United States. National War College. Course 4, Syllabus

Title: United States. National War College. Course 4, Syllabus - Region 2

REGION 2: RUSSIA AND EUROPE

OVERVIEW

All the ancient conflicts, wrongs, injustices and animosities are suddenly coming back to life and back to mind. The sudden outburst of freedom has thus not only untied the straitjacket made by communism, it has also unveiled the centuries-old often thorny history of nations.

Vaclav Havel
President, Czech Republic

In his 1947 "Mr. X" article, George Kennan called for a "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansionist tendencies" accompanied by the rebuilding of the war-shattered economies of Western Europe. This strategy has borne fruit. All of the major objectives of postwar American strategy have been achieved. Western Europe is prosperous and increasingly integrated; the Cold War division of Germany and of Europe has ended; the former "captive nations" of Central and Eastern Europe are free of communist rule, have elected governments and, with a few exceptions in the Balkans, are pursuing market reforms; and the Soviet Union has imploded into a collection of independent states with Russia embarked on a tenuous course of political and economic reform.

The new Europe, however, is far from being "whole and free." The euphoria that greeted the fall of the Berlin Wall faded with the harsh reality of Sarajevo. The new democracies face enormous challenges as they attempt to achieve social and political cohesion, to create prosperous economies, and to deal with ethnic animosities.

The critical issue remains uncertainty about Russia's future. Russia is a wounded country with a huge nuclear arsenal, bereft of empire, undergoing wrenching change and beset by internal conflict. Although the "iron curtain" that divided Europe has been lifted, major divisions remain between a stable and prosperous Western Europe and a poor Eastern Europe, between those selected in the first round of NATO and European Union enlargement and those left out, and between western institutions and a potentially isolated Russia. Looking to the south, Western Europe faces a North Africa with an exploding population, economic and political turmoil, radical Islamic movements, and a rising tide of immigrants knocking on Europe's closing doors.

While the end of the Cold War eliminated the central threat that was the catalyst for the creation of NATO and for the large American troop presence on the Continent, the need for an active American engagement in Europe remains. A peaceful and prosperous Europe continues to be critical to U.S. interests. As it has for half a century, the transatlantic alliance remains a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy and commits the United States to the defense of its European allies, a commitment which will be extended eastward with NATO's enlargement. Second, the interdependence of the American and European economies means that the cost to the United States of any prolonged period of war or instability in Europe would be devastating. Our trade with Europe exceeds $230 billion annually; Europe accounts for about half of the foreign revenues of American firms; and U.S. investment in Europe is three times that in Asia. Third, Europe and America share principles of democracy, human rights and economic liberalism and have a common interest in promoting these values together. Finally, as the Balkan conflicts demonstrate, Europe continues to be dependent on the United States for its security and for leadership.

Our study of Russia and Europe focuses on the forces of integration and disintegration in this wide and differentiated region. We will begin by addressing the changed and changing political, economic and security environment in the wider Europe, first discussing the Russian context in both its Asian and European dimensions, the internal dynamics in Russia, and U.S.-Russian relation. Then, we will review the impacts of the revolutions of 1989/91, the movement toward "ever greater union" in Western Europe and enlargement of western structures to the East, and the challenges to U.S. interests in the Balkans. We will conclude with the question of American policy toward Russia and Europe now and in the future.

Block Objectives.

Understand the key political, economic, cultural, and military trends in Russia and Europe

Examine U.S. interests and foreign policy goals in the region

Assess challenges to and opportunities for advancing these interests

Critically evaluate current U.S. strategy and propose alternative approaches for achieving U.S. goals in Russia and in Europe

Demonstrate the ability to craft national security objectives for this region and to develop a regional security strategy looking toward 2010.

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS IN EUROPE DURING 1995 - 1999

February 1995.- In the secessionist republic of Chechnya, fighting expands beyond Grozny, the capital, as Russian forces continue to pursue fighters loyal to Chechen president Dzhokhar Dudayev. The government says Chechen rebels violated the cease-fire, which officially ended on February 19th, with an assault on Grozny.

President Slobodan Milosevic rejects an offer by the so-called Contact group (US, France, Russia, Britain, and Germany) to lift trade sanctions on Serbia in return for Serbia's regonition of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.

June 1995.- French President Jacques Chirac announces resumption of nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

Russia announces it will activate its membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace Program, which will make Russia an associate member of NATO for an indefinite trial period.

September 1995.- NATO announces that it will suspend air attacks after Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Serb military commander General Ratko Mladic agree to withdraw all heavy weaponry outside the 12.5-mile "exclusion zone" around Sarajevo.

France begins nuclear testing on Mururoa atoll.

October 1995.- Leaders from nearly all the UN's member nations gather in New York to celebrate the organization's 50th anniversary.

US President Bill Clinton announces that the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian government, and Croatia have agreed to an American-mediated cease-fire to take effect October 10, 1995.

US-sponsored peace talks between the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia (representing the Bosnian Serbs) begin in Dayton, Ohio.

December 1995.- The 1st NATO troops arrive in Bosnia to prepare for the nearly 60,000 NATO troops that are to enforce the Dayton peace accords of November 21, 1999.

Government officials in the Ukraine and the Group of Seven (G7) nations sign an agreement under which the Ukraine will close its Chernobyl nuclear power plant by 2000.

