United States. National War College. Course 4, Syllabus

Title: United States. National War College. Course 4, Syllabus - Region 3

The Middle East is the most troubled region of an increasingly turbulent world. Its people are not at peace with one another, or with themselves and they tend to feel that outsiders do not understand them.

Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr.
A Concise History of the Middle East

The Middle East is an area of crucial importance to the United States for two reasons. First, the United States has long-standing commitments to the security of two key countries, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Second, oil from the region plays a critical role in maintaining the strength of the U.S. economy which, in turn, is an indispensable foundation of the long term military capability necessary for defending vital interests against potential threats.

To serve the national interest, especially needs related to security and economic well-being, U.S. policy makers have pursued two broad goals for the past two decades: assuring adequate supplies of petroleum at reasonable prices and resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although for a time the United States attempted to deal separately with these issues, the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and events thereafter made it evident that there is a clear linkage between the security of petroleum and the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is one reason why the United States has worked persistently for a lasting settlement between Israel and its neighbors.

As the violent events of the past several years have again reminded us, the task of U.S. policy makers is complicated by the instability of many Middle Eastern states. In large part, this situation can be attributed to the social changes caused by the modernization process, especially geographic mobility, urbanization, media exposure and the emergence of a professional middle class. The despair engendered by unfulfilled expectations associated with the quest for modernization is frequently exploited by political leaders who seek to compensate for their own failures and weak legitimacy by deflecting attention to real or imagined internal and external enemies. This contributes to violence within and between states.

Since instability and violence are generated by the intersection of contemporary problems and age-old animosities rooted in history, religion and politics, it is important to become acquainted with some of the major socio-political characteristics of the Middle East that both create opportunities for, and place constraints on, U.S. policy options. Accordingly, our study of the Middle East begins by addressing the area in the context of U.S. national security policy and then moves to a consideration of the role of religion, nationalism, ideology and domestic politics as determinants of the policies of the states in the region. After examining these determinants, we will look at the challenges that confront U.S. policy, first in the Persian Gulf area and then the Arab-Israeli dispute. In the final lesson our thinking returns to the broader questions of future issues, strategic choices and U.S. policy in the Middle Eastern area.

At the completion of our brief study of the Middle East it would be unreasonable to assume that we will arrive at comprehensive solutions for the problems we face. However, we should have enhanced our ability to critically assess policy proposals and to make realistic suggestions with regard to the formulation of U.S. interests, goals, and objectives, and the use of various instruments of statecraft in the area.

Block Objectives.

Understand key political, economic, social, cultural and military trends and developments in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

Analyze U.S. interests and foreign policy goals in this region.

Assess challenges to and opportunities for pursuing these interests and goals.

Evaluate current strategies and policies toward the region and propose future approaches for advancing U.S. interests in this region.

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS IN AFRICA DURING 1995 - 1999

April 1995.- Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi announces that he plans to withdraw Libya from the UN and is preparing to send flights of pilgrims to Mecca despite a 1992 UN ban on flights into and out of Libya.

August 1995.- In Rwanda, the UN suspends the arms embargo it imposed last year.

February 1996.- The CIA reports that Libya is nearing completion of what will be the world's largest chemical weapons plant.

February 1997.- UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appeals for an end to airlifts of arms to former Rwandan soldiers and Hutu militiamen at the Tingi Tingi refugee camp in eastern Zaire.

UN Secretary General Annan calls for an international force to assist refugees in eastern Zaire.

May 1997.- Nigerian peacekeeping troops seize control of the country's airport. Coup leaders abolish the constitution and ban political parties, but promise the restoration of "proper democracy" in the future.

August 1997.- In Kenya, President Daniel arap Moi is accused by the opposition of orchestrating the appearance of insurgency in order to arrest opposition leaders.

October 1997.- In a visit to Libya, South African President Nelson Mandela expresses his indebtedness to Colonel Muammar Qaddafi for supporting the struggle against apartheid.

