Prof. JUDr Armin A. Steinkamm, Dipl.sc.pol.Univ.
Lecture given on 1 May 1998 in Prague.
Dear Minister, Deputies and Senators, Generals, Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Friends,
It is a great honour and pleasure to speak to you today on the topic of the "Civil Control of the Military in Democratic Societies - Status and Ways of Development".
As we all know this topic is a subject of the PHARE programme, called the "Civil Control of the Military and Officers in Democratic Societies", which has been implemented since the end of last year together with the Association of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Army of the Czech Republic and the German Association of Reserve Officers of the Bundeswehr, in cooperation with the Association of Reservists of the Republic of Hungary and the Association of Reserve Soldiers of the Slovak Republic under finance fellowship of the European Union. I would like to thank here to our Czech friends for the initiative made in favour of this Project that has its beginning in the "Gaming Initiative". I would like to thank you also for excellent cooperation we have developed during implementation of this Project.
I shall divide my lecture according to the needs of the topic and also especially to requirements of its implementation:
First, I´ll outline initial situation that existed in reformist countries after political shift with regard to my topic.
The second step will be clarification of the term of the "civil control". At the same time, I´ll develop fundamental hallmarks of this term without insisting this catalogue is complete.
In the third step, I´ll show on the example of the Federal Republic of Germany at what levels the criteria of the civil control can be applied: Outside and inside the army, within state authorities and in society.
To the status of the civil control of the military belongs, as the fourth step, also "stocktaking" of development and implementation of criteria in other participating countries, in the Czech and Slovak republics, and in the Republic of Hungary. Due to time limitation, I cannot make this stocktaking within this lecture. This task will be a significant target in the framework of implementation of our Project, but, of course, we are dependent also upon publications and cooperation made by these countries. In particular during that, it will be demonstrated that for the civil control of the military no generally valid conception can exist but that each country must develop its own specific model for the "civil control of the military".
The fifth step of my presentation relates to the practical steps the civil control can be further developed by in partner nations.
The sixth step must be discussion on how we shall manage to include the five above-mentioned steps into our programmes supposed in our Project description. That must be made by the Project Implementation Team at workshops.
1. Initial status
My task is to deliver major address on the topic of the "Civil Control of the Military in Democratic Societies - Status and Ways of Development". The "comprehensive" view to this topic requires reminding the initial status: Security political change did not bring to majority of participating countries only liberation from communist and almost unconditional domination of Moscow. It was also necessary to create democratic structures. They had to be newly constitutionally and legally restructured by reforms, often without practical experience and constitutional-legal knowledge. The transformation of armed forces was even more difficult. Before 1989, the armed forces were an instrument of the "ruling class" for maintenance of the communist power system. The armies were in a close symbiosis with it what sharply contrasted with official labelling of the "people s army". The change and new orientation of armies of the former Warsaw Pact countries in many cases had to be started by the same people who were for years members of the ruling system. Only some countries found their strength to develop fundamentally new personnel orientation of the military command. On the other hand, it proved correct that career soldiers of SMALLER states of the Warsaw Pact welcomed after 1989 the perspective to serve again definitely their own nation and fulfil duties in favour of their own people.
Here are possibly the roots of problems that come from constitutional and legal arrangements a number of reformist countries still apply as before, and especially in leadership of armed forces, their democratic control, and their integration into the society. This knowledge is the basic reason that the NATO countries offer, initiated in January 1994 to cooperate within the Partnership for Peace, among others proposes to work together towards the target to ensure democratic control of the military and to support transparency of defence planning and budgeting in cooperating partner countries. But a question what content is meant by these targets in concrete is neither answered by PfP document nor a study on NATO enlargement. The "democratic control of the military" is generally perceived as subordination of armed forces to democratically elected political bodies. It means that all decision making on national defence was transferred to those who are in charge of the defence policy of the given country. But who this responsibility was transferred to? To the head of state, parliament, government, or civilian government servants of the executive power? The following has been left still open in the PfP document:
- how should the civil control of the military be achieved
- which structures and procedures are necessary for that, and
- what role should be played by the given state bodies.
In NATO countries, principle of democratic control of armed forces is strictly set. Initial situation in former communist countries was quite different. Even there the control of armies was carried out by the politics, but not democratically legitimized. Armies fulfilled their "revolutionary class goal" under leadership of the communist party. To that the own qualities of each army are being attached: obedience, discipline, loyalty, friendship and solidarity, and unity, which more or less differs from the civilian world. The army is the element of stability. But history is full of examples of political interference or even taking over the power by soldiers. Therefore the loyalty of the military to the state and its bodies, and to the constitution is decisive.
It is a historical experience that a picture of army and its position in the whole state establishment, especially also its loyalty towards the politics and its representatives, is up to the two factors: Political (and constitutional-legal) sources for existence of the army and legal consequences creating legal framework of this existence. Another historical experience is that the function of the army is carried out the more perfectly,
- the more convincingly the political objective of the military is formulated, and
- this objective is legalized.
2. Attempt for explanation of terms - criteria of the civilian control
If it is expected from my today s lecture that I´ll show the "status and ways of development of the civil control of the military in democratic society", I must, with regard to the status, first of all explain the term "Civil Control of the Military in Democratic Societies". Even this is not an easy task. Because even in NATO countries there are different ideas and historical experience.
a) If we want to analyze the issue of the civil control, my first thesis is as follows: The civil bodies must have power in three fields: the constitution must guarantee them:
- Decision making over war and peace. Democracy does exist only in case the holders of power elected by people decide over survival of society in a decisive way.