January 1996.- Government officials in France announce that France will no longer conduct nuclear weapons testing.

February 1996.- The Bosnian government announces that the siege of Sarajevo is officially over.

France's President Jacques Chirac announces that the armed forces will be reduced about one-third its current size and become an all-volunteer force within the next 6 years.

March 1996.- Serbian President Slobodan Milosovic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, and acting Bosnian President Ejup Ganic meet in Geneva to officially reaffirm their commitment to the November 20 Dayton peace accords.

April 1996.- Russian forces reportedly halt attacks in the secessionist Russian republic of Chechnya. President Boris Yeltsin called for peace negotiations with the rebels and an end to the fighting.

June 1996.- France's President Jacques Chirac announces that France will resume participation in NATO. France pulled out of the organization in 1966.

August 1996.- In Moscow, President Boris Yeltsin is sworn in at the Kremlin as the first democratically elected president in Russian history.

March 1997.- In Helsinki, US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin conclude a summit meeting with an agreement that extends the 1993 Start II Treaty deadline to eliminate land-based multiple warheads to the end of 2003.

March 1998.- The countries of the so-called contact group on the former Yugoslavia (the US France, Britain, Russia, Italy, and Germany) agree to impose modest diplomatic and economic sanctions on Yugoslavia for its "unacceptable use of force" against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

May 1998.- In Birmingham, England, on the last day of the annual summit meeting of the world's 7 leading industrial democracies, Russia is formally made a member.

June 1998.- In Albania, Prime Minister Fatos Nano calls on NATO to deploy troops along the border between Albania and the Serbian province of Kosovo. President Rexhep Mejdani demands that Serbia call off its offensive in Kosovo.

April 1999.- NATO planes continue to bomb targets throughout Yugoslavia, including war-torn Serbian province of Kosovo. NATO says the bombing will continue until Yugoslavia meets all NATO conditions: Granting full political autonomy to Kosovo, withdrawing Serbian forces from the province, and allowing foreign troops to police the agreement.

May 1999.- Russia and other members of the Group of Eight (G8) draft a plan to end the conflict in Yugoslavia; the plan calls for withdrawal of Serbian troops and police forces from Kosovo, followed by deployment of an international military peacekeeping presence.

June 1999.- NATO halts its 78-day bombing campaign of Yugoslavia after Serbian troops begin leaving Kosovo.

TOPIC 14: MOSCOW MELTDOWN: THE RUSSIAN CONTEXT

Tuesday
25 January 2000
0900-1130 (L)

Conditions in Russia have been uneasy since the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, which brought to an end the last truly multinational empire. The very entity, which was the only homeland Russians had known and about which millions of citizens felt deeply--both positively and negatively--disintegrated seemingly overnight. Over 25 million Russians woke on the morning of December 9, 1991 to find themselves no longer the privileged citizens of a great empire, but for many Russians detested minorities in newly independent states of the former Soviet Union ranging from Estonia to Tajikistan. Two years later, a "parliamentary" coup attempt against Boris Yeltsin was crushed with brutal force.

The enormous problems of the transition from a centralized command economy to a market-oriented economic system have resulted in both seriously reduced living standards and social instability in Russia and, even more so, in Ukraine, Belarus and the Central Asian republics. Instead of its role as a huge empire and a global superpower, Russia is left with nuclear arms but little else of her former status. The war in Chechnya reveals the serious weaknesses in the Russian military, the volatility of Russia's southern border, and the fractious ethnic mix in that region and in the rest of Russia's "near abroad." Similarly, the building boom, high priced boutiques, and grand limousines of Moscow belie the much darker picture of crime, unpaid workers, declining living standards, and decay in much of the rest of the Russian Federation.

Moscow confronts a series of conflicts along its southern borders in what used to be the Soviet Union. The danger of spillover of this violence into Russia is always present. What were the Soviet Union's domestic problems are now some of its most difficult foreign policy issues, including the fate of Russian minorities in the newly independent states. Facing a new and uncertain environment, Russia has made a major effort to improve its relations with the major powers in the regions, particularly China and Ukraine.

The post-Soviet period has seen a growing recognition on the part of former Soviet states (with the notable exception of the Baltics) that Russia is the integrating factor in the region, in both military and economic affairs. At the initiative of its authoritarian president, Belarus has, for all intents and purposes, "rejoined" Russia. The states of Central Asia have also shown little real interest in severing links to the Russia. Indeed, they have recognized how dependent they remain on Russia for market access, technology, and military protection.

The continuing uncertainties regarding President Yeltsin's health and capacity to govern contribute to the turmoil in the Russian political order, a system in transition toward more democratic norms but not a Western style democracy, nor likely to become such. All of the many domestic problems facing Russia were in full display last autumn as the rouble collapsed, Russia defaulted on much of its debt, the Duma rejected Yeltsin's first choice for prime minister, and President Yeltsin, beset by serious illness, was all but invisible.

In today's lecture, Professor Mel Goodman will examine the status of political and economic reform in Russia, review the range of internal problems the current and leadership faces, assess the impact these matters have on stability in Russia and in Moscow's foreign policy, and try to develop a better understanding of the various factors that shape the Russian leadership's view of the world.

Topic Objectives.