November 1997.- President Bill Clinton imposes sanctions on Sudan for sponsoring terrorism and human rights abuses.

December 1997.- Thabo Mbeki is elected head of the African National Congress; Mbeki, who was unopposed, will take over from President Nelson Mandela.

April 1998.- The UN World Food Program announces that Ethiopia needs approximately 60,000 tons of food aid for an estimated 800,000 people in the eastern and lowland regions of Tigre and Amhara, which have been devastated by drought and poor harvests.

April 1999.- In Niger, President Ibrahim Bare Mainassara, who seized power in a January 1996 coup, is assassinated by members of his president guard. The army says it has taken control of the government and confers leadership of the country on the National Reconciliation Council.

TOPIC 22: THE MIDDLE EAST AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Monday
7 February 2000
0900-1030 (L)

All politicians make their decisions on the basis of national or political interest and explain them in terms of altruism.

Abba Eban

The purpose of today's topic is to set the stage for our examination of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Before assessing current developments and deciding where we are going and where we would like to go, it is important that we develop an understanding of the past. To achieve this understanding, we will focus on both the general history of the area and recent American involvement therein.

The author of the first reading, Professor Bernard Lewis, addresses the question of general history in a broad, interpretative, and comparative essay that highlights similarities and differences between the cultural histories of the Middle East and those of Europe, America, India, and China. Three key themes emerge as the discussion unfolds: the discontinuity of cultural history, the centrality of Islam as a source of identity and authority, and the major linguistic divisions in the region--Turkish, Persian, and Arabic. Lewis also presents a succinct and thoughtful account of the ebb and flow of empires.

Unlike the Lewis article, the second reading by Bard O'Neill is an overview of American involvement in the area that addresses its evolution, socio-political setting, American interests and goals, challenges for the future, and possible policy orientations. The third reading by Richard Cooper provides an overview of the critical place of the Persian Gulf region in world petroleum supply and the relationship of political stability in the region to availability of such resources. The fourth provides an official statement of American policy in the area.

The lecture will present an analytical overview of current United States involvement in the Middle East. It will address the relationship of the Middle East to the international balance of power, American interests and goals, regional trends that impede the achievement of goals, patterns of conflict in the area, issues that generate conflicts, and U.S. policy responses.

Topic Objectives.

Understand the historical roots of the current political, economic, cultural, and socio-political context in the Middle East

Review current U.S. interests and goals in the region

Examine the issues that generate conflict in the region and that have implications for U.S. policy

Issues for Consideration.

As you read and think about the Lewis essay, what points strike you as most interesting and why? Which ones should be kept in mind as we approach current Middle Eastern problems? Drawing on the historical insights you have gained, what views do you think various Middle Eastern leaders might have regarding the substantial American presence in the Gulf?

If you were asked to identify four or five broad themes that characterize the post World War II American involvement in the Middle East, what would they be? Why did you choose them? What, if any, contradictions can you identify in American policy?

The pace of social change in the Middle East is greater than ever. Awareness of a better life, awakened by education, urbanization and media exposure, has resulted in increased demands on governments that often lack the human and material resources to respond effectively and quickly. What are the implications of this situation for American policy?

Gone are the long lines at gas stations that in the 1970's drove home our dependence on Persian Gulf oil. What are the prospects of another oil crisis? Are we better prepared to deal with such an eventuality today?

Required Readings.

a. Bernard Lewis, "The Map of the Middle East: A Guide for the Perplexed," The American Scholar (winter 1989): 19-38.

b. Bard E. O'Neill, "The United States and the Middle East: Continuity and Change," in U.S. Foreign and Strategic Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, Howard Wiarda, ed. (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1996), pp. 107-127.

c. Richard N. Cooper, "The Gulf Bottleneck: Middle East Stability and World Oil Supply," Harvard International Review, vol. XIX: 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 20-23, 67.

d. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Martin Indyk, "U.S. Policy in the Middle East," Dispatch, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State), July 1999, pp. 9-16.