- Management and control of the military: The first rule of the democratic relation of the army and (civilian) society is that (elected) executive power applies its last word on where, when and how the army will be used. In order to preclude incorrect interpretation, the command authority must be, in the ultimate instance, exercised by only one person (therefore the delegation of the command authority to the head of state, and at the same time to the minister of defence is constantly burdened by problems).
- The third critical area of the civil control relates to the formulation of the military policy: The competence to define the kind of army, its structure and size must be reserved for civilian holders of the power - and not for soldiers.
b) The second thesis is: The civil control must also have its limitations. In all three mentioned areas the civilian holders of power would be subject to legitimate criticism if they make decisions without advice of experienced officers. It applies first of all in the case the civil party has only little professional military knowledge. The advices of experienced officers are therefore significant for effectiveness of the defence policy - it is not meant that these advices are always correct, or that they should be followed. In particular, the soldiers must not become part of governmental process. Armed forces can legitimately engage into the politics only for the sake of preservation of democracy as it was during the coup d´état in Portugal in 1975 and in the Soviet Union in 1991. The mission of the military is to defend society and democracy, not to design them. Citizens in democracy are aware of necessity of the military: In case of need, it is the major instrument for preserving freedom. The military must therefore be effective, disciplined and obedient. The soldier must even die for defence of his country. Missions of the military cannot be the basis of society.
c) If state authorities did understand the need for civil control of the military, they are then before a problem on how to ensure this control: The third thesis to that is: That must first of all be the task of the state establishment structure under the constitutional-legal basis, and then also political and social measures are necessary to be taken.
aa) The structure of the state power must ensure that authority over the army be divided between executive and legislative powers. No one of them can exercise complete control because neither executive nor legislative power must be capable of using army against each other. The military must obey both of them and both of them have to cooperate in defence related affairs. That must be ensured by appropriate laws!
The military is part of the executive power. The government proposes the defence policy and budget. This is done through the civilian minister that is supported by civilian bureaucracy with knowledge of military issues, which is necessary for gaining trust from the side of the military leadership. The most recent crises in some post-communist countries underline the need to have a civilian minister of defence.
The need is also to have well informed staff at disposal. There are many institutions in western countries today (for instance, in Germany, it is the Federal Academy for Security), where officers and civil servants study together. In countries of central and Eastern Europe, the study of "security policy" was till recent times possible only with stress given to the "military security policy". Many countries had a number of distinguished military theorists and practitioners, but almost no academically educated civilian experts. Isolation of soldiers from a study of the national security and unilateral stress that was put on the study of warfare made the tension between civilian and military officials of ministries of defence and foreign affairs more acute. But government must be advised by civilian officials. The loyalty ties of officers are so strong that civilian officials cannot fully rely on them as the only advisers. That is also the reason for arrangement applied in the U.S.A. that active or retired soldier can become a defence secretary only ten years after termination of their active service.
Not only the executive but also legislation power needs to have at their disposal the skilled staff of experts for making decisions in military related issues.
The deputies need experts not only for parliamentary control but also for compiling budget, the legislation power is responsible for. Just in this the greatest power of the parliament is. Unfortunately, the experts are lacking in. Many times also the deputies serving in the most important committees for military affairs - defence and budget ones - often are not interested in military issues. There are too few deputies who served in the military. That explains their reserve to engage in military problems as well as their liking to leave military issues to professional soldiers. That should be changed.
If you view my ideas in the context, it will occur that there are more fundamental elements important for the civil control over the military. These elements certainly are:
* explicit definition of mission and legal framework of objectives, and existence of the army itself,
* subordination of the military to democratically elected political bodies of government and parliament,
* it means that all defence related those to whom the responsibility for the national defence was delegated by elections (government and parliament) must make decisions,
* military hierarchy, responsible to the civilian defence minister, member of government, allowing no exception,
* as the third power, it is necessary mention the judicature. Mutual control of individual elements of power will prevent abuse of power by one of them,
* professionally educated civilians, cooperating with soldiers, in particular in developing defence norms and standards that are in concert with constitution, defence policy and defence budget,
* clear separation of the military and civilian powers of government, and
* effective parliamentary control of the government, and control of the military by the parliament.
These elements correspond with division of power as the fundamental principle of democratic order:
* legislation power, parliament, sets the legal framework for the military, passes budget and carries out the parliamentary control,
* executive power is the government, to which the administration of the country is subordinated, in this case in relation to the military and this executive power applies laws and creates policy.
bb) Besides the state authorities, responsible for the civil control of the military, I have above mentioned the political and social arrangements to be made in support of the civil control of the military. Due to time limitation I´ll mention three of them that seem to me as the critical ones.
The most important elements for order in the state there are the constitutionality and rule of law. It does not mean only that the state by its constitution sets and guarantees the legal order. It means also the guarantee of some, in western democracies historically developed, state legal principles, as the above mentioned division of power, guarantee of fundamental individual rights, link-up of legislation with constitutional order, and the link-up of executive power and the judicature with law and right. But it is insufficient if legislation produces laws and the executive applies them. The constitutionality and legal order must be supported by population and permanently required by education, the media, and a number of organizations.
