Title: "Civil Control of the Military and Officers in Democratic societies" Project - Development of the System of Civilian control of the Hungarian Military (1988-98)

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYSTEM OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE HUNGARIAN MILTIARY (1988-98) - FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF MILITARY SOCIOLOGY

Zoltán László Kiss [1]

1. TRANSFORMED CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN POST-COMMUNIST CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES:

The armed forces of the Central European ex-Warsaw Pact countries were under close control of the hegemonic and/or monopolian communist parties [2]. The militaries had two main tasks. They had to defend their countries from potential external enemies (external task) - but had to defend the communist regime from its opponents as well (internal task). Both the communist parties and national armed forces were controlled by Moscow [3]. These facts defined their tasks, organizational structure, size, armaments and displacement as well.

The ruling communist parties defined military doctrines, strategies and main objectives of the development of armed forces. The communist top-leaders had never full trust in the professional military, that's why (their ideology supporting system) deeply penetrated into the military organizations (see e.g.: rule of institutional networks of political officers, political organizations, special departments; exercising intelligence oversight and the sporadic use of other means in the armed forces) and superseded military professionalism with unconditional, declared political (and party [4]) loyalty [5]. In the militarized societies [6] the military organization acted as the last formal agent of political socialization, and there were evident signs of very close ties within the political and military structures and elite groups.

The Communist Party direction over the armed forces was neither democratic nor truly civilian but it was real and usually very effective. Also, it is very important to stress that importance of the military and the main features of the civil-military relations differed from country to country in ex-Warsaw Pact countries. The results were up to many conditions, e. g. from:

* forms of political régime (from dictatorial to oligarchic [7]);
* historical, political, economic, cultural and social aspects of political and military sub-systems in the society;
* self-identity, rules, interests and possibilities; potential and effective social and political power of military elite groups,
* traditions and recent features of political culture's elements (values, norms, attitudes; typical forms of political behaviour and sources of power in political and military organizations), etc.

Many of these differences found reflections also in theories of civil-military relations in former communist countries:

* The institutional conflict model suggested by Roman Kolkowitz and Andrzej Korbonski (1982) described the military and the communist party as two opponents in a permanent and multifaceted conflict resulting in political instability (see e. g. cases of the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania);

* The institutional congruence model proposed by Odom; Herspring and Iván Völgyes (1978) depicted the relationship between political party and the military as consensual and symbiotical (see e. g. cases of Czechoslovakia and Hungary);

* In our opinion, the most relevant and effective model for scientific research of all communist countries is a Colton's 'participatory model' that saw the participation of the military in political life as the main feature of communist civil-military relations.

After the political changes, new political elites of post-communist Central European countries had to:


1. re-draft basic concepts and principles of security and defence policy of their countries with new ideas on potential application of the armed forces;

2. re-structure civil-military relations (Sarvaš, 1996:45) and work out an effective system of the democratic control over the armed forces. For this reason, in these young democracies the political players were out for:


* accomplish of depolitization and discontinue ideological impregnancy of armed forces (that's why: separating the military from the communist party and banning any party to exercise activities within the military);
* subordinate the armed forces to parliamentary, governmental and presidential control;
* establish formal channels to the legislature for the articulation of institutional interests of the military organization.


The matter of 'democratic and civilian control [8] of armed forces' has been specified as one of the most important aims and factors for effective modernization and integration of the military organizations [9]. Civil control with its constitutional-legal; political and social; economic; cultural and educational; institutional and military aspects was also often mentioned among prerequisites for NATO membership.

According to Jeffrey Simon (1995), the following are the most important basic requirements, which seem necessary for creating an effective civilian and political oversight of the military:


1. a clear constitutional-legal division of authority between president and government; and between prime minister and defence minister in their relations with armed forces as well;

2. a significant and precisely defined role of the Parliament in legislature on defence matters, in granting budget approval and expenditure control;

3. peacetime governmental control of the General Staff and of the military commanders exercised through civilian defence ministry;

4. restoration of the distorted image and prestige of the military in the society and effective accountability of the armed forces.