Supplemental Readings:

1. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1999).

2. Albert C. Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (London: Oxford University Press, 1991).

3. Michael C. Hudson, "To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy toward the Middle East," The Middle East Journal, vol. 50:3 (Summer 1996), pp. 329-343.

TOPIC 23: THE MIDDLE EAST CONTEXT

Tuesday
8 February 2000
0830-1130 (LS)

Wednesday
9 February 2000
0900-1100 (IS)

I will pose a question for us all. Its answer will be bitter. The question is this: Who of us trusts his neighbors? No one. Who of us, after analyzing the circumstances and evaluating matters, would not find that the negatives are much more than the positives.

Address by Moroccan King Hassan II to
Arab Parliamentary Union Conference,
April 4, 1995

The crisis we live in is a vicious struggle between individuals, organized groups and Arab regimes over the answers to fateful questions that deal with who we are: Are we Muslims? Are we Arab nationalists? Or are we all of this, or parts of it?

Hamad al-Turki
Professor, King Saud University

For us, democracy is only a means to an end; it is most definitely not a value.

Sheikh Abd el-Baki
Saharawi, Founder of
the Islamic Salvation Front
(Algeria)

Prior to turning our attention to issues and challenges confronting the United States in the Middle East and what policies the United States might adopt in dealing with them, it is essential that we gain a fuller understanding of some of the major determinants of the foreign policies of the Middle Eastern states.

Although geopolitical balance of power concepts that were discussed in Course I may help us explain and perhaps anticipate shifting coalitions among states in the Middle East, they are inadequate when it comes to explaining the timing and nature of such shifts, short term aberrations, and the details of policies. To provide a more complete explanation, we must examine contextual factors that, in various combinations, account for foreign policy behavior. The key contextual factors include the role of nationalism, ideology, and religion, and the pressures and limitations generated by three domestic problems which plague many Middle Eastern countries: weak national unity, fragile political legitimacy, and economic underdevelopment.

While the three domestic problems are interrelated, the question of fragile legitimacy is especially salient. Leaders who are worried about maintaining power often adopt foreign policies designed to alleviate such worries. Moreover, since many regimes do not have the capability to meet domestic demands, they must demonstrate their effectiveness in the regional and/or international arenas if they are to establish and reinforce their legitimacy. As a consequence, westerners trying to understand relations among Middle Eastern states must be alert to the internal political dynamics that, more often than not, play a key role in determining and shaping foreign policies.

As part of their effort to rally support and address these problems, Middle Eastern leaders have frequently emphasized nationalism and/or religion. Theoretically, radical nationalism and religion confer on people a higher sense of commitment that enables them to transcend parochial loyalties, to make the sacrifices necessary for economic progress, and to support their leaders.

In the Arab world, there are two sometimes contradictory foci of nationalism--loyalty to the nation-state and loyalty to a larger Pan-Arab enterprise. The success of each has been mixed. In fact, when it comes to the quest for Pan-Arab unity, some would argue that friction and divisiveness have, more often than not, been the norm.

Although the emphasis on nationalism is still very much a part of the Middle Eastern political landscape, in recent years it has been supplanted by or merged with religious appeals. The most noteworthy phenomenon has been a resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism of various types within both Sunni and Shiite communities. This resurgence is highly differentiated, ranging from a greater emphasis on social and religious conservatism by regimes friendly to the U.S. at one end of the spectrum to the violent pursuit of an Islamic order by radical political movements at the other.

While many factors explain the emergence of Islamic fundamentalists (revivalists) in specific countries, a major common denominator is the general disappointment of segments of the educated strata with the failures of Arab governments when it comes to meeting economic, social, and political needs. For many whose expectations are unfulfilled, a reemphasis on Islam reveals reasons for their plight (i.e., corrupt political leaders who have strayed from the verities of Islam, and/or the impact of western secular ideas) and provides a renewed sense of purpose, meaning and worth in their lives.

