the face of Ukraine's escalating insistence on independence and Yeltsin's growing conviction that the way to power was through the demise of the old central government. In early December, Yeltsin, Ukrainian leader Kravchuk, and Belarussian leader Shushkevich met at Belovezh Forest to sign an agreement formalizing the demise of the USSR and creating in its place a Commonwealth. The Soviet era was over.
The Belovezh Forest agreements created another major dilemma for the high command. Should they back Gorbachev or shift their support to the newly-created Commonwealth?(Note 50) In the end, Defense Ministry leaders decided to abandon the old Soviet central government, in part because the center had lost control of financial resources, making the military dependent on the three Slavic republics for support, and in part because the Commonwealth agreement envisioned retention of a unified military and unified control over nuclear weapons.(Note 51) In short, although many within the military saw the Belovezh agreement as a betrayal, the military leadership and the officer corps eventually accepted the Commonwealth because they saw it as the nucleus of a new (and perhaps more viable) center.(Note 52)
The high command's hopes for the Commonwealth, however, were frustrated by Ukraine, which steadfastly refused any involvement in a Commonwealth defense arrangement involving either a single armed forces or Commonwealth control of national forces. Determined to disengage from its former partners, Ukraine began in early January 1992 to nationalize troops on it soil, including assets such as the Black Sea Fleet that both Russia and newly appointed Commonwealth Commander Shaposhnikov claimed as Commonwealth forces. Ukrainian Defense Minister Morozov ordered a cessation of direct communications between troops units located in Ukraine and the General Staff in Moscow.(Note 53) Kiev also announced that military personnel in "non-strategic" units on Ukrainian territory would be obliged to sign a new oath of allegiance to Ukraine.
These developments were profoundly disturbing to the officer corps, which still clung to the hope that a unified military could be preserved.(Note 54) A poll taken at a meeting of officers' representatives in Moscow on 17 January 1992 revealed that 71% of the assembly participants favored restoration of the old USSR. Support for the idea of restoring the USSR was strongest among senior officers and less strong among those with fewer years in service. Moreover, 79% of the assembly participants felt that the military should have the deciding say in determining the future of the armed forces; only 19% felt that the army must await decisions by politicians on the army's future.(Note 55) A follow-on June 1992 poll of participants in an expanded meeting of the Coordinating Council for officer's assemblies found that nearly all thought that the situation in the military had significantly worsened since the beginning of the year; respondents also reported that the Armed Forces was becoming increasingly politicized during this period. (Note 56)
Yet the military, for all its opposition to the demise of the USSR and the breakup of the unified military, refrained from intervening in these processes. There is no evidence that the high command or lower-level commanders were actively planning measures to counter the USSR's demise by force. Nor did they take steps to remove Yeltsin in the spring of 1992, when it became clear that he was acquiescing to the centrifugal forces that doomed the Commonwealth as a successor state to the USSR and ultimately doomed the unified military. In fact, many officers were probably greatly relieved in May 1992 when Yeltsin finally announced the creation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, in part because the decision clarified the military chain of command.(Note 57)