Understand the security implications of the collapse of the Soviet Union for major regions of the world, for the Russian Federation and for the United States

Examine the evolution of the U.S.-Russian Federation relationship since 1991

Examine current and potential future foreign policy and security issues between the U.S. and Russia and their implications for the U.S.

Issues for Consideration.

Why do conditions in Russia matter for her neighbors? Will the fact that Russia needs to tend to its serious domestic problems affect the extent to which Moscow engages in outside adventures?

Are Russia's problems endemic to Russian history and culture or more those of a state in transition from an authoritarian political model to a more democratic one?

Why is the "minorities question" key to Russia's future?

Should the United States try to "anchor" Russia to Western institutions? If so, how? What, if any, means of influence does the U.S. have to affect domestic developments in Russia? To affect Russian foreign policy?

What is the nature of Moscow's ties to the former Soviet republics? What are the factors that draw these now independent states together? That keep them apart? Is a "reconstituted Soviet Union" a viable prospect?

Required Readings:

a. Sherman Garnett, "Russia's Illusory Ambitions," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76:2 (March/April 1997), pp. 61-76. (Internet version, pp. 1-10)

b. Stephen Blank, "Which Way for Sino-Soviet Relations?" Orbis, vol. 42:3 (Summer 1998), pp. 345-360.
c. Martha Brill Olcott, "The Caspian's False Promise," Foreign Policy, no. 111 (Summer 1998), pp. 95-113. (Internet version, pp. 1-10)

d. Anatol Lieven, "The Weakness of Russian Nationalism," Survival, Volume 41, Number 2, Summer 1999, pp. 53-70.

e. Sergo Mikoyan, "Russia, the United States, and Regional Conflict in Eurasia," Survival, Volume 40, Number 3, Autumn 1998, pp. 112-126. (See ProQuest)

Supplemental Readings:

1. Karen Dawisha, "Russian Foreign Policy in the Near Abroad and Beyond," Current History, vol. 95:603 (October 1996), pp. 330-334.

2. Sherman Garnett, "The Russian Far East as a Factor in Russian-Chinese Relations," SAIS Review, vol. XVI: 2 (1996), pp. 1-20.

3. David Mark, "Eurasia Letter: Russia and the New Transcaucasus," Foreign Policy, no. 105 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 141-159.

4. John Mroz and Oleksandr Pavluk, "Ukraine: Europe's Linchpin," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75:4 (1996), pp. 52-62.

5. Martha Brill Olcott, "Sovereignty and the 'Near Abroad'," Orbis, vol. 39:3 (Summer 1995), pp. 353-367.

6. William D. Jackson, "Imperial Temptations: Ethnics Abroad," Orbis, vol. 38:1 (Winter 1994), pp. 1-18.

7. Herbert J. Ellison and Bruce A. Acker, "The New Russia and Asia: 1991-1995," NBR Analysis, vol. 7:1 (June 1996).

TOPIC 15 : THE NEW AND WIDER EUROPE: THE ISSUE OF "TRANSITION" IN EASTERN EUROPE

Wednesday,
20 January 2000
1100-1200 (L)

In the aftermath of the revolutions of 1989-90, hopes soared that democracy and market economies would quickly take root and flourish in Eastern Europe. And, vibrant democracies and fledgling markets economies have been established in the northern half of the region. However, the transition from communism to liberal political and economic systems has proved very difficult and the former communist states have differed markedly in how well they have accomplished this transformation.

The states of the region took different paths ranging from the quick imposition of "shock therapy" in Poland to a slower pace of market reform in Hungary and the Czech Republic, to still slower and conflicted paths of economic improvement and democratic reform in much of the Balkans, in Ukraine, and to little change in Belarus. The transition from closed, authoritarian political regimes and command economies has proved a daunting challenge for leaders and populations alike as they strive to develop political and social cohesion, to create prosperous economies and to deal with ethnic animosities, resurgent nationalism and territorial disputes.

The "northern tier" states have faired much better than their neighbors in Southeastern Europe. In Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Baltic states democracy is firmly entrenched, their economies are largely privatized, and they are attractive to western investors. Slovakia, too, now to appears to be on a rapid reform course. Southeast Europe is another story. The most recent elections in Romania and Bulgaria brought in reform leaders committed to turning their economies around but they face very tough challenges. The signs elsewhere in the region and further to the east in Belarus and Ukraine are less encouraging.

Nearly all of the former communist states of this region aspire to membership in the European Union, seeing such membership as critical to prosperity and a symbol of their "rejoining" Europe. In this lesson, we will examine the efforts to consolidate democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, investigate the causes of instability and conflict in this region and address the implications of developments in this region for U.S. interests.

Issues for Consideration.

What are U.S. security interests in East-Central Europe? What role can or should the United States play in this region to help consolidate democratic institutions, foster economic progress and enhance stability?

For the most part the states of this region are new states, having achieved independence, or in the case of Poland regaining independence, from their former empires following the First World War. Their experience with democracy is very limited and they endured German occupation and then Russian domination for much of post-independence history. What makes the post-Cold War period different, and prospects better for this region, than the interwar period?

How would you assess the political and economic reform process among these states -- in which states are the signs most hopeful? Least hopeful? Why?