The constitutionality and legal state discourage soldiers from interfering into the politics. An answer is considerably different to a question to which extent the constitutionality and legal state, guarantees of civil rights and freedom of press are developed in former communist countries, how system of education, the media, and organizations support them.
The second, quite substantial democratic institution of the democratic control of the military always was the "civil force". By this members of militia or reservists are meant who are "twice citizens" as once said by Winston Churchill: citizen and soldier: these soldiers for a time less identify themselves with military than with civilian part of society. During crisis they are important counterweight to the military, the counterweight that does not follow laws and order. On common, ordinary day, they are the most important element supporting integration of the military into the society. It is applicable first of all to associations of reservists and their members. In NATO countries they play significant role in support of armed forces as a link between government, society and the military, but also in support of professional common interests of soldiers and reservists. The role of associations of reservists but also of other social organizations has the focal importance for the civil control - but also for support - of the military. Therefore it will also play specifically significant role in our Project. I´ll speak about it later.
For the third, it is the army itself, which can and must execute democratic control over itself. It will be the easier, the army itself will adhere to the given legal norms, its rights and duties, discipline order and order for complaints, and - where legal status allows for - regulations on personnel representation and spokespersons. The civil control is applied also in principles of leadership (in Germany we know "Citizen in Uniform" and "Inner Führung"). The civil control begins there, where the military co-operates with the media, trade unions and other non-governmental organizations. The civil control is first of all implemented by open and full-of-understanding cooperation with organizations of reservists and also by appropriate treatment of future reservists during their conscription/military service.
3. Levels of the Civil Control
I would like to apologize for devoting so much time to a description of the term of the "civil control of the military" (there is no short definition for it). I made attempts to develop criteria of the civil control - constitutional, political, and others. The outcome now is a tangle of relations that I would like, with help of this slide, to explain in brief, and try to illustrate the above said.
CIVIL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY
I. RELATIONS OF SOCIETY AND THE MILITARY AT A LEVEL OF LAWS AND STATE AUTHORITIES
II. RELATIONS OF SOCIETY AND THE MILITARY ON THE VOLUNTARY BASIS TOWARDS NON-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS
| Conceptual | "Citizen in Uniform" Conception of "Inner Führung" |
Let me explain this slide picture on the example of German reality. The German comprehension of management of the military and the democratic control clearly shows what is meant by that. The civil control of the military starts at a level of laws and state authorities inside and outside the military.
a) The Bundeswehr is part of the executive. Also for it a principle is applied that the holder of executive power is the federal government. Within the federal government the federal defence minister exercises the highest military authority over the Bundeswehr. He administers the Bundeswehr independently and within his responsibility in the framework of policy guidelines that are set by the federal chancellor.
This is the basis for the second constitutional-legal novelty: The head of state (federal president) is no longer military superior. The head of state enjoys representation and honorary rights only. He has also the right to appoint and discharge commissioned and non-commissioned officers but up to the rank of colonel he delegates his right to the minister of defence.
Advantages of this constitutionally political arrangement are clear: Our constitution rules out bad and uncertain position of the defence minister, which he has in those countries where the supreme commander is the head of state (Austria, Italy, but also in numerous countries of central and Eastern Europe). In those countries the defence minister from the military viewpoint "reports" to the head of state, but at the same time he is politically responsible towards the parliament. This uncertain position creates precariousness and numerous problems many of them you have already experienced. But there is the significant circumstance that missions of military management cannot be executed without respect to broadly interconnected foreign and domestic political, economic, financial political and other relations. This circumstance calls for coordination of overall policies what applies to the minister of the government being in charge of defence who, as distinct from the head of state, is involved into the whole politics.
The one who gained by the transfer of the command authority is not, according to the German Constitution, the defence minister. The parliament gained. Now, it may apply its otherwise routine parliamentary powers into the military field - that field of the state policy that was in German history removed from the direct parliamentary control. Because the Bundeswehr is part of the executive, and is subordinated to one member of the government, the parliamentary control is applied to it as well as to the defence minister himself. The federal defence minister is therefore responsible to the parliament and to the chancellor in the same extent - not less and not more - as according to the Article 65 of the Constitution as any other departmental minister is. The federal chancellor can relieve him from office anytime.
By this way the interconnection of the Bundeswehr with the parliamentary democratic system of the government is reflected. The Constitution has made it with intensity, which was not ever achieved in the past historical eras of the military legislature.
The Bundeswehr is in its all forms of activities subject to control of the parliament and administration courts as any other part of the federal administration. The constitution has even made this control stronger:
- First, by establishing special committee of the Bundestag for defence, which has even rights of investigation committee. Only after a request of the one fourth of its members it has a duty to make a cause the subject of its investigation, as, for example, current cases of the rightist extremism in the Bundeswehr (which do not fall into the jurisdiction of investigation committee, as far as its extent and content are concerned, as became apparent recently).
- Additionally, it is necessary to mention introduction of a representative for the military - ombudsman - for protection of fundamental rights of soldiers, as an auxiliary body of the Bundestag in performance of the parliamentary control.
The committee for defence and ombudsman look after prompt and permanent monitoring of the military sector, significant military political decisions down into details of routine military life.
The transparency of the Bundeswehr is ensured by the constitutional requirement to set size of the military and principles of its organization in a budget bill. It is then passed by the parliament.
The German preference of the political leadership and parliamentary control - primacy of the politics - does not mean anything else than "democratic control".
b) Inside the military, they are first of all the provisions of the military legislature, which complies with the idea of the civil control of the military: The Military Act, Military Discipline Order, and in particular, the Complaints in the Military Order.