In our opinion, from the view of military organization, there are four different sides of civilian control over the armed forces:

Sides of civilian control

That's why we can theoretically divide the aspects of the civil control over the military into the following ones:

1. the civil state control, exercised by institutions of independent power players and state bodies /mainly by representatives of legislation and executive power/ ;

2. the civil social control, which is exercised by representatives and agents of civic society /e. g.: NGO's, civil associations, social movements; independent scientific and research institutes/; the media and the public;

3. internal organizational system of civilian control that succeed mainly in organizational norms, values and requirements during modernizational waves, structural reforms, transitions and conflict resolutions;

4. subjective /internal/ individual control, exercised by professional military officers and NCOs as citizens in uniform, who are:


* integral part of the civilian society;
* not only passively accepting facts of democratic control and obedient to external constitutional pressures with a bad grace ; but :
* actively interiorizating system of norms, values, and requirements of civil control ;
* calling for separation of political and military-professional jurisdictions and spheres of authority, and
* give a flat refusal to external political attempts that should affront professional integrity of officers´ corps and NCOs.


During and after the velvet revolutions of the Central and Eastern European countries, the Western countries were interested in widening the sphere of security, democracy and decent civil-military relations in Europe. The ex-Warsaw Pact countries are concerned mainly about the possibility that in upcoming years Russia would try to re-establish its hegemony over the states of the former Soviet Union - and they are also afraid that Russia would sooner or later try to apply (manifest or latent) political, economic and/or military pressure to the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, which Russia still considers to be its sphere of interest. It is mainly this potential threat that makes these young democracies seek guarantees for their security in view of such future threats.

Democratic and civilian control [10]. of armed forces with its constitutional, legal, institutional and military aspects is often mentioned among prerequisites for NATO membership. Investments in the military usually have also clearly been influenced by the political goal of joining NATO. In our opinion, former socialist Central and Eastern European countries have been relatively successful in re-structuring civil-military relations[11]; the armed forces went through a real transformation and downsizing due to the financial constraints and proscriptions of treaties.

Since 1989, after the political changes and even before the prospective NATO membership, a general modernization and structural conversion process was started in the Hungarian Defence Forces. In the first several years, the stress was laid on legal clarification process; after that the focus of the public debates has switched from the Law (and legal matters /WHY?/) to implementation of the current ultimate goal; institutional; organizational and social/cultural aspects /HOW?/. The declared goal of actual modernizational processes is to build a modern, 'post-Cold-war'-type Hungarian military organization, convergent with the host society; under strong civil control; and in which the dominant values are more 'occupational' (Moscos, 1986; Nuciari, 1994:10) - based on professional experience of the members - and 'not bureaucratic' (Caforio, 1988a; Nuciari, 1994: 17).

The current legal and constitutional status of civil state control over the Hungarian armed forces was shaped in the Constitution Bill passed by the Parliament. Nowadays, the fundamental legal and institutional framework for the democratic control of the armed forces already exists, and it allows transparent functioning of the military according to the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, the Security Policy Principles, the Principles of National Defence, the Act on Military Service and other parliamentary resolutions.

The Hungarian Constitution determines unambiguously the basic rights and responsibilities of the Parliament; the President of the Republic and the Government e. g. in such areas as running, financing, controlling and using the armed forces. The Defence Committee of the Parliament, the Constitutional Court, the State Audit Office and the Government Control Office also play important role in exercising their rights above the military. If we want to take into consideration the main elements of the institutional structure of the civil control of the Hungarian military, we can devise the following theoretical framework:

Institutional structure of civilian control of the Hungarian Military

a. Positive features:

The active system of guarantees for effective civil control with its fundamental constitutional-legal [12], political, economic [13], and social framework practically established fairly good conditions for further development in the Hungarian military, gradually decreasing the number of fields considered from the viewpoint of legislation as 'grey zones'.

The necessary elements for efficient democratic and civil control over the military have established in the political system. As a result of this achievement, the authority of the democratic (legislative and executive) state structures has been gradually strengthening. This provides for permanent and institutional guidance and control over the armed forces. The main political institutions of democratic control over the armed forces in Hungary (namely through democratically elected and accountable political bodies), which work according to the division of political power, provide a stable basis for the appropriate and justified use of the armed forces.

1. In conformity with our Constitution, the President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the Hungarian Armed Forces.

2. The Parliament passed constitutional law on the comprehensive security system; laws and other documents of primary importance (e. g.):


* law on the Defence of the Hungarian Republic (which defines responsibilities of the state and local governments);
* White Book on security and defence of the Hungarian Republic;
* laws, which define in detail the place, tasks and organizational structure of the armed forces and civil defence in peacetime, in case of crises and in war;
* law on service relations of professional members of the military;
* law on service relations of conscripts;
* law on special service relations of leaders, lecturers and students of military higher educational system, etc.