How should the U.S. apportion its limited assistance dollars and diplomatic capital in this region? What means does the United States have to influence developments there?

What options do the states of Central and Eastern Europe have to provide for their security? Why are virtually all of these states interested in joining NATO?

While proclaiming to support including the former communist states in the EU, the current EU members have proceeded at a snail's pace on enlargement east. Why has the EU not moved more quickly? What are the barriers to EU membership for the states of Central and Eastern Europe?

Required Readings.

a. Peter Rutland, "The Revolutions of 1989 Reconsidered," Current History, vol. 98:627 (April 1999): 147-152.

b. Michael Radu, "Why Eastern and Central Europe Look West," Orbis, vol. 41:1 (Winter 1997), pp. 39-57.

c. Jiri Pehe, "The Disappointments of Democracy," Transitions (May 1998): 38-42.

d. Peter Ford, "Moving Toward a Seamless Continent," The Christian Science Monitor, August 7, 1998, pp. 1-5. (Internet Version)

e. Strobe Talbott, "European Enlargement: An American Perspective," Address to the conference, A Wider Europe: EU Enlargement and U.S. Interests, Washington DC, March 12, 1998, pp. 1-5. (Department of State Internet).

Supplemental Readings.

1. Minton F. Goldman, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).

2. J.F. Brown, Hopes and Shadows (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994).

3. J.F. Brown, Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991).

4. Janusz Bugajski, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994).

5. Judy Batt, East Central Europe: From Reform to Transformation (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991).

TOPIC 16: STRATEGIC VIEW FROM MOSCOW

Thursday
27 January 2000
0830-1130 (LS)

This morning we will hear from either the Russian Ambassador, Yuri Ushakov, or a former senior official of the KGB, General Oleg Kalugin. It is essential in a course such as this to receive a Russian assessment of Moscow's strategic outlook. Whether we get the official views of the ambassador or the non-official views of a former senior KGB general, we will receive a better understanding of the Russian mindset regarding the Kremlin's near-term and long-term opportunities and vulnerabilities. It is important to remember that Russia is undergoing no less than four simultaneous revolutions (national, economic, political, and social) that will have an impact on the views of our speaker.

Issues for Consideration.

1. What are the major problems plaguing the Russian society today?

What is the Russian view of their national security situation and the expansion of NATO?

How different is the Russia view of the post-Cold War security environment from our own? What are the factors that shape Moscow's view of the world and of U.S. policy?

To what degree can the United States influence domestic or foreign policies in Russia?

How serious is the "crisis" in the Russian military? Can Russia afford to maintain a viable defense capability at current force levels and with growing economic pressures on government spending? How might reduced defense spending and a deteriorating economy affect Russian security policies in the near term and the long term?

Required Readings.

a. Dimitri Simes, "Return of Russian History," Foreign Affairs, Volume 73, January/February 1994, pp. 67-82.

b. Archie Brown, "The Russian Crisis: Beginning of the End or End of the Beginning," Post-Soviet Affairs, January-March 1999, Volume 15, pp. 56-73.

c. Peter Rutland, "A Flawed Democracy," Current History, vol. 97:621 (October 1998), pp. 313-318.

d. John M. Joyce, "The Old Russian Legacy," Foreign Policy, no. 55 (Summer 1984), pp. 132-154.

e. Anonymous, "End of a road for Russia?" The Economist, September 5, 1998, pp. 45-47.

f. Dale Herspring, "Russia's Crumbling Military," Current History, vol. 97:621 (October 1998), pp. 325-328.

g. Donald N. Jensen, "How Russia is Ruled - 1998," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Report, 1998, 44 pages (For student reference)

h. Dean Wilkening, "The Future of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Force," Survival, Volume 40, Number 3, Autumn 1998, pp. 89-111. (See ProQuest)

Supplemental Readings.

1. Grigory Yavlinski, "Russia's Phony Capitalism," Foreign Affairs, vol. 77:3 (May/June 1998), pp. 67-79.

2. Anatol Lieven, "Russia's Military Nadir," The National Interest (Summer 1996), pp. 24-33.

3. Michael Spector, "The Wars of Aleksandr Ivanovich Lebed," The New York Times Magazine, October 13, 1996, pp. 43-48ff.
24-33.

4. Tanya Frishy, "The Rise of Organized Crime in Russia: Its Roots and Social Significance," Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 50:1 (1998), pp. 27-49.

TOPIC 17: TENSIONS IN THE RELATIONSHIP: NATO EXPANSION

Friday,
28 January 2000
0900-1100 (P)

Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union (EU) to the east carries the promise for the former communist states of "rejoining" Europe and benefiting from the economic success their western neighbors have enjoyed and of consolidating their political and economic reforms under NATO's security umbrella. At the same time, however, this enlargement of long-established western institutions, especially NATO, threatens to create new dividing lines on the continent, isolating Russia from this new Europe and relegating the states in between, such as Ukraine, to an uncertain "gray area." At the summit meeting commemorating the Atlantic Alliance's 50th anniversary, NATO's eastern border expanded to include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The European Union, caught up in its own internal reform process and launching monetary union, has been slower to open its doors to the East.