The United States has been the object of sharp denunciations by radical Islamic fundamentalists on two counts. First, it is perceived to be the principal source of secular materialism and western ideas that are deemed morally corrosive; second, it is the major supporter of Israel, which is considered illegitimate. Militant fundamentalists want the U.S. presence in the Middle East drastically reduced; some want it eliminated altogether. At times, this has led to acts of terrorism directed at U.S. citizens. More importantly, militant fundamentalism poses threats to American security and economic interests. The challenge for us is to arrive at dispassionate and informed judgments regarding the nature and extent of the threat and what to do about it.

The first group of readings is intended to acquaint you with the broad contextual determinants of Middle Eastern foreign policies, including the influence of religion. Your seminar instructor may assign students to present reports on core countries represented in the second cluster of country readings. As you read the various articles, do not concern yourself with the details regarding specific people or events. Rather, ask yourself what general characteristics, problems and concerns seem to have the greater implications for domestic political developments and for foreign policy.

Topic Objective.

Develop an appreciation for the broad contextual determinants of Middle eastern foreign and security policies with particular attention to socio-economic factors and to the role of Islam

Issues for Consideration.

How would you explain the basic elements of Islam? What are the major social, economic, and political reasons for contemporary Islamic revivalism? What policy guidelines would you establish for Washington's approach to this matter?

What is your understanding of the various meanings of jihad? What is the implication of the different meanings for political-military assessments of Middle Eastern issues?

What do you think about the compatibility of democracy and Islam? What are the implications for the U.S. policy of enlargement regarding support for the spread of democracy and support for human rights?

How do economics and natural resources (especially the problem of water scarcity) affect Middle Eastern domestic and foreign policies?

What do you believe are the most important social, political and economic changes in Israel in the past several years? What are their implications for the peace process?

If, as Robin Wright suggests, Iran's revolution implodes, what might be the consequences for relations with its neighbors, the West and the United States?

How do you think the following factors influence Turkish foreign policy?

What is your assessment of the long-term stability of two key American friends in the area: Egypt and Saudi Arabia?

Required Readings.

Socio-Economic Factors (all read)

a. The Middle East, 8th ed., (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Inc., 1994), pp. 169-189.

b. Fawaz A. Gerges, "The Decline of Revolutionary Islam in Algeria and Egypt," Survival (spring 1999), 113-125 (Internet version pp.1-10) (See ProQuest)

c. Abbas J. Ali, "Middle East Competitiveness in the 21st Century's Global Market," The Academy of Management Executive (February 1999), pp. 102-108 (Internet version pp. 1-8).

d. Martin Kramer, "The Ancient Sunni-Shiite Feud," The New York Times (August 5, 1987), p. 27.

e. Robert W. Bermudes, "Jihad: Violence or Spiritual Struggle," Middle East International (18 February 1994), p. 19.

f. Bernard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy," The Atlantic Monthly (Feb 1993), pp. 89-99.

g. "Water in the Middle East," The Economist (December 23, 1995-January 5, 1996), pp. 53-55.

Country Reports (Individual student assignments)

h. Peter David, "After Zionism, A Survey of Israel," The Economist, April 25, 1998, pp. 3-17.

i. Robin Wright, "Dateline Tehran: A Revolution Implodes," Foreign Policy, no. 103 (Summer 1996), pp. 161-174.

j. Alain Gresh, "The Most Obscure Dictatorship," Middle East Report (November-December 1995), pp. 1-8.

k. Richard Dowden, "The Elusive Golden Apple, A Survey of Turkey," The Economist (June 8, 1996), pp. 3-8, 11-18.

l. Eberhard Kienle, "More Than a Response to Islamism: The Political Deliberalization of Egypt in the 1990s," The Middle East Journal (Spring 1998), pp. 219-235.

Supplemental Readings.

1 . Roy R. Anderson, et. al., Politics and Change in the Middle East, Fifth edition (Upper Saddle river, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998).