The "players", who are necessary to be mentioned in the official field, are as follows:
- superiors,
- confidants, elected by non-commissioned officers and soldiers contributing to the course of service process, and
- personnel representations, which also with their broad rights contribute to formation of the course of service.
This ensures significant goal of integration of soldiers into the military. The tools used are not only information, interpretation of sense of the military service, social care, and military religious care. The participation of soldiers themselves contributes in a significant way. Elected confidants of all rank groups represent interests of their friends, and they have right to submit proposals and intervene in many issues of the daily course of service. The participation of soldiers is the integral part of the military command, and corresponds to a picture of an individual according to our constitution. But this participation comes to its end in enforcing the primacy of the politics in many fields of the military service and, of course, in military campaign (engagement, war).
Linking elements of this integration are represented by conceptions of the "Citizen in Uniform" and "Inner Führung".
c) With a view to integration of the military into society, I would like to mention the following:
The Bundeswehr is the army based on general conscription. This conscription expresses readiness of citizens to assume personal responsibility for protection of the country. Through the general conscription service the Bundeswehr is in a close contact with all inhabitants and with the young generation in particular.
Let me add: The importance of the general conscription does not change anything at the principle that from a good reason anybody must not be forced to undertake military service with an arm. The one who will take advantage of his legal right has to undertake the civil compensatory service.
During build-up of the German army the special stress was laid on the overall conception of integration that should have also facilitated the integration of the Bundeswehr into society. Unlike many other countries, soldiers of the Bundeswehr take part in social, public and political life of the Federal Republic of Germany without limitation. The soldiers exercise both passive and active election rights by which they send deputies to many community bodies, parliaments of the federal lands, and to the German Bundestag. They are members of political parties, trade unions and other social organizations. The "German Association of the Bundeswehr", with its membership of about 250 000 active and former soldiers, is a trade-union-like interest representation of the Bundeswehr members. They do not have, of course, the right for strike and tariffs bargaining.
At all levels of the state (public) administration, economy, trade unions, in associations and organizations, the broad and close official or personal contacts are being developed. This is the evidence of integration of the Bundeswehr into society.
Integration of soldiers is also supported by provisions and arrangements of additional care, such as making service close to their domicile, free of charge travel of conscripts home, regulations on time of service and liberties, or granting the right to wear uniform for reservists.
The policy of free democracy is subject to the consent of citizens. The responsible participation of citizens at the political process is the more significant the stronger is. The important means of integration is therefore also extensive information of citizens on the security situation including situation within the military. It especially refers to information provided for reservists who quite decisively contribute to understanding of policy and the role of army by the general public. But also soldiers, and conscripts in particular, need information. Work with the public in defence issues is therefore of the same importance as a correct work of the media in providing information about the military.
Up to now, I have dealt with the term of the "civil control of the military in democratic society", and I mentioned criteria that characterize this term. The speaking about the current status should not have been only presentation of the civil control of the military in the Federal Republic of Germany. We are especially interested in a status of countries participating in our PHARE programme, that is the Czech and Slovak republics, and the Republic of Hungary. To review the status of the civil control implementation in these countries should not be my task. It must be task of those participants of our Project that come from the given country. Based on criteria of the "civil control of the military" developed by us, it will be necessary to examine to which extent these criteria are adhered to, and where drawbacks appear. For this, we can use a number of remarkable publications. They are partly highly critical. I have in my mind the Adelphi-Paper of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, in which Hungarian contributor Mrs. Reka Szermenyi publishes an article the Central European Civil-Military Reform at Risk - Progress in Establishing Democratic Controls over the Military has not been Sustained. I would like to mention also the Defence Studies "Behind Declarations - Civil-Military Relations in Central Europe" of the Institute of Strategic Studies in Budapest or also very informative Czech study called "Security and the Military in Modern Society" by the Faculty of Social Sciences of local (Czech, in Prague) Charles University. I can name also publications by Chris Donelly, and especially also the Conference Reports of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, which show drawbacks and propose suggestions on how to improve the civil control.
Only then it will be possible to develop proposals on what measures would be possible to take in order to work out the conception of the "Civil Control of the Military" for the given country, or what measures are necessary for meeting criteria of the civil control of the military respectively. I reiterate once again that one conception cannot exist and be applicable for all countries. It is demonstrated already by different NATO countries´ conceptions as well as other nations. Each nation must develop its own specific model of the "civil control of the military" - typical, specifically Czech, Slovak or Hungarian model.
What is necessary to do, first needs to be find out on the basis of criteria considered to be generally valid. During that it can be revealed that there are some faults, for example, in the constitutional law, defence legislature, policy, or the military. Participants of this Project will try to put their finger on them - all that with reference to respective publications and outcomes of the conference. But we can contribute to solution with advice how to remove the faults and drawbacks.
I would like to put one concrete contents example above these methodical steps. In recent years, not only NATO countries witnessed tendencies in today s PfP countries that just PfP programme has been designed to stop them. Persisting or growing introversion of the military sector. There, where the officers´ corps is strongly isolated from the (civilian) society and external effects of western countries, where civil-military relations are missing at many, but predominantly at local levels, the democratic control of the military is not easy. The army in democratic nation needs communication and integration into society - and all that for its own support. I have already mentioned the significance of the public opinion. The issue of correct relations of state, army and the civilian society was, by the way, the core, around which all discussions rotated during build-up of new German armed forces in the middle 50s. This discussion has kept going till these days. Even disputes over details are not missing today. This discussion can provide ideas also for other nations. Our knowledge is as follows:
- Placing the Bundeswehr into social isolation could have domestic political fatal consequences because some political-military-authoritative potential could develop that would be susceptible to radical propaganda, and in crisis situation could be easily activated.