3. The Defence Committee of Parliament is regularly briefed on the situation of armed forces, future missions, technical developments and personnel changes [14].

4. The ombudsman of the Human Rights and his team carry out an overall examination on possibilities of successful application of basic human rights in the Hungarian military. Their official report that summarised results of study stated that law was not seriously violated.
These experiences show significant similarities with results of a study entitled 'On the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces and the Parliamentary Control of the Ministry of Defence' carried out by independent experts [15]. Researchers analyzed the current situation in the Hungarian defence sector (Oct 1995 - Jan 1997). The official report that summarised results of the study stated the following:


* democratic and civil control over the military have been established; the Constitution, laws and decrees guarantee the necessary political and legal framework;
* defence force and defence issues are increasingly made public and accessible. 'The public is permanently informed about transformation of the defence force and research teams. Setting up the Secretariat for Integration in the Ministry of Defence and creating the integration authority of the Deputy Secretary of State for International Affairs have widened the scale of civil control in the ministry.' (Szenes, 1997:21)


On the other hand, the British "transillumination" report called attention to the negative facts and tendencies as well. According to their opinion, several changes should be introduced, as they are necessary for effective functioning of the civil control system (e. g. at the governmental level).

b. Dilemmas and tasks:

1. Besides the existing system of democratic and civil state control over the military, we need to continuously improve the control mechanisms. Further laws and decrees are necessary on the relations between economy and defence; defence restructuring and conversion, etc.

2. The most direct contact with the society as a whole has come true through conscripts and reservists - and their families. It is very important part of the civil social control. The messages sent by them influence the public opinion to a great extent. In an ideal case, it would be desirable that the conscripts would come up with positive results as a consequence of their efforts. If the period spent in the army as a conscript is considered by them to be fruitful, this will encourage them to support the army after their discharge. All that can be considered as a reserve of great importance, existing on the level of community and social relations. From this view, our following empirical data seem to be very expressive as they were gathered in a research carried out among subordinated conscripted soldiers:



Source: Draftees '96 (data file)

Research carried out by Dept. of Sociology, Miklós Zrínyi Military Academy.

3. We have to agree with Rudolf Joó, who insisted on the importance of functioning strong non-governmental organizations within the defence communities: 'The Central European politics desperately needs independent academies, media experts, skilled advisers to political parties capable of participating in public debate on defence and security policy, presenting alternative views and programmes.' (Joó, 1996:71) That's why in our opinion one of the most urgent tasks seems to be establishing a civilian expert panel and appointing skilled people into appropriate positions. They will ensure that professional standards meet the requirements and decisions of policy in the defence sphere (first of all in key areas of the Defence Portfolio).

The results achieved during the past years have been significant, even if the situation today is still far from the satisfactory one (e. g. one of the largest problems is a lack of knowledgeable civilian experts in foundations and academic workshops).

The administration had to cover some ground to eliminate the deficiencies for more effective civilian control. The main source of potential organizational conflicts was:

* on the one hand, the civilian experts had to accumulate their experiences in special fields, which had been earlier traditionally integral parts of military decision-making process (e. g. planning and supervision of budgeting, human resources, etc.);
* on the other hand, the soldiers had to be convinced that control exercised by civilians did not pose a threat to their profession.

The independent experts needed to improve the quality of the higher military education and the civil-military relations; and suggested to work out a strategy that aims at the gradual training of all Hungarian Defence Force members in the field of civil-military relations.

In this spirit, and in accordance with the Act of Parliament devoted to Higher Education and other civilian expectations for the successful accreditation, the Miklós Zrinyi Military Academy, as post-graduate military higher educational institute of the Hungarian military, has been transformed into the National Defence University from 1st September 1996. The University currently has:

* two military college-level faculties (Lajos Kossuth Military College for Land Forces /in Szentendre/, and Air Force Officer College for Air Force /in Szolnok/) - János Bolyai Military Technical College will be a part of it, as well; and
* two faculties (Faculty of Military Science and Faculty of Management and Organization); and
* several institutions, which are actively involved in both teaching and research (e. g.: Strategic and Defence Research Institute; Disarmament and Civil-Military Relations Centre /that became later Centre for Civil-Military Relations/; etc.).

Training started on the 1st September 1997 attended by:

* civilian experts majoring in security and defence policy /on undergraduate level/ and
* staff officers majoring in defence management /on post-graduate level/ at the National Defence University.