2. Colbert C. Held, Middle East Patterns (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

3. "Islam and the West, A Survey of Islam," The Economist, August 6, 1994, pp. 3-15.

4. John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

5. Robin Wright, In the Name of God (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989).

6. Alan Richards, "Economic Roots of Instability in the Middle East," Middle East Policy (September 1995), pp. 175-187.

7. Ira M. Lapidus, "Beyond the Unipolar Moment: A Sober Survey of the Islamic World," Orbis, vol. 40:3 (Summer 1996), pp. 391-404.

TOPIC 24: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: THE PERSIAN GULF/SOUTHWEST ASIA

Friday
11 February 2000
0830-1000 (IS)

If the world were a flat circle and one were looking for its center, a good argument could be made that it would lie in the Gulf--Arab or Persian--depending on your perspective. Nowhere in the world today is there such a convergence of global interests. No area is quite as central to the continued economic health and stability of the world.

David D. Newsom
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Department of State, April 11, 1980

Our ties with the rest of the world are based upon interest. There are no sentiments. And everyone knows that sentiments do not exist; there are common interests between countries. Common interests link countries together.

Speech of His Royal Majesty,
Fahd Ibn Abdel Azziz,
King of Saudi Arabia, July 26, 1988It is paradoxical that while the United States lacks a clear policy and strategy in other parts of the world, it maintains a well designed policy in the Arab [Persian] Gulf. This policy is known as "dual containment..." It can be said that the United States considers Iraq and Iran as a real threat to vital U.S. interests in the Arab Gulf [that] must be contained through political isolation, trade embargo and, if necessary, armed confrontation.

Zafir Nazim Salman, Al-Jumhuriyah
(Baghdad), July 9, 1995

The importance of the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia for American foreign and national security policy was established clearly by the Arab oil embargo and production cutbacks of 1973 and accentuated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war. As a result of these events, substantial American human and material resources were devoted to security problems in the Gulf. The creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and its evolution into the Central Command, the reflagging operations in 1987-1988, the 1991 war in the Gulf, and periodic flare-ups and troop deployments since the war reflect this reality.

This topic assesses three central dimensions of American security policy in the Persian Gulf: First, the reasons for emphasizing the security of petroleum from the Gulf; second, threats to the acquisition of petroleum; and third, how to assure the security of the Gulf in the coming years.

The readings are designed to expose you to various facets of the security problem and different views on how to address it. As you contemplate what needs to be done, you may wish to think about continuity and change (i.e., enduring issues that pre-dated the Gulf War and new issues that have surfaced). In particular, ask yourselves what American interests are vital or major, what goals we should pursue, what the obstacles are to achieving the goals, what instruments we should use, and what our strategy should be.

Topic Objectives.

Assess the central dimensions of U.S. security policy in the Persian Gulf region

Appreciate the central role in American interests of access to petroleum from the Gulf

Examine the threats to petroleum access, WMD proliferation risks, and dangers of inter-regional conflict

Issues for Consideration.

What do you think should be the essential elements of a strategy conducive to Persian Gulf security? What kinds of threats should it address?

How should the United States respond to those Arabs who ask for support for democratization? Would such support raise problems with respect to the goal of regional stability? How do the contextual factors you studied in the previous topics affect what is plausible and likely to be effective?

If you were a political advisor to leaders of the Persian Gulf oil-producing states, what stance would you recommend with regard to American requests for military facilities to support potential crisis deployments?

Many observers believe that Iran is very important with respect to long-term American national security interests in the Persian Gulf. What guidelines would you establish for dealing with Iran? What opportunities are presented by Iran's enormous needs for economic development? How should the interests of the Arab states be accommodated? What Iranian behavior would you consider necessary before the United States adopts a policy of "critical dialogue" with Iran? What stance should the United States take towards Iranian dissident groups?

Following the Gulf War the United States sold large amounts of military hardware to the Persian Gulf states. What is your assessment of the wisdom of arms sales like these and the objective of supporting arms control in the region?

