The Armed Forces' involvement in the 4 October tank assault on the White House traumatized the military. Survey data suggest that few Russians think that the crisis has resolved the political stalemate. (Note 86) In fact, many feel that the crisis in governance has gotten worse, not better.(Note 87) An increasing proportion say that it is time for Yeltsin to step down.(Note 88) These sentiments were reflected in the results of the December 1993 parliamentary elections, when voters turned a decisive thumbs-down to radical reformers closely associated with Yeltsin and the executive's attack on the legislature.

While military attitudes (in the absence of reliable survey data) cannot be stated with certainty, it seems clear that the officer corps was particularly embittered by the October events. In Grachev's words, "The military still feels bitterness because it was forced to help solve the problems created by political confrontation."(Note 89) One indicator of this bitterness is the fact that some officers who took part in the tank attack on the White House have tried to conceal their role in the assault, reportedly because they fear violent retaliation.(Note 90)

Another indirect indicator of the military's negative reaction to the October events was its voting pattern in the December 1993 legislative elections. The Armed Forces apparently voted more heavily for the opposition, especially for Zhirinovkiy's ultranationalists, than did the civilian population. Although most servicemen vote at civilian polling places and much of the military vote is thus buried in civilian totals, data from those electoral precincts with a high proportion of military voters suggest that conservative candidates were particularly popular with servicemen.(Note 91)

Yeltsin estimated (apparently on the basis of these data) that Zhirinovkiy's ultranationalist party garnered a third of the military vote in the proportional race, compared to less than a quarter for the population as a whole.(Note 92) However, according to chief of the Counterintelligence Service Sergey Stepashin, Zhirinovskiy captured 40 percent of the military vote. The figures provided to Yeltsin, he said, were "adjusted"Capparently downward for the president, implying that more than 40% actually voted for Zhirinovskiy.(Note 93) These figures tally with those provided by a Russian journalist, who claims that within the officer corps, 40% voted for Zhirinovskiy. According to the journalist, this estimate was derived from voting patterns in closed military precincts, where officers voted in separate polling stations from conscript personnel.

Other reports suggest that Communist and other "Red-Brown" candidates also garnered a large proportion of the military vote. One government official claims that 50-80% of the army vote went to Zhirinovskiy's ultranationalists, the Communists, and other conservative groups.(Note 94) Two disenchanted army colonels asserted that 67.8% of the vote in closed polling places on military garrisons went to Zhirinovskiy and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.(Note 95)

Additional evidence of the military's attraction to Zhirinovskiy came from Vladimir Smirnov, Assistant Chief of the Analytical Center of the Presidential Administration. Smirnov asserted that analysis within the presidential apparatus of voting patterns at closed polling stations provided strong evidence of military support for Zhirinovskiy. He explained this development by arguing that educational work among military men was "national-socialist" in content.(Note 96)

Zhirinovskiy's strong showing among servicemen in the election coincides with public opinion surveys on the socio-demographic makeup of Zhirinovskiy supporters. Such surveys indicate that the ultranationalist leader is particularly popular among military servicemen and among young males in general.(Note 97) Further evidence of the military's attraction to Zhirinovskiy comes from a study by the Public Opinion Foundation (a reputable Moscow-based polling firm). Respondents in an 18 December survey were asked how they voted in the early December legislative elections.(Note 98) The results indicate that military personnel voted disproportionately for the Liberal Democratic Party. A subsequent study by the same firm also found that servicemen (and policemen) were more likely to support Zhirinovskiy for president.(Note 99) Similarly, a late January poll among urban residents by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center found that army and law enforcement personnel were more likely to view Zhirinovskiy's statements in the State Duma as rational and appropriate.(Note 100)