- It is necessary to ensure economic, material and social support for soldiers. They must not be left to form peripheral groups of society.
- It is necessary to support social integration in a sense of participation of soldiers in social and political life. The "eternal topic" in Germany has been political and social legitimacy of the military in the "key areas" with multiple effect: At our universities, higher colleges, among intellectuals, and partly also in the media.
Finally, based on this background, some practical steps could be recommended that could be useful at present situation for majority of PfP countries, and which we can also mention within our Project and state concrete examples of external assistance:
a) If not already made, it seems meaningful to develop a study identifying principles and mechanisms of the democratic control with optional models and guiding criteria enabling to choose a specific model for the given country.
b) Create a team, made up of civilian and military experts, which will develop proposals for implementation of principles and mechanisms of the democratic control, taking into account
- given legal framework,
- organization of defence, and others.
c) The goal of these works could be also proposals for improvement of civil-military cooperation, outside the military sector, inside and outside the field of national authorities.
d) The useful can further be the development of programmes intended for improvement of integration of the military into population. These programmes could include the following statements:
- how the conscription is meaningfully explained to population,
- how the prestige of the military, its officers and soldiers can be improved,
- what measures seem to have sense in order to encourage especially the corps of officers to enhance its interest in various relations between the military and society in the democracy, and to have it to cooperate for improving integration.
In this context a remark must not be left unnoticed that many soldiers are not aware of the fact that funding for the military, but also first of all their own pay depend to a certain extent upon prestige that the army enjoys at the public. This prestige - positive or negative - affects also politicians who must decide over this financial support at the parliament.
e) In this connection, there is an interesting study on education achieved by deputies of the parliament and their staff in defence related affairs as well as development of structures for education and participation of the public in debate over the defence issues. Here, also journalists could be engaged.
f) The decisive significance for integration of the military into society is attributed to the reservists who are not only "mediators" between the military and society, but also important element of the democratic control. More than other groups of population, the reservists can be used to support integration of the military into society. The army must be aware of the fact that every conscript after leaving the military is such a reservist: He should not obliged to it only as a "bearer of a combat force" in case of war, and as a bearer of readiness to defence inside population. He should first of all be a positive "bearer of image" of the military and its support in society. It will impose destructive influence upon the military, if it discharges year by year thousands of conscripts who will tell only bad stories about the military at home, at work, and at their table in a pub.
Based on this background, it seems meaningful to develop a "conception of reservists". In Hungary, I made some proposals to this issue following a request of the deputy defence minister. Such a conception we have had in Germany for 10 years already. I have contributed to it as well; it is permanently developed and has a positive impact on reservists and the army. The conception describes ways on how to motivate reservists for additional voluntary military education, and to engage in favour of the defence policy. Also it is necessary to say that the build-up of functional associations of officers and reservists on the voluntary basis is not only supported by words but partly also funded. To the topic of the "Conscription + Reservists" a discussion will take place of all chiefs of general staffs of central European countries with the chairman of the NATO Military Committee, General Naumann, within the "Gaming Talks" on 15 May 1998.
Practical steps I have mentioned here as examples are the examples. The next ones must follow. We must also include them into programmes, which form the subject of our debate.
Let me come to the conclusion. The democratic control of the military is not identical with supervision over it in its own sense of the word. The democratic control is - as shown by an "American origin" of this term - an active formation of civil-military relations in favour and for support of the military from the public and in social environment. All measures must eventually follow the target of firm establishment of the military into society, not being separated from it. The army must be able to serve its country without occupying decisive power position, but also not gaining weight that is not prescribed by the constitution.
There is no generally valid conception for achievement of these targets. According to rules of the constitution, history and culture of individual countries, the forms of the civil control of the military, can differ a lot from each other. For all that, as I however tried to show, there are fundamental elements of management and democratic control of the military, which are indispensable in democratic systems. The target of our Project is to put together these fundamental elements in favour of our countries.
Also, on behalf of the Project Implementation Team I thank you for your willingness to help us with it.
CIVIL CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Phare Workshop, Prague, 1 May 1998
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Let me introduce myself once again. My name is Antonín Sverák, and I am lieutenant colonel in reserve. At present, I work as a civilian employee of the Foreign Relations Section at the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic. I am a member of the Central Council of the Association of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Army of the Czech Republic (ACWO ACR), where I work in the Foreign Relations Section. During 1995-1997, I worked in favour of the NATO fellowship programme that was focused on the democratic control of armed forces.
At the same time, I would like to wish you a pleasant rest of your stay in our republic and a success of today's and tomorrow's meetings, which were started by the fruitful lecture of Professor Dr. Steinkamm.
Dear guests,
In my presentation, I would like to express some basic ideas about what ACWO ACR understands under the democratic control of security policy, with the emphasis given to civil management and control of the military, as this range of problems may sometimes be named. I would not like to go deeply into the semantics of this problem, instead, I would rather discuss its specific practical side. I will also try to respect the wish of managers of this workshop and I will stick to the following points:
- - official definition of civil control of armed forces,
- methods of the civil control as used in the Czech Republic
- position and role of non-governmental organizations in the process of civil control of armed forces,
- how ACWO ACR participates in the democratic control of the army
- perspectives of application of the democratic control of armed forces in the Czech Republic.