Some Iraqi opposition leaders like Mohammad Bakr al-Hakim, head of the Iran-based Shiite organization, the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, have called for more active support for insurgents inside Iraq. They have challenged the view that a successful insurrection would lead to the dismemberment of Iraq--something that all countries in the area wish to avoid. What policy actions, if any, would you recommend the United States take with respect to insurrection in Iraq?

The role of Turkey as a "crossroads" of tensions where European, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern interests and rivalries intersect has led some to believe that Ankara can play a more active part in the region. What are the opportunities and limits of such activism and what are the implications for U.S. interests?

Required Readings.

a. Zalmay Khalilzad, "The United States and the Persian Gulf: Preventing Regional Hegemony," Survival , vol. 37:2 (Summer 1995), pp. 95-120. (See Pro Quest)

b. Joseph A. Kechichian, "Trends in Saudi National Security," The Middle East Journal (Spring 1999), pp. 232-253.

c. Graham E. Fuller, "Iran and Iraq: The Battleground of Cultures," The Center of the Universe: The Geopolitics of Iran (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 34-51.

d. Sharam Chubin and Jerrold D. Green, "Engaging Iran: A US Strategy," Survival, vol. 40:3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 53-69. (Internet version, pp. 1-11)

e. "The Revolution's Evolution," World Press Review, October 1999, Volume 46, Number 10, pp. 14-16.

f. Peter Mansfield, "Why the Arabs Want to Keep Iraq Intact," Middle East International, October 9, 1992, pp. 16-17.

Supplemental Reading.

1. F. Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994).

2. George Lenczowski, "Iran: The Big Debate," Middle East Policy, vol. 3 (1994), pp. 52-62

3. Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Changing Military Balance in the Gulf," Middle East Policy (June 1998), pp. 35-44.

TOPIC 25: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Friday
11 February 2000
1015-1130 (L)

Monday
14 February 2000
0830-1130 (LS)

War and peace is not like a switch you can turn on and off. Arabs and Zionists have been in conflict for maybe 100 years of mutual hatred. We'll need many, many years to settle our feelings.

General Abdulrazak Dardari
Chief of Operations
of the Syrian Army in 1973.

Approximately 40 percent of Israel's youth hate Arabs. Of this number, approximately 60 percent feel a strong desire to take revenge against Arabs.

Carmel Institute for Social Studies, Israel 1997

"Dwell on the past and you'll lose an eye; forget the past and you'll lose both eyes." Nowhere is this ancient Russian proverb more applicable than in the Middle East where recollections of past injustices and glories have played a key part in galvanizing emotions and stimulating violence. Like other conflicts in the area, the one between Israel and its Arab neighbors cannot be understood without reference to historical roots that continue to influence the perceptions of both parties in a profound way. Indeed, any effort to understand contemporary issues without an appreciation of the past would be fruitless.

The past few years have been tumultuous for Arabs and Israelis. Confident assertions about the irreversibility of the peace process were replaced in many quarters by growing doubts, owing to major terrorist bombings in Israel, a bloody border confrontation in southern Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah,and discontent in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The cautious optimism of the Arabs about the1999 election of Ehud Barak as Prime Minister in Israel has, for the moment at least, renewed hopes for an eventual Arab-Israeli settlement.

To avoid future nightmares, a host of thorny issues must be settled. Israel and the Palestine National Authority must go beyond periodic interim agreements and resolve fundamental long term questions These include how much land will be returned to Palestinian political control, what the status of Jerusalem will be, how the Palestinian refugees of 1948 and 1967 will be accommodated, what will happen to Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, who will provide security and how, and whether the Israelis will accept the achievement of the PLO's most important goal, the creation of a state.

Accords with Syria and Lebanon will have to address final borders, security arrangements, and water sharing. In the case of Syria and the Golan Heights, these matters, as well as the larger issue of defining the nexus between the Syrian demand for a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights and Israel's demand for a full normalization of relations with Syria, will be complicated by domestic political considerations.