The states of East-Central Europe are also seeking membership in the European Union. While politically appealing, EU enlargement to the east is economically and technically challenging. Even the best performing economies in East-Central Europe have incomes one-third or less of the EU average, a much larger portion of their population in agriculture, and an overhang of non-competitive industries. At a time when EU members have cut spending to meet the requirements for monetary union and when unemployment remains at double digit levels, there is little enthusiasm over the prospect of spending tens of billions of new "euros" to enlarge the union.

Opposition to NATO's expansion eastward is the one issue that unites Russian across the political spectrum from democratic reformers to old style communists. For Russians, accustomed to viewing NATO as the threat throughout the Cold War, the Alliance's existence much less its expansion to Russia's western marches indicates that western hostility toward Russia remains, confronting Moscow with a powerful military coalition when Russian forces are weak, accentuating Russia's loss of power and influence, and threatening to isolate Moscow. While Russian leaders have been forced to swallow the first round of NATO enlargement, they have made clear that further expansion to the former Soviet Baltic Republics would pose an unacceptable challenge to vital Russian interests. The inclusion of the Baltic states would, in the words of a senior Russian diplomat, divide Russian territory by placing a hostile alliance between the Kalingrad oblast and the rest of the Federation.

In this topic, we will have a debate between two distinguished experts on European security that will examine both the case for NATO's eastward march and the case against further enlargement.

Topic Objectives.

Assess NATO's enlargement process, its affect on the states of Central Europe and on the west's relationship with the Russian Federation.

Issues for Consideration.

What security structure would serve best to protect U.S. interests and provide security for Europe during the current period of transition? In 10 years? With the Soviet Union no more and the Russian military in shambles, what is the purpose of NATO? Of the American troop presence on the continent?

Why does Russia oppose NATO enlargement? In view of Russia's importance to European and to global security is NATO expansion in the U.S. interest? Does it contribute to European stability as its proponents claim or endanger that stability?

At the Madrid summit meeting in 1997, where the first three applicants from the east were invited to join the Alliance, NATO leaders stated that the Alliance "will continue to welcome new members" and "expects to extend further invitations in the coming years." In your view, should NATO enlarge further? If so, when, under what criteria, and to which states?

In the May 1997 "Founding Act", NATO established a special relationship with Russia. What should be the goals of this arrangement? Should Russia be considered for NATO membership sometime in the future? What might such Russian membership mean for the character and missions of such an Alliance?

Required Readings.

a. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "NATO: the Dilemmas of Expansion," The National Interest, Issue 53 (Fall 1998), pp. 13-17. (Internet version, pp. 1-5)

b. Alexei Pushkov, "Don't Isolate Us: A Russian View of NATO Expansion," The National Interest, Issue 47 (Spring 1997), pp. 58-62. (Internet version, pp. 1-5)

c. Michael Brown, "Minimalist NATO: A Wise Alliance Knows When to Retrench," Foreign Affairs, vol. 78:3 (May/June 1999), pp. 204-218.

d. Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, "Open NATO's Door Carefully," Washington Quarterly, vol. 22:2 (spring 1999), pp. 125-138.

e. Documents:

NATO Press Release

NATO Basic Texts

Supplemental Readings:

1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74: 1 (January/February 1995), pp. 26-42.

2. Karl-Heinz Kamp, "NATO Entrapped: Debating the next Enlargement Round," Survival, vol. 40:3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 1-11.

3. Stephen Blank, "Russia, NATO enlargement and the Baltic States," World Affairs, vol. 160:3 (Winter 1998), pp. 115-125.

4. Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement and Central Europe (Washington DC: NDU Press, 1996).

TOPIC 18: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN THE CAUCASUS

Monday
31 January 2000
0900-1130 (Panel)

This morning we will have a unique opportunity to hear from the ambassadors from the Caucasus: Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moscow has been preoccupied with the so-called "near abroad" or those former republics of the Soviet Union that are now independent countries. In the west, Moscow's major concerns in the near abroad have been in Ukraine and the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In the east, Moscow has had to deal with the emergence of five new Muslim countries: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikstan. Russia is particularly concerned with the actions of China and Afghanistan in this region. And in the south, Moscow's primary interest is maintaining stable relations with Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, where the Russians are concerned with the policies of Turkey and Iran. The possible Balkanization of Russia's southern underbelly is a long-term threat to Moscow's interests as well as to the strategic stability of all of Eurasia.

Although there are more than 25 million Russians living in the near abroad, particularly in Ukraine and Kazakstan, very few Russians live in the countries of the Caucasus. The population of Georgia is more than five million but there are less than 400,000 Russians in Georgia; the population of Azerbaijan is more than seven million but there are less than 400,000 Russians in Azerbaijan; the population of Armenia is around three million but there are only 50,000 Russians in Armenia. Whereas the treatment of ethnic Russians in an issue in some countries of the near abroad, particularly in the Baltics, this is not a problem in the Caucasus.

The major problems in the Caucasus concern the challenge of an unexpected independence nearly ten years ago, establishing direct bilateral contacts of all kinds with other states, breaking their dependence on Russia, and dealing with the pipeline politics associated with the presence of oil and natural gas in the region. The war in Chechnya complicates all of these issues. The ambassadors will address all of these issues this morning.

Issues for Consideration.

What are the national interests of the countries of the Caucasus: Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan? How do pipelines and politics run together in this region?

What are the interests of the United States and Russia in this region? What are the interests of Turkey and Iran in this region?

