This review of the military's response to the tumultuous political events of the last five years suggests that Russia has yet to transform the old Soviet Armed Forces into an apolitical military. To the contrary, the Defense Ministry leadership has consistently acted as an autonomous actor in opposing any developments it perceives as threatening the integrity of the state, first the USSR and now Russia. The Defense Ministry has functioned as an institutional lobby backing a centralized system conducive to the retention of first the USSR Armed Forces and now the Russian Armed Forces. Moreover, political leaders have used Defense Ministry forces (albeit with great distaste by Defense Ministry leaders) in quelling civil disorder and separatist threats, first on the USSR's periphery and now on Russia's periphery.

In terms of its involvement in power struggles at the center, however, the military has proven to be a most reluctant participant. In the months leading up to the August 1991 coup, the officer corps and the high command were increasingly dismayed by the escalating threats to Soviet integrity and what they saw as the political leadership's ill-advised reaction to them. Both the Defense Ministry leadership and individual high-ranking officers actively lobbied in favor of retention of a centralized state and single army.

Few in the military high command, however, including Yazov himself, showed any enthusiasm for the conspiracy to oust Gorbachev and reverse the trends that they so strongly opposed. There are several alternative (although not mutually exclusive) explanations for the Defense Ministry's actions (or lack thereof) during the coup.

One explanation is that it became clear by 20 August that the coup conspirators were totally inept. To come to the aid of such bumbling conspirators was to associate oneself and one's institution with sure failure. A second explanation is that the military had become so thoroughly depoliticized during the Soviet period that there was no tradition of military intervention in politics. A third explanation is that the Armed Forces was by August 1991 so disorganized and demoralized that the use of military units in any struggle risked military fragmentation. Fourth, there were deep political divisions within the officer corps and within the high command itself that undermined the Defense Ministry's cohesiveness.

The most compelling explanation, however, was that to support the coup conspiracy by assaulting the Russian White House would have risked widespread unrest and possibly civil war. This was seen by most in the high command as a greater threat to the survival of the USSR than the union treaty. It was this argument that motivated Yazov's order to withdraw the troops from Moscow.

The military's failure to react when the three Slavic states met in the Belovezh Forest and decided to abolish the Soviet Union can also be seen within this framework. One possible explanation is that, for many within the officer corps, there were viable alternatives to the Soviet military. Those stationed in Ukraine had the option of affiliating themselves with the emerging Ukrainian military. For those in stationed in Russia, the Russian Federation was an alternative source of identity.

The most persuasive explanation, however, is that the final breakup of the USSR was accomplished peacefully and without bloodshed. It is likely that at least some within the military leadership questioned the continued viability of the USSR and felt that it might be destabilizing to try to intervene in the process of its demise.

Similarly, the military's refusal to get involved in the Russian executive-legislative conflict prior to October 1993 is best explained as a reflection of the Defense Ministry's assessment that these conflicts posed no immediate threat of civil disorder. Lacking this threat, there was no consensus within the Defense Ministry leadership or within the officer corps at large on the need for Armed Forces intervention.

Military reluctance to intervene politically was also evident in October 1993, when it took major disorders in the capitol to induce a hesitant high command to answer the call of their Commander in Chief. Most accounts of the events in the critical hours preceding the attack on the White House indicate that Grachev's reluctance to commit Defense Ministry forces was not just a result of his own desire to keep his options open, but rather reflected a larger reluctance within the Defense Ministry Collegium and among lower level commanders to use force against the White House. Some of this reluctance may have stemmed from sympathies with Yeltsin's opponents, but much of it was due to a deeper aversion to military intervention in politics. It was only the breakdown of order in Moscow that convinced an unwilling high command to authorize the use of Defense Ministry forces in the assault on the White House. The primary motive was not to prop up Yeltsin, but to restore order and prevent the situation from spiraling into civil war.

In fact, the two coups in Russia's recent past the hardliners' unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Gorbachev in August 1991 and Yeltsin's successful attempt to overthrow parliament in September/October 1993 Care similar in several key respects. In both cases, the Minister of Defense (career military men) initially was clearly involved on the side of one of the participants. In 1991, Yazov was one of the coup leaders; in 1993, Grachev originally came out in clear support of President Yeltsin. In both cases, there were elements within the military that wanted to take political sides. However, in neither case did the military commanders aggressively seek to support the side that was claiming the mantle of savior of the state. In both instances, when faced with the possibility of internal fissures along politically partisan lines, the commanders of forces (as opposed to the ministers) resisted taking decisive action.

The most striking difference between the military's response in 1991 and 1993 can be traced to the riots in the streets of Moscow in October 1993. In August 1991, Yeltsin successfully mobilized a massive, but nonviolent, resistance to the coup conspirators. In October 1993, Rutskoy and other anti-Yeltsin leaders in the White House made the mistake of endorsing violence, thus presenting an immediate and unmistakable threat to the stability of the state.