As you ponder these issues and what American policy should be, it is important to keep in mind the larger context discussed in previous topics. On the Israeli side remember the absolute centrality of physical security that is rooted in the historical persecution of Jews, as well as the demographic and geographic disparities compared to the Arabs. On the Arab side, it is important to note that security is conceptualized as safeguarding the ruling regime. Since (as we have seen in the first two topics) there are multiple internal and external threats to the regimes, their ability to make grand gestures and concessions to Israel tends to be circumscribed. The point is that both sides bring different fears and concerns to the negotiating table. A failure to take them into account could doom the peace process at some point, especially since there are dedicated and frequently violent opponents of the peace process on both sides who are searching for opportunities to exploit in order to foster breakdowns in that process.

If the past reaction to interim agreements is prelude, we should fully expect any progress in the peace negotiations to lead to more violence in the short term, as secular and Islamic Palestinian rejectionists are joined by religious extremists on the Israeli side in a tacit mutual quest to derail and ultimately eviscerate the Oslo process.

Topic Objectives.

Understand the historical roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict

Analyze the key divisive issues in the current conflict

Assess the possible effects of progress, immobilism, or reversal in the Arab-Israeli peace process for U.S. policy in the region

Issues for Consideration.

How would you summarize the evolution of Israeli-American relations?

What is your assessment of the most important issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict? How does the Turkish factor affect the Arab-Israeli equation?

In what ways do inter-Arab relationships and the increasingly acrimonious divisions in Israel complicate the peace process?

What are the threats to peace inherent in stalemate or regression of the peace process? What are the possible effects on future political alignments and overall US policy in the area?

What do you believe should be the basic components of a lasting settlement? Which ones would you anticipate being resisted by domestic political forces?

Required Readings.

a. Samuel W. Lewis, "The United States and Israel: The Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance," The Middle East Journal (Summer 1999), pp. 365-378.

b. Moshe Ma'oz, "From Conflict to Peace? Israel's Relations with Syria and the Palestinians," The Middle East Journal (Summer 1999), pp. 393-416.

c. Regional Aspects of a Comprehensive Arab-Israeli Peace Settlement: Next Steps to Preserve and Promote the Peace Process, Baker Institute Study No. 2 (Houston: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 1996), 7 pages.

d. Scott Peterson, "Entangled in S. Lebanon, Israel Debates Its Vietnam," The Christian Science Monitor, October 1, 1997, p. 1.

e. E.V. Kontorovich, "Time to Cut Aid to Israel," The Wall Street Journal, August 8, 1996, p. A10.

Issue Areas (Individual student assignments)

f. Aluf Ben, "A Rare Window of Opportunity," Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), September 1999 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Near East South Asia (FBIS-NESA), September 28, 1999 (entry date), 5pp.

g. Khalil Shikaki, "Peace Now or Hamas Later," Foreign Affairs, vol. 77:4 (July/August 1998), pp. 29-43. (Internet version, pp. 1-8)

h. Raymond A. Hinnebush, "Does Syria Want Peace? Syrian Policy in the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations, Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XXV: 5 (Autumn 1996), pp. 42-57.

i. Chad F. Emmett, "The Status Quo Solution for Jerusalem," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XXVI: 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 89-97.

j. Alain Gresh, "Turkish-Israeli-Syrian Relations and Their Impact on the Middle East," The Middle East Journal, vol. 52:2(Spring 1998), pp. 188-203. (Internet version, pp. 1-11)

Supplemental Readings.

1. The Middle East, 8th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1994), pp. 16-60.

2. Ilana Kass and Bard E. O'Neill, The Deadly Embrace (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996).

3. Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998).

4. Robert O. Freedman, ed., The Intifada (Miami: Florida International Press, 1991).

5. The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, The West Bank and Gaza: Israel's Options for Peace (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1989).