Are the predictions of wealth for this region reasonable? Can the United States look to the Caucasus as an alternate source for energy supplies?

Could this region become a cradle of conflict because of ethnic differences between Christians and Muslims?

Will continued Russian differences with Dagestan and Chechnya in the North Caucasus create national security problems for Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan?

Required Readings.

a. Jonathan Aves, "National Security and Military Issues in the Transcaucasus: The Cases of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia," in State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, edited by Bruce Parrott, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, pp. 209-234.

b. Amy Myers and Robert Manning, "The Myth of the Caspian 'Great Game': The Real Geopolitics of Energy," Survival, Volume 40, Number 4, Winter 1998-1999, pp. 112-131. (ProQuest)

c. Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl and Melvin A. Goodman, The Wars of Eduard Shevardnadze, University Park: Penn State Press, 1997, pp. 257-283.

TOPIC 19: THE CHANGING EUROPEAN CONTEXT

Tuesday
21 February 2000
1030-1200 (DR)

The disintegration of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, and the breakup of the Soviet Union dramatically altered power relationships in Europe. The threat of Soviet aggression that was the raison d'�tre for NATO and for the intensive postwar American engagement in European affairs is gone, and no comparable threat appears on the horizon. A united Germany, its capital returned to Berlin and no longer constrained to a limited political role by its incomplete sovereignty, is once again the principal player in Central Europe. Symbolic of Germany's return as a "normal" country was German participation the Kosovo war, the German lead in Balkan stability initiative, and the command of KFOR by a German officer.

The bipolar East-West structure and its rival alliances, for all their ideological tension, proved predictable and stable. Both sides avoided provocation that might run the risk of armed conflict and understood the rules of the game. A tense peace was maintained in Europe at the cost of trillions of dollars in defense spending and at a very high cost of freedom and economic well being for the peoples east of the dividing line. Now, Europe has entered an era of promise but also one of uncertainty, instability and danger.

Western Europe remains committed to their great experiment of an "ever more perfect union." With much fanfare, eleven EU members launched monetary union and a single currency one year ago. This represents an unprecedented step in relinquishing a key element of state sovereignty - the right to influence the value of one's currency. National currencies have traditionally been a symbol of the state and its sovereignty. In less than two years time, those symbols will begin to disappear from circulation, of value only to collectors of memorabilia. After a strong beginning and assertions that the new European currency would soon rival the dollar, however, the euro has fallen in value as Europe's largest economy has stalled and unemployment remains at double-digit levels. At the heart of "ever closer union" is the question of whether the nation-state will be replace by the EU as the dominant actor in European political and economic life.

The second major challenge for the EU is taking in new members from the east. While politically appealing, EU enlargement is economically and technically challenging. Even the best performing economies in East-Central Europe have incomes one-third or less of the EU average and an overhang of non-competitive industries.

These sea changes have been both exciting and frightening for the peoples of Europe. While change has brought new opportunities, it threatens familiar institutions and bonds, and promises an uncertain future. Today's Europe does not face the Cold War threat of catastrophic war, but a sense of security remains elusive. The high tension stability of the Cold War era has been replaced by a less tense but less stable and predictable environment. The "iron curtain" of the Cold War is gone, but there is a danger that new dividing lines are being drawn, especially with the expansion of NATO. The transition to democratic rule in the former Soviet empire is far from assured, and ethnic and national conflicts dot the region. Nowhere has this instability and violence been more obvious than in the Balkans.

Developments outside Europe also pose potential threats to European security. Political turmoil, rapidly expanding populations and economic despair in North Africa provide fertile fields for anti-western movements and radical Islamic factions. While NATO's focus traditionally has been on East-West matters, Southern Europe's attention increasingly is drawn to the South. The Mediterranean is Europe's Rio Grande. On its southern shores there is poverty, high unemployment, explosive population growth and authoritarian rule. To the north lies an affluent, aging European populace inhospitable to immigrants, especially Muslims from North Africa.

In this topic we will review the changes taking place in the European security context and the challenges to American interests and policy these changes present.

Topic Objectives.

Review the major trends and developments in the wider European security context

Examine the opportunities for and challenges to U.S. interests that these developments present

Issues for Consideration.

What are United States security interests in the new Europe? Have they changed in light of the collapse of the Soviet empire? If so, how?

What rationale is there for continuing to station American forces in Europe? How long do you think the Congress will support a large U.S. troop presence in Europe?

Will the new Germany dominate Europe politically as well as economically? If so, what would be the implications of this for U.S. policy?

Is the nation-state dead in Europe? What are the implications of a Europe that acts with more unity and is less amenable to U.S. influence?

What does adoption of the "euro" mean for Europe? Will the "euro" be a strong currency that rivals the dollar?

Required Readings.

a. "America's Enduring Interests in Europe," United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, June 1995), pages 1-4 (Internet version).

b. William Wallace and Jan Zielonka, "Misunderstanding Europe," Foreign Affairs, vol. 77:6 (November/December 1998), pp. 65-79.

c. Dominique Moisi, "Dreaming of Europe," Foreign Policy (summer 1999), pp. 44-58.

d. Timothy Garton-Ash, "Goodbye to Bonn," New York Review of Books, vol. 45:17 (November 5, 1998), pp. 41-43. (Internet version, pp. 1-6)

e. Robert Frank, "Europe's `On Freud's Couch' as Countries Vie for Identity," Wall Street Journal, October 19, 1998, pp. A1, A12. (Interactive Edition, pp. 1-5)

f. "Gambling on the euro," The Economist, January 2, 1999, pp. 19-22.