Before I start to discuss the first point, I would like to come back to our recent history, which should help me explain you some moments of our national development that is brought about our national specifics in the field of understanding and implementing the civil control.
During a period of the so-called First Republic (1918-1939), the Czechoslovak Army was relatively well trained. Because of the political decision, it was not used to defend the republic against the fascism. During the World War II, our citizens fought both on the eastern and western front lines, and they contributed to the defeat of Nazi-Germany. A new army, built up after the coup d'état in 1948, was entirely under the influence of the Soviet Union, as the whole society also was. Besides the professional control there was another one. It was a political control done by the communist party. For decades, the army fell down into isolation, or in a better case, it was tolerated by the citizens. The military participated neither in political nor executive power, it served the Czechoslovak Communist Party, which exercised decisive competencies both in the society and in the Czechoslovak People's Army. We can say that the civil control was characterized by the civilian mass party system, where the military was expelled from the domestic political life (according to M. Janowitz).
November revolution in 1989 in former Czechoslovakia meant a radical change also in the fields of security, defence and armed forces. The alternative to use the military to interfere in the development of the society was not typical for our conditions, people were afraid rather of police and secret services. The most important post-November step that relates to the armed forces was depolitization set by the strongest democratic party, the Civic Forum. Legislative precondition for this was the removal of the "leading role of the Czechoslovak Communist Party" from our Constitution. The office of the Main Political Administration and political bodies were disbanded, posts of political officials within the military units were cancelled, and any activity of the Communist Party within the military was prohibited. All the political activities of professional soldiers and conscripts were banned, too. Gradually, the controlling competence over the military started to become the tools of democratic control of armed forces as they are applied in standard democratic societies. The peaceful removal of Soviet troops from the whole territory of our country and the smooth division of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic and also federal Czechoslovak Army in 1993 were positive moves in transition of the military from totalitarian and one-party system to a democratic and apolitical Army. We, in the Czech Republic, could then go on with democratization processes inside the army and exercise its civil control.
The establishing of civil control of armed forces in the Czechoslovak Federal Republic and in the Czech Republic was based upon the reality that the Czechoslovak Republic between the two world wars was an advanced democratic country with built democratic mechanisms. Democratic interwar traditions and their resumption during 1945-48 survived in minds of some members of Czechoslovak People's Army, which showed the year 1968 (during occupation of our country by the former USSR and some of its satellites), and especially the reactions in November of 1989. A part of soldiers who were dismissed after 1968 for their disagreement with the occupation and who were taken back to active service, initiated and implemented lots of steps leading to the civil control of the military.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Just to be impartial, I have to say that the civil control system of armed forces has not been fulfilled yet in the Czech Republic. It is still an ongoing process especially in its implementing phase and in the field of the so-called informal players. We are not yet at the level of other advanced democratic nations. Why it is so - 8 years after our velvet revolution - is the topic of another part of my lecture. But first, I would like to say several sentences to explain the term of the civil control of the military as it is defined in official documents and also as the Czech experts understand it.
The conception of civil control is generally based on the Constitution of the Czech Republic, which sets the place and role of its formal players, i. e. President of the Republic, government, Parliament, Supreme Control Office and bodies of justice. At present, the government and the Parliament have received bills of new military related laws. The participating bodies and individuals expected probably more specific statement and legislative support of democratic (civil) control of security policy and armed forces. I have to admit that even I did expect more. As far as I know from the whole range of the so-called armed forces laws, only the bill of constitutional Czech Republic Security Act directly addresses our problem with its Article 4, which says: "Extent of conscription, the tasks of armed forces, armed security corps, rescue corps and emergency services, their organization, preparation, replenishment and legal conditions of their members are set by law so that the civil control of armed forces is ensured". If we want to try to define the civil control of armed forces closer, the best document to help us would be the ministerial White Paper on Defence from of 1995. It says that: "one of the most significant relations between the society and defence sector is the civil control of the military, which is exercised in all democratic countries, and which is one of criteria for admission of new countries into NATO, including the Czech Republic. Civil army control is a feedback to control and command authorities of armed forces, and it is exercised by constitutional bodies of state power. This control includes gathering and analysis of information about activities and position of the army, and its major components as well as necessary authorization to push adopted decisions through. It is a process of open communication between responsible representatives of the state and the military command. Justifiability and indispensability of the civil army control come from some of its general qualities. The army is the biggest and the best-armed element within the state, there is a specific directive way of managing it, and some of its activities must be kept secret from the public".
The White Paper also defines the areas of civil army control in the Czech Republic, which are:
- - participation of the military in implementation of domestic military and foreign policy,
- preparedness of the military to do what it is predetermined to do,
- handling of allocated budget resources,
- maintaining of legislative standards, laws, basic rights and liberties of soldiers,
- level of army integration into the society.
Each of these areas has, of course, certain priorities, which are the subject matter of specific control activity.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
From the whole range of different attitudes to methods of democratic control, there are two basic ones, which adequate means and players correspond to. One of the controlling and managing methods is the formal one (it has already been said what we, in the Czech Republic, understand under this term), while the other one is informal control done by the public, political parties, non-governmental and non-profit organizations, business organizations, research organizations, the mass media, and within the armed forces this control is performed by conscripts, professional soldiers and civilian employees of the defence department.