TOPIC 26: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MIDDLE EAST: STRATEGY TOWARD THE FUTURE

Tuesday
15 February 2000
0900-1100 (IS)

When we have a calamity we must attribute it to an enemy from the outside or resolve it through a friend from the outside.

Jarallah Umar al-Kuhali
Minister of Culture
Yemen Arab Republic
Al-Dustur (Amman),
January 22, 1994

While the quote above is about Yemen, it pertains to the Arab world in general. It is surely relevant to the U.S. role in the region since World War II. The United States has been blamed for much that has gone wrong, sometimes fairly, but often unfairly. Be that as it may, as a superpower Washington has been relied on by many in the area to help resolve their disputes.

Given its mobilized power and its vital interests in the Middle East, the United States will remain the major and most active outsider for the foreseeable future. For the Class of 2000, this means that many of you will have to wrestle with Middle Eastern problems when you return to your services and agencies. Accordingly, it is important to take stock of where we are now and how we should approach the future.

The preceding coverage of contextual factors and contemporary issues has provided a solid grounding for understanding current American policy and the numerous complex factors that impinge on it. Now we must turn our attention to the future in the hope of anticipating new developments and adapting our strategic thinking to such factors. Here, of course, we return to those enduring questions that statesmen and strategists have always asked and pose them again with respect to the next ten years or so.

Topic Objectives

Evaluate current U.S. strategy toward the Middle East

Develop a future-oriented American security strategy for the region

Issues for Consideration:

Assume you are part of a task force appointed by the President's National Security Advisor that is charged with crafting the general features of American grand strategy in the Middle East for the next ten years in light of international and regional changes. Drawing on the understanding of the Middle East that you have developed thus far, as well as today's readings, how would you answer the following questions posed by the White House?

What will be the most salient U.S. interests in the Middle East? Which will be vital, major, peripheral? What should U.S. long-term goals be?

What will be the possible opportunities and threats to vital and major interests?

What aims should the United States pursue vis-�-vis particular issues or countries? Among other things, what should the objectives be with respect to the various manifestations of Islam, socio-economic modernization, political development, arms proliferation, terrorism and the previously considered Persian Gulf and Arab-Israeli conflict issues?

Which instruments of statecraft should be used? In what new ways, given the technological revolution or so-called "third wave?" In a world of complex interdependence, what should the role of other major powers, especially American friends and allies be? Other powers?

Required Readings (all):

a. R.K. Ramazani, "The Emerging Arab-Iranian Rapprochement," Middle East Policy, vol. 6:1 (June 1998), pp. 45-62. (Internet version, pp. 1-12)

b. Richard W. Murphy and Gregory Gause III, "Democracy and U.S. Policy in the Muslim Middle East," Middle East Policy, vol. 5:1 (January 1997), pp. 58-67.

Issue Areas (Individual Student Assignments)

c. Masoud Kazemzadeh, "Thinking the Unthinkable: Solving the Problem of Saddam Hussein for Good," Middle East Policy, vol. 6:1 (June 1998), pp. 73-86. (Internet version, pp. 1-10)

d. Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack, and Mathew Waxman, "Coercing Saddam Hussein: Lessons from the Past," Survival, vol. 40:3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 127-151. (Internet version, pp. 1-17)

e. Geoffrey Aronson, "Hidden Agenda: U.S. -Israeli Relations and the Nuclear Question," The Middle East Journal, vol. 46:4 (Autumn 1992), pp. 615-630.

f. Simon Serfaty, "Bridging the Gulf Across the Atlantic: Europe and the United States in the Persian Gulf," The Middle East Journal, vol. 52:3 (Summer 1998), pp. 337-350. (Internet version, pp. 1-10)

g. W. Seth Carus, "Iran as a Military Threat," Strategic Forum, National Defense University (May 1997), 4 pages.

h. Al J. Venter, "New-Era Threat: Iraq's Biological Weapons," Middle East Policy (June 1999), pp. 104-117.