Supplemental Readings.

1. Elizabeth Pond, The Rebirth of Europe (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).

2. Axel Krause, Inside the New Europe (New York: HarperCollins, 1991).

3. Walter Lacquer, Europe in Our Time: A History 1945-1992 (New York: Penguin Books, 1992).

4. Tina Rosenberg, The Haunted Land: Facing Europe's Ghosts after Communism (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).

5. Jacques Rupnik, "Europe's New Frontiers," Daedalus, Vol. 123:2 (1994), pp. 91-113.

TOPIC 20: THE WAR IN KOSOVO: IMPLICATIONS

Wednesday,
2 February 2000
0900-1100 (P)

You cannot understand Yugoslavia without a thorough knowledge of its history...because the reasons for its birth were the same as those for its death.

Dobra Cosic
Writer, historian and President of
Yugoslavia (1992-1993)

The disintegrative forces of nationalism in the new Europe have been on display in their most brutal form in the multinational state of Yugoslavia. "Ethnic cleansing" contrasted sharply with visions of a "Europe whole and free". The future of the U.S. role in post-Cold War Europe, of U.S.-Russian relations, and of NATO have been tested by the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo and by the peace-enforcement missions there.

With national antipathies providing the fuel for populist demagogues to exploit, Yugoslavia disintegrated into bloody civil strife in 1991, first in Slovenia and Croatia, then in Bosnia, and most recently in Kosovo where NATO launched two months of air attacks on that province and on Serbia proper to force Belgrade to withdraw its forces from the province.

NATO-led peacekeeping forces have been deployed to Bosnia since December 1995 to implement the military aspects of the Dayton agreements that brought an end to the fighting in that former Yugoslav republic. While military tasks of enforcing the cease-fire and separating the warring forces have been achieved, carrying out the civil side of the accords has proved far more difficult. These difficulties and lack of cooperation among the parties raise questions about the long-term viability of the peace agreement reached at Dayton and whether NATO and the United States should deploy forces to Bosnia for the indefinite future.

Left out of the Dayton accords was the question of Kosovo - a province of Serbia whose majority Albanian population chafed under Serb rule. Unlike Bosnia, where the contending groups are all Slavs, who speak the same language and lived together in relative peace for centuries, in Kosovo Serbs and Albanians are of different ethnicity, speak different languages, and have a history of conflict and alternating domination of one populace by the other. The Albanians of Kosovo enjoyed considerable autonomy under the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, a situation strongly resented by the Serbs. Slobodan Milosevic launched his rise to power with a nationalist appeal to Kosovo Serbs at Kosovo Polje in 1987 and established repressive Serb control.

What had been largely passive Albanian resistance to Serb oppression turned increasingly violent in 1998 with widening attacks on Serb officials and Albanian collaborators by a shadowy Kosovo Liberation Army (the KLA), seeking independence from Serbia. Serb military and para-military police cracked down hard on the Albanian resistance, forcing up to 300,000 to flee their homes. After months of negotiations and the threat of NATO air strikes, an agreement was reached calling for a cease-fire, withdrawal of some Serb units, international monitoring, and negotiation of steps toward restoring some Albanian rights. That tenuous accord broke down in early 1999 as KLA elements resumed their insurgency and Serbia reinforced its forces and went on the offensive against KLA strongholds.

With violence escalating, Serbia refused to agree to a plan crafted largely by the United States that would have granted Kosovo considerable self-rule and required Belgrade to withdraw most of its military and police forces. NATO began an air campaign to force Serb compliance, and Serb forces responded with a well-planned, massive expulsion of much of the Albanian population. Approximately half the prewar Albanian population of Kosovo either was expelled or fled Kosovo, numerous villages were burned and thousands of Albanians were summarily executed by Serb para-military and police units.

After two months of escalating air attacks on Serb units in Kosovo and on Serbia proper, with allied cohesion holding up, and with Russia joining the allies in pressuring Belgrade to agree to terms, Milosevic backed down and withdrew all Serb forces from the province. A peacekeeping force under NATO command has deployed to Kosovo with robust rules of engagement and a major role in civilian implementation of the settlement, a civilian authority under the United Nations governs Kosovo, and it is the Serbs who have been fleeing the province. Kosovo is, in effect, an international protectorate. Like Bosnia, a lengthy and costly NATO and international presence will be required. In Kosovo the greatest danger to peace now is not from Belgrade, but from a radicalized and victorious Albanian populace that demands independence not just autonomy within Serbia and who see NATO not as a protector but as a protector but as a barrier to that goal.

In this topic, Ambassador Peter Gabraith will review U.S. and European interests and policies toward the Kosovo conflict, assess the United States and NATO peace enforcement role, and discuss the implications of the war in Kosovo for the U.S., for Europe and for U.S.-Russian relations.

Topic Objectives.