Part of Zhirinovskiy's appeal to military personnel was his success in exploiting two key issues: growing disorder and the loss of great power status. Survey data on voters' motives reveal that those who voted for both the LDP and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation did so because they saw these parties as being most likely to support the restoration of order in the country. Zhirinovskiy voters, in addition, saw the LDP as the group most capable of defending the interests of Russians in Russia and the near abroad. Zhirinovskiy voters were also more supportive than other voters of restoration of a centralized state within the boundaries of the old Soviet Union. Only 13% of Zhirinovskiy voters reported that they voted for the LDP because they saw this party as the main opposition to Yeltsin.(Note 101)

These findings suggest that military alienation from the Yeltsin leadership is at least as strong as that of the civilian populace and perhaps given the Defense Ministry's resentment of the role it was forced to play in resolving the crisis much stronger. In sum, the events of 21 September-4 October almost certainly acted to reinforce the military's reluctance to come to Yeltsin's assistance in a future struggle.

After the October crisis, the military in a pattern similar to its actions after the 1991 coup reverted to its pre-crisis strategy of lobbying. The Defense Ministry, for instance, emerged during the spring and summer battle over the 1994 budget as the most vocal institutional claimant on resources. Defense Ministry officials mounted an aggressive public campaign through high-level statements and on the pages of its press organ, Red Star to justify the military's resource demands. Despite early support from both Yeltsin and defense supporters in both houses of the legislature for a 55 trillion ruble defense budget, the Defense Ministry eventually lost the budget battle, when presidential, parliamentary, and government forces joined forces in support of a much lower figure.(Note 102)

There were also signs in the aftermath of the October crisis that civilian control over the military had been seriously weakened. The most dramatic example of this was the curious saga of General Aleksandr Lebed. An airborne officer and reported early crony of Grachev, Lebed was appointed in June 1992 to head Russia's 14th Army in Dniester, where the dispute between Moldovan authorities and Slavic-speaking separatist forces had erupted into a civil war. Lebed quickly emerged as an outspoken advocate of Dniester autonomy and critic of the Moldovan government, but his repeated forrays into regional politics earned him not a reprimand, but a promotion from Yeltsin. Two years later, convinced he could act with impunity, Lebed issued a defiant political challenge to both Yeltsin and Grachev in a well-publicized 20 July 1994 interview in a major Moscow newspaper in which he characterized Yeltsin as "a minus" and endorsed the Pinochet model of military rule.(Note 103) Moscow responded to Lebed's defiance by attempting to remove him from his command, but this brought a storm of protest from Lebed's officers, who sent Defense Minister Grachev a message demanding that Lebed be retained and the decision to disband the Army be reversed. Some officers reportedly threatened mutiny if Lebed were removed from his post.(Note 104)

In the face of this resistance, the Defense Ministry beat a hasty retreat, denying plans to fire Lebed. Yeltsin, for his part, praised the insubordinate general. Lebed, he said, played a "great role" in keeping the situation in Moldova under control and preventing largescale bloodshed.(Note 105) Defense Minister Grachev also found it necessary to sing Lebed's praises, characterizing him as a "reliable helper" to whom he had offerred the post of Tajikistan Defense Minister. However, after Lebed refused the offer, Grachev agreed that the rebellious commander would remain in Dniester or perhaps even replace Grachev as Defense Minister.(Note 106)

Moscow's lack of resolve in dealing with Lebed and his officers demonstrates weak civilian control of the military and will likely embolden other officers to dabble in politics. The events also serve to legitimize the idea that Russian field commanders are less agents of the high command in Moscow than autonomous actors who represent the interests of the officers under their command.(Note 107)

An ominous harbinger of continued military resistance to civilian control is the 11 August acquittal of former ground forces commander Valentin Varennikov for his role in the August 1991 coup. Varennikov, the only participant in the 1991 coup to reject the Duma's 23 February 1994 amnesty and to demand a trial to vindicate his actionsCused the trial to publicize his view that the abortive coup was not an illegal attempt to overthrow the legitimate leadership, but rather a well-meaning attempt to prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union. Both the prosecutor and the court agreed with Varennikov's reasoning and acquitted him of treason charges.(Note 108) By vindicating Varennikov's actions (and by implication those of other military coup participants), the ruling removes a potential legal barrier against military intervention in politics.