Without wanting to detract anyone from significance of other players participating in the civil control of the Czech armed forces, I would like to point out the controlling functions of the Czech Parliament. Generally, and correctly, it is being considered the decisive part of the democratic control. The House of Deputies carries it out during its plenary sessions, e. g., by passing the final state account, through meetings of its committees, or activities of individual MPs. The Parliament of the Czech Republic makes decision about deployment of the Czech armed forces in case of crisis or war and over military campaigns abroad in the peacetime, as it has been the case during our participation in UNPROFOR, UNCRO, IFOR, and SFOR peacekeeping operations. The Parliament supervises the work of the government regarding the armed forces, events within the armed forces themselves, and decides allocation of funds for the armed forces by passing the state budget. It has an influence on the military budget and its structure, and it can request some problems that exist within the Ministry of Defence to be figured out. To investigate individual serious events, the House of Deputies (the Senate does not have the supervisory function) establishes fact-finding commissions. The Chairman of the Defence and Security Committee of the House of Deputies, (former Deputy Defence Minister) RNDr. Petr Necas, considers effective tasking of the armed forces from the level of the government and the Ministry of Defence as one of the most important moments of the democratic control.
The number of civilian employees at the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff is still rising (MoD - 283 soldiers and 163 civilians; GS - 408 soldiers and 104 civilians). Along with other persons participating in control of the armed forces, they represent a significant community that needs to be paid attention to from the viewpoint of their preparation for performing their functions. There is no complex and systematic professional-military preparation of civilians in the Czech Republic. The only thing that the government, parliamentary, and ministerial officials can build upon, is their experience gained in the course of performing their functions. There is a negative consequence connected with this fact in terms of greater fluctuation at some posts, where new officials must be repeatedly introduced into their functions, either because of their low professional knowledge when being appointed to their specific positions or due to insufficient abilities to perform required tasks, etc. It seems that the prerequisite for effective civil control of the armed forces lies in stabilization at the functions. As far as this problem is concerned, we are lacking perspective personnel management policy that would be supported by legislation, e. g., by the Act on State Service.
For security and military education of civilians participating in control of the armed forces, it is necessary to understand the security and defence issues as a matter that relates to a wide range of state institutions, to establish the so-called security communities and create a relevant independent security studies centre.
Implementation of the basic methods of the civil control of armed forces has been gaining international dimension. The effective democratic control is one of the basic preconditions for the membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. It is defined by the Partnership for Peace, NATO Enlargement Study, and it is also practically proved by participation of our units in peacekeeping operations, mainly in the former Yugoslavia, where they operate along with military contingents of Western democracies, with the British unit in particular.
The method of informal control of armed forces reflects the reality that the army and its members are or should be connected with a broad network of social relations. Informal relations can produce also negative impact (e. g. insufficient or false information about situation within the army, communication blockade among professional soldiers and civilian employees and so on), or the can have positive influence (development of civilian expert's reports, the transfer of skills from the military area to the civilian one and so on.) for performance of control at the formal level.
Non-governmental and non-profit organizations play an important role in the civil control of armed forces process in democratic countries, especially when elaborating independent statements and analyzing strategic issues. Abroad, there are organizations, which specialize on individual problems in the security and defence field, and which prepare independent documents and analyses for governmental bodies. These organizations influence significantly, in cooperation with the mass media, the public opinion. In our country, there is only similar body, which is of some importance. It is the Institute of International Relations. Within this Institute, there is a team of security policy, which was established by the late PhDr. Jaroslav Janda. The team is of interdepartmental character. Each year, the Institute develops and presents to the decision-making bodies and to the public an up-to-date study about the Czech Republic´s security policy.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
What is the role of the Association of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of ACR in the civil control system within the framework of non-governmental and non-profit organizations?
The Association is a successional organization of Commissioned Officers Association and Warrant Officers Association from a period of the so-called First Republic (1918-1939). Nevertheless, at present, it is only one among many organizations, whose activities are connected with our armed forces. The Association gradually won international recognition - in the framework of the Gaming Initiative activities, recently also as an organization with ambitions to join CIOR association. The proof of its international policy is also this Phare workshop, which is organized together with the Ministry of Defence, which the Association considers to be another step in developing efficient dialogue that could lead to strengthening the role of the Association in the process of civil army control and management. The Association of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of ACR works out each also a report about the state of the military, which then presents to competent bodies. The report is worked out in cooperation with the Association´s members both in the central office and in the regional ones, in fact, by reserve and active members of the defence department. It is significant that the report is better accepted and appraised by bodies, which are outside the armed forces than by bodies like MoD and ACR GS. They do not consider yet the Association as an adequate partner for talks, and they rather communicate with „hybrid body" representing „hodgepodge" interests of various organizations linked to the military. But these represent such a broad range of interests that it is impossible at present to unify them. I think that from the viewpoint of the civil army control, the most important among them is ACWO ACR, and this Association must also strengthen its role in the future.
Dear guests,
I am coming now to the end of my lecture, where I would like to sum up some main positive and negative moments influencing the civil army control level in the Czech Republic, and at the same time, I would like to outline the areas, where we have to put our attention in the future.