Evaluate U.S. and NATO policy toward conflicts in the Balkans

Examine U.S. interests involved in the Balkans, the relative importance of these interests

Critically analyze U.S. policy objectives relating to the war in Kosovo

Assess the implications of this war and the peace enforcement effort in Kosovo for U.S. relations with Russia

Issues for Consideration.

What United States interests are involved in former Yugoslavia? Do those interests justify the continued commitment of American forces to peace enforcement duties? Should we expect/demand that the Europeans handle these missions on their own?

What were the NATO objectives for the war in Kosovo? Were they achieved? Were there alternatives means to military force for achieving these aims?

What does the future hold for Kosovo? How long and for what purposes should NATO forces be deployed in Kosovo?

What was the role of Russia in the Kosovo conflict? Where did NATO and Russian interests and objectives coincide? Where did they differ?

Why did Russian forces deploy to the Pristina airport in advance of and much to the surprise of NATO forces? What do the differences between Russia and he west over Kosovo mean for future cooperation in security matters in Europe?

In Kosovo, NATO used force within a sovereign state, without UN Security Council authorization, and with Russian political opposition. What are the implications of this action for the principle of state sovereignty, for NATO, and for relations with Russia?

Required Readings.

a. Tim Judah, "Kosovo's Road to War," Survival, vol. 41:2 (Summer 1999): 5- 18.

b. Chris Hedges, "Kosovo's Next Masters," Foreign Affairs, vol. 78:3 (May/June 1999): 24-42.

c. William Clinton, "Remarks by the President at United States Air Force Academy Commencement Ceremony," White House Press Release, June 2, 1999, pp. 1-8.

d. Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, "Unlearning the Lessons of Kosovo," Foreign Policy (fall 1999), pp. 128-140.

Supplemental Readings.

1. Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers (New York: Times Books, 1996).

2. Laura Silber and Alan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin Books, 1997).

3. Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

4. Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

TOPIC 21: "AGENDA 2000": U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD EUROPE AND RUSSIA

Thursday,
3 February 2000
0900-1100 (IS)

We conclude our study of the new Europe and the transatlantic relationship with a seminar devoted to what the future may hold for European security, for the United States role in Europe, and for U.S.-Russian relations.

The dramatic and unexpected developments in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have been a humbling experience for those who try to forecast the future course of global events. Neither analysts nor policy makers foresaw or were prepared for the revolutionary tide that swept communist regimes from power in a few short months in the fall of 1989, for the implosion of the Soviet Union, or for the death of communism in Russia. Yet strategists and policy makers must attempt to lay out assumptions that may vary from the "common wisdom" and establish long-range objectives for U.S. policy if they are to be prepared to deal with new developments and to channel change in Europe and in Russia in directions conducive to American interests.

Some of the questions we need to address include: What are prospects for continued political and economic reform in Russia? In the other former Soviet republics? In Central and Eastern Europe? Are we recreating new dividing lines in Europe, just a bit farther to the east? What does the future hold for the transatlantic relationship and the U.S. troop presence in Europe? With the threat of large-scale aggression gone and no comparable hegemonic danger to Europe on the horizon, why retain NATO? For what purposes? With the European Union expanding and with a wealthy Western Europe possessing the manpower and economic resources, if not the will, to defend themselves from likely dangers, is it time for American forces to retire the colors and return home to more pressing priorities? In short, what are the implications of developments in the wider Europe for U.S. policy and what can and should Washington do to influence the course of events in this region over the coming decade and beyond?

Topic Objectives.

Evaluate current U.S. strategy toward Russia and Europe.

Demonstrate the ability to craft national security objectives and formulate strategy for this region.

Recommend revisions to current strategy.

Issues for Consideration.

What assumptions would you make about the future course of events in Russia? In the other states of the former Soviet Union? In the Balkans? What can/should the United States do to influence developments in this region? What should be the division of effort between the United States and the West Europeans?

What should be Russia's role in European security? How can the West meet the security needs of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe without isolating Russia and engendering a hostile response?

Should the United States continue to play the leading role in European security with all the commitments that implies? How might you make the case to the Congress and the public that such a role is necessary? If you do not believe that the United States should continue to bear this burden, how might American interests in Europe be protected and advanced?

Looking out ten years, what objectives would you set for U.S. policy? What strategies would you suggest to reach those objectives?

Required Readings.

a. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Geostrategy for Eurasia," Foreign Affairs, vol. 76:5 (September/October 1997), pp. 50-64.

b. Steven Sestanovich, "U.S. Policy toward Russia," Statement before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 20, 1998, pp. 1-9.

c. Alexi Arbatov, "Eurasia Letter: A Russian-U.S. Security Agenda," Foreign Policy, no. 104 (Fall 1996), pp. 102-117. (Internet version, pp. 1-9)

d. Fred Bergston, "America and Europe: Clash of the Titans?" Foreign Affiars, vol. 78:2 (March/April 1999), pp. 20-34.

e. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "America's Stake in Russia Today," Orbis, vol. 41:1 (Winter 1997), pp. 31-38.

Supplemental Readings.

1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs, vol. 74:1 (January/February 1995), pp. 26-42.

2. James E. Goodby, "Europe Undivided," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 21:3 (Summer 1998), pp. 191-207.

3. David S. Yost, "The New NATO and Collective Security," Survival, vol. 40:2 (Summer 1998), pp. 135-160. (See ProQuest)