4. Another important aspect is the monitoring of the armed forces by the media and the public. The openness of the armed forces to the public that is based on active external and internal PR and PA activities can result in unexpected levels of social support.

Investments in the military usually have clearly been influenced by the political goal of joining NATO. In our opinion, the former socialist Central and Eastern European countries have been relatively successful in re-structuring civil-military relations [16]; the armed forces went through a real transformation and downsizing due to the financial constraints and proscriptions of treaties.

According to our opinion, the following will be the most important factors that will determine the forms and functioning of the ideal 'post-modern' military organizations in Central and Eastern European countries in the near future



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[1] Zoltan Laszlo Kiss is an Asst. Professor of Sociology at the Department of Sociology, at Miklos Zrinyi National Defence University (Budapest, Hungary)

[2] Nominations for the highest positions of the military elite's corps and sub-elite groups (eg. for the Chief of General Staff; for higher command positions and for generals) were in the hands of the Central Committee of the party (see: 'nomenclatura'-lists). Although both the MoD and the General Staff were under strict control of the Party.

[3] The armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries had as their first function the support of plans drawn up by the Soviet General Staff so they were to protect not their own national interests but that of the Socialist World.

[4] Being a party member was close to a condition to become officer.This fact is one of the main reasons of high proportion of party members among officers /usually approx. 80-90% in armies of the former socialist countries/.

[5] The military elite groups (that were often strongly contra-selected), however, needed the help of the communist party for the preservation and improvement of their relatively privileged material status and absolute power in the whole organization. (Barany, 1991:75-99)

[6] The ruling communist parties created paramilitary organizations; they used military education for more effective socialization of children. In addition, the whole national economy; language of science, literature and arts were militarized as well.

[7] Examples for the dictatorial form: Romania under Ceau(escu, Albania under Enver Hodzsa, Yugoslavia under Tito, Soviet Union under Stalin, GDR under Honecker, Bulgaria under Zsivkov - and some examples for oligarchical form: Czechoslovakia under Husák, Hungary under János Kádár; Poland under Gierek, Albania after Enver Hodzsa and Yugoslavia after Tito. See more about this topic: (Bebler, 1992:66; Vlachova-Sarva( 1997: 2-19).

[8] The term 'civil control' cannot be translated directly into Hungarian, because the word 'control' - even though also exists in the Hungarian language - is more one-sided than in English. 'Control' means rather to 'exercise authority over' or 'check' - and the meaning to 'regulate' or 'power to direct' is simply missing. That's why if we use the word 'control' in the Hungarian language, it could cause confusion.

[9] We are also convinced that democratic control over the military:

* enables integration of the armed forces into the society and provides the means of cooperation between the military and civilians in the field of national security;
* prevents the possible use of the armed forces in actions against the Constitution and society;
* provides an opportunity to build confidence in relationships among nations through transparency in defence planning, in order to enhance international cooperation and gives a chance to maintain international stability as well.

[10] The term 'civil control' cannot be etc. see (8).

[11] In our view, the following factors were the sources of this relative success:

* civil control has been common interest of civilians and the armed forces (both parties understood that re-construction of civil-military relations was of relatively low political and social costs and it brought about relatively high benefits for society - therefore this was one of the few policy areas that received broad-based political support;
* in these societies, there is a growing acceptance of the norms of military professionalism and civilian control.

[12] The articles of the Constitution referring to the state security and defence matters stipulate that the Armed Forces of the Republic of Hungary shall serve to protect independence of the state and the inviolability of its borders, and that they shall maintain a neutral attitude on political matters and be subject to civil and democratic control.

[13] The most evident function of the civil control is the oversight of military budgeting and spendings, as well as personnel policy within the armed forces. A comprehensive transformation of currently used procedures of defence and budget planning has just started to be compatible with those applied in NATO.

[14] E.g. in last two years, among the activities of the Defence Committee, there were several important issues on their agenda, such as the various tasks arising from legislation related to national defence; observation of processes in conjuction with Parliamentary decisions on medium- and long-term modernization of HDF; Hungarian participation in IFOR/SFOR; management of IFOR/SFOR logistic bases located in Hungary; preparation of memorandum on joining NATO and - after our invitation into NATO (Madrid, 8th July 1997), that - preparation for participation in common defence (in accordance with the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty);

[15] Name of "transilluminiation" group of the British Ministry of Defence was DMCS Management and Consultancy Services.

[16] In our view, the following etc. see (11)