1. The military defence of the Czech Republic is based on the universal civic principle. This principle comes from the tenet that the state guarantees the values and interests of majority of its citizens, and these in turn are ready to participate in its military defence. The Czech Republic counts on a personal engagement and an adequate participation of its citizens in the military defence of the state, and it considers this participation as an expression of the civic responsibility.
On the other side, the state has entrusted the constitutional authorities (their bodies: Parliament, President of the Republic, government, Ministry of Defence), and ACR with responsibility for the military defence of the Czech Republic that ensure its further aspects. This doubled responsibility of the state and of the citizen, must be, however, accompanied with a sufficient will to the military defence, i. e. the personal will of the citizens and the political will of the state. The level of civil support of the armed forces will work as a catalyst of their democratic control. In this sense, it will be necessary to build upon the experiences from building-up the German armed forces control model, based, inter alia, on the theory of a "Citizen in Uniform."
2. The role of the Parliament towards security of the state, the citizen and the military currently focuses on legislation process. In constitutional and other laws, the powers of the President, government, and individual ministers must be clearly and unambiguously distributed among, determined the mutual subordination and management procedures, it must be defined the role of the military in peacetime, as well as authority to declare war in case of aggression against the country or when it is necessary for meeting international commitments. With the purpose to harmonize our legislation with new economic and political conditions, as well as NATO and EU legislation, relevant laws will be discussed before the end of this year. It is true, that a more timely passing of some of them would in many respects advance the issues of the security of the state and of the citizen, as well as the issues of the armed forces in the right direction.
3. The Parliamentary control of activities of the armed forces is increasingly realized through a consistent check-up and approval of the budget for the departments, involved in implementation of the security policy. The House of Deputies Defence and Security Committee takes an active part not only in the working out the defence and security budget but it intervenes already in the shaping and realization of the concept of the Czech Republic´s security policy. In this respect, the legality of activities of all subjects engaged, e. g. in issues of updating of the military equipment, will be enforced.
4. An important turning point for the activity of CR´s armed forces was withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the state territory. Under the control of the already civilian minister of defence, rationalization of the army structures and implementation of international agreements, e. g. the CFE Treaty, gradually took place. The army was depolitized. Civilians have occupied the top posts in the military. A credit of some of them was a service in the army, from which they had been sacked during the purges following the year 1968. A majority of them, however, has already retired. For some "genuine" civilians the job in the army was only temporary, a great job changing took place among them. A stabilization of civilians is a prerequisite for a more competent decision-making and for performance of specialized jobs.
5. An important element of the democratic control is a clear and explicit charging with tasks and management of the Ministry of Defence. We can call it a complex analysis of the positive performance of the set tasks. The Parliament committees play the interoperability role, especially the Foreign Policy Committee with allocation and economic committees, a co-operation of the House of Deputies with the Senate, government and the President. Relevant members show a greater responsibility for further development of the security of the state. A positive phenomenon is the fact that the government coalition and the major opposition party, the Social Democratic Party, are in substance united in efforts for a full membership of our republic in NATO. As a shortcoming in some stages of realization of the democratic control, the non-existence of the State Defence Council makes itself felt, even though it existed in the period shortly after the velvet revolution.
6. An important place in the system of the democratic control of armed forces has the Supreme Audit Office in the framework of checking-up of administering the state property and supervision of the state budget spending. The Czech Republic still needs to solve the role of legal power within the whole democratic and civil control complex. We can use Austria as an example.
7. An increasingly rising share of civilians employed at the Ministry of Defence and in the General Staff is an evidence of effort of the decision-making authorities to strengthen the civil control and management of the defence sector. Passing the law on the state service and awarding the state tenure, i.e. something similar, what has been awarded to career soldiers, would be helpful for a greater stabilization of the civilian personnel.
8. The General Staff and high-ranking military commanders are subject to the governmental control through the civilian Minister of Defence. The ministerial authorities who take part in elaboration of the defence budget, must have an access to the intelligence information, must participate in the strategic control and in the long-term planning, the preparation of the army structure, the working out of the procurement plan, and first of all in the conceptional management of the development of the defence sector, and of the Army of the Czech Republic.
9. Within conditions of the Czech Republic, no system of training of non-military officials, participating in the democratic control and management of the armed forces, has been created so far. In the past, the defence authorities, dealing with the strategic defence issues, ensured their military preparedness (with a various degree of success). At present, these bodies do not exist in the army. Their tasks are in the main performed only by the Foreign Relations Institute, a body of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which employs renowned experts for security issues, and it ensures inter-ministerial co-operation in solving the tasks of the security of the state and the citizen.
10. Especially the members of the present House of Deputies´s Defence and Security Committee but also other officials, entering the process of the democratic control and management of armed forces, make greater use of possibilities of gaining the necessary military knowledge and skills, especially in courses and seminars organized in the framework of PfP, NACC or NAA or other Atlantic activities or initiatives of WEU, OSCE, and other institutions and organizations.
11. The Ministry of Defence organizes, in co-operation with the Military Academy, professional and language schooling for civilians, which, however, does not cover the needs. A natural prerequisite for the democratic control of the security policy and armed forces is a professional and skilled competence of those in charge.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
At the end of my presentation, I would like to say that it was not the task of my lecture to discuss all the factors working for or against the development of the civil army control in the Czech Republic. Some of you may have lacked for closer determination of the role of all the formal and informal players entering this process or more clear specification of internal control of the military. These and other issues can, according to the interest, become the subject matter of further discussion or of future